It is equally established that a speaking order means an order that speaks for itself and an order can only speak through the reasons rendered in support thereof. In fact provision of reasons in support of an order or a decision is so well entrenched in modern day jurisprudence that it will not be wrong to label reasons as the un-conspicuous third pillar of natural justice, the other two being audi alteram partem and nemo judex in causa sua. It is only when the decisions and orders reveal a rational nexus between the facts considered and the conclusions drawn that such opinions can be held to be just and reasonable and not otherwise.
While no particular form of recording or provision of reasons is required, it suffices if the adjudicating authority records reasons which are proper, relevant, germane, intelligible and proportionate.
It may be added here that the provision of reasons in an order or a decision is an essential attribute thereof and the chain between conclusion and fact in a decision is broken if there are no reasons provided to support the conclusion.
The term ‘reasons’ has not been defined in any statutory law but in common parlance or in terms of reasonable prudence, the presence of reasons is what confirms whether an order or a decision is reasonable and confirms to the requirement of reasonableness. In order to be reasonable there should be an umbilical link between the conclusions and the material on which such conclusions are based. The condition to give reasons introduces clarity and excludes arbitrariness. A reasoned order may be said to be an absolutely desirable condition associated with judicial dispensation. Reasons substitute subjectivity with objectivity and failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice.
The affected party can know why a decision has gone against him. The mysterious face of a sphinx is inconsistent with a judicial or quasi-judicial exercise. Right to reasons is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system and is indicative of application of mind by the decision maker.
While Articles 4, 9 and 10-A of the Constitution are enough to provide a foothold to the concept of provision of reasons in judicial, quasi-judicial and even administrative orders and decisions, Article 14 of the Constitution which speaks about the right to dignity may also be compromised if reasons are not forthcoming in a decision or an order. Article 14 of the Constitution provides for protection of dignity and in case an order or a decision is passed without reasons then the said Article may also be invoked to attack such an order or a decision on the basis that the order or decision so passed treats and addresses a living person as an object or a nonliving thing. Therefore, and arguably, the right to reasons may also be premised as a concomitant right of the right to dignity. It is indeed arbitrary and condescending to have a persons’ status redefined without an adequate explanation of reasons for such change.
However, there is another side to the coin and commentators and jurists have also stated that there were certain factors that militated against the giving of reasons in that it could place an undue burden on the decision maker, demand the articulation of inexpressible value judgments and offer an invitation to the litigious to comb reasons for grounds of challenge. But even such commentators have acknowledged and admitted that modern day jurisprudence is geared towards openness and that there is a perceptible and conspicuous trend towards greater transparency in decision making. The giving of reasons is widely regarded as one of the cardinal principles of good administration in that it encourages a careful examination of relevant issues, the elimination of extraneous considerations and consistency in decision making. Likewise, the giving of reasons may protect the decision maker from unjustified challenges, because those adversely affected are more likely to accept a decision if they know why it has been taken. To use a cliché, ‘justice will not be done if it is not apparent to the parties why one has won and the other has lost.’ Fairness surely requires that the losing party should be left in no doubt why it has lost. A reasoned decision is also necessary to enable the person prejudicially affected to know whether a ground of appeal or review is available to him. If those entitled to be heard have no right to know how a decision has been reached, the legally conferred opportunity of hearing may well go down as an empty ritual. Furthermore, without reasons, it is extremely difficult to detect errors!
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