Held, even in case some of the executants of power of attorney had expired during the pendency of the proceedings, authorization on behalf of the remaining executants, who still survived, would continue to remain in force.P L D 2005 Karachi 684
(a) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)---
----S. 15(2)(vi), (3)(4)---Sindh Cultural Haritage (Preservation) Act (XII of 1994), Ss.6, 10 & 19---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition---Ejectment of tenants was sought on the sole ground of demolition and reconstruction of property which was protected and notified under the Sindh Cultural Heritage (Preservation) Act, 1994---Landlord of the property (Wakt), before filing ejectment applications had obtained permission for demolition and reconstruction plan from the competent Authority, which was the requirement of S.15(2)(vi) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979---Tenants also fully enjoyed the protection of S. 15(3)(4), the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979---Jurisdiction of Rent Controller would not be barred in respect of the premises declared as protected heritage by virtue of S. 19, Sindh Cultural Heritage (Preservation) Act, 1994---Demolition of building and reconstruction was only possible when the dispute between the owner/landlord and the concerned Authority under Sindh Cultural Heritage (Preservation) Act, 1994 was resolved in terms of the said Act and in accordance with law and in the given situation passing of ejectment order in favour of landlord, subject to the condition of its executability against the tenants only after grant of no objection/permission for demolition/reconstruction by the Committee under the Sindh Cultural Heritage (Preservation) Act, 1994, was balanced and equitable course followed by the lower forums, which called for no interference from the High Court in exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction under Art. 199 of the Constitution---Principles.
Rashid Brothers, Faisalabad v. Ch. Muhammad Anwar Khan and another 1981 SCMR 782; Dawood Adam Kabari v. Mst. Khatija Bai 1984 CLC 1713; Hassan and others v Fancy Foundation PLD 1975 SC 1 and Muhammad Yousuf and another v. Muhammad Sarfraz Cheema, Additional District Judge and others PLD 1987 SC 20 ref.
(b) Power of attorney---
----Held, even in case some of the executants of power of attorney had expired during the pendency of the proceedings, authorization on behalf of the remaining executants, who still survived, would continue to remain in force.
(c) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)---
----S. 15(4)---Ejectment on ground of demolition and reconstruction of building---Held, it was not a condition imposed by statute upon the landlord that for the purpose of raising new construction he had to keep in mind the provision for accommodating the existing tenant or to design the new construction of the building in a way so as to suit the requirement of the tenant(s).
(d) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---
----Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---Grant of relief under Art.199 of the Constitution is purely discretionary in nature and in case when the concurrent findings of the two. Courts were based on proper appreciation of evidence, there would be no justification to interfere in the impugned orders.
Tassawar Hussain Rizvi for Petitioners (in Constitutional Petition No.213 of 2003).
Khawaja Samiul Hassan, for Petitioners (in Constitutional Petitions Nos.436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 562 of 2003 and 895 to 897 of 2003).
K.A. Wahab for Petitioner (in Constitutional Petition No.585 of 2003).
Muhammad Younus for Petitioner (in Constitutional Petition No.383 of 2003).
Ghulam Abbas Peshori for Petitioner (in Constitutional Petition No.640 of 2003).
Iftikhar Jawaid Qazi for Petitioner (in Constitutional Petition No.431 of 2003).
Syed Ehsan Raza for Respondent No.1 ((in all the Constitutional Petitions).
Dates of hearing: 25th April and 2nd May, 2005.
JAWAID ARSHAD MIRZA through Legal Representatives VS TRUSTEES OF HAJI SIR ABDULLAH HAROON
P L D 2005 Karachi 684
Before Anwar Zaheer Jamali, J
JAWAID ARSHAD MIRZA through Legal Representatives---Petitioner
Versus
TRUSTEES OF HAJI SIR ABDULLAH HAROON and others---Respondents
Constitutional Petitions Nos.213, 383, 431,436 to 444, 562, 585, 640 and 895 to 897 of 2003, decided on 24/06/2005.
JUDGMENT
ANWAR ZAHEER JAMALI, J.---By this common judgment I intend to dispose of above numbered eighteen Constitutional Petitions, relating to different tenements in the buildings bearing Nos. 42 SB-6, 28 SB-6 and 53 SB-4, all owned by respondent Haji Sir Abdullah Haroon Wakf, as the same arise out of similar set of facts and contain common questions of law for consideration.
2. The relevant facts forming background of this litigation are that the respondent, Haji Sir Abdullah Haroon Wakf (hereinafter referred as respondent No. 1), is owner of building constructed over plots No.42 SB-6, 28 SB-6 and 53 SB-4, Raja Ghazanfar Ali Road, Karachi, which consists of several residential and commercial tenements (herein after referred to as rented premises), in possession of different petitioners, at different rates of rent. In respect of these rented premises, respondent No.1 filed separate ejectment applications against each tenant/petitioner seeking their ejectment on the sole ground of demolition and reconstruction of the said properties. It was stated in the application that such demolition and reconstruction of new building, for which respondent No. I have permission and approved plan from the competent authority, will provide better facilities in the building and it will also improve the general outlook of the area.
3. The petitioners in their respective written objections denied the claim of the respondent No. 1, being not bona fide; claimed themselves to be old tenants in the building and some of them also pleaded payment of Pagri however, they did not dispute the ownership/landlordship of respondent No.1 and availability of permission for reconstruction and approved building plans with them. In some of the rent cases maintainability of ejectment applications was also challenged as the persons who had filed the ejectment application was not duly authorized to do so on behalf of the respondent No. 1.
4. After usual proceedings in all the rent cases, in rent cases Nos.842 of 1992 and 167 of 1995, which are now subject-matter of Constitutional Petition No.213 of 2003 and 640 of 2003 respectively, the ejectment applications of respondent No.1 were dismissed by the Rent Controller with the observations that the approved building plan produced by respondent No.1 had expired during the pendency of rent case and further the disputed buildings have been declared as notified property under the Sindh Cultural Heritage (Preservation) Act, 1994. However, in Rent Appeals Nos. 1269 of 2001 and 116 of 2002, relating to these two rent cases, such orders of the Rent Controller were set aside by impugned judgments dated 18-11-2002/1-4-2003, with the condition that the ejectment order passed by the Appellate Court in favour of respondent No.1 will not be executable against the petitioner until necessary permission/no objection for demolition/reconstruction of the disputed building is obtained by respondent No.1 under the Sindh Cultural Heritage (Preservation) Act, 1994, (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1994) from the competent authority. In all the other rent cases i.e. Rent Case Nos. 804, 805, 810, 811, 813, 814, 815, 819, 821 to 827 and 847 all of 1992, the ejectment applications filed by respondent No.1 were allowed by the Rent Controller on the ground of reconstruction, through various orders passed in these cases. The appeals preferred by the petitioners against such ejectment orders were also dismissed with similar condition as contained in the ejectment order passed by the Appellate Court in Rent Appeal No.1269 of 2001, that the tenants shall not be evicted from the rented premises till permission is obtained by the landlord from the Authorities concerned for reconstruction of the building under the provisions of Sindh Cultural Heritage Protection Act, 1994. It is against such identical orders of ejectment passed by the learned Rent Controller and the Appellate Court of Additional District Judge (South) Karachi, in various rent appeals, that these petitions have been preferred by the petitioners.
5. Mr. S. Tasawar Hussain Rizvi, learned counsel for the petitioner in Constitutional Petition No.213 of 2003, in his arguments, contended that in view of the promulgation of Sindh Cultural Heritage (Preservation) Act, 1994, and declaration of the disputed property as protected heritage in terms of section 6 of the Act, vide Notification published by the Government of Sindh, the rented premises in possession of the petitioners could not be vacated from them on the ground of demolition and reconstruction. In such circumstances, even passing of conditional ejectment order by the Appellate Court is not justified. Learned counsel, however, did not dispute that the requirement of section 15(2)(vi) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, for seeking eviction of the tenant on the ground of re-construction were fulfilled by respondent No.1 by production of Approved Building Plans and permission for reconstruction from the competent authority.
6. Mr. Khawaja Samiul Hassan, Advocate representing petitioners in other Constitutional petitions Nos. 436 to 444, 562 and 895 to 897 of 2003, also strongly urged the same ground. He also made reference to section 19 of the Sindh Cultural Heritage (Preservation) Act, 1994, and contended that since the Act of 1994 has overriding effect on any other law contrary to it, therefore, the ejectment applications filed by the respondent No.1 for seeking ejectment of petitioners from the rented premises situated in the disputed buildings, which have been declared as protected heritage, were not maintainable. Learned counsel, however, did not dispute that there is no dispute as regards the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties since the time of commencement of ejectment proceeding till this date, as stated by the petitioners in their respective written objections and that at the time of filing of ejectment applications in the year 1992 the Sindh Cultural Heritage (Preservation) Act, 1994, was not even promulgated. The learned counsel also did not dispute about the availability of valid approved building plans and permission of reconstruction with the respondent No.1 in respect of the disputed properties at the time of filing of ejectment applications.
7. Mr. Abdul Razzak, Advocate, holding brief for Mr. K.A. Wahab, Advocate for the petitioner in C.P. No.585 of 2003, and Mr. Muhammad Younus, Advocate in C.P. No.383 of 2003, adopted the arguments of M/s. Tassawar Hussian Rizvi and Khawaja Samiul Hassan, Advocates. Mr. Ghulam Abbas Peshori, Advocate for petitioner in C.P. No.640 of 2003 in addition to adopting the arguments of M/s. Tassawar Hussain Rizvi and Khawaja Samiul Hassan, Advocates, further contended that the ejectment applications filed on behalf of respondent No.1 were not maintainable in law as the person, who has filed the ejectment applications, was not holding any valid authority on behalf of Sir Haji Abdullah Haroon Wakf. He also contended that in the approved building plans no provision for accommodating the tenant (his client) in the newly constructed building was provided by the landlord to frustrate the spirit of section 15(4) of the Ordinance of 1979. Thus, without providing specific provision in this regard to safeguard the interest of the petitioner/tenant, ejectment application should not have been allowed by the Rent Controller and the Appellate Court. Mr. Iftikhar Jawaid Qazi, Advocate for petitioner in C.P. No.431 of 2003 also advanced his arguments in line to the submissions of other learned counsel, as noted above.
8. In reply, Mr. Ehsan Raza, learned counsel for respondent No.1 in all these petitions contended that the whole action for declaring the disputed properties as protected heritage, was taken by the concerned authorities without any notice or opportunity of hearing to respondent No. 1, during the pendency of ejectment applications before the Rent Controller, however, as soon as respondent No.1 came to know about this development they have immediately initiated proceedings in terms of sections 6(2) and 10(3) of the Sindh Cultural Heritage (Preservation) Act, 1994, which proceedings are still sub judice before the concerned committee for determining the status of the disputed property or its deletion from the notified list of protected heritage. Making reference to the provisions of section 15(2)(vi) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, learned counsel contented that the only requirement of law for seeking ejectment of tenant by the landlord on the ground of reconstruction is the approved building plans and permission for reconstruction from the competent authority, and in such cases even the question of examining the bona fide of the landlord is not involved. Further by virtue of section 15(3) of the Ordinance the rights of the tenant ejected on the ground of reconstruction are fully protected in case the owner/landlord of the property fails to demolish the building within six months of the delivery of possession or he fails to raise construction within two years thereafter. In the present case, not only such protection is fully available to the petitioners and they will also be entitled for restoration of possession after reconstruction as provided under section 15(4) of the Ordinance of 1979, but in addition to it, while ordering ejectment, through impugned orders, the Appellate Court has further safeguarded their interest by imposing additional condition upon the respondent No.1 that they will not be entitled to execute the impugned ejectment orders against the petitioners, unless necessary permission/no objection was obtained by them under the Sindh Cultural Heritage (Preservation) Act, 1994 for reconstruction of the building. Thus in all fairness these petitions being devoid of any legal cause are liable to be dismissed. To fortify his submissions learned counsel placed reliance on following cases:--
(a) Rashid Brothers, Faisalabad v. Ch. Muhammad Anwar Khan and another (1981 SCMR 782).
(b) Dawood Adam Kabari v. Mst. Khatija Bai (1984 CLC 1713).
(c) Hassan and others v Fancy Foundation (PLD 1975 SC 1).
(d) Muhammad Yousuf and another v. Muhammad Sarfraz Cheema, Additional District Judge and others (PLD 1987 SC 20).
In the case of Rashid. Brothers (supra), it was held that renewal of sanction expired during the pendency of ejectment proceedings would not affect the maintainability or the merits of ejectment application as it would be only a formality. In the case of Dawood Adam Kabari (supra), ejectment of tenant on the ground of reconstruction, of property was allowed subject to the condition of eviction of premises by other tenants of the same building as reconstruction was not possible without eviction of all the tenants. In the case of Hassan and others (supra), while dealing with a case relating to ejectment of tenant on the ground of reconstruction, it was held that it is well-settled principle in general, when substantive law is altered during the pendency of an action, the rights of the parties are decided according to law as it existed when the, action was begun unless the new statute shows that clear intention to vary such rights. In the case Muhammad Yousaf (supra), while dealing with a civil petition, arising out of ejectment proceedings filed against the tenant on the ground of reconstruction, it was held by the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan that the question whether property was required for the purpose of reconstruction by the landlord reasonably and in good faith in terms of the Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI) of 1959 section 13(2)(iv) was one of fact and concurrent findings are not open to question in writ jurisdiction.
9. I have carefully considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material placed on record. Before I proceed to examine above-noted contentions of the learned counsel with reference to the various provisions of Sindh Cultural Heritage (Preservation) Act, 1994, and the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance of 1979, it will be advantageous to reproduce hereunder the relevant provisions of both the enactments which read as under:---
Section 6 of the Act of 1994.
6. Declaration of protected heritage.--(1) Government may, by notification in the official Gazette on the recommendation of Committee or otherwise declare any premises of historical, cultural or architectural value to be protected heritage within the meaning of this Act.
(2) A copy of every notification published under subsection (1) shall be published in newspapers and fixed up in a conspicuous place on or near such premises/object together with an intimation that any objections to the issue of the notification received by Government within one month from the date of the notification shall betaken into consideration.
(3) On the expiry of the said period of one month, Government after considering the objection, if any, may confirm or withdraw the notification.
(4) A notification under this section shall, unless and until it is withdrawn, be conclusive evidence of the fact that the premises or objects to which it relates is a protected heritage within the meaning of this Act.
Section 10 of the Act of 1994
(10) (1) If it is apprehended that any person intends to destroy, remove, alter, deface or imperal the protected heritage or to build on or near the site thereof in contravention of the terms of an agreement for its preservation under section 8, the Committee may make an order prohibiting any such contravention.
(2) If an owner or other who is bound by an agreement for the preservation or maintenance of a protected heritage under section 8 refuses to do any act which is in the opinion of the Committee is necessary to such preservation for maintenance, or neglects to do any such act within such reasonable time as may be fixed by the Committee may authorize any person to do any such act, and the expense of doing any such act or such portion of the expense as the owner may liable to pay under the agreement may be recovered from the owner as if it were an arrear of land-revenue.
(3) A person aggrieved by an order under this section may appeal to Government which may cancel or modify it, and its decision shall be final.
Section 19 of the Act of 1994
19. Overriding effect.--The provision of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force.
Section 15 of the Ordinance of 1979
15. Application to Controller.---(1) Where a landlord seeks to evict the tenant otherwise than in according with section 14, he shall make such application to the Controller.
(2) The Controller shall, make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the premises within such period as may be specified in the order, if he is satisfied that---
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi) the premises. is required by the landlord for reconstruction or erection of a new building at the site and the landlord has obtained necessary sanction for such reconstruction or erection from the authority competent under any law for the time being in force to give such sanction;
(vii)
(3) Where the landlord who has obtained the possession of the premises for the purpose of reconstruction of the building or erection of a new building, shall demolish the existing building within six moths of taking over of the possession of the premises or, as the case may be, commence the erection of the new building within two years of the taking over of the possession of the premises, and in case the landlord fails to demolish the building as aforesaid, the tenant shall be entitled to be put into possession of the premises (and for the purpose he may apply to the Controller for an order in that behalf.).
(4) Where the landlord constructs the building as aforesaid the tenant who was evicted from the old building may, before the completion of new building and its occupation by another person, apply to the Controller for an order directing that he be put in possession of such area in the new building as does not exceed the area of the old building of which he was in occupation and the Controller shall make an order accordingly in respect of the area applied for or such smaller area, as considering the location and type of the new building and the needs of the tenant, he deems just and no payment of rent to be determined by him on the basis of rent of similar accommodation in the locality.
10. A bare reading of the three sections from the Act of 1994, as reproduced above, would show that the Government of Sindh on the recommendation of the Committee constituted under section 3 of the Act of 1994, or otherwise can declare any premises as protected heritage within the meaning of section 2(vi) of the Act. Upon publication of such Notification objections can be filed within one month, and on filing of objections the Government could either confirm or withdraw the Notification. However, in case of non-withdrawal of Notification, it shall be considered as conclusive evidence of the fact that the property is protected heritage within the meaning of the Act. Section 10 of the Act deals with the situation where any person intends to destroy, remove, alter, deface or imperil the protected heritage or to build on or near the site thereof construction in contravention of the terms of the agreement. In such situation for preservation of protected heritage within the meaning of section 8, the Government may authorize any person to do any such act to maintain and preserve the protected heritage or such portion of it at the expense of the owner and in case such expense are incurred by the Committee it shall be recovered as arrears of land-revenue. While subsection (3) to section 10 gives right of appeal to a person against any decision taken in preceding subsections of section 10. Further, section 19 of the Act of 1994 provides that the provision of this Act shall have overriding effect not withstanding any thing to the contrary contained in any other law in force at the relevant time.
11. On the other hand, the provisions of section 15(2)(vi) read with subsection (3) of the Ordinance of 1979, provide for the conditions to be fulfilled by the landlord/owner of the property for seeking eviction of his tenant on the ground of reconstruction and erection of the building and the consequences in case such ejectment order has been obtained on the ground of reconstruction but the property is not demolished or the construction is not commenced by the landlord within the stipulated period. Subsection (4) to section 15 further confers right to the tenant to be inducted in the newly constructed building in terms thereof.
12. In all these petitions, there is no denial of the fact that the respondent No.1 (owner/landlord of the property) before filing of ejectment applications had obtained permission for demolition and reconstruction of disputed buildings and approval of new construction plan from the competent authority, which is the requirement of subsection 2(vi) to section 15 of the Ordinance. There is also no denial of the fact that the ejectment of the petitioners from their respective tenements in the disputed buildings has been sought by the respondent No. I on the sole ground of demolition and reconstruction of the existing building over plots Nos.42 SB-6, 28 SB-6 and 53 SB-4, Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan Road, Karachi. Thus, the petitioners fully enjoy the protection under section 15(3) of the Ordinance, 1979, that if after their eviction, the building is not demolished within six months or reconstruction is not carried out within two years, they will be entitled for immediate restoration of possession of their respective tenements. In addition to it, C after reconstruction, the petitioners will be again entitled for induction in the newly constructed building in terms of section 15(4) of the Ordinance, 1979. Such protection provided by the legislature in all fairness, is more than sufficient to discourage any landlord from seeking eviction of his tenant(s) on the ground of reconstruction, if his intentions are not bona fide or tainted with mala fide. It is for this reason that the legislature has done away with the condition of bona fide, while allowing ejectment of the tenant(s) on the ground of reconstruction. In the present case, admittedly, the Sindh Cultural Heritage (Preservation) Act, 1994 (Act XII of 1940) was promulgated on 30th April, 1994 and subsequently by issuance of Notification in terms of section 6 of the Act the disputed buildings have been notified as protected heritage. Thus it is obvious that the demolition and reconstruction of these buildings is only possible when the dispute between owner/landlord and the concerned authority under the Heritage Act is resolved in terms of the said Act of 1994 and in accordance with law.
13. The learned counsel for respondent No. 1 has made a categorical statement before this Court that an application in terms of section 10(3) of the Act of 1994 was submitted before the Secretary Culture, Tourism, Sports and Youth Affairs Government of Sindh on 18-10-1995, which is still pending for adjudication. Such statement is duly supported with the photostat copies of the application and other material placed on record in some connected Constitutional Petitions and the counter affidavit of Mr. Ameen Gul, Attorney/Rent Collector of respondent No.1 Haji Sir Abdullah Haroon Trust. In such circumstances, more particularly when the Act of 1994 has come into force on 30-4-1994, during the pendency of ejectment applications, it would have been unjust and unfair if the ejectment applications had been dismissed by the Rent Controller or the Appellate Court with the observations that firstly the landlord should obtain permission/no objection from the committee under the Act of 1994 for demolition of the building and then to file fresh ejectment applications for eviction of tenants. In the given situation, passing of ejectment order in favour of respondent No. 1, subject to the condition of its executability against the petitioners only after grant of no objection/permission for demolition/reconstruction by the committee under the Act, of 1994, seems to be balanced and equitable course followed by the lower forums, which calls for no interference from this Court in exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of D the Constitution.
14. The submission of the learned counsel that by virtue of section 19 of the Act of 1994 jurisdiction of Rent Controller would be barred in respect of the premises declared as protected heritage, has no force as even in respect of such premises ejectment of tenant, on any of the grounds available under sections 14 and 15 of the Ordinance of 1979, will be regulated by the provisions of Ordinance, of 1979, therefore, the Rent Controller would be competent to entertain and decide such cases. However, the right of owner/landlord for demolition of the building declared as protect heritage will be further subject to the provisions of the Act of 1994. It will be pertinent to mention here that in the instant case, by imposition of condition for obtaining prior no objection for demolition from the committee, the Rent Controller and the Appellate Court have virtually diluted the effect of the Act of 1994. Thus, it cannot be considered any more a valid hurdle in granting ejectment applications in respect of such buildings on the ground of reconstruction.
15. The submissions of Mr. Ghulam Abbas Peshori and Mr. Iftikhar Jawaid Qazi, Advocates, that the rent applications were not maintainable in law as it were not filed by duly authorized person, are devoid of any legal force as in several Constitutional petitions photostat copies of the general power of attorney dated 6th October, 1982, executed by the Trustees of respondent No.1 (i.e. Yousuf A. Haroon, Mehmood A. Haroon and Abdullah Al-Hussain Haroon) in favour of Faqir Muhammad s/o Mansoor Khan have been filed on the basis of which all the ejectment applications were filed by the said attorney. Contents of this power of attorney reveal that it is a general power of attorney, which authorizes the attorney to file rent cases and ejectment applications on behalf of the Trust. The genuineness of this power of attorney and'its contents are not in dispute and thus clearly prove the lawful authorization in favour of the attorney to initiate proceedings on behalf of respondent No. 1. Even in case some of executant of this power of attorney has expired during the E pendency of the proceedings, authorization, on behalf of the remaining executants, who still survive, will continue to remain in force. The submission of Mr. Ghulam Abbas Peshori as to the non-providing of proper provision for induction of tenant (his client) in the newly constructed building in terms of sub-section (4) to section 15 of the Ordinance of 1979 has also no force as it is not a condition imposed by statute upon the landlord that for the purpose of raising new construction F he has to keep in mind the provision for accommodating the existing tenant or to design the new construction of the building in a way so as to suit the requirements of the tenant(s).
16. In the facts and circumstances discussed above, the orders of the Appellate Court as well as orders of the Rent Controller in all the rent cases (except R.A. No.842 of 1992 and 167 of 1995) are based on proper appreciation of relevant facts and the provisions of law and do not call for any interference by this Court in exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution. Rather, looking to the peculiar facts and circumstances of these cases the condition of obtaining permission/no objection from the Committee under the Act or 1994, as condition precedent, for execution of ejectment orders is just, fair and equitable and from any angle it cannot be termed as unwarranted by law.
17. Moreover, grant of relief under Article 199 of the Constitution is purely discretionary in nature and in the given facts and circumstances of these cases, when the concurrent findings of the two Courts, based on H proper appreciation of evidence, are in favour of respondent No. 1, I find no justification to interfere in the impugned orders of ejectment passedagainst the petitioners.
18. For the foregoing reasons all these petitions, being without substance, are dismissed in limine along with pending applications.
M.B.A./J-25/KPetitions dismissed.
P L D 2005 Karachi 684
(a) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)---
----S. 15(2)(vi), (3)(4)---Sindh Cultural Haritage (Preservation) Act (XII of 1994), Ss.6, 10 & 19---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition---Ejectment of tenants was sought on the sole ground of demolition and reconstruction of property which was protected and notified under the Sindh Cultural Heritage (Preservation) Act, 1994---Landlord of the property (Wakt), before filing ejectment applications had obtained permission for demolition and reconstruction plan from the competent Authority, which was the requirement of S.15(2)(vi) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979---Tenants also fully enjoyed the protection of S. 15(3)(4), the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979---Jurisdiction of Rent Controller would not be barred in respect of the premises declared as protected heritage by virtue of S. 19, Sindh Cultural Heritage (Preservation) Act, 1994---Demolition of building and reconstruction was only possible when the dispute between the owner/landlord and the concerned Authority under Sindh Cultural Heritage (Preservation) Act, 1994 was resolved in terms of the said Act and in accordance with law and in the given situation passing of ejectment order in favour of landlord, subject to the condition of its executability against the tenants only after grant of no objection/permission for demolition/reconstruction by the Committee under the Sindh Cultural Heritage (Preservation) Act, 1994, was balanced and equitable course followed by the lower forums, which called for no interference from the High Court in exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction under Art. 199 of the Constitution---Principles.
Rashid Brothers, Faisalabad v. Ch. Muhammad Anwar Khan and another 1981 SCMR 782; Dawood Adam Kabari v. Mst. Khatija Bai 1984 CLC 1713; Hassan and others v Fancy Foundation PLD 1975 SC 1 and Muhammad Yousuf and another v. Muhammad Sarfraz Cheema, Additional District Judge and others PLD 1987 SC 20 ref.
(b) Power of attorney---
----Held, even in case some of the executants of power of attorney had expired during the pendency of the proceedings, authorization on behalf of the remaining executants, who still survived, would continue to remain in force.
(c) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)---
----S. 15(4)---Ejectment on ground of demolition and reconstruction of building---Held, it was not a condition imposed by statute upon the landlord that for the purpose of raising new construction he had to keep in mind the provision for accommodating the existing tenant or to design the new construction of the building in a way so as to suit the requirement of the tenant(s).
(d) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---
----Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---Grant of relief under Art.199 of the Constitution is purely discretionary in nature and in case when the concurrent findings of the two. Courts were based on proper appreciation of evidence, there would be no justification to interfere in the impugned orders.
Tassawar Hussain Rizvi for Petitioners (in Constitutional Petition No.213 of 2003).
Khawaja Samiul Hassan, for Petitioners (in Constitutional Petitions Nos.436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 562 of 2003 and 895 to 897 of 2003).
K.A. Wahab for Petitioner (in Constitutional Petition No.585 of 2003).
Muhammad Younus for Petitioner (in Constitutional Petition No.383 of 2003).
Ghulam Abbas Peshori for Petitioner (in Constitutional Petition No.640 of 2003).
Iftikhar Jawaid Qazi for Petitioner (in Constitutional Petition No.431 of 2003).
Syed Ehsan Raza for Respondent No.1 ((in all the Constitutional Petitions).
Dates of hearing: 25th April and 2nd May, 2005.
JAWAID ARSHAD MIRZA through Legal Representatives VS TRUSTEES OF HAJI SIR ABDULLAH HAROON
P L D 2005 Karachi 684
Before Anwar Zaheer Jamali, J
JAWAID ARSHAD MIRZA through Legal Representatives---Petitioner
Versus
TRUSTEES OF HAJI SIR ABDULLAH HAROON and others---Respondents
Constitutional Petitions Nos.213, 383, 431,436 to 444, 562, 585, 640 and 895 to 897 of 2003, decided on 24/06/2005.
JUDGMENT
ANWAR ZAHEER JAMALI, J.---By this common judgment I intend to dispose of above numbered eighteen Constitutional Petitions, relating to different tenements in the buildings bearing Nos. 42 SB-6, 28 SB-6 and 53 SB-4, all owned by respondent Haji Sir Abdullah Haroon Wakf, as the same arise out of similar set of facts and contain common questions of law for consideration.
2. The relevant facts forming background of this litigation are that the respondent, Haji Sir Abdullah Haroon Wakf (hereinafter referred as respondent No. 1), is owner of building constructed over plots No.42 SB-6, 28 SB-6 and 53 SB-4, Raja Ghazanfar Ali Road, Karachi, which consists of several residential and commercial tenements (herein after referred to as rented premises), in possession of different petitioners, at different rates of rent. In respect of these rented premises, respondent No.1 filed separate ejectment applications against each tenant/petitioner seeking their ejectment on the sole ground of demolition and reconstruction of the said properties. It was stated in the application that such demolition and reconstruction of new building, for which respondent No. I have permission and approved plan from the competent authority, will provide better facilities in the building and it will also improve the general outlook of the area.
3. The petitioners in their respective written objections denied the claim of the respondent No. 1, being not bona fide; claimed themselves to be old tenants in the building and some of them also pleaded payment of Pagri however, they did not dispute the ownership/landlordship of respondent No.1 and availability of permission for reconstruction and approved building plans with them. In some of the rent cases maintainability of ejectment applications was also challenged as the persons who had filed the ejectment application was not duly authorized to do so on behalf of the respondent No. 1.
4. After usual proceedings in all the rent cases, in rent cases Nos.842 of 1992 and 167 of 1995, which are now subject-matter of Constitutional Petition No.213 of 2003 and 640 of 2003 respectively, the ejectment applications of respondent No.1 were dismissed by the Rent Controller with the observations that the approved building plan produced by respondent No.1 had expired during the pendency of rent case and further the disputed buildings have been declared as notified property under the Sindh Cultural Heritage (Preservation) Act, 1994. However, in Rent Appeals Nos. 1269 of 2001 and 116 of 2002, relating to these two rent cases, such orders of the Rent Controller were set aside by impugned judgments dated 18-11-2002/1-4-2003, with the condition that the ejectment order passed by the Appellate Court in favour of respondent No.1 will not be executable against the petitioner until necessary permission/no objection for demolition/reconstruction of the disputed building is obtained by respondent No.1 under the Sindh Cultural Heritage (Preservation) Act, 1994, (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1994) from the competent authority. In all the other rent cases i.e. Rent Case Nos. 804, 805, 810, 811, 813, 814, 815, 819, 821 to 827 and 847 all of 1992, the ejectment applications filed by respondent No.1 were allowed by the Rent Controller on the ground of reconstruction, through various orders passed in these cases. The appeals preferred by the petitioners against such ejectment orders were also dismissed with similar condition as contained in the ejectment order passed by the Appellate Court in Rent Appeal No.1269 of 2001, that the tenants shall not be evicted from the rented premises till permission is obtained by the landlord from the Authorities concerned for reconstruction of the building under the provisions of Sindh Cultural Heritage Protection Act, 1994. It is against such identical orders of ejectment passed by the learned Rent Controller and the Appellate Court of Additional District Judge (South) Karachi, in various rent appeals, that these petitions have been preferred by the petitioners.
5. Mr. S. Tasawar Hussain Rizvi, learned counsel for the petitioner in Constitutional Petition No.213 of 2003, in his arguments, contended that in view of the promulgation of Sindh Cultural Heritage (Preservation) Act, 1994, and declaration of the disputed property as protected heritage in terms of section 6 of the Act, vide Notification published by the Government of Sindh, the rented premises in possession of the petitioners could not be vacated from them on the ground of demolition and reconstruction. In such circumstances, even passing of conditional ejectment order by the Appellate Court is not justified. Learned counsel, however, did not dispute that the requirement of section 15(2)(vi) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, for seeking eviction of the tenant on the ground of re-construction were fulfilled by respondent No.1 by production of Approved Building Plans and permission for reconstruction from the competent authority.
6. Mr. Khawaja Samiul Hassan, Advocate representing petitioners in other Constitutional petitions Nos. 436 to 444, 562 and 895 to 897 of 2003, also strongly urged the same ground. He also made reference to section 19 of the Sindh Cultural Heritage (Preservation) Act, 1994, and contended that since the Act of 1994 has overriding effect on any other law contrary to it, therefore, the ejectment applications filed by the respondent No.1 for seeking ejectment of petitioners from the rented premises situated in the disputed buildings, which have been declared as protected heritage, were not maintainable. Learned counsel, however, did not dispute that there is no dispute as regards the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties since the time of commencement of ejectment proceeding till this date, as stated by the petitioners in their respective written objections and that at the time of filing of ejectment applications in the year 1992 the Sindh Cultural Heritage (Preservation) Act, 1994, was not even promulgated. The learned counsel also did not dispute about the availability of valid approved building plans and permission of reconstruction with the respondent No.1 in respect of the disputed properties at the time of filing of ejectment applications.
7. Mr. Abdul Razzak, Advocate, holding brief for Mr. K.A. Wahab, Advocate for the petitioner in C.P. No.585 of 2003, and Mr. Muhammad Younus, Advocate in C.P. No.383 of 2003, adopted the arguments of M/s. Tassawar Hussian Rizvi and Khawaja Samiul Hassan, Advocates. Mr. Ghulam Abbas Peshori, Advocate for petitioner in C.P. No.640 of 2003 in addition to adopting the arguments of M/s. Tassawar Hussain Rizvi and Khawaja Samiul Hassan, Advocates, further contended that the ejectment applications filed on behalf of respondent No.1 were not maintainable in law as the person, who has filed the ejectment applications, was not holding any valid authority on behalf of Sir Haji Abdullah Haroon Wakf. He also contended that in the approved building plans no provision for accommodating the tenant (his client) in the newly constructed building was provided by the landlord to frustrate the spirit of section 15(4) of the Ordinance of 1979. Thus, without providing specific provision in this regard to safeguard the interest of the petitioner/tenant, ejectment application should not have been allowed by the Rent Controller and the Appellate Court. Mr. Iftikhar Jawaid Qazi, Advocate for petitioner in C.P. No.431 of 2003 also advanced his arguments in line to the submissions of other learned counsel, as noted above.
8. In reply, Mr. Ehsan Raza, learned counsel for respondent No.1 in all these petitions contended that the whole action for declaring the disputed properties as protected heritage, was taken by the concerned authorities without any notice or opportunity of hearing to respondent No. 1, during the pendency of ejectment applications before the Rent Controller, however, as soon as respondent No.1 came to know about this development they have immediately initiated proceedings in terms of sections 6(2) and 10(3) of the Sindh Cultural Heritage (Preservation) Act, 1994, which proceedings are still sub judice before the concerned committee for determining the status of the disputed property or its deletion from the notified list of protected heritage. Making reference to the provisions of section 15(2)(vi) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, learned counsel contented that the only requirement of law for seeking ejectment of tenant by the landlord on the ground of reconstruction is the approved building plans and permission for reconstruction from the competent authority, and in such cases even the question of examining the bona fide of the landlord is not involved. Further by virtue of section 15(3) of the Ordinance the rights of the tenant ejected on the ground of reconstruction are fully protected in case the owner/landlord of the property fails to demolish the building within six months of the delivery of possession or he fails to raise construction within two years thereafter. In the present case, not only such protection is fully available to the petitioners and they will also be entitled for restoration of possession after reconstruction as provided under section 15(4) of the Ordinance of 1979, but in addition to it, while ordering ejectment, through impugned orders, the Appellate Court has further safeguarded their interest by imposing additional condition upon the respondent No.1 that they will not be entitled to execute the impugned ejectment orders against the petitioners, unless necessary permission/no objection was obtained by them under the Sindh Cultural Heritage (Preservation) Act, 1994 for reconstruction of the building. Thus in all fairness these petitions being devoid of any legal cause are liable to be dismissed. To fortify his submissions learned counsel placed reliance on following cases:--
(a) Rashid Brothers, Faisalabad v. Ch. Muhammad Anwar Khan and another (1981 SCMR 782).
(b) Dawood Adam Kabari v. Mst. Khatija Bai (1984 CLC 1713).
(c) Hassan and others v Fancy Foundation (PLD 1975 SC 1).
(d) Muhammad Yousuf and another v. Muhammad Sarfraz Cheema, Additional District Judge and others (PLD 1987 SC 20).
In the case of Rashid. Brothers (supra), it was held that renewal of sanction expired during the pendency of ejectment proceedings would not affect the maintainability or the merits of ejectment application as it would be only a formality. In the case of Dawood Adam Kabari (supra), ejectment of tenant on the ground of reconstruction, of property was allowed subject to the condition of eviction of premises by other tenants of the same building as reconstruction was not possible without eviction of all the tenants. In the case of Hassan and others (supra), while dealing with a case relating to ejectment of tenant on the ground of reconstruction, it was held that it is well-settled principle in general, when substantive law is altered during the pendency of an action, the rights of the parties are decided according to law as it existed when the, action was begun unless the new statute shows that clear intention to vary such rights. In the case Muhammad Yousaf (supra), while dealing with a civil petition, arising out of ejectment proceedings filed against the tenant on the ground of reconstruction, it was held by the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan that the question whether property was required for the purpose of reconstruction by the landlord reasonably and in good faith in terms of the Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI) of 1959 section 13(2)(iv) was one of fact and concurrent findings are not open to question in writ jurisdiction.
9. I have carefully considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material placed on record. Before I proceed to examine above-noted contentions of the learned counsel with reference to the various provisions of Sindh Cultural Heritage (Preservation) Act, 1994, and the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance of 1979, it will be advantageous to reproduce hereunder the relevant provisions of both the enactments which read as under:---
Section 6 of the Act of 1994.
6. Declaration of protected heritage.--(1) Government may, by notification in the official Gazette on the recommendation of Committee or otherwise declare any premises of historical, cultural or architectural value to be protected heritage within the meaning of this Act.
(2) A copy of every notification published under subsection (1) shall be published in newspapers and fixed up in a conspicuous place on or near such premises/object together with an intimation that any objections to the issue of the notification received by Government within one month from the date of the notification shall betaken into consideration.
(3) On the expiry of the said period of one month, Government after considering the objection, if any, may confirm or withdraw the notification.
(4) A notification under this section shall, unless and until it is withdrawn, be conclusive evidence of the fact that the premises or objects to which it relates is a protected heritage within the meaning of this Act.
Section 10 of the Act of 1994
(10) (1) If it is apprehended that any person intends to destroy, remove, alter, deface or imperal the protected heritage or to build on or near the site thereof in contravention of the terms of an agreement for its preservation under section 8, the Committee may make an order prohibiting any such contravention.
(2) If an owner or other who is bound by an agreement for the preservation or maintenance of a protected heritage under section 8 refuses to do any act which is in the opinion of the Committee is necessary to such preservation for maintenance, or neglects to do any such act within such reasonable time as may be fixed by the Committee may authorize any person to do any such act, and the expense of doing any such act or such portion of the expense as the owner may liable to pay under the agreement may be recovered from the owner as if it were an arrear of land-revenue.
(3) A person aggrieved by an order under this section may appeal to Government which may cancel or modify it, and its decision shall be final.
Section 19 of the Act of 1994
19. Overriding effect.--The provision of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force.
Section 15 of the Ordinance of 1979
15. Application to Controller.---(1) Where a landlord seeks to evict the tenant otherwise than in according with section 14, he shall make such application to the Controller.
(2) The Controller shall, make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the premises within such period as may be specified in the order, if he is satisfied that---
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi) the premises. is required by the landlord for reconstruction or erection of a new building at the site and the landlord has obtained necessary sanction for such reconstruction or erection from the authority competent under any law for the time being in force to give such sanction;
(vii)
(3) Where the landlord who has obtained the possession of the premises for the purpose of reconstruction of the building or erection of a new building, shall demolish the existing building within six moths of taking over of the possession of the premises or, as the case may be, commence the erection of the new building within two years of the taking over of the possession of the premises, and in case the landlord fails to demolish the building as aforesaid, the tenant shall be entitled to be put into possession of the premises (and for the purpose he may apply to the Controller for an order in that behalf.).
(4) Where the landlord constructs the building as aforesaid the tenant who was evicted from the old building may, before the completion of new building and its occupation by another person, apply to the Controller for an order directing that he be put in possession of such area in the new building as does not exceed the area of the old building of which he was in occupation and the Controller shall make an order accordingly in respect of the area applied for or such smaller area, as considering the location and type of the new building and the needs of the tenant, he deems just and no payment of rent to be determined by him on the basis of rent of similar accommodation in the locality.
10. A bare reading of the three sections from the Act of 1994, as reproduced above, would show that the Government of Sindh on the recommendation of the Committee constituted under section 3 of the Act of 1994, or otherwise can declare any premises as protected heritage within the meaning of section 2(vi) of the Act. Upon publication of such Notification objections can be filed within one month, and on filing of objections the Government could either confirm or withdraw the Notification. However, in case of non-withdrawal of Notification, it shall be considered as conclusive evidence of the fact that the property is protected heritage within the meaning of the Act. Section 10 of the Act deals with the situation where any person intends to destroy, remove, alter, deface or imperil the protected heritage or to build on or near the site thereof construction in contravention of the terms of the agreement. In such situation for preservation of protected heritage within the meaning of section 8, the Government may authorize any person to do any such act to maintain and preserve the protected heritage or such portion of it at the expense of the owner and in case such expense are incurred by the Committee it shall be recovered as arrears of land-revenue. While subsection (3) to section 10 gives right of appeal to a person against any decision taken in preceding subsections of section 10. Further, section 19 of the Act of 1994 provides that the provision of this Act shall have overriding effect not withstanding any thing to the contrary contained in any other law in force at the relevant time.
11. On the other hand, the provisions of section 15(2)(vi) read with subsection (3) of the Ordinance of 1979, provide for the conditions to be fulfilled by the landlord/owner of the property for seeking eviction of his tenant on the ground of reconstruction and erection of the building and the consequences in case such ejectment order has been obtained on the ground of reconstruction but the property is not demolished or the construction is not commenced by the landlord within the stipulated period. Subsection (4) to section 15 further confers right to the tenant to be inducted in the newly constructed building in terms thereof.
12. In all these petitions, there is no denial of the fact that the respondent No.1 (owner/landlord of the property) before filing of ejectment applications had obtained permission for demolition and reconstruction of disputed buildings and approval of new construction plan from the competent authority, which is the requirement of subsection 2(vi) to section 15 of the Ordinance. There is also no denial of the fact that the ejectment of the petitioners from their respective tenements in the disputed buildings has been sought by the respondent No. I on the sole ground of demolition and reconstruction of the existing building over plots Nos.42 SB-6, 28 SB-6 and 53 SB-4, Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan Road, Karachi. Thus, the petitioners fully enjoy the protection under section 15(3) of the Ordinance, 1979, that if after their eviction, the building is not demolished within six months or reconstruction is not carried out within two years, they will be entitled for immediate restoration of possession of their respective tenements. In addition to it, C after reconstruction, the petitioners will be again entitled for induction in the newly constructed building in terms of section 15(4) of the Ordinance, 1979. Such protection provided by the legislature in all fairness, is more than sufficient to discourage any landlord from seeking eviction of his tenant(s) on the ground of reconstruction, if his intentions are not bona fide or tainted with mala fide. It is for this reason that the legislature has done away with the condition of bona fide, while allowing ejectment of the tenant(s) on the ground of reconstruction. In the present case, admittedly, the Sindh Cultural Heritage (Preservation) Act, 1994 (Act XII of 1940) was promulgated on 30th April, 1994 and subsequently by issuance of Notification in terms of section 6 of the Act the disputed buildings have been notified as protected heritage. Thus it is obvious that the demolition and reconstruction of these buildings is only possible when the dispute between owner/landlord and the concerned authority under the Heritage Act is resolved in terms of the said Act of 1994 and in accordance with law.
13. The learned counsel for respondent No. 1 has made a categorical statement before this Court that an application in terms of section 10(3) of the Act of 1994 was submitted before the Secretary Culture, Tourism, Sports and Youth Affairs Government of Sindh on 18-10-1995, which is still pending for adjudication. Such statement is duly supported with the photostat copies of the application and other material placed on record in some connected Constitutional Petitions and the counter affidavit of Mr. Ameen Gul, Attorney/Rent Collector of respondent No.1 Haji Sir Abdullah Haroon Trust. In such circumstances, more particularly when the Act of 1994 has come into force on 30-4-1994, during the pendency of ejectment applications, it would have been unjust and unfair if the ejectment applications had been dismissed by the Rent Controller or the Appellate Court with the observations that firstly the landlord should obtain permission/no objection from the committee under the Act of 1994 for demolition of the building and then to file fresh ejectment applications for eviction of tenants. In the given situation, passing of ejectment order in favour of respondent No. 1, subject to the condition of its executability against the petitioners only after grant of no objection/permission for demolition/reconstruction by the committee under the Act, of 1994, seems to be balanced and equitable course followed by the lower forums, which calls for no interference from this Court in exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of D the Constitution.
14. The submission of the learned counsel that by virtue of section 19 of the Act of 1994 jurisdiction of Rent Controller would be barred in respect of the premises declared as protected heritage, has no force as even in respect of such premises ejectment of tenant, on any of the grounds available under sections 14 and 15 of the Ordinance of 1979, will be regulated by the provisions of Ordinance, of 1979, therefore, the Rent Controller would be competent to entertain and decide such cases. However, the right of owner/landlord for demolition of the building declared as protect heritage will be further subject to the provisions of the Act of 1994. It will be pertinent to mention here that in the instant case, by imposition of condition for obtaining prior no objection for demolition from the committee, the Rent Controller and the Appellate Court have virtually diluted the effect of the Act of 1994. Thus, it cannot be considered any more a valid hurdle in granting ejectment applications in respect of such buildings on the ground of reconstruction.
15. The submissions of Mr. Ghulam Abbas Peshori and Mr. Iftikhar Jawaid Qazi, Advocates, that the rent applications were not maintainable in law as it were not filed by duly authorized person, are devoid of any legal force as in several Constitutional petitions photostat copies of the general power of attorney dated 6th October, 1982, executed by the Trustees of respondent No.1 (i.e. Yousuf A. Haroon, Mehmood A. Haroon and Abdullah Al-Hussain Haroon) in favour of Faqir Muhammad s/o Mansoor Khan have been filed on the basis of which all the ejectment applications were filed by the said attorney. Contents of this power of attorney reveal that it is a general power of attorney, which authorizes the attorney to file rent cases and ejectment applications on behalf of the Trust. The genuineness of this power of attorney and'its contents are not in dispute and thus clearly prove the lawful authorization in favour of the attorney to initiate proceedings on behalf of respondent No. 1. Even in case some of executant of this power of attorney has expired during the E pendency of the proceedings, authorization, on behalf of the remaining executants, who still survive, will continue to remain in force. The submission of Mr. Ghulam Abbas Peshori as to the non-providing of proper provision for induction of tenant (his client) in the newly constructed building in terms of sub-section (4) to section 15 of the Ordinance of 1979 has also no force as it is not a condition imposed by statute upon the landlord that for the purpose of raising new construction F he has to keep in mind the provision for accommodating the existing tenant or to design the new construction of the building in a way so as to suit the requirements of the tenant(s).
16. In the facts and circumstances discussed above, the orders of the Appellate Court as well as orders of the Rent Controller in all the rent cases (except R.A. No.842 of 1992 and 167 of 1995) are based on proper appreciation of relevant facts and the provisions of law and do not call for any interference by this Court in exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution. Rather, looking to the peculiar facts and circumstances of these cases the condition of obtaining permission/no objection from the Committee under the Act or 1994, as condition precedent, for execution of ejectment orders is just, fair and equitable and from any angle it cannot be termed as unwarranted by law.
17. Moreover, grant of relief under Article 199 of the Constitution is purely discretionary in nature and in the given facts and circumstances of these cases, when the concurrent findings of the two Courts, based on H proper appreciation of evidence, are in favour of respondent No. 1, I find no justification to interfere in the impugned orders of ejectment passedagainst the petitioners.
18. For the foregoing reasons all these petitions, being without substance, are dismissed in limine along with pending applications.
M.B.A./J-25/KPetitions dismissed.
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