PLD 2024 SC 1108
Under the precincts of Section 5 of the Specific Relief Act 1877 , the Court may grant the specific relief (a) by taking possession of certain property and delivering it to a claimant; (b) by ordering a party to do the very act which he is under an obligation to do; (c) by preventing a party from doing that which he is under an obligation not to do; (d) by determining and declaring the rights of parties otherwise than by an award of compensation; or (e) by appointing a receiver. However, according to Section 7 of the 1877 Act, specific relief cannot be granted for the mere purpose of enforcing a penal law. The letter of the law makes it somewhat discernible that the jurisdiction to grant a decree of specific performance is discretionary, as encapsulated under Section 22 of the 1877 Act, but exercise of such discretion should not be arbitrary. Rather, it must be based on sound and reasonable grounds guided by judicial principles. The incidences in which specific performance is enforceable by the Courts are provided under Section 12 of the 1877 Act, such as (a) when the act agreed to be done is in the performance, wholly or partly, of a trust; (b) when there exists no standard for ascertaining the actual damage caused by nonperformance of the act agreed to be done; (c) when the act agreed to be done is such that pecuniary compensation for its non-performance would not afford adequate relief; or (d) when it is probable that pecuniary compensation cannot be got for the non-performance of the act agreed to be done. The explanation attached to this Section further enlightens that unless and until the contrary is proved, the Court shall presume that the breach of a contract to transfer immoveable property cannot be adequately relieved by compensation in money, and that the breach of a contract to transfer moveable property can be thus relieved.
This is a well-known elucidation of law that the plaint cannot be rejected in piecemeal under Order VII Rule 11, CPC. Even if one prayer contained in the plaint is found to be maintainable in the relevant facts and circumstances of this case, the plaint cannot be rejected in part. What is essentially required is that the plaintiff must demonstrate that not only a right has been infringed in a manner that entitles him to a relief but also that when he approached the Court, the right to seek that relief was in subsistence. Nothing more than the averments of the plaint have to be seen for the purposes of adjudicating whether the plaint unveiled any cause of action. However, the dearth of proof or weakness of proof in the circumstances of the case did not furnish any justification for coming to the conclusion that there was no cause of action disclosed in the plaint, because for the rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11, CPC, the Court cannot take into consideration pleas raised by the defendants in the suit, as at that stage, the pleas raised by the defendants are only contentions in the proceedings, unsupported by any evidence on record. However, if there is some material apart from the plaint which is admitted by the plaintiff, the same can also be looked into and taken into consideration by the Court while deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11, CPC. Moreover, the Court may, in exceptional cases, consider the legal objections in the light of averments of the written statement but the pleading as a whole cannot be taken into consideration for the rejection of plaint. The Court has to presume the facts stated in the plaint as correct for the determination of such application. In case of any mixed questions of law and facts, the right methodology and approach is to allow the suit proceed to the written statement and discovery phases and to determine the matter either by framing preliminary issues or through a regular trial. This rule does not justify the rejection of any particular portion of the plaint or a piecemeal rejection, as the concept of partial rejection is seemingly incongruous to the provisions of Order VII Rule 11, CPC. However, it should be kept in mind that astute drafting for creating illusions of cause of action are not permitted in law, and a clear right to sue ought to be shown in the plaint. Where there is a joinder of multiple causes of action, and at least on some of these causes could potentially lead to a decree, a plea of demurrer cannot be admitted to reject the plaint. Similarly, if there are several parties and the plaint discloses a cause of action against one or more of them then, too, the plaint cannot be rejected, as what is required in law is not the reading of the plaint in fragments but reading it as a whole. The Court is under an obligation to give a meaningful reading to the plaint and if it is manifestly vexatious or meritless, in the sense that it does not disclose a clear right to sue, the court may reject the plaint, but before rejecting, it must determine whether litigation of such a case will be absolutely vexatious and an abuse of the process of the court.
While under Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act 1877 , clauses (a) to (d), certain conditions have been provided in which the Court may grant decree of specific performance, but in order to explain the niceties of such conditions, the legislature has also provided illustrations dealing with each condition separately. The internal aid of interpreting any statute or its provision can be derived primarily from the statute itself including its preamble, illustrations, headings, marginal notes, punctuation, transitory provisions, etc. It is an elementary rule of law that the illustrations should not be considered redundant or inconsequential, as they are evenly significant and constructive for securing the proper meaning of the provision. While they cannot influence the ordinary connotation of the section, they are beneficial to demonstrate the means and methods by which such sections are set in motion while interpreting the law.
PLD 2024 SC 1108
Undoubtedly, the plaint can be rejected under Order VII Rule 11, CPC, at any stage of the proceedings to culminate the civil action, on the philosophy that incompetent lawsuits should be buried to their inception in order to save the precious time of the Court which may be consumed and dedicated in serious and genuine litigation, but at the same time, this underlying principle does not give license to invoke the same in every lawsuit just to prolong or drag the proceedings with mala fide intention or ulterior motives. On the contrary, such application must articulate, distinctly, how and in which condition, as enumerated under Order VII Rule 11, CPC, is the plaint liable to be rejected, rather than filing it with sweeping or trivial allegations to waste the valuable time of the Court. In the present case, the application was filed by the petitioner in the Trial Court on the grounds that (1) the suit is not maintainable under law; (2) the suit is barred under Companies Ordinance, 1984, and the Act; (3) the jurisdiction of the Court is lacking one under the Act and that the Court could not entertain the suit; (4) the suit is not maintainable under law even if the jurisdiction is assumed, and; (5) the suit is barred under the Specific Relief Act, 1877, and other provisions of laws and no effective decree could be passed in a case where jurisdiction does not lie.
PLD 2024 SC 1108
The genus of specific relief, in fact, articulates the remedy afforded by the Court to ensure the implementation of specific performance and obviate the contravention of an obligation. The Specific Relief Act, 1877, (“1877 Act”) grants access to the legal framework meant for dispensing specific relief in the civil lawsuits for ensuring justice and ordering a party to perform the contractual obligations. The nature of relief is an equitable one, which is structured on the philosophy of evenhandedness and justness. While awarding or declining this discretionary relief, the Court, according to the facts and circumstances of the case, ought to have weighed up the rudiments sine qua non for the specific relief, such as the nitty-gritties of the contract executed between the parties, the demeanor of the person concerned, and the level-headedness and judiciousness of enforcing the relief which is broad enough to assimilate a wide range of contractual disputes vis-à-vis the mode and manner of specific relief obtainable in civil suits. According to Section 3 (Interpretation Clause) of the 1877 Act, "settlement" means any instrument (other than a will or codicil as defined by the Succession Act, 1925) whereby the destination or devolution of successive interests in moveable or immoveable property is disposed of or is agreed to be disposed of. While Section 4 of the same Act provides that nothing in this Act shall be deemed (a) to give any right to relief in respect of any agreement which is not a contract; (b) to deprive any person of any right to relief, other than specific performance, which he may have under any contract; or (c) to affect the operation of the Registration Act, 1908 on documents.
PLD 2024 SC 1108
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