While proceeding with the suit under sub-rule (3) of Rule 1 of Order XVII CPC could close his evidence so as to get to the next stage in the trial.

4. Perusal of the above cited paragraph and proceedings of the learned Trial Court leads to conclusion that learned Trail Court showed extra ordinary indulgence in the matter and granted adequate opportunities to the petitioner to produce evidence in support of his claim. The benevolence shown by the learned Trial Court was misconstrued by the petitioner. In fact the conduct of the petitioner was not only carefree or negligent but also contumacious. The petitioner neither before the learned Courts below nor in the memorandum of instant revision petition has disclosed any reason which caused hindrance in his way to produce evidence before the learned Trial Court on 14.6.2013, 10.7.2013, 11.9.2013, 23.10.2013, 20.11.2013, 15.1.2014, 23.1.2014, 8.2.2014 and 12.2.2014. After examining the record of the case, I am of the view that the learned Trial Court was confronted with a situation where the petitioner was not ready with his evidence. In these attending circumstances, learned Trial Court while proceeding with the suit under sub-rule (3) of Rule 1 of Order XVII CPC could close his evidence so as to get to the next stage in the trial. This is what the learned Trial Court precisely did in the present case. The citation of the Order XVII Rule 3 CPC in judgment dated 12.02.2014 does not make any difference because substance of the said judgment shows that the learned Trial Court meant to close the evidence under Order XVII Rule 1 (3) CPC. Accordingly I hold that evidence of the petitioner was rightly closed. In arriving at this conclusion I stand fortified from the judgment rendered in the cases of Pirzada Amir Hssan and others v Mrs. Shamim Shah Nawaz and others (1984 CLC 3080) and The Administrator, Lahore Municipal Corporation, Lahore v Abdul Hamid and others (1987 CLC 1261).  

 Part of Judgment 

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT, LAHORE. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT.

Civil Revision-Civil Revision(Against Decree)-Pre-emption
3543-14

2017 LHC 311

Inference from the omission of word “certified” clearly absolves the petitioner from filing certified copies of the impugned judgments etc. along with revision petition

7. The above cited provision of law makes it obligatory for the petitioner to furnish copies of the pleadings, documents and order of the subordinate Court along with revision petition. The word “certified” is absent in the above proviso to section 115 (1) CPC. Inference from the omission of word “certified” clearly absolves the petitioner from filing certified copies of the impugned judgments etc. along with revision petition. Approaching the Copying Agency for obtaining certified copy of the impugned judgment, therefore, would not in any manner extend the benefit of section 12 of the Limitation Act to the petitioner. The second proviso to section 115 (1) CPC makes it obligatory for the subordinate Court to provide a copy of the impugned decision within three days thereof. Here again there is no requirement of law that such a copy shall be a certified copy. It was, thus, duty of the petitioner to have approached the lower Court which passed the impugned judgment and decree to obtain copy of the same. Once the application was made to the subordinate Court and there was failure of the lower Court to provide copy within prescribed period of three days, revision petitioner could have sought condonation of delay on the ground that it was beyond his control to obtain a copy from the lower forum. It is not the case of the petitioner that he filed an application before the learned subordinate Court for compliance of mandate of second proviso to section 115 (1) CPC and, therefore, the petitioner cannot be held entitled to get the benefit of section 12 of the Limitation Act for the time spent in obtaining certified copy of impugned decree from Copying Agency. In this regard reliance is placed on the cases of Said Muhammad v Sher Muhammad and 2 others (2001 MLD 1546) and Sultan Khan and 3 others v Sultan Khan (2004 MLD 918).  

 Part of Judgment 

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT, LAHORE. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT.

Civil Revision-Civil Revision(Against Decree)-Pre-emption
3543-14

2017 LHC 311

Revisional powers of the Court under Section 115 CPC, he has ninety days to make the petition, failing which the petition is liable to be dismissed.

5. Another aspect of the matter which dissuaded me to interfere with the concurrent findings of the learned Courts below is delay in filing revision petition. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Province of Punjab through District Officer Revenue Rawalpindi and others v Muhammad Sarwar (2014 SCMR 1358) has held that where an aggrieved party seeks redressal against the judgment or order through the revisional powers of the Court under Section 115 CPC, he has ninety days to make the petition, failing which the petition is liable to be dismissed. On being confronted with the said principle of law, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner on 11.08.2014 applied for obtaining certified copy of the impugned decree dated 09.07.2014; that the petitioner had been regularly visiting the copying branch for obtaining certified copy of the decree but the same was delayed; that the certified copy of the decree which though was prepared on 11.08.2014 but was delivered to the petitioner on 01.11.2014; and, that after getting the certified copy of the impugned decree, the petitioner filed revision petition before this Court on 25.11.2014. On the basis of said facts he contends that revision petition is not barred by time; and, that since office had raised objection, the petitioner filed an application (C.M.No.2 of 2014) for condonation of delay. He requests that if there is any delay, same may be condoned on the basis of afore stated facts. 

Part of Judgment 

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT, LAHORE. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT.

Civil Revision-Civil Revision(Against Decree)-Pre-emption
3543-14

2017 LHC 311

If a mandatory condition for the exercise of a jurisdiction before a Court, tribunal or authority is not fulfilled, then the entire proceedings....

 In “Izhar Alam Farooqi, Advocate v. Sheikh Abdul Sattar Lasi and others” (2008 SCMR 240) it was ruled by the honourable Supreme Court as below:

 “6. It is true that a Court which has the jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute and pass an order has also implicit power to have the order implemented and merely an erroneous order passed by the Court of competent jurisdiction does not render the order without jurisdiction. This is an established law that jurisdiction cannot be assumed with the consent of the parties and notwithstanding the raising of such an objection of the parties, the forum taking cognizance of the matter must at the first instance decide the question of its jurisdiction. There can be no exception to the principle that an order passed or an act done by a court or a tribunal not competent to entertain the proceedings is without jurisdiction and that it is mandatory for the court or tribunal as the case may be to attend the question of jurisdiction at the commencement of the proceedings because the jurisdictional defect is not removed by mere conclusion of trial or inquiry and objection to the jurisdiction can be raised at any subsequent stage. This court in Rashid Ahmad v. State PLD 1972 SC 271 held as under: - 

“If a mandatory condition for the exercise of a jurisdiction before a Court, tribunal or authority is not fulfilled, then the entire proceedings which follow become illegal and suffer from want of jurisdiction. Any orders passed in continuation of these proceedings in appeal or revision equally suffer from illegality and are without jurisdiction”. ”

 Part of Judgment 

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT BAHAWALPUR BENCH BAHAWALPUR

Writ Petition-Land-Direction to Departments
6382-19

2019 LHC 2976

Constitution, but is now referable to Article 38(a) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, in Chapter 2, relating to Principles of Policy.

The objective of the MRTPO came up before the august Supreme Court of Pakistan in Sanaullah Woolen Mills Ltd. and Another v. Monopoly Control Authority (PLD 1987 SC 202) while hearing an appeal against an order under the MRTPO wherein the august Supreme Court of Pakistan held that: 

This legislation is the first of its kind in Pakistan and was intended to provide measures against undue concentration of economic power, growth of unreasonable monopoly power and unreasonably restrictive trade practices to secure national interest of Pakistan in relation to its economic and financial stability. It was enacted before the Constitution, but is now referable to Article 38(a) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, in Chapter 2, relating to Principles of Policy. Such legislations became an important aspect of economic policies of almost all the western countries. Economic power belonging to the genus monopoly was commonplace with the economy but the enacting sections of our Ordinance regulating the undertaking’s undue concentration of power has no analogous in the world, and should, therefore, be regarded exceptional in the context of monopoly or antitrust legislations in the various countries of the world. (Emphasis added)

 Part of Judgment 

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT AT LAHORE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT 

Writ Petition
1024369.9518-09

2020 LHC 2274

Download Link

Accordance with law and the matter was thoroughly examined with regard to controversy in the two proceedings...

For ready reference it is expedient to refer the law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court involving the identical circumstances in Jewan and 7 others v. Federation of Pakistan through secretary, Revenue, Islamabad and 2 others (1994 SCMR 826), relevant portion whereof is as under:-

“Until such time the documents relating to earlier proceedings were brought on record in accordance with law and the matter was thoroughly examined with regard to controversy in the two proceedings, it was not possible for the Courts below to reach the conclusion that the present suit involves the same controversy which was decided in the earlier proceedings”.

 Part of Judgment 

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT, LAHORE. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT.

Civil Revision
1089-08

2017 LHC 4821

Attestation by witnesses under Article 17, QSO, not required for a Waqfnama

  Download Link PDF: https://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/downloads_judgements/c.a._154_l_2018.pdf 

Attestation by witnesses under Article 17, QSO, not required for a Waqfnama 

The question that arose for determination, before the Court was: whether a waqfnama is required to be attested by two men or one man and two women, as per provisions of Article 17(2)(a) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984? 

The Court answered the question in negative with the observations: “Since the waqfnama is not a document pertaining to financial or future obligations, therefore, to prove this document, the conditions of Article 17 of the Order of 1984 were not applicable.”

10. Anjuman-e-Khuddam-ul-Qur’an v. Najam Hameed

Present Mr. Justice Ijaz ul Ahsan and Mr. Justice Amin-ud-Din Khan 

 Download Link PDF: https://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/downloads_judgements/c.a._154_l_2018.pdf 

Plaint was sought on the ground that the matter was barred by res judicata and it has been rightly held that the same could be decided after framing regular issue and leading evidence

In Punjab Board of Revenue, Employees Cooperative Housing Society Limited v. Additional District Judge, Lahore and others (2003 SCMR 1284), relevant para whereof as under:- 

“the judgments passed by the Courts below in this case are perfectly in accordance with law for rejection of the plaint was sought on the ground that the matter was barred by res judicata and it has been rightly held that the same could be decided after framing regular issue and leading evidence”. 

 Part of Judgment 

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT, LAHORE. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT.

Civil Revision
1089-08

2017 LHC 4821

Procedure provided in the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, the validity of the said document cannot be determined/examined by the learned Courts below, hence the petitioners have been condemned un-heard.

3. Contention of learned counsel for the petitioners is that the learned trial Court after framing issues even with regard to any preliminary issue was obliged to provide opportunity to the parties to lead evidence so that fate of the suit should have been decided whereas in the instant case, the alleged suit claimed to be filed by mother of the present petitioners has not been confronted either to her or to the petitioners at any stage of the proceedings and unless and until it is not placed on record according to the procedure provided in the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, the validity of the said document cannot be determined/examined by the learned Courts below, hence the petitioners have been condemned un-heard. He has placed reliance on Muhammad Zubair and others v. Muhammad Sharif (2005 SCMR 1217) and Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Defence and another v. Jaffar Khan and others (PLD 2010 SC 604). Further contends that unless any document has been produced in evidence in proper way provided under the procedure, reliance cannot be placed on such document. Hence both the learned Courts below have committed material illegality and irregularity while passing the orders impugned, thus the same are un-sustainable in the eye of law.  

Part of Judgment 

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT, LAHORE. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT.

Civil Revision
1089-08

2017 LHC 4821

Parties must know the crucial and critical factual and legal aspects of the case which .....

I am also fortified from the case law reported in Haji Farman Ullah v. Latif-ur-Rehman (2015 SCMR 1708) which reads: 

“It may be pertinent to mention here that the purpose of framing issues in a civil litigation is that the parties must know the crucial and critical factual and legal aspects of the case which they are required in law to prove or disprove through evidence in order to succeed in the matter on facts and also the points of law”. 

Part of Judgment 

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT, LAHORE. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT.

Civil Revision
1089-08

2017 LHC 4821

Exercise of its powers under Section 148 CPC, as on the said date the trial Court had become functus officio by virtue of its judgment....

6. I am convinced by the ratio laid down in latest case-law of apex Court, reported as Muhammad Wahid and another v. Nasrullah and another (PLJ 2016 SC 25) relevant portion thereof, as under:- 

“Admittedly the appellants had made application for extension of time for deposit of balance sale consideration on 14.10.2008 after lapse of 40-days. Such application, in the given circumstances, could not have been granted by the learned trial Court in exercise of its powers under Section 148 CPC, as on the said date the trial Court had become functus officio by virtue of its judgment/decree dated 31.07.2008. The issue that the trial Court had passed a preliminary decree on the said date which became final on 31.10.2008, has no nexus with the condition incorporated in the decree of the trial Court which had specifically stated that in case of non-deposit of balance sale consideration within the stipulated time, the suit shall stand dismissed. Such a decree could have only been challenged by the appellants in appeal and the Appellate Court was competent to allow an application of the nature if justifiable grounds were found in such an application seeking extension of time for deposit of balance sale consideration. The jurisdiction with the trial Court was available only within the stipulated period of 40 days, and the moment this period of 40 days was over, it ceased to have jurisdiction and had become functus officio, in view of the condition incorporated in the decree.  

Said reiteration of august Supreme Court has binding force in view of Article 189 of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 in view whereof, it is held that the Appellate Court had become functus officio after lapse of time granted to make up deficiency of court fee to consider the application of the petitioner for extension of time in this regard, therefore, the petitioner has no justification to move such application. Resultantly, this petition having no merit stands dismissed. No order as to costs.

Part of Judgment 

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT, LAHORE. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT.

Civil Revision
3790-11

2017 LHC 4831

Suit for specific performance---Oral agreement to sell immovable property---Proof---Plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance of an oral agreement to sell immovable property

The petitioner’s foremost contention is that undeniably the stand of the respondents was based on oral agreement to sell whereas, the particulars of oral agreement to sell have not been explained in the alleged Iqrar Nama, which was sine qua non for getting a decree in a case of specific performance. Reliance is placed on Muhammad Nawaz through L.Rs. vs. Haji Muhammad Baran Khan through L.Rs. (2013 SCMR 1300), relevant portion whereof is reproduced hereunder:-

“Suit for specific performance---Oral agreement to sell immovable property---Proof---Plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance of an oral agreement to sell immovable property---Trial Court decreed the suit in favour of plaintiff---High Court set aside judgment and decree of Trial Court---Validity---Perusal of plaint showed that plaintiff had neither mentioned date of striking of bargain nor witnesses in whose presence the oral agreement to sell was arrived at were mentioned-- -No period was fixed for completion of oral agreement to sell and such fact did not find mention in the plaint-- -Names of alleged marginal witnesses of the oral agreement were not incorporated in the plaint----.”

 The second limb of his argument is that no one can be allowed to prove his case beyond the scope of pleadings as enunciated by the honourable Supreme Court in a case reported as Muhammad Wali Khan and another vs. Gul Sarwar Khan and another (PLD 2010 Supreme Court 965). In another case cited as Mubarak Ali and others vs. Khushi Muhammad and others (PLD 2011 Supreme Court 155) it has been held that no one can be allowed to plead and seek relief from the Courts on a plea not founded and embedded in his pleadings. In sequel to the said case law, the judgment reported as Combind Investment (Pvt.) Ltd. vs.Wali Bhai and others (PLD 2016 Supreme Court 730) is also referred, which pronounces that none of the parties to a judicial proceeding can be allowed to adduce evidence in support of a contention not pleaded by it and the decision of a case cannot rest on such evidence. 

 Part of Judgment 

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT, LAHORE. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT.

Civil Revision
2742-10

2017 LHC 4763

Cumulative effect of Order VI Rule 4 CPC read with Order VIII Rule 2 and other enabling provisions, by same stroke requires that the “defendant must raise” in written statement and specifically and particularly plead “all matters, ......

Download PDF Link : https://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/downloads_jud gements/c.p._1965_2019.pdf 

Present Mr. Justice Mushir Alam and Mr. Justice Maqbool Baqar In the context of an insurance claim, the Court was faced with the question: whether a defendant who has not raised the defence of limitation in his written statement filed in the suit can file an application under section 12(2) CPC agitating the ground of limitation, after final decision of the suit up to the apex Court? 

Doctrine of constructive res judicata explained :

The Court answered the question in negative while explaining the doctrine of constructive res-judicata with reference to the relevant provisions of CPC, thus: “Indeed, in adversarial proceedings a litigant has to cross the barrier of limitation, before his rights are adjudicated. Like Order II Rule (2) CPC mandates the Plaintiff to include the whole claim and seek all reliefs in a suit to which he is entitled, where a plaintiff omits to sue in respect of the portion so omitted to claim any relief to which he may be entitled, he cannot, except by leave of the Court, afterwards sue for any relief so omitted. Cumulative effect of Order VI Rule 4 CPC read with Order VIII Rule 2 and other enabling provisions, by same stroke requires that the “defendant must raise” in written statement and specifically and particularly plead “all matters, which show that the suit not to be maintainable or that the transaction is either void or voidable in point in law, and all such grounds of defence as, if not raised, would be likely to take opposite party by surprise or would raise issues of facts not arising out of the plaint as for instance fraud, limitation, release, payment, performance or facts showing illegality,”(Order VIII Rule 2 CPC) plea of misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, willful default or undue influence, and in all other cases in which particulars may be necessary” (Order 6 R 4 ibid). These rules of prudence require both the plaintiff and defendant to plead all facts that may constitute cause of action for any relief and for the defendant which may constitute a defence to specifically refute any claim on merits as well raising specific defense denouncing claim on the assertions of fraud, limitation, release, payment, performance or facts showing illegality. Unless such particulars are specifically pleaded in the plaint or in written statement as a defence other party may it be plaintiff or defendant would have no opportunity to controvert the same, as neither the issue could be framed nor, evidence could ordinarily be allowed to be raised or led at trial or attended in further appeals or revisions as the case may be. Failure to raise such plea at the first opportunity (either in plaint or written statement as the case may be) to assert any right or claim any relief where such rights and relief is founded on such assertion or raising such plea as a defence to contest and or controvert any such claim may well amount and be successfully be defeated on doctrine of constructive res-judicata, in subsequent proceeding” (Para 9)

Application of doctrine of equitable estoppel to insurance matters :

The Court also held the doctrine of equitable estoppel applicable to insurance matters, with the observations: “In addition to doctrine of constructive res-judicata, doctrine of equitable estoppel having received statutory recognition under Article 114 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 is gainfully applied in Insurance matter where the insurer uses the tool of surveyor, assessors and or investigators to investigate into claim of loss and assessment of damages and induce the insured to believe that the claim will be paid and or settled once the survey, assessment or investigation into loss or damages is completed in due course and then belatedly, refutes the claim putting the insured at disadvantage to bring claim within limitation. In all fairness, in such circumstances the insurer may be equitably estopped from raising plea of limitation as a defense to the Insurance claim in Court of law.” (Para 10)

 2. Jubilee General Insurance Company v. Ravi Steel Company 

Download PDF Link :  https://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/downloads_jud gements/c.p._1965_2019.pdf 

Gift deed, authenticity of ---Prerequisites for valid gift i.e. “offer” “acceptance” and “delivery of possession” not proved-----

3. Although both the learned Courts below after examining record of case decided factual position holding that the petitioners failed to prove the factum of gift as required by law through their elaborated judgments, however, the petitioners’ counsel, when confronted with the law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in a case reported as Mst. Saadia v. Mst. Gul Bibi (2016 SCMR 662) wherein beneficiary of gift has been desired to prove its basic/essential ingredients offer, acceptance and handing over possession by leading direct confidence inspiring evidence he tried to wriggle out of the situation but failed. It is expedient to reproduce the relevant Para of this judgment for ready reference:-

“----Gift deed, authenticity of ---Prerequisites for valid gift i.e. “offer” “acceptance” and “delivery of possession” not proved---Nonexamination of attesting witnesses of gift deeds---Interested witnesses presented to prove execution of purported gift deeds--- Non-production of original gift deeds along with the plaint---Evidence of Hand Writing Expert not helpful in circumstances where Photostat copies of purported gift deeds were used for comparing signatures--- Possibility of manipulation/substitution/subsequent addition of attesting witnesses could not be ruled out---Gift deeds could not be termed as valid in such circumstances”

 Part of Judgment 

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT, LAHORE. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT.

Civil Revision
776-10

2017 LHC 4816

Failed to prove performance of Talbe-Muwathibat as per mandate of law, the question of subsequent talb loses its value and no decree for possession through pre-emption can be passed in their favour

7. Pursuant to the above discussion, as the respondents/plaintiffs have failed to prove performance of Talbe-Muwathibat as per mandate of law, the question of subsequent talb loses its value and no decree for possession through pre-emption can be passed in their favour. Reliance is placed on Mst. SAHIB JAMALA v. FAZAL SUBHAN and 11 others (PLD 2005 Supreme Court 977). 

Part of Judgment 

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT, LAHORE.

Civil Revision-Civil Revision(Against Decree)-Pre-emption
2301-11

2017 LHC 986

Plaint nor in the notice talb-e-ishhad as such, meaning thereby he was not present at the time of making of talb-e-muwathibat,

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner/defendant has argued that impugned judgments and decrees are result of misreading and non-reading of evidence on record. The preemptors have failed to substantiate their stance by producing two truthful witnesses as per mandate of section 13 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 as Fazal Elahi, the other witness was not produced. Moreover, Muhammad Rasheed (P.W.7) deposed during his deposition that he alongwith his father made talb-e-muwathibat, but neither his name is depicted in the plaint nor in the notice talb-e-ishhad as such, meaning thereby he was not present at the time of making of talb-e-muwathibat, therefore, his statement is inadmissible in evidence but this aspect of the case has been ignored totally by the learned Courts below. Furthermore, there is no special power of attorney on behalf other legal heirs in favour of Muhammad Rasheed (P.W.7) as has been stated by him and the amended plaint has not been signed by all the legal heirs, so the requirements of provisions of Order VI, Rule 14 of the C.P.C. are missing, thus, the suit ought to have been dismissed instead of decreeing the same. There are material contradictions in the statements of the witnesses, but the same have been ignored and on the basis of surmises and conjectures, the impugned judgments and decrees have been passed, which resulted in miscarriage of justice. Both the learned Courts below while passing the impugned judgments and decrees have committed procedural and substantive illegalities and irregularities; hence, they have failed to exercise vested jurisdiction in accordance with law. Therefore, by allowing the civil revision (No.2301 of 2011), the impugned judgments and decrees may be set aside and suit instituted by the respondents/plaintiffs may be dismissed. Relies on Humayun Naseer Cheema and 3 others v. Muhammad Saeed Akhtar and others (2007 CLC 819-Lahore), Muhammad Hussain and others v. Ehsan Ullah (2008 MLD 382-Lahore), Jamal Din and others v. Muhammad Ishaq (2010 MLD 743-Lahore), Ghafoor Khan (deceased) through LRs. v. Israr Ahmed (2011 SCMR 1545) and Muzaffar Hussain v. Mst. Bivi and 7 others (PLD 2012 Lahore 12). 

 Part of Judgment 

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT, LAHORE.

Civil Revision-Civil Revision(Against Decree)-Pre-emption
2301-11

2017 LHC 986

Application is not for setting aside sale under Order XXI Rule 90 CPC but to set aside auction proceedings.

19. The case law relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner is not relevant to the facts of this case. In Mst. Nadia Malik case supra, the facts are that admittedly 1/4th amount paid through cheque and remaining amount was not paid in 15 days and instead application for extension of time was made. It was in these circumstances, august Court held sale to be nullity. Further said case being in banking jurisdiction application was under section 19(7) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 and apex Court held that 20% deposit condition cannot be applied to give premium to the auction purchaser over his default. However, in present case as discussed above, the 1/4th was deposited with Court auctioneer in time and auction purchaser was also ready to deposit the remaining 75% in time but could not deposit due to stay by revisional Court. He also sought guidance of executing Court, which allowed him to deposit 75% of amount after revision was disposed of. Beside above, in present case, instant application is not for setting aside sale under Order XXI Rule 90 CPC but to set aside auction proceedings. Similarly cases of Haji Zahid Saeed etc supra and Messrs Ali Match Industries etc supra are not applicable, being relating to cases where application under Order XXI Rule 90 was filed. Whereas in case of Sheikh Niamat Ali supra, Afzal Maqsood Butt supra, Muhammad Afzal Khan etc supra, admittedly 75% amount not deposit without due cause. In case of Khursheed Begum etc supra, the best property in locality was sold away on throw away price which resulted to injury due to material irregularities, which is not case here. In case of Brig. (Retd.) Mazhar-ul-Haq etc supra, Court held that non fixation of reserve price will have strong bearing on allegation of fraud but in this case, there is no question of fraud specially when the auction purchaser himself offered to cancel auction in his favour if his bid money be returned by objector/judgment debtor. 

 Part of Judgment 

 IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT MULTAN BENCH, MULTAN JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT.

Civil Revision-Civil Revision (Against Interim Order)
375-15

2017 LHC 1880

Erred while ignoring doctrine of “Radd” or “rule of exclusion”, whereby the latters/remote were to be excluded by the full sister being nearer

 2. Ch. Ehsan ul Haq Virk, Advocate, learned counsel for the petitioners while relying upon Saadullah and others Vs. Mst. Gulbanda and others (2014 SCMR 1205) and quoting verses of Sura An-Nisa interpreted by Peer Muhammad Karam Shah, an eminent religious scholar submitted that petitioner/plaintiff being full sister of the propositus under Para 65 of the Muhammadan Law of D.F. Mulla falls at serial No.6 of the residuary table, whereas the full brother’s sons to whom inheritance was also shared are figuring at serial No.9, but both the Courts below erred while ignoring doctrine of “Radd” or “rule of exclusion”, whereby the latters/remote were to be excluded by the full sister being nearer.

Part of Judgment 

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT, LAHORE.

Civil Revision
3109-11

2017 LHC 4565

Application under section 12(2) of the C.P.C. instead of moving an application for correction of entries.......

2. During course of arguments, the main thrust of the learned counsel for the petitioner was on the score that the learned Courts below failed to apply correct law on the subject, rather failed to adjudicate the matter with independent judicious mind, as correction of long standing entries in the revenue record did not come in the domain of the revenue hierarchy but to recourse the civil Court, being court of ultimate jurisdiction. Moreover, if at all the respondents were aggrieved of the judgment of learned trial court dated 16.06.1956, they would have filed an application under section 12(2) of the C.P.C. instead of moving an application for correction of entries incorporated in the mutation No.1403 Dated 26.02.1960 but this aspect has totally been ignored by the learned Courts below while delivering the impugned judgments and decrees. Both the learned Courts below have neither read the evidence on record nor perused the documents with the suit and have rendered the impugned judgments and decrees mere on the basis of surmises and conjectures, which has resulted in miscarriage of justice; hence, by allowing the civil revision in hand, the impugned judgments and decrees may be set aside, consequent whereof the suit instituted by the petitioner may be decreed, as prayed for. Relies on Sameen Khan and 4 others v. Haji Mir Zad and others (2002 CLC 754-Peshawar), Kala Khan and others v. Rab Nawaz and others (2004 SCMR 517) and Mst. Mumtaz Begum through Legal Heirs and others v. Muhammad Shafique and others (PLD 2009 Lahore 418). 

Part of Judgment 

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT, LAHORE.

Civil Revision-Civil Revision(Against Decree)
1386-11

2017 LHC 980

Transaction executed in favour of present petitioner was hit by the principle of lis pendens whereas the principle of lis pendens in the facts and circumstances involved in the case was not attracted, hence the impugned decisions are not sustainable in the eye of law.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the objections filed by the petitioner on the basis of registered sale deeds dated 19.03.1981 and 12.10.1986 qua same land purchased from principal owners namely Muhammad Sarwar and National Industrial Cooperative Finance Corporation, have not been taken into consideration in execution of decree dated 13.09.1971 passed by the learned trial Court and affirmed upto Hon’ble Supreme Court while dismissing Civil Petition No.1603-L of 2001 on 29.06.2004 holding that objections were not sustainable because the petitioner had purchased the suit land after passing of decree, hence the transaction executed in favour of present petitioner was hit by the principle of lis pendens whereas the principle of lis pendens in the facts and circumstances involved in the case was not attracted, hence the impugned decisions are not sustainable in the eye of law. He has placed reliance on Mst. Surayya Begum v. Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. and 4 others (PLD 1990 Lahore 4), Riaz Hussain and others v. Muhammad Akbar and others (2003 SCMR 181) and Muhammad Hussain & Co. Rice Dealers through Muhammad Hussain and 8 others v. Habib Bank Limited through Attorneys and 2 others 2005 CLD 1400 (Lahore).  

Part of Judgment 

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT, LAHORE.

Civil Revision
3674-11

2017 LHC 4782

Revenue Courts enjoy ample jurisdiction under section 172(2)(vi) of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967

3. Avowing the findings recorded by the learned Courts below in the impugned judgments, the learned counsel for the respondents No.1 to 5 has argued that the revenue authorities have not changed the verdict of the Civil Court dated 16.06.1956, rather have made correction with regard to implementation of the same in its true spirit and the revenue Courts enjoy ample jurisdiction under section 172(2)(vi) of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967 in this respect; therefore, the learned Courts below have rightly reached to the conclusion and have rightly non-suited the petitioner. The impugned judgments and decrees being well-versed and wellbalanced do not call for any interference in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction as both the learned Court below have exercised vested jurisdiction in an apt way. Dismissal of the instant revision petition has been prayed for. Relies on Dilmir and others v. Member, Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and 9 others (PLD 1991 Lahore 314), Malik Muhammad Nawaz and others v. Malik Hameedullah etc. (PLJ 2001 Revnue 5) and Dildar Ahmad and others v. Member (Judicial-III) BOR, Punjab, Lahore and another (2013 SCMR 906).

 Part of Judgment 

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT, LAHORE.

Civil Revision-Civil Revision(Against Decree)
1386-11

2017 LHC 980

Essential to prove the performance of Talbs in accordance with law, as elaborated under Section 13 of The Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 and when Talbs are not proved as per dictates and requirement of law,

6. It is, by now, a settled principle of law that in order to succeed in a suit for possession on the basis of pre-emption, it is mandatory and imperative as well as essential to prove the performance of Talbs in accordance with law, as elaborated under Section 13 of The Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 and when Talbs are not proved as per dictates and requirement of law, the same results fatal to the pre-emptor’s. 

In the present case, Muhammad Rasheed (P.W.7) appeared as pre-emptor on his behalf and on behalf of the other legal heirs of original pre-emptor, but he failed to produce any power of attorney executed in his favour authorizing him to appear on their behalf and deposed that he was present at the time of making of talb-e-muwathibat by his deceased father Muhammad Raman, but the plaint as well as alleged notice talb-i-ishhad is silent in this regard as neither in the plaint nor in the alleged notice of talb-i-ishhad his name emerges, rather name of Muhammad Sarwar and Fazal Elahi besides Bashir Ahmad (informer) appear; meaning thereby the statement of P.W.7 is beyond the pleadings and the same is inadmissible. A further question arises here that right to acquire suit property by exercising right of pre-emption accrues on the date of sale but when at that time the present respondents did not have such right, coupled with above scenario i.e. non-presence of Muhammad Rasheed (P.W.7) at the time of making of talb-imuwathibat, the suit ought to have been dismissed on this single score, as making of talb-i-muwathibat has not been proved by the respondents/plaintiffs in accordance with law; reliance is placed on Muzaffar Hussain v. Mst. Bivi and 7 others (PLD 2012 Lahore 12). 

Apart from the above, even if it is presumed and admitted for the sake of arguments that the respondents/plaintiffs have right of pre-emption against the present petitioner, even then non-appearance of the other respondents/plaintiffs except Muhammad Rasheed turns fatal to the respondents/plaintiffs, as right of pre-emption is a personal right, which can be exercised personally, which is missing in this case. In this regard reliance is placed on Humayun Naseer Cheema and 3 others v. Muhammad Saeed Akhtar and others (2007 CLC 819-Lahore). 

In addition to the above, the respondents/plaintiffs have failed to produce Fazal Elahi, before whom allegedly the original pre-emptor performed talb-i-muwathibat as his evidence can be termed as that of independent witness because the other witness namely Muhammad Sarwar is legal heir of Muhammad Ramzan, the original pre-emptor and is an interested witness; therefore, adverse presumption under Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 arises against the respondents/plaintiffs due to withholding of essential witness that had he been produced, he would not have supported their stance. Reliance is placed on Muhammad Hussain and others v. Ehsan Ullah (2008 MLD 382-Lahore). 

 Part of Judgment 

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT, LAHORE.

Civil Revision-Civil Revision(Against Decree)-Pre-emption
2301-11

2017 LHC 986

Purchased the suit land during pendency of the appeal before the Appellate court, hence the principle of lis-pendens is attracted

3. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No.1 while referring to para-6 of judgment of this Court passed in RSA 791/1976 contends that this question of fact has already been dealt with by this Court, hence there was no occasion for the executing Court or first Appellate Court to re-determine the same in presence of findings recorded by this Court while deciding the above said appeal. It is also added that this Court while deciding the appeal also observed that the matter is reportedly pending in a separate suit filed by Mst. Shaukat Ara challenging the transaction cancelled from the name of Muhammad Sarwar, therefore, adjudication of the same point raised by the petitioner in objection petition was out of question to be determined by the learned executing Court and learned lower Appellate Court, hence both the Courts below have not committed any illegality or irregularity while passing the impugned orders. Further submits that the petitioner had purchased the suit land during pendency of the appeal before the Appellate court, hence the principle of lis-pendens is attracted. Reliance is placed on Muhammad Ashraf Butt and others v. Muhammad Asif Bhatti and others (PLD 2011 SC 905) and Mst. Tabassum Shaheen v. Mst. Uzma Rahat and others (2012 SCMR 983). 

Part of Judgment 

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT, LAHORE.

Civil Revision
3674-11

2017 LHC 4782

The important words which have been used in the aforereferred rule are “appear” and “defend” (contest a suit filed under Order XXXVII CPC)

7. The important words which have been used in the aforereferred rule are “appear” and “defend”. The afore-noted words would show that in order to contest a suit filed under Order XXXVII CPC, a defendant has to file an application under Rule 3 of the Order for seeking leave to appear and defend the suit and if this application is accepted, may be subject to some condition, a defendant will be allowed to contest the suit however if his application is rejected, he shall have no right to “appear” in further proceedings of the suit and to “defend” his case, unlike the regular civil suits, wherein even if a defendant is proceeded against ex parte or during the course of the suit any adverse order is passed against him, he as of right can participate in further proceedings of the suit. Reliance can be placed on judgments reported as Ghulam Muhammad and others v. Mst. Irshad Begum and others [PLD 1964 Lahore 782], Habib Ismail Bajwa v. Khawaja Ghulam Mohy-ud-Din [PLD 1970 Lahore 428], Azizullah Khan and 4 others v. Arshad Hussain and 2 others [PLD 1975 Lahore 879] and Police Department through Deputy Inspector-General of Police and another v. Javid Israr and 7 others [1992 SCMR 1009]. 

 Part of Judgment 

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT, LAHORE.

Civil Revision-Civil Revision (Against Interim Order)
4664-16

2017 LHC 961

Declining application under Order VI Rule 17 C.P.C

 4. So far as the matter with regard to non-production of evidence is concerned, I have examined the case of petitioner in the light of judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court reported as Rana Tanveer Khan v. Naseer-ud-Din and others (2015 SCMR 1401) and I am of the affirmed view that the petitioner has not been granted adequate opportunity to lead evidence. On 23.02.2011 by rejecting the application under Order VI Rule 17 C.P.C. for seeking amendment in the plaint, the case was adjourned for 16.03.2011 for production of evidence and on the said date, the petitioner obtained time for production of evidence which was although granted but with caution that on account of non-production of evidence, her right to lead evidence will be closed and case was fixed for 21.03.2011 (after 5-days) and on the said date on account of non-availability of evidence, her right was struck off and suit was dismissed. Hon’ble Supreme Court in a case referred supra wherein the delinquent party had availed four opportunities with caution and for that reason Hon’ble Supreme Court held it enough and sufficient to meet the ends of justice but in the instant case only one opportunity was given to the petitioner, hence the view taken by the learned trial Court in not granting another opportunity to lead evidence by imposing cost is hereby declared harsh. I find it a fit case where this Court must exercise the power provided under Section 115 C.P.C., to rectify the wrong done by both the learned Courts below. Consequently, this revision petition is allowed, the order dated 23.02.2011 passed by the learned trial Court refusing to grant amendment in the plaint qua incorporation of subsequent transactions done by the defendants/respondents, is hereby set aside, as a result whereof, said application is allowed and the petitioner is permitted to incorporate all those transactions which had been made by the defendants in favour of other persons but before filing of suit and file the amended plaint accordingly within a period of 15-days from the date of entrustment of this case to the learned trail Court. Although on account of grant of permission for filing amended plaint the order and decree dated 21.03.2011, whereby the suit of the petitioner was dismissed on account of lack of evidence has become redundant, hence I set aside the same not only on this ground but also on the ground that adequate opportunity to lead evidence was not granted to the petitioner. At the same time the judgment of the learned first Appellate Court who did not adequately meet with the grounds taken in the memo of appeal with regard to the order passed by the learned trial Court declining application under Order VI Rule 17 C.P.C. being defective in this regard is also set aside, as a consequence whereof, the suit of the petitioner shall be deemed to be pending before the learned trial Court which shall re-adjudicate the same after receiving amended plaint and written statement in terms mentioned above.

Part of Judgment 

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT, LAHORE.

Civil Revision
839-12

2017 LHC 4767

Initial presumption in Pakistan is that a Muslim is a Sunni until the contrary is proved; and, that the burden to prove that the deceased was Shia is on the person alleging him to be not Sunni but Shia

The full Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of “Ghulam Shabbir and others v. Mst. Bakhat Khatoon and others” (2009 SCMR 644) has held that the initial presumption in Pakistan is that a Muslim is a Sunni until the contrary is proved; and, that the burden to prove that the deceased was Shia is on the person alleging him to be not Sunni but Shia.  

Part of Judgment
 THE LAHORE HIGH COURT LAHORE 
Civil Revision
1777836.955-15
2018 LHC 701

Produced by predecessor-in-interest of the respondents after permission for additional evidence,

11. During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the petitioners repeatedly argued that as the petitioners were not provided an opportunity to rebut the evidence produced by predecessor-in-interest of the respondents after permission for additional evidence, it is fit case for remand. In this regard, I do not agree with learned counsel for the petitioners firstly for the reason that remand of cases in routine has been deprecated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan as held in the cases reported as Shahida Zareen v. Iqrar Ahmad Siddique (2010 SCMR 1119) and Habib Ullah v. Azmat Ullah (PLD 2007 SC 271) and secondly only copies of public record were brought on record by the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents in addition to producing one Waseem Akhtar who was cross- examined by the petitioners at reasonable length, thus, the petitioners could not claim that they were not allowed an opportunity to unveil the truth by producing further evidence. Further, as the petitioners failed to rebut the fact regarding minority of predecessor-in-interest of the respondents at the time of making gift by her in the name of predecessor-ininterest of the petitioners, the very basis of their case fell to ground.  

Part of Judgment 

 IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT BAHAWALPUR BENCH, BAHAWALPUR

Civil Rev. Against Decree

337-09

2017 LHC 4412

The rights of a person in the land record in the Record of Rights, and such person feels aggrieved, for correction of such entries he has to approach Civil Court for declaration under section 53 of the Act or in other words under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act both the relief available being of the same nature and identical

Reference in this respect can be made to “RASTA MAL KHAN and others versus NABI SARWAR KHAN and others” (1996 SCMR 78) wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan held as under:- 

“10. Regarding bar of jurisdiction of the Civil Court under section 172, subsection (2), clause VI of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967 it may be pointed out that exclusion of jurisdiction of Civil Court relates to the correction of the entries made by the Revenue Officer in  performance of his duty without touching the right of the persons in the land, but whenever such entries interferes with the rights of a person in the land record in the Record of Rights, and such person feels aggrieved, for correction of such entries he has to approach Civil Court for declaration under section 53 of the Act or in other words under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act both the relief available being of the same nature and identical. The dispute herein pertained to the nature of the transactions in the suits for preemption based on the impugned mutation. The suits were therefore rightly held triable by the Civil Court.” 

Even this Court in the case of “ALLAH RAKHA and another versus MEMBER (REVENUE), BOARD OF REVENUE, PUNJAB, LAHORE and 22nd others” (2004 MLD 597) has also adopted the same principles.

 Part of Judgment 

 IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT RAWALPINDI BENCH RAWALPINDI JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Civil Revision-Civil Revision (Against Decree) u/s. 115, C.P.C.
672-11

2017 LHC 1965

Enforceable through the civil suit in respect of the evacuee property and that the suit was barred by section 113 of the Limitation Act, 1908 being not relevant for setting aside the judgment and decree under section 12(2), C.P.C.

Reliance in this behalf is placed on Mst. Nasira Khatoon and another Versus Mst. Aisha Bai and 12 others (2003 SCMR 1050), wherein it has been observed as under: 

“The contention of learned counsel that the exchange agreement, dated 12.2.1948 would not be enforceable through the civil suit in respect of the evacuee property and that the suit was barred by section 113 of the Limitation Act, 1908 being not relevant for setting aside the judgment and decree under section 12(2), C.P.C. the same would need no comments. The scope of this special provision can neither be extended beyond the grounds of fraud, misrepresentation and defect of jurisdiction enumerated therein nor the learned Division Bench of the High Court, seized of the matter, could sit over the judgment passed in Letters Patent Appeal.” (emphasis supplied)

 Part of Judgment 

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT, LAHORE. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Writ Petition-Miscellanous-Civil Suit
30622-14

2017 LHC 2371

Sections 29 and 31 of the Punjab Boards of Intermediate and Secondary Education Act, (XIII of 1976), came into consideration in number of judgments

7. Sections 29 & 31 of the Act came into consideration in number of judgments. Reliance in this regard may be placed on Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Lahore and another vs. Hassan Suleman (2000 SCMR 1415), the relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced below: 

“The only plea raised by the learned counsel appearing in support of this petition is that in terms of Sections 29 and 31 of the Punjab Boards of Intermediate and Secondary Education Act, (XIII of 1976), no act done, order made or proceedings taken by a Board in pursuance of the provisions of the Act could be called in question in any Court. Reliance in this behalf is placed on Muhammad Rafique vs. The Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education and others (1983 SCMR 1024). We are afraid, the precedent case is of no avail to the petitioner-Board in that the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts of plenary jurisdiction is admittedly attracted to the grant of a declaration in terms of Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act (I of 1877). The precedent relates to an unfair means case against the petitioner and the observation read in conjunction with the facts of the said case takes it out of the preview of the argument being advanced by the learned counsel in support of this petition. Moreover, the resolution of Issues Nos. 2 and 3 came about after recording evidence and it was respectively held thereunder by all the Courts below that the date of birth of the respondent/plaintiff was incorrectly recorded being against even the physio-chemistry of birth in the two brothers born on different dates, could not be lumped together for the purpose of determination of their dates of birth.” (emphasis supplied)

 Part of Judgment 

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT, LAHORE. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Writ Petition-Miscellanous-Civil Suit
30622-14

2017 LHC 2371

The decision of an application under Section 12(2) of “CPC” in a cursory manner without framing of issues is nowhere prohibited under the law.

11. The petitioners remained mum for a considerable period and now after the death of their father, who died in the year 2009 moved the application under Section 12(2) of “CPC” which is clearly based on ulterior motives. The learned Additional District Judge was justified to dismiss such frivolous application in limine. The decision of an application under Section 12(2) of “CPC” in a cursory manner without framing of issues is nowhere prohibited under the law. It is always dependent upon the judicial conscious of the court, either to frame issues or to proceed with such an application without framing of any issue and decide the same summarily. No hard and fast rule can be made for the said purpose. Apparently there is no infirmity in the procedure adopted by the court below to decide the fate of application under Section 12(2) of “CPC”. Reference can be made to “Messrs DADABHOY CEMENT INDUSTRIES LTD. and 6 others versus NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION, KARACHI” (2002 SCMR 1761) and “NAZIR AHMED versus MUHAMMAD SHARIF and others” (2001 SCMR 46)

 Part of Judgment 

 IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT RAWALPINDI BENCH RAWALPINDI JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Civil Revision-Civil Revision (Against Decree) u/s. 115, C.P.C.
310-17

2017 LHC 1913
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