-Protection of buyer--Section 53-A of Act, 1882 will come into play for protection of buyer only when buyer has performed his commitments substantially and is willing to perform remaining part of his promise, if any, and there is no other way in which buyer can be considered to have committed breach or there is indication of buyer breaching his promises when required to be met as per contract.

 PLJ 2022 Lahore 129 (DB)

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (IV of 1882)--

----S. 53-A--Proforming of commitments by buyer--Protection of
buyer--Section 53-A of Act, 1882 will come into play for protection of buyer only when buyer has performed his commitments substantially and is willing to perform remaining part of his promise, if any, and there is no other way in which buyer can be considered to have committed breach or there is indication of buyer breaching his promises when required to be met as per contract.                                       

                                                                                 [Pp. 132 & 133] A

Benefit of doctrine of part performance--

----Availability--Benefit of doctrine of part performance is not available to a person who seeks to acquire a valid title to property dealt with under a transaction which remains inchoate. [P. 133] B

Ref. 2000 SCMR 204.

Specific Relief Act, 1877 (I of 1877)--

----S. 9--Transfer of Property Act, (IV of 1882), S. 53-A--Non-entitlement of claim--Dismissal of suit for recovery of possession--Pendency of appeal in Supreme Court of Pakistan--Agreement to sell on basis of which appellants seek transfer of title over suit property was not accepted by High Court being invalid and accordingly their suit was dismissed--Appellants certainly are not entitled to claim benefit under said document and no protection as envisaged by Section 53-A of Act, 1882 can be extended to their possession--No person shall be deprived of his property save in accordance with law--Appellants have no authority or claim to retain possession of property merely on ground that they have filed an appeal before Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan wherein no injunctive order has been passed in their favour--Appeal was dismissed.          [Pp. 133 & 134] C, D & H

2004 CLD 232 ref.

Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--

----Art. 24, Deprivation of property--Breach of constitution--Creating hindrances in way of owner of property debarring him from enjoying benefits with regard to possession of property amounts to clear breach of Article 24 of Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973.                               [P. 133] E

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (V of 1908)--

----S. 144(1)(2)--Application for restriction--Where and in so far as a decree is varied or reversed Court of first instance shall, on application of any party entitled to any benefit by way of restitution or otherwise, cause such restitution to be made as will, so far as may be, place parties in position which they would have occupied but for such decree or such part thereof as has been varied or reversed; and, for this purpose, Court may make any orders, including orders for refund of costs and for payment of interest, damages, compensation and mense profits, which are properly consequential on such variation or reversal--No suit shall he instituted for purpose of obtaining any restitution or other relief which could be obtained by application under sub-section (1).   

                                                                                              [P. 134] I

Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 (XLV of 1860)--

----S. 441--Criminal trespass--Whoever enters into or upon property in possession of another with intent to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy any person in possession of such property, or, having lawfully entered into or upon such property, unlawfully remains there with intent thereby to intimidate, insult or annoy any such person, or with intent to commit an offence, is said to commit “criminal trespass”.      [P. 133] F

Words and Phrases--

----Annoyance--Word “annoyance” according to Black’s Law Dictionary, Ninth Edition, is meant for “nuisance” and has been defined as “A condition that interferes with use or enjoyment of property, especially a non-transitory condition or persistent activity that either injures physical condition of adjacent land or interferes with its use or with enjoyment of easements on land or of public highways”.   [P. 134] G

Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--

----Art. 5(2)--Obligation of citizen--Obedience to Constitution and law is inviolable obligation of every citizen wherever he may be and of every other person for time being within Pakistan. [P. 135] J

2004 CLD 232; 1983 SCMR 906 ref.

Mr. Muhammad Naveed Farhan, Advocate for Appellants.

Mr. Muhammad Farooq Warind, Advocate and Dr. Malik M. Hafeez, Advocate for Respondents.

Mr. Muhammad Javed Khan, Civil Judge 1st Class/Research Officer, Lahore High Court for Legal Assistance.

Date of hearing: 20.9.2021.


 PLJ 2022 Lahore 129 (DB)
[Bahawalpur Bench, Bahawalpur]
Present: Anwaarul Haq Pannun and Abid Hussain Chattha, JJ.
AHMAD WAQAS etc.--Appellants
versus
ISHTIAQ ALI etc.--Respondents
R.F.A. No. 114 of 2017, heard on 20.9.2021.


Judgment

Anwaarul Haq Pannun, J.--Through this Regular First Appeal, the judgment and decree dated 28.07.2017 passed by the learned Civil Judge 1st Class, Khanpur decreeing the suit for recovery of possession along with mesne profits filed by the respondents/plaintiffs against the appellants/defendants has been assailed. It is pertinent to mention here that the appeal filed by the appellants before the learned appellate Court below was returned because of lack of pecuniary jurisdiction.

2. The facts of this case in brief are that the respondents filed a suit for recovery of possession along with mesne profits with the averments that they handed over possession of their property (suit property) to one Muhammad Afzal on lease, but one Farooq Ahmad, the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants, in collusion with the said lessee after taking over the possession of the suit property, not only managed to forge an agreement to sell dated 08.05.1986 but also instituted a suit for specific performance against the respondents, which was decreed by the learned trial Court on 15.12.1996; the respondents filed an appeal against the said judgment and decree, which was dismissed by the learned lower appellate Court on 19.02.2004; they filed second appeal before this Court, which was accepted on 04.06.2015 resulting in dismissal of the suit for specific performance of agreement to sell filed by the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants, whereupon the suit for recovery of possession was filed by the respondents that since possession of the appellants over the suit property is illegal after dismissal of their suit for specific performance on the basis of a forged/ fictitious agreement to sell, therefore, they be put into possession of the properly. The appellants contested the suit by filing their written statement mainly on the ground that they are in possession of the suit property since 1986 on the basis of agreement to sell and suit of the respondents is hit by the principle of law of acquiescence; further that their appeal with regard to the suit property is pending before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan. On the basis of divergent pleadings of the parties, requisite issues were framed and evidence was recorded by the learned trial Court. Consequently, as stated earlier, the suit of the respondents was decreed by the learned trial Court. Hence, this appeal. It is worth mentioning here that allegedly a civil appeal has been filed by the appellants before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan against the judgment dated 04.06.2015 passed by this Court, as mentioned above, in R.S.A No. 02 of 2004 relating to the suit for specific performance of agreement.

3. Arguments heard. Record perused.

Description: A4. The only ground on which the judgment and decree of the learned Court below is sought to be set aside is that possession of the appellants over the suit property is protected on the basis of equitable doctrine of part performance i.e. existence of agreement to sell the property and the transferees were put in possession of the property in part performance of the agreement, as embodied in Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred to be “the Act, 1882). We are afraid, the essence of handing over the possession as contemplated in Section 53-A of the Act, 1882 lies not merely in handing over possession but lies in the intention of the transferor to transfer the ownership rights of the property for consideration in favour of the transferee. Section 53-A of the Act, 1882 is to protect interest of a buyer of the property who has satisfied his commitments and is also willing to honour his commitments, and in that eventuality the transferor cannot go against him and take back possession or cancel the sale. In case the buyer has made defaults or from his conduct it appears that he will not fulfill his promises which are required to complete the sale then the buyer may not get protection of Section 53-A of the Act, 1882 and the seller can cancel the sale and repossess the property. In other words, it can be said that Section 53-A of the Act, 1882 will come into play for protection of the buyer only when the buyer has performed his commitments substantially and is willing to perform the remaining part of his promise, if any, and there is no other way in which the buyer can be considered to have committed breach or there is indication of the buyer breaching his promises when required to be met as per contract. If there is no sale, then Section 53-A of the Act, 1882 will not be helpful. The benefit of the doctrine of part performance is not available to a person who seeks to acquire a valid title to the property dealt with under a transaction which remains inchoate. Reliance is placed on the dictum reported as Muhammad Yousaf vs. Munawar Hussain and 5 others (2000 SCMR 204). In the instant case, the agreement to sell on the basis of which the appellants seek transfer of title over the suit property was not accepted by this Court being invalid and accordingly their suit was dismissed vide judgment dated 04.06.2015, meaning thereby payment of sale consideration and delivery of possession under the agreement to sell has not been proved and even the disputed agreement to sell itself remained legally unproved, therefore, under the law, the appellants certainly are not entitled to claim the benefit under the said document and no protection as envisaged by Section 53-A of the Act, 1882 can be extended to their possession. In this context, reference is made to the judgments reported as Abdul Khaliq vs. Muhammad Asghar Khan and 02 others (PLD 1996 Lahore 367) and Noor Muhammad vs. Abdul Ghani (2002 CLC 88). Moreover, Article 24(1) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, envisages that no person shall be deprived of his property save in accordance with law. Needless to observe that creating hindrances in the way of owner of the property debarring him from enjoying the benefits with regard to possession/use of the property amounts to clear breach of Article 24 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. Reliance is placed on the judgment reported as Watan Party and another vs. Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 2011 SC 97).

Description: EDescription: DDescription: CDescription: B5. It may be appropriate to observe that to safeguard the every precious rights conferred upon a citizen under the above referred Article, remedies are available to owner of the property on civil as well as criminal side and he has the right to recover possession of the property by having a resort not only to the Civil Court but can also seek the offender punished for committing this continuous offence by setting the machinery of law into motion on criminal side. It may not be out of context to refer the provisions of Section 441 of Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, which read as under:

Description: FCriminal trespass. Whoever enters into or upon property in the possession of another with intent to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy any person in possession of such property, or, having lawfully entered into or upon such property, unlawfully remains there with intent thereby to intimidate, insult or annoy any such person, or with intent to commit an offence, is said to commit “criminal trespass”.

Description: GIt may be observed that causing annoyance by retaining possession over a property owned by others without any lawful excuse, amounts to committing a continuous offence. The word “annoyance” according to the Black’s Law Dictionary, Ninth Edition, is meant for “nuisance” and has been defined as “A condition that interferes with the use or enjoyment of property, especially a non-transitory condition or persistent activity that either injures the physical condition of adjacent land or interferes with its use or with the enjoyment of easements on the land or of public highways”. It has further been defined that the general distinction between a nuisance and a trespass is that the trespass flows from a physical invasion and the nuisance does not.

Description: H6. Since in the instant case, the alleged agreement to sell on the basis of which the appellants claim that they had been handed over possession of the property as part performance has since been found to be not enforceable for the reasons recorded in the judgment of this Court, therefore, in sum and substance the appellants have no authority or claim to retain possession of the property merely on the ground that they have filed an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan wherein no injunctive order has been passed in their favour. Moreover, the reservation expressed by the learned counsel for the appellants that in case by way of execution of the judgment under challenge, possession of the suit property is delivered to the respondents and the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan decides the matter in favour of the appellants, they shall suffer irreparable loss. Suffice it to say that there exists no occasion for any harm or loss to the appellants in case the decree under execution is reversed or the suit for specific performance filed by the appellants regarding which the appeal has been filed by the appellants is decreed, as in order to cater both the eventualities the law has provided a remedy in the shape of Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which is the complete answer to the above submission and apprehension made by the learned counsel, and reads as under:

Description: I“Application for restitution.--(1) Where and in so far as a decree is varied or reversed the Court of first instance shall, on the application of any party entitled to any benefit by way of restitution or otherwise, cause such restitution to be made as will, so far as may be, place the parties in the position which they would have occupied but for such decree or such part thereof as has been varied or reversed; and, for this purpose, the Court may make any orders, including orders for the refund of costs and for the payment of interest, damages, compensation


and mense profits, which are properly consequential on such variation or reversal.

(2) No suit shall he instituted for the purpose of obtaining any restitution or other relief which could be obtained by application under sub-section (1).”

Moreover, a successful vendee can be put into possession of the suit property after passing of the decree for possession through specific performance of a contract.

Description: J7. The appellants at the moment have no right whatsoever to retain their possession over the disputed property as required by Article 5(2) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, which ordains that obedience to the Constitution and law is the inviolable obligation of every citizen wherever he may be and of every other person for the time being within Pakistan. Moreover, admittedly no injunctive order has been issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the appeal filed against the judgment of this Court dated 04.06.2015. In the dictum reported as H.M. Fazil Zaheer vs. Kh. Abdul Hameed and others (1983 SCMR 906), the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan has held that mere filing of appeal or revision does not operate as stay order and prohibition or restraint cannot be implied but must be clearly expressed and communicated. In the judgment reported as Messrs Agro Dairies (Pvt.) Limited throush Director and 02 others vs. Messrs Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan through Branch Manager and 03 others (2004 CLD 232) it has been observed that mere filing or pendency of petition/appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court does not operate as a stay or restraint order.

8. In view of all above, no case for interference by this Court in this appeal is made out and the same is accordingly dismissed.

(Y.A.)  Appeal dismissed

--Cancellation of inheritance mutation--Laws of inheritance as per Islamic Shariat were not applicable-

 PLJ 2022 SC 281

West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962 (V of 1962)--

----S. 2-A--Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 184(3)--Cancellation of inheritance mutation--Laws of inheritance as per Islamic Shariat were not applicable--Purported exclusion of other legal heirs--Decision with regard to date of purported acquisition by two sons--Leave to appeal was granted--Appeal was dismissed--Purported acquisition by two sons was through inheritance mutation number 2207, which was after cut-off date of 15 March 1948--Therefore, inheritance mutation number 2207 and purported acquisition by sons cannot be saved as being contrary to application of Islamic Shariat law of inheritance--Consequently, it was correctly cancelled--And, all legal heirs of Allah Ditta are entitled to his estate as per their respective shares in accordance with Islamic Shariat.      [P. 284] A

Mr. M. Ishtiaq Ahmed Raja, ASC for Appellants.

Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Abbasi, ASC and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah AOR for Respondent Nos.  2-4.

Respondents Nos.  1-A C(i)-(v), 15 & 16, Ex-parte.

Mr. Zahid Mehmood Abbasi, Attorney for Respondent No. 1-B.

Date of hearing: 19.4.2022.


 PLJ 2022 SC 281
[Appellate Jurisdiction]
PresentQazi Faez Isa and Yahya Afridi, JJ.
Mst. RAJ BEGUM (deceased) through her L.Rs and others--Appellants
versus
Mst. AJAIB JAN (deceased) through her L.Rs and others--Respondents
C.A. No. 230 of 2016, decided on 19.4.2022.
(On appeal from the judgment dated 06.05.2013 passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in C.R. No. 121/13)


Judgment

Qazi Faez Isa, J.--Allah Ditta died in the year 1947 or 1948. He was survived by a widow, two sons and three daughters. Inheritance mutation number 2207 in the names of his two sons was attested on 6 April 1956 and showed them as the sole heirs to the agricultural land of Allah Ditta measuring 53 kanals and 13 marlas. A suit was filed by Allah Ditta's daughters, who claimed their inheritance and sought cancellation of inheritance mutation number 2207. The suit was decreed, the appeal against the same was dismissed, and so too was the civil revision filed in the High Court by the appellants. It is against these three concurrent judgments that a petition for leave to appeal (CPLA No. 1252/2013) was filed and leave was granted vide order dated 24 February 2016.

2. The learned Mr. M. Ishtiaq Ahmed Raja, representing the appellants (who are the legal heirs of the sons), states that, at the time of death of Allah Ditta laws of inheritance as per Islamic Shariat were not applicable and as per prevailing custom sons alone were entitled to the estate of their father. In this regard reliance was placed on the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962 (‘the 1962 Act’). Section 2-A of the 1962 Act stipulates that, ‘where before the commencement of the Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1948, a male heir had acquired any agricultural land under custom' he 'shall be deemed to have become, upon such acquisition, an absolute owner of such land, as if such land had devolved on him under the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat)' The learned counsel submits that the said Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1948 ('the 1948 Act’) was enacted on 15 March 1948 ('the cut-off date’). Therefore, since Allah Ditta died prior to the cut­ off date his sons alone would become the owners of his estate, to the exclusion of the other legal heirs. To support his contention reliance is placed on the decision in the case of Ghulam Haider v. Murad (PLD 2012 SC 501).

3. Learned Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Abbasi, who represents two daughters/their legal heirs, submits that the three concurrent judgments had correctly applied the facts and the applicable law. Therefore, this appeal be dismissed. He further states that there is nothing on record to establish that the two sons had acquired the said agricultural land before the 1948 Act was enacted. On the contrary, learned counsel says, admittedly the sons purported to acquire the said land pursuant to inheritance mutation number 2207, which was made in their favour of on 6 April 1956, that is, long after the cut-off date of 15 March 1948, And, Section 2-A of the 1962 Act requires the male heir to have ‘had acquired any agricultural land under custom’ before the cut-off date. However, the sons, as per their own showing, had acquired the said land after the cut-off date. It is next submitted that the decision in Ghulam Haider v. Murad also does not support the sons' claim of exclusive ownership, as therein the mutation in favour of the son was made in the year 1944, that is, before the cut-off date. The decision in Ghulam Haider v. Murad had stated that acquisition prior to the cut-off date was essential for a son or sons to claim exclusive ownership, as under:

"However, as regards Murad's suit filed against Mutation No. 5631 attested on 28.02.1959 in favour of Mst. Sehati and Mst. Bano the said suit should also have failed because the land subject matter of that mutation had never been formally "acquired" by Murad before March 15, 1948. Section 2-A introduced through Ordinance XIII of 1983 was applicable only to those acquisitions of agricultural land which acquisitions had come about prior to March 15, 1948 and in the case of the land subject matter of Mutation No. 5631 there was no formal acquisition of that land by Murad till attestation of that mutation on 28.02.1959 and, thus, after March 15, 1948 the said land could have devolved upon the heirs of Lal deceased only under the Islamic law of inheritance and not under the customary law of inheritance which by then had become extinct. In this view of the matter the suit filed by Murad challenging Mutation No. 5631 attested on 28.02.1959 was liable to be dismissed."

The aforesaid (extract from paragraph 11, at page 542), according to learned counsel, clinches the argument in favour of all legal heirs.

4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and with their able assistance examined the documents on record, the applicable laws and the cited judgment. In our considered view the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent is correct. Because, even if it be accepted that Allah Ditta died before the cut-off date of 15 March 1948 the two sons had not acquired the said land, and, thus, excluded the other legal heirs. The purported exclusion of the other legal heirs took place when inheritance mutation number 2207 took place in the sons' favour on 6 April 1956, which was after the cut-off date of 15 March 1948. The sons had relied upon the inheritance mutation number 2207 to establish their acquisition but such purported acquisition did not accord with the requirements of the 1962 Act, the enactment date of the 1948 Act and the interpretation there of by this Court in the case of Ghulam Haider v. Murad.


Description: A5. Leave to appeal was granted by recording learned Mr. M. Ishtiaq Ahmed Raja's contention (which has also been noted by us above) with regard to the 1962 Act, the enactment date of the 1948 Act and the decision in the case of Ghulam Haider v. Murad (above). And, we have considered the application of the 1962 Act, the 1948 Act and the said decision with regard to the date of purported acquisition by the two sons. Admittedly, the purported acquisition by the two sons was through inheritance mutation number 2207, which was after the cut-off date of 15 March 1948. Therefore, the inheritance mutation number 2207 and the purported acquisition by the sons cannot be saved as being contrary to the application of Islamic Shariat law of inheritance. Consequently, it was correctly cancelled. And, all the legal heirs of Allah Ditta are entitled to his estate as per their respective shares in accordance with Islamic Shariat.

6. Therefore, for the aforesaid reasons, this appeal is dismissed. In case the judgments of the subordinate Courts and of the High Court have still not been implemented by the concerned authority, and the ownership of all the legal heirs of Allah Ditta is not recorded in the property records, the same should be done immediately, as decades have already passed since the death of Allah Ditta and some of his legal heirs have remained deprived of their inheritance.

(R.A.)  Appeal dismissed

Thumb-Impression-- It is settled practice of Courts not to base findings merely on expert’s opinion. -- -Filing a suit for declaration, Article 120 of Limitation Act, 1908 provides limitation of six years from date of right to sue.

 PLJ 2022 Lahore 118

Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 (10 of 1984)--

----Art. 49--Land Revenue Act, (XVII of 1967), S. 42--Title qua immovable property--Mutation--Scope of-- It is well established by now that mutation per se is not deed of title and party relying upon its entries is always bound to prove transaction reflected therein.                                                

                                                                                             [P. 120] A

Ref. AIR 1930 PC 93; AIR (35) 1948 PC 210; PLD 1965 Lahore 472; 1992 SCMR 1832 PLD 1988 Lahore 45.

Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 (10 of 1984)--

----Art. 49--Mutation containing sale transaction--Financial liability--Marginal witness--Examination of Tehsildar out of its signatories by beneficiary was not enough to meet with legal requirement--Impugned mutation was not liable to be taken as evidence, its attestation was established or sale transaction embodied therein proved, especially, when marginal witness while appearing on behalf of plaintiff created serious doubts in veracity of disputed mutation.    [P. 122] B

Ref. 2016 SCMR 986.

Witness--

----Attestation of mutation--Allegation of lady--Not personally known--Thus allegation of lady that she was impersonated could not be rebutted.                                                       [P. 122] C

Thumb-Impression--

----Expert opinion--Doubtful report--Opinion of an Expert is always a weak, type of evidence and is not that of conclusive nature--It is so weak and decrepit as scarcely to deserve a place in our system of jurisprudence--Expert’s testimony recorded in case in hand cannot be treated as substitute of available direct evidence. It is settled practice of Courts not to base findings merely on expert’s opinion.                             

                                                                                             [P. 124] D

Ref. 2004 SCMR 1859, 2006 SCMR 193.

Land Revenue Act, 1967 (XVII of 1967)--

----S. 42--Limitation Act, (IX of 1908), Art. 120--Suit was filed after 11 years of sanction of mutation--Beneficiaries failed to prove--A document which was procured by playing fraud, can be challenged at any stage of time--Plaintiff prayed for declaring mutation in dispute as illegal, which was implemented in relevant record of right--Every new entry in revenue record gives fresh cause of action to plaintiff and adverse entries therein even if are allowed to remain unchallenged does not necessarily extinguish right of party against whom such entry are renewed [P. 126] E

1995 SCMR 284.

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (V of 1908)--

----S. 115--Civil revision--Jurisdictional defect--Appellate Court below misconstrued available evidence and law on subject, which being tainted with misreading/ non-reading of evidence as well as suffering from jurisdictional defect fully calls for interference by applying exceptions provided u/S. 115 of Code, 1908.     [P. 127] G

Limitation Act, 1908 (IX of 1908)--

----S. 120--Limitation for filing of suit--Filing a suit for declaration, Article 120 of Limitation Act, 1908 provides limitation of six years from date of right to sue.                                [P. 126] F

Miss Gulzar Butt, Advocate for Petitioner.

Mr. Sajjid Ali, Advocate for Respondents.

Date of hearing: 11.2.2021.


 PLJ 2022 Lahore 118
Present: Ch. Muhammad Masood Jahangir, J.
Mst. NOOR ELAHI--Petitioner
versus
MUHAMMAD ABBAS etc.--Respondents
C.R. No. 203 of 2008, heard on 11.2.2021.


Judgment

Undisputedly, the subject area was titled by the present petitioner, who claiming her to be a folk/illiterate lady, on 26.04.1992 brought declaratory suit against respondents, asserting that the said, land was only leased out, but while impersonating her, the respondents managed its transfer in their favour vide oral sale Mutation No. 192 dated 25.04.1981, whereas neither she offered its sale nor received any consideration, therefore, it being forged, fictitious as well as collusive was inoperative upon her rights and liable to be cancelled. The respondents/defendants (who inter se were brothers) obviously contested the suit through their written statement while pleading that suit area had been purchased by them, that the vendor/plaintiff in the company of her husband as well as attesting witnesses had appeared before Revenue Officer, who after recording the statement of the plaintiff and affixing her thumb-impressions over the Pert, sanctioned the subject mutation.

The parties to prove their respective stances produced evidence in pros & cons. As a result of appreciation thereof, the learned Trial Court decreed suit in hand and cancelled the mutation in dispute through judgment dated 17.06.2004, but the learned Appellate Court after analyzing the material with different angle dismissed the suit while reversing decree of the subordinate Court vide impugned judgment of 01.11.2007. Thus, the instant civil revision on behalf of the petitioner/plaintiff.

2. Arguments heard and record consulted.

Description: A3. Before adverting to the salient features of the case, it is to be added that mutation proceedings are initiated primarily for fiscal purposes to collect the land revenue and is only meant for maintaining the record. It is again not disputed that the revenue official/officer enters and attests the mutation during summary proceedings, which by no stretch of imagination can be considered judicial proceedings wherein right title qua immoveable property is determined. Although these proceedings made under Section 42 of the Land Revenue Act, 1967 are admissible under Article 49 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 and some presumption is also attached thereto, but it is always rebuttable. It is well established by now that mutation per se is not deed of title and the party relying upon its entries is always bound to prove the transaction reflected therein. In holding so, I am fortified by the law laid down in Gangabai and others vs. Fakirgowda Somaypagowda Desaiand others (A.I.R.1930 PC 93), Durga Prasad and another vs. Ghanshiam Das and others (A.I.R. (35) 1948 PC 210), Muhammad and others vs. Sardul (PLD 1965 Lahore 472), and Hakim Khan vs. Nazeer Ahmad Lughmani and 10 others.(1992 SCMR 1832). Whereas this Court in the judgment titled M. Malik vs. Mst. Razia (PLD 1988 Lahore 45) defined the ‘sale’ as under:

“Sale means transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part paid and part promised where sale was made orally and reported Patwari by parties thereto who had admitted payment of the consideration and delivery of possession on the basis whereof mutation was entered. Sale would be effected and completed on that day and not when mutation in respect thereof was sanctioned.”

The august Supreme Court further elaborated the paramount ingredients of sale in Ali Muhammad and others vs. Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner and others (1984 SCMR 94) to the following effect:

“Sale is defined as being a transfer of ownership for sale -price is an absolute transfer of rights in property sold and no rights are left in transferor. Essential elements of sale are (i) the parties; (ii) subject matter; (iii) transfer or conveyance and (iv) price or consideration.”

Whereas, according to Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, it is to be established on record that the sale price has been passed on to the vendor and in default thereof, sale is not completed.

4. While keeping in mind aforesaid features, when case of the parties consulted, the petitioner/plaintiff in paras 3 to 6 of the plaint narrated detail of the alleged malpractices, misrepresentation and fraud played upon her to usurp suit land. The respondents/defendants denied the said allegations while asserting that genuine transaction of sale was effected and after making payment of the consideration, the disputed mutation was properly attested. The said mutation was sanctioned on the attestation of Shafi Muhammad (PW2) & late Khan Bahadur Lumberdar, the father of PW3, whereas it was attested on the verification of Muhammad Ashiq (PW4), the husband of the plaintiff. As per available record, out of them two signatories (PW2 & 4) as well son (DW3) of third because the latter had already passed away was produced by the plaintiff. Out of those, PW1 explicitly worded that the plaintiff had never sold out suit area and consideration was also not paid to her, that she did not appear before the Tehsildar in his presence, and that she did not thumb-mark the sale mutation before him. He further stated that only for procuring some loan, his own thumb-impression was procured by the Patiuari. The next witness Riasat Ali (PW3) deposed on oath that his father Khan Bahadur though was Lumberdar, but he was illiterate person, who prior to his death told him that Patwari had managed his thumb-impression while cheating him, whereas plaintiff according to his knowledge never sold out subject land. On the same lines Muhammad Ashiq (PW4), who admittedly is husband of the plaintiff stated under oath that his wife had neither sold out the suit land nor she turned up before the Tehsildar and that he as well never appeared before the said officer or signed the subject mutation.

Description: BIn response, the beneficiary though examined the Patzvari (DW5), but he was not the one, who either entered the mutation under dispute or attested in his presence. Although, the concerned Tehsildar (DW4) endorsed the genuine sanction of the disputed mutation, but admitted that consideration was not paid before him, whereas it was only acknowledged by the plaintiff/vendor that she had already received it. As a matter of law, subject mutation containing sale transaction was document pertaining to financial liability, thus required to be strictly proved. The examination of Tehsildar out of its signatories by the beneficiary was not enough to meet with the legal requirement. As such, the impugned mutation was not liable to be taken as evidence, what to talk that its attestation was established or the sale transaction embodied therein proved, especially, when the marginal witness while appearing on behalf of the plaintiff created serious doubts in the veracity of disputed mutation. See Islam-ud-Din through LRs and others vs. Mst. Noor Jahan through LRs. and others (2016 SCMR 986), wherein it was held that:

“The attesting witnesses of .all the three mutations are Muhammad Rashid son of Maula and Akbar Jan son of Mehr Jan, however, only one witness (Muhammad Rashid) was produced and no any reason was given for the non-production of Akbar Jan. Article 79 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 stipulates that a document “shall not be used in evidence until two attesting witnesses at least had been called for the purpose of proving its execution”.

Description: CApart therefrom, the Revenue Officer (DW4) during the cross-examination conceded that the plaintiff was not personally known to him, as such he could not say with certainty that she along with the witnesses actually appeared before him for attestation of mutation or not, thus the allegation of the lady that she was impersonated could not be rebutted. Even otherwise, father of respondents/ beneficiaries while appearing as DW2 during the cross-examination stated that the plaintiff/lady at that moment was about 15/16 years old and she (in 1981) was paid consideration of currency notes valuing rupees 500/1000, whereas learned counsel for the plaintiff on the strength of “Pakistani rupee - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia” pointed out that notes of rupees 500 were introduced in 1986 followed by denomination of 1000 rupees in the next year. This position was strengthened when printed material to this extent was provided by the learned counsel for the petitioners, which is also retained on the file. The learned counsel for the beneficiaries after going through the same fell in great difficulty to respond the same satisfactorily and this situation provided much corroboration to the stance of the petitioner. In absence of proof that consideration was made good, the sale definitely could not be established.

5. Mr. Sajid Ali, Advocate for the respondents submitted that apart from mutation, the vendor herself reported the transaction to the Patwari, who recorded the same in the Register Roznamcha Waqiati, therefore, mutation duly supported by the report recorded in the Daily Diary could not be annulled. Suffice it to say that no doubt rapat Roznamcha Waqiati (Exh.D5) was brought on record, but without recording statement of its maker. There is no hesitation to hold that rapat Roznamcha Waqiati is not per se admissible, whereas exhibition of document as well as proof of its contents are two different aspects and the latter to me is more relevant and important, which to the extent of Exh.D5 was lacking here. Moreover in judgment reported as Zulfiqar and others vs. Shahdat Khan (PLD 2007 SC 582) the apex Court while dealing with a rapat Roznamcha Waqiati recorded on behalf of vendor has already held it to be against intention of relevant provision of law. The pertinent conclusion being relevant is reproduced as under:

“Although Roznamcha Waqiati is required to be maintained under the West Pakistan Land Revenue Rules, 1968 and entry made during the course of performance of official duty is admissible yet if the report contains the statement of a private individual, it is required to be proved to establish its correctness. It may also be noted here that under Section 42 of The West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967 it is the person acquiring a right in the land who has to make such a report to the Patwari Halqa. However, in the case in hand the report way made by the vendor and, therefore, within the scope of Section 42, it is even doubtful whether such a report, at the instance of vendor (a person alienating his right) could be said to have been recorded by the Pahvari in the discharge of his official duty.”

In addition thereto, Roznamcha itself is not a document to confer title in view of bar contained in Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908, ‘but the respondents being beneficiaries were required not only to lead solid evidence that the petitioner had sold out the suit land to him and also received its price as a whole or in part. This view finds support from the judgment of the august Supreme Court reported as Tooti Gul and 2 others vs. Irfanuddin (1996 SCMR 1386). Moreover, these entries were also not confronted to the plaintiff/alleged vendor (PW1), when she appeared in the witness box.

6. The next emphasis of Mr. Sajid Ali that the Revenue Officer (DW4) in his depositions explicitly deposed that vendor admitted before him that she had already received sale proceed, thus her statement duly supported by the entry recorded during sanction of mutation was enough to prove that consideration was received by the vendor/plaintiff, was again not well founded. The august Supreme Court even in a case wherein registered sale instrument was under question held that mere an admission as to receipt of sale price before Attesting Officer could not be taken as conclusive proof. See Muhammad Shafi and other vs. Allah Dad Khan (PLD1986 SC 519).

Description: D7. The other argument of learned counsel for respondents that the disputed mutation was referred to Finger Expert Bureau to compare alleged thumb-impression of the plaintiff, who (DW6) reported it to be identical with the admitted one, therefore, the stance of the plaintiff was falsified is not well founded. Although, Expert opined the similarity, but he also endorsed that by putting another thumb-impression over the already existed thumb mark available on the subject mutation, it was tried to be impaired, thus made the report doubtful. Even otherwise, the opinion of an Expert is always a work, type of evidence and is not that of conclusive nature. It is so weak and decrepit as scarcely to deserve a place in our system of jurisprudence. In view of this infirmity, the Expert’s testimony recorded in the case in hand cannot be treated as substitute of available direct evidence. It is settled practice of Courts not to base findings merely on expert’s opinion. In this regard, reference can be made to a case reported as Syed Muhammad Umer Shah vs. Bashir Ahmed (2004 SCMR 1859) wherein it was held as under:

“After scanning the entire evidence on record and after going through the concurrent findings, we are of the firm view that the only opinion of a Handwriting Expert, otherwise a weak piece of evidence, should not be allowed to prevail against strong circumstances and strong evidence giving inference, altogether, to the contrary. When once the petitioner had failed to prove his case on the basis of the very evidence produced by him, he cannot be given the benefit of the only favouarble opinion by the Expert, being otherwise a weak piece of evidence.”

This view was again affirmed by the same Court in case Mst. Saadat Sultan and others vs. Muhammad Zahur Khan and others (2006 SCMR 193) in the following words:

We have carefully examined the contentions as adduced on behalf of petitioners in the light of relevant provisions of law and record of the case. We have scanned the entire evidence and perused the judgments of learned trial and Appellate Courts as well as the judgment impugned. Let we make it clear at the outset that the opinion of Handwriting Expert is a very weak type of evidence and is not that of a conclusive nature. It is well-established by now that expert’s evidence is only confirmatory or explanatory of direct or circumstantial evidence and the confirmatory evidence cannot be given preference where confidence inspiring and worthy of credence evidence is available. In this regard we are fortified by the dictum as laid down in Yaqoob Shah v. The State PLD 1976 SC 53. There is no doubt that the opinion of Handwriting Expert is relevant but it does not amount to conclusive proof as pressed time and again by the learned Advocate Supreme Court on behalf of petitioner and can be rebutted by overwhelming independent evidence. In this regard reference can be made to Abdul Majeed v. State PLD 1976 Kar. 762. It is always risky to base the findings of genuineness of writing on Expert’s opinion. In this behalf we are fortified by the dictum as laid down in case of Ali Nawaz Gardezi v. Muhammad Yousuf PLD 1963 SC51,”

8. As far as, submission of learned counsel for the respondents that suit for simple declaration without seeking relief of possession was not maintainable is concerned, suffice it to add that per para 4 of the plaint, the plaintiff explained that the suit land was under lease, which while exercising fraud was mutated, therefore, simple suit for declaration is maintainable. After its final culmination in her favour, she might have opportunity to initiate proceedings to recover the possession. The learned Appellate Court ignored the said part of the plaint while rendering its findings on the issue settled in this behalf. Above all, the superior Courts while dealing with relevant provision/ Order VII, Rule 7 of the Code, 1908 reproduced here:

7. Relief to be specifically stated--Every plaint shall state specifically the relief which the plaintiff claims either simply or in the alternative, and it shall not be necessary to ask for general or other relief which may always be given as the Court may think just to the same extent as if it had been asked for. And the same rule shall apply to any relief claimed by the defendant in his written statement.

in series of cases cited as Manager, Jammu and Kashmir, State Property in Pakistan vs. Khuda Yar and another (PLD 1975 SC 678), Ch. Akbar Ali vs. Secretary, Ministry of Defence. Rawalpindi and another(1991 SCMR 2114), Mst. Arshan Bi through Mst. Fatima Bi and others vs. Maula Bakhsh through Mst. Ghulam Safoor and others(2003 SCMR 318), Altaf Hussain alias Mushtaq Ahmed vs. Muhammad Din and otters (2010 CLC 1646), Sardara and Allah Ditta through legal heirs and others vs. Mst. Bashir Begum and another (PLD 2016 Lahore 587) and Muhammad Riaz and others vs. Qaim Ali and others (PLD 2019 Lahore 97) have already observed that for mere technicalities a suit cannot be defeated due to its bad form. It was further observed that a Court in aid of justice vests with unfettered powers to provide, mould and grant adequate relief even if not claimed through the contents of the plaint. As such the suit was competent in all respect and plaintiff could not be non-suited for such drawback, if any.

Description: EDescription: F9. The next contention of learned counsel for respondents that the suit was filed after 11 years of the sanction of subject mutation, therefore, the same was liable to be dismissed on the score of limitation is without any substance. As discussed above, beneficiaries failed to prove the transaction of sale as well as valid attestation of impugned mutation. A document which was procured by playing fraud, can be challenged at any stage of time. As regards filing a suit for declaration, Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908 provides limitation of six years from the date of right to sue. The plaintiff prayed for declaring the mutation in dispute as illegal, which was implemented in the relevant record of right. The every new entry in the revenue record gives fresh cause of action to the plaintiff and adverse entries therein even if are allowed to remain unchallenged does not necessarily extinguish the right of the party against whom such entry are renewed. This view has been affirmed by the apex Court in the judgment reported as Wali and 10 others vs. Akbar and 5 others (1995 SCMR 284), wherein it is held that any new entry in the revenue record on the basis of the forged document  gave rise to a new cause of action. Moreover, any transaction/document, which is result of fraud neither can be perpetuated nor protected on the ground of period of limitation and whenever such transaction is assailed, the Court of law has to refuse to give effect to it. Reliance can be placed upon recent judgment reported as “Ghulam Farid and another vs. Sher Rehman


through L.Rs” (2016 SCMR 862). As such suit was very much within time and Issue No. 7 is answered against the respondents/defendants.

Description: G10. For the reasons discussed hereinabove, this Court has come to the conclusion that the learned Appellate Court below misconstrued available evidence and law on subject, which being tainted with misreading/ non-reading of evidence as well as suffering from jurisdictional defect fully calls for interference by applying the exceptions provided under Section 115 of the Code, 1908. Thus, this civil revision is allowed, judgment impugned herein is set aside and that of learned Trial Court by virtue of which suit of the petitioner decreed, is restored. No order as to costs.

(R.A.)  Civil Revision allowed

In essence, a mortgage is a contract between two parties (i.e. a borrower/ mortgagor and a lender/ mortgagee) where a capital sum of money is lent in exchange for a proprietary interest in land

 In essence, a mortgage is a contract between two parties (i.e. a borrower/ mortgagor and a lender/ mortgagee) where a capital sum of money is lent in exchange for a proprietary interest in land. It is important to note that unlike other proprietary interests in land, a right accrues to both the mortgagor and a mortgagee once a mortgage deed has been executed between two parties. These interests are: 1) the mortgagor's/ borrower's right to have the land redeemed/ returned once the capital money lent has been repaid; and 2) the mortgagee's/ lender's right to possess and acquire the property if the capital money lent is not repaid as stipulated in the mortgage deed. The proprietary rights of both the mortgagor and mortgagee are independent proprietary interests and there is oftentimes no bar on the parties to transfer and/or sell their respective rights in the mortgage to subsequent parties.

The rights of both the mortgagor as well as the mortgagee are also enumerated in the TPA 1882. The relevant portion of section 60 deals with the right of the mortgagor to redeem the property he has mortgaged.
Mortgages are regulated in the province of Punjab by the Punjab Redemption and Restitution of Mortgaged Lands Act 1962 (hereinafter referred to as the "Mortgage Act"). For the purposes of the present appeal, it may be prudent to reproduce the relevant portions of the Mortgage Act for ease of reference. Section 1 of the Mortgage Act deals with the extent of the Act.

CIVIL APPEAL NO.339 OF 2016
Dadu Khan (deed.) thr. LRs and 3 others VERSUS Ghulam Abbas and 23 others
23-08-2022




















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