i. Whether the Courts below were justified in giving preference to prior unregistered document over a subsequent registered document pertaining to the same immovable property?
PLJ 2024 Lahore (Note) 42
Present: Ch. Muhammad Iqbal, J.
BEGUM SHAHIDA AHMAD and 3 others--Petitioners
versus
REGISTRAR COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES and others--Respondents
W.P. No. 6783 of 1994, decided on 8.1.2024.
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (I of 1894)--
----Ss. 4, 6, 18 & 30--Acquisition of land--Final award was issued--Non-availing of statutory remedy--Principle of laches--Past and closed transaction--Principle of approbate and reapprobate--Acquisition proceedings were attained finality--Entire amount of compensation was deposited—Maintainability--Statutory remedy--Petitioners had statutory remedy of filing a reference under Section 18 read with Section 30 of Act, but despite knowledge, said remedy had not been explored rather petitioners straightaway approached High Court without availing statutory remedy, instant writ petition was not maintainable--Matter regarding acquisition of land in question had attained status of finality and had become past and closed transaction which could not be reopened on whims and caprice of an indolent party--Land had been acquired through process of law, entire amount of compensation had been deposited before Collector concerned and final Award has been issued and it is settled law that after issuance of award ordinarily constitutional petition was not maintainable--Petition dismissed.
[Para 8, 9, 10, 11 & 12] A, B, C, D, E & F
2023 PLC (CS) 186, 2012 CLC 1729, 2023 SCMR 1247,
PLD 2013 Lahore 565, 2016 SCMR 14, 2007 SCMR 569 and
2005 SCMR 1320 ref.
Mr. Muhammad Atif Amin, Mr. Waqar A Khan, Mr. Irfan Dawood and Ch. Rizwan Sarwar, Advocates for Petitioners.
Mr. Tariq Masood and Hassan Tariq, Advocates for DHA.
Mr. Waseem Iqbal Butt, Advocate for Settlement Department for Respondents.
Date of hearing: 20.12.2023.
Judgment
Through this constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 the petitioners have challenged the validity of notification [dated 30.04.1980] Gazetted on 06.05.1980 under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, notification [dated 05.05.1981] gazetted on 09.05.1981 issued under Section 6 of the Act ibid and the Award dated 20.06.1979.
2. Brief facts of the case, as contended by learned counsel for the petitioners, are that the urban agricultural land measuring 14 Kanal 07 Marla falling in Khasra No. 123 of Moza Chohang Khurd, Tehsil Lahore Cantt, Lahore was allotted to Shams-ud-Din Ali Ahmad who died on 12.03.1988 and the petitioners are his legal heirs. The said land was acquired and award was issued on 20.06.1979. The petitioners filed a Writ Petition. [No. 4875/1992] challenging therein the acquisition of land in question. The said petition was disposed of
by this Court on 18.04.1993 with the direction to the Respondent
No. 2/Secretary, Lahore Cantonment Cooperative Housing Society, Lahore [now merged into Defence Housing Authority, Lahore] to complete the proceedings of inquiry and take final decision in the matter. Respondent No. 2/Defence Housing Authority finalized the proceedings on 28.12.1993. The petitioners obtained copy of the said proceedings on 04.04.1994 from where it revealed that Respondent
No. 2 stated that a sum of Rs. 287,000/-including compensation amount of land in question was received by Respondents No. 4 to 7 who are successors in interest of Muhammad Boota and the petitioners should recover the said amount from Respondents No. 4 to 7. That Muhammad Boota challenged the allotment of Shams-ud-Din Ali Ahmad before the Additional Commissioner (Settlement), Lahore through an appeal which was accepted on 08.05.1971 and land of Khasra No. 121 was allotted to said Muhammad Boota whereas land measuring 14 Kanal 07 Marla situated in Khasra No. 123 was allotted to Shams-ud-Din Ali Ahmad.
On 20.02.1979, Respondent No. 2 sent an offer letter to Shams-ud-Din Ali Ahmad to sell his land in question in its favour, which was replied on 05.03.1979. Respondent No. 3/Additional Deputy Commissioner, Lahore Cantt. Vide letter dated 23.12.1988 inquired from Respondent No. 2 to confirm the ownership of Shams-ud-Din Ali Ahmad but despite presence of the aforesaid correspondence and the document of ownership, the Respondent No. 2 handed over the compensation amount of the land in question to the Respondents No. 4 to 7. Against the above disbursement of the compensation amount, the petitioners filed the titled writ petition which was earlier disposed of by this Court on 03.04.2002 with the direction to Respondent No. 2 to settle the issue. The said judgment dated 03.04.2002 was assailed before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan wherein the leave was granted on 18.12.2008 and the petition was converted into civil appeal. In the said appeal, the Respondent No. 2/DHA filed CMA No. 1290/2008 with the assertions that land owned by Shams-ud-Din Ali Ahmad and Muhammad Boota was acquired through process of law and the copies of notifications as well as award were placed on record. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan vide judgment dated 10.02.2015 allowed the appeal, set aside the order dated 03.04.2002 and remanded the matter to this Court by allowing the parties to amend their memo of petition and parawise comments as well as to place on record the relevant documents in support of their respective claim. In compliance of the judgment dated 10.02.2015, the petitioners have filed amended writ petition and the respondents have also filed amended reply/parawise comments thereto.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the petitioners are owner of land measuring 14 Kanal 07 Marla but their land had been occupied by the Respondent No. 2 without any compensation, thus a fair compensation may be determined as per the market value of the land and the earlier Award as well as acquisition proceedings be declared as illegal.
4. Learned counsel for the respondents inter alia submits that Khasra No. 123 was acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the compensation of the said award regarding land measuring 14 Kanal 07 Marla was deposited in treasury and the owners of the said land may withdraw the said amount. That instant writ petition is hit by the principle of laches. That the matter of acquisition of land has been finalized and award had been announced. The said proceeding of acquisition as well as award whereof were assailed in different writ petitions which acquisition has been upheld in writ petitions as well as in the Intra Court Appeals as such the issue of acquisition as well as award whereof has become a past and closed matter which could not be re-opened. Adds that Ahmad Hassan Khan, Advocate who was duly authorized by the petitioners through power of attorney filed an application for inspection of record of Writ Petition No. 4063/1981, which petition was instituted against the impugned Award and accordingly, he inspected the file on 27.02.1982, thus since that day, the acquisition proceedings of the land in question as well as the issuance of the award were in the knowledge of the petitioners but they neither filed any objections nor reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 against acquisition process within time. The learned counsel lastly prayed for dismissal of the writ petition.
5. I have heard learned counsels for the parties and have gone through the record.
6. Shams-ud-Din Ali Ahmad, predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners, filed Writ Petition [No. 4875/1992] with the prayer that the Registrar Cooperative Societies and Secretary of Lahore Cantonment Cooperative Housing Society (now DHA/Respondent
No. 2) may be directed to act in accordance with law and the possession of land in question [measuring 14 Kanal 07 Marla] may be restored in his favour. In the said writ petition, the Respondent No. 2 categorically stated that the land in question had been acquired in the year 1979 and compensation whereof had been deposited with the said authority and land for all legal intents and purposes stood vested with the acquirer. Even then, the legal heirs of Muhammad Boota also submitted reply in the said writ petition and acknowledged the acquisition of land in question in favour of Respondent No. 2. The said writ petition was disposed of with the consent of the parties on 18.04.1993 with the direction to the Respondent No. 2 to complete the proceedings of inquiry regarding payment of compensation. The Respondent No. 2 in its report stated that an amount of Rs. 2,87,000/-as compensation of the acquired land including the land measuring 14 Kanal 07 Marla was received by legal heirs of Muhammad Boota [Respondents No. 4 to 7].
7. Further, the petitioners before filing amended writ petition, prayed in the petition that the respondents may be directed to compensate the petitioners for land measuring 14 Kanal 07 Marla as per the prevalent market value of the land. The Writ Petition was disposed of on 03.04.2002 with the direction to the Respondent No. 2 to settle the dispute. The said order was assailed by the petitioners before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan through Civil Appeal No. 2250 of 2008 which was allowed vide judgment dated 10.02.2015 and the matter was remanded to this Court with the following directions:
“7. Mr. Najam-ul-Hassan Kazmi, learned ASC for the appellants when confronted with all these facts of acquisition of disputed land and the documents in support thereof produced by Respondent No. 2, submits that in the writ petition these facts were not brought to the notice of the High Court by the respondents, so as to enable the petitioners to respond and rebut this material against them. He, therefore, urged that the impugned judgment may be set aside and the case may be remanded to the High Court with permission to both the parties to amend their respective memo of petition and parawise comments and also to place on record all the relevant documents as regards the earlier two suits instituted by the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants before the Civil Court, as well as record of earlier Writ Petition No. 4875/1992, and any other record of the Land Acquisition Officer, etc. relating to the disputed land, so that the claim of the appellants may be decided afresh in accordance with law. To this suggestion, learned ASC for Respondent No. 2 and other respondents have no objection for the reason that the documents placed on record through C.M.A No. 816/2009 have not been considered by the Lahore High Court during the pendency of the writ petition filed by the appellants, as the same did not form part of its record.
8. This being the position, by consent the impugned judgment is set aside and Writ Petition No. 6783/1994 (Re: Begum Shahida Ahmad and others versus Registrar Cooperative Societies and others) is remanded to the Lahore High Court, Lahore with the observation that the parties to the petition may be allowed to amend their memo of petition and parawise comments and also to place on record all the relevant documents in support of their respective claim within a period of two months, whereafter the petition may be heard and decided on merits and in accordance with law.”
In post-remand proceedings, the petitioners filed amended writ petition with the prayer as under:
“It is, therefore, prayed that the respondents be directed to compensate the petitioner for the land measuring 14 kanals 7 marlas wrongly taken over by them without any further delay. The compensation be determined according to prevalent rates and the so called alleged Award and also alleged acquisition proceedings inclusive of the alleged notification dated 06.05.1980, 05.05.1981 and 20.06.1979 be declared to be illegal, mala fide, without lawful authority and of no legal effect.”
Admittedly, Respondents No. 4 to 7/the legal heirs of Muhammad Boota filed Writ Petition [No. 4063/1981] claiming therein the ownership of Khasra No. 123 comprising land measuring 14 Kanal 07 Marla. The said writ petition was withdrawn on 16.02.1982. Mr. Ahmad Hassan Khan, Advocate, duly appointed counsel of the petitioners, filed an application on 16.02.1987 for inspection of the record of Writ Petition No. 4063/1981 [which application is available at page 88 of the reply filed by Respondent No. 2]. In the said writ petition Respondents No. 4 to 7 challenged the acquisition proceedings, notification dated 07.07.1981, notifications under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 dated 11.04.1979, 20.05.1970, 30.04.1980 published 06.05.1980, notification under Section 6 of the Act ibid and all actions pursuant to those notifications. Furthermore, in reply of the W.P.No. 4875/1992 filed by Shamas-ud-Din the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners, the aforesaid notifications were also brought on record by the respondents. Thus, the above documents show that the petitioners were well aware about the acquisition proceedings from the very beginning of the process but they did not challenge the same within reasonable time rather they filed instant writ petition in the year 1994 i.e. after lapse of about 14 years of the acquisition proceedings, as such the petition is hit by the principle of laches.[1]
8. As the petitioners prayed that the compensation may be determined as per the market price of the land in question, suffice it to say in this regard that the petitioners have statutory remedy of filing a reference under Section 18 read with Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 but despite knowledge, the said remedy has not been explored rather the petitioners straightaway approached this Court through writ petition without availing the statutory remedy, as such instant writ petition is not maintainable. Reliance in this regard is placed on Mian Azeem Waheed’s case[2] wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan has held that “8. The writ jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be exploited as the sole solution or remedy for ventilating all miseries, distresses and plights regardless of having equally efficacious, alternate and adequate remedy provided under the law which cannot be bypassed to attract the writ jurisdiction. The doctrine of exhaustion of remedies stops a litigant from pursuing a remedy in a new Court or jurisdiction until the remedy already provided under the law is exhausted. The profound rationale accentuated in this doctrine is that the litigant should not be encouraged to circumvent or bypass the provisions assimilated in the relevant statute paying the way for availing remedies with precise procedure to challenge the impugned action, so as in this case, the Customs Act, which is in its own wisdom a complete set of law with regard to the genus of remedies, but the petitioners, rather than filing a Revision petition against the impugned Valuation Ruling under Section 25-D of the Customs Act, directly approached the learned Islamabad High Court where the writ petitions were ultimately dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction and the net result emerging from the entire litigation is that the impugned valuation ruling is intact. The extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution cannot be reduced to an ordinary jurisdiction of the High Court ...” It is also settled law that in the absence of any objection on the part of the owner [of the acquired land] such land stands vested in the Acquiring Agency/Authority and the compensation ascertained and deposited in Government Treasury became the property of owner.[3]
9. The petitioners placed on record the detail of acquired land and also the compensation as well as the award of the compensation of land situated in Moza Chung Khurd [detail whereof is available at page No. 138 of this writ petition as well as page No. 77 of reply of DHA]. The aforementioned notifications were challenged in Writ Petition No. 1950/1982 & Writ Petition No. 953/1983 which were dismissed by this Court vide consolidated judgment dated 11.07.1983. The said judgment was challenged through Intra Court Appeal Nos. 200 and 251 of 1983 which were also dismissed vide consolidated judgment dated 27.04.2015. In these circumstances, the matter regarding the acquisition of the land in question has attained the status of finality and has become past and closed transaction which cannot be reopened on the whims and caprice of an indolent party.[4]
10. Another aspect of the matter is that the petitioners on the one hand are praying for grant of compensation of the land claimed to be owned by their predecessor, whereas on the other hand have prayed for setting aside the acquisition proceedings which assertion suffers from the principle of approbate and reprobate which is not permissible as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in Overseas Pakistanis Foundation’s case[5] that “It is also settled law that nobody is allowed to approbate and reprobate as law laid down by this Court in Ghulam Rasool’s case PLD 1971 SC 376.”
11. Even otherwise, as the land had been acquired through process of law, entire amount of compensation had been deposited before the Collector concerned and the final Award has been issued and it is settled law that after issuance of the award ordinarily constitutional petition is not maintainable. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in Habib Ullah’s case[6] has held that “... Admittedly the award in this case for orchards was announced on 4-6-1999. The petitioner in the circumstances had got statutory remedy of reference provided under Section 18 of the Act. The determination of compensation for trees is admittedly a question of fact which certainly cannot be made in the exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction.”
12. Learned counsel for the petitioners has not been able to Point out any illegality or material irregularity in the impugned orders/notifications and has also not identified any jurisdictional defect calling for interference by this Court.
13. In view of the above, this writ petition is hereby dismissed being devoid of any merits as well as on the following grounds:--
i. Being hit by the principle of laches.
ii. Availability of the statutory remedy of filing reference under Section 18 read with Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
iii. The matter regarding the impugned Award/ Acquisition Proceeding has attained the status of finality and has become past and closed transaction.
(Y.A.) Petition dismissed
[1]. Abdul Ghafoor Va State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan through Chairman & 2 Others (2023 PLC (C.S.) 186] and Mian Aurangzeb Noor vs. Rent Controller, Lahore and another (2012 CLC 1729).
[2]. Mian Azam Waheed & 2 Others vs. The Collector of Customs through Additional Collector of Customs, Karachi (2023 SCMR 1247).
[3]. Sardar Dildar Ahmad Cheema vs. Board of Revenue, Punjab through Member (Revenue) and others (PLD 2013 Lahore 565).
[4]. Pakistan International Airlines Corporation vs. Aziz-ur-Rehman Chaudhary and another (2016 SCMR 14).
[5]. Overseas Pakistanis Foundation & Others vs. Sqn. Ldr. (Retd) Syed Mukhtar Ali Shah & Another (2007 SCMR 569).
[6]. Habib Ullah vs. Land Acquisition Collector & Others (2005 SCMR 1320).
West Pakistan Land Revenue Rules, 1968--
----R. 6-A--Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 199--Death of permanent Lambardar--Appointment of --Appeal--Accepted--Matter was remanded--Validity--Maintainability--Member, Board of Revenue, had merely remanded matter to Deputy Commissioner and had not finally decided issue on merits, as such, against remand order ordinarily writ petitions were not maintainable--Counsel for petitioner had not pointed out any illegality or material irregularity in impugned remand order and had also not identified any jurisdictional defect--Petition dismissed. [Para 7 & 8] A & B
2018 SCMR 1177, 1986 SCMR 251, PLD 1963 (W.P.) Lahore 461,
2007 CLC 768, 2010 CLC 1921 ref.
Mr. Sameer Ijaz, Adeela Mustafa Mian & Adeel Ahmed Chaudhary, Advocates for Petitioner.
Mr. Gohar Nawaz Sindhu, Addl. Advocate General along-with Najeeb Ullah, Tehsildar Sharqpur for Respondents.
Date of hearing: 20.12.2022.
Judgment
Through this Single judgment, I intend to decide the titled Writ Petition as well as Writ Petition [No. 31709 of 2022] as common questions of law and facts are involved in both petitions.
2. Through Writ Petition No. 40588/2022, the petitioner has only challenged the validity of orders dated 02.11.2021 and 20.05.2021 passed by the Commissioner, Lahore Division, Lahore as well as Member, (Judicial-II), Board of Revenue, Punjab respectively to the extent of remand of the case.
3. Through Writ Petition No. 31709 of 2022, the petitioner has challenged the vires of order dated 20.05.2022 passed by the Member (Judicial-II), Board of Revenue, Punjab who disposed of ROR
No. 2419/2021 filed by the petitioner, set aside the remand order dated 02.11.2021 passed by the Commissioner, Lahore Division, Lahore and rest of the findings were upheld.
4. Brief facts of these cases as narrated by the learned counsel for the petitioners are that Ghulam Rasool brother of Respondent
No. 5 Basharat Hussain was permanent Lumberdar of Chak No. 15/UCC who died leaving behind two sons namely Ahmad and Farooq. The District Collector, invited applications to fill up the vacant post and after receiving the report from the revenue field staff as well as Assistant Commissioner, the District Collector vide order dated 03.03.2021 appointed Respondent No. 5 Basharat Hussain as permanent Lumberdar of the said Chak. (sic) order, petitioner filed an appeal, which was accepted by the Commissioner Lahore Division vide order dated 02.11.2021, set aside the order dated 03.03.2021 of the District Collector, Sheikhupura and remanded the matter to him to call afresh the applications from the interested candidates, after making wide publicity through Mushtari Munadi, hold General Meeting (Jalsa-e-Aam) in the revenue estate and appoint a best suitable person having good integrity in the light of policy /notification No. 881-2010/397-LR-II dated 20.04.2010 issued by the Board of Revenue, Punjab. Petitioners in both writ petitions assailed the said order through ROR Nos. 2315 & 2419 of 2021 which were disposed of by the Member, (Judicial-II). Board of Revenue, Punjab who vide order dated 20.05.2022, set aside order dated 02.11.2021 passed by the Commissioner, Lahore Division, Lahore and remanded the case to the District Collector for decision afresh to invite fresh applications from the desirous candidates of Chak No. 15/UCC, Tehsil Sharaqpur, District Sheikhupura on merits as per law. The order of ROR was assailed by the petitioners in both cases through these writ petitions.
5. I have heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioners as well as learned law officer at full length and gone through the record with their able assistance.
6. The Member, Board of Revenue, Punjab after hearing both the parties came to the conclusion that the codal formalities as per requirement of Rule 6-A of the Land Revenue Rules, 1968 have not been properly fulfilled by the Commissioner, Lahore and remanded the matter to the District Collector for decision afresh. For ready reference, operative part of order dated 20.05.2022 to reproduced as under:--
“5. Arguments advanced on behalf of both parties have been heard and considered. Record/ documents attached with the case file has also been perused including orders of the Courts below minutely. The District Collector, Sheikhupura while appointing Basharat Hussain s/o Anayat Hussain as lambardar of chak No. 15/UCC, Tehsil Sharaqpur did not follow the prescribed procedure for the appointment of lambardar on 03.03.2021, who passed the same in haste against the factual position. As per the previous CNIC of Basharat Hussain his address was of District Gujranwala and after this to obtain the post of lambardar he got changed the address of his residence which is of Tehsil Sharaqpur, District Sheikhupura. Basharat Hussain was not owner of land at the time of filing of application for the post of lambardar, meaning thereby he was not owner of land in the concerned estate. These crucial aspects were ignored by the District Collector, Sheikhupura while passing the order dated 03.03.2021. The Commissioner, Lahore Division, Lahore has rightly interfered into the order of District Collector, Sheikhupura dated 03.03.2021 vide his justified and valid order dated 02.11.2021. The Commissioner, Lahore Division, Lahore only violated Rule 6-A of the Land Revenue Rules, 1968 by remanding the case to District Collector for decision afresh for which he was not competent to do so under the Rule ibid as it is only the prerogative of Board of Revenue, Punjab. The order dated 02.11.2021 of Commissioner, Lahore Division, Lahore to the extent of remand is hereby set aside and rest of the findings are upheld. The case is remanded to the Deputy Commissioner/ District Collector, Sheikhupura for the appointment of lambardar afresh who is directed to invite fresh applications from the desirous candidates of Chak No. 15/UCC, Tehsil Sharaqpur, District Sheikhupura and appoint a suitable candidate for the said post by observing all procedural/ codal formalities applicable on the subject. The new appointment of lambardar shall be made purely on merits. With these remarks, the revision petitions are disposed of. Status quo granted in the cases on 01.12.2021 and extended from date to date is vacated as such. Files be consigned to record room after due course of law.”
7. Even otherwise, the Member (Judicial-II), Board of Revenue, Punjab through the impugned order dated 20.5.2022 has merely remanded the matter to the Deputy Commissioner/ District Collector, Sheikhupura and has not finally decided the issue on merits, as such, against the remand order ordinarily writ petitions are not maintainable. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in a case titled as Allah Ditta & Others vs. Member (Judicial), Board of Revenue & others (2018 SCMR 1177) has held as under:
“6. Order of remand is not a final order and simply sends the matter for re-examination for the second time. It does not finally determine the claim or the rights of the parties. The forum to which the case is sent for fresh decision is free to re-examine the case and pass a fresh judgment. Against any such subsequent decision or judgment, alternate remedy is available to the parties. Further, Board of Revenue is the highest Court of appeal and revision in revenue cases and is a controlling authority in all matters connected with the administration of land, collection of land revenue, preparation of land record and other matters (See section 5 of the Board of Revenue Act, 1957). In this background the Courts after having judicially examined the remand order passed by the Board of Revenue have expressed reluctance to interfere and for these reasons have maintained that order of remand would not be amenable to writ jurisdiction (see Ramzan v. Rehabilitation Commissioner (Legal) Sargodha (PLD 1963 Lahore 461), Kaniz Fatima v. Board of Revenue (PLD 1973 Lahore 495) and Ghulam Rasool v. Khudai Dad (PLD 1986 Quetta 130). This is not an absolute rule. An order of remand that is facially perverse or without jurisdiction or otherwise void can be interfered with, like any other order (see Ghulam Rasool (supra)). The constitutional power to judicially review an order of remand passed by the Board of Revenue is not in any manner curtailed or abridged by the precedents cited above. Infact, the principle that emerges from the wisdom of the precedents is that, for reasons narrated above, the constitutional Court must approach and examine a remand order passed by the Board of Revenue with care and circumspection, so as to sparingly interfere with it, unless of course, the remand order is facially perverse, without jurisdiction or otherwise void. Amenability of writ jurisdiction against a remand order is in this context and subject to above conditions.”
Reliance can also be placed on the cases titled as Muhammad Ilyas Khan vs. Muhammad & others (1986 SCMR 251), Ramzan vs. Rehabilitation Commissioner (Legal) Sargodha & another (PLD 1963 (W.P.) Lahore 461), Akbar Ali & 18 others vs. Mukhtar Ahmad & 14 others (2007 CLC 768) & Ghulam Ahmad vs. Member Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore & others (2010 CLC 1921).
8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has not pointed out any illegality or material irregularity in the impugned remand order passed by the Member Board of Revenue, Punjab and has also not identified any jurisdictional defect.
9. For the foregoing reasons, these writ petitions are dismissed being not maintainable as well as devoid of any merits. However, the Deputy Commissioner/ District Collector, Sheikhupura is directed to decide the matter in terms of order passed by the Member Board of Revenue, Punjab as early as possible.
(Y.A.) Petition dismissed
Specific Relief Act, 1877 (I of 1877)--
----Ss. 9 & 54--Suit for possession and perpetual injunction--Dismissed--Appeal--Non-producing of demarcation report--Sole witness--No independant witness was produced by appellant--Detail of suit property was not mentioned by appellant in his statement--Challenge to--The appellant also did not mention in his statement that from whom he had purchased suit property--He also did not mention details of alleged registered sale deed in his favour--During cross examination he stated that at time of sale deed, demarcation of land was made by owners but neither demarcation report nor any witness of said process was produced by him--Appellant appeared as a sole witness and did not produce any other independent witness to support his version--Courts below rightly dismissed claim of appellant--Counsel for appellant had not pointed out any ground whereby his appeal falls within mischief of Section 100 of CPC--Nothing has been shown as to how decisions given by Courts below were contrary to law or there had been failure of Courts below in determining issue of law or usage having force of law--Appeal dismissed. [Para 4 & 5] A & B
2022 SCMR 284 ref.
Mian Waqas Akhtar and Sh. Sajid Mehmood, Advocates for Appellants.
Ms. Gulzar Butt, Advocate for Respondents.
Date of hearing: 18.12.2023.
Judgment
Through this regular second appeal the appellants have challenged the validity of the judgment & decree dated 14.12.2015 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Nankana Sahib who dismissed the suit for possession alongwith perpetual injunction filed by the appellants and also assailed the judgment & decree dated 18.10.2018 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Nankana Sahib who dismissed the appeal of the appellants.
2. Brief facts of the case are that the appellants/plaintiffs filed a suit for possession alongwith perpetual injunction regarding land measuring 08 Kanal fully described in paragraph No. 1 of the plaint against the respondents/defendants and contended that the respondents/defendants are in illegal possession of the suit land. The respondents/defendants filed contesting written statement. Out of the divergent pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed issues, recorded pro and contra evidence of the parties and finally dismissed the suit vide judgment & decree dated 14.12.2015. Being dejected, the appellants filed an appeal which was also dismissed by the first appellate Court vide judgment & decree dated 18.10.2018. Hence, this second appeal.
3. I have heard learned counsels for the parties and have gone through the record.
4. Bashir Ahmad, the appellant/plaintiff averred in the plaint that land measuring 08 Kanal was purchased by him and he raised construction but while appearing as P.W.1 he deposed that he purchased land about 12/13 years ago. The said P.W. recorded statement on 23.02.2015 whereas he neither produced any registered sale deed nor mutation of the suit land in his favour. The appellant/plaintiff produced copy of Register Haqdaran Zameen for the year 1981-1982 which shows that as per his own statement he purchased the suit property 12/13 years ago [i.e. about 2002/2003] whereas he produced the alleged revenue record in his favour pertaining to year 1981 which belies the veracity of the said document. The appellant/plaintiff also did not mention in his statement that from whom he had purchased the suit property. He also did not mention the details of the alleged registered sale deed or mutation in his favour. During cross examination he stated that at the time of sale deed, the demarcation of the land was made by the owners but neither the said demarcation report nor any witness of the said process was produced by him. Further, the appellant/plaintiff appeared as a sole witness and did not produce any other independent witness to support his version. Thus, the Courts below rightly dismissed the claim of the appellant.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant has not pointed out any ground whereby his appeal falls within the mischief of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nothing has been shown as to how the decisions given by the Courts below are contrary to law or there has been failure of the Courts below in determining the issue of law or usage having force of law. The Courts below have properly appreciated the record and no illegality has been pointed out warranting interference in this second appeal. Reliance is placed on the case titled as Bahar Shah & others vs. Manzoor Ahmad (2022 SCMR 284).
6. Consequently, this appeal has no merit which is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs.
(Y.A.) Appeal dismissed
1. Scope of Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877.
Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (XLIX of 2001)--
----S. 9--Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 199--Joint venture agreement--Bid was accepted--Acceptance letter--Claim for exemption from income tax--Refused--Appeal--Dismissed--No verification of JV Office in Fata--No authority of WAPDA--JV had allegedly subsequently established said place of business but relevant officer of respondent as evident from when visited said place, he could not find any place of business of petitioner; this being purely a question of fact cannot be decided by High Court in its limited jurisdiction--It was income of partners of JV which was subject to incidence of taxation and both members of JV were resident of settled area as one had registered office at Lahore and other is Foreign Company having office at Islamabad--WAPDA had no authority either to committed with contractor or to allow contractor to claim exemption from statutory taxation--Ignorance of law is no excuse for a person that he would not be subject to penal or taxing laws of State--Petition dismissed.
[Para 23, 24 & 25] A, B & C
2017 PTD 1561 ref.
Mr. Isaac Ali Qazi, Advocate for Petitioner.
M/s. Sanaullah, DAG, Shakirullah Afridi & Mukhtar Ahmad Maneri, Advocates for Respondents.
Date of hearing: 30.1.2023.
Judgment
Syed Arshad Ali, J.--On 25th May, 2018, a joint venture agreement under the name & style of M/s CGGC-Descon Joint Venture (“JV”) was inked between China Gezhouba Group Company Limited, a corporation registered under the Laws of People’s Republic of China having registered office at China Wuhan City (hereinafter referred to as Foreign Company) and Descon Engineering Limited; a company incorporated under the Company Laws of Pakistan having Head Office at Ferozpur, Lahore (hereinafter referred to Local Company). As evident from the, JV,the object of this agreement was to offer a joint bid for the project, namely, Construction of Civil Works including, Design, Supply and Installation of Electrical and Mechanical Works and Hydraulic Steel Structures for Mohmand Dam Hydropower Project to Pakistan Water & Power Development Authority (“WAPDA”) being the employer. Article-III of the JV describes the shares of the respective companies at the ratio of 70% and 30%; whereas Article-VI of the JV envisages that the project will be managed through a Project Implementation Office lead by the Project Manager appointed by the Lead Partner. The said Nominated Project Manager shall be authorized to deals with the employer/Engineer regarding all matters related with and/or arising out of the performance of the contract on behalf of the JV in consultation with Project Implementation Officer.
2. The bid of JV was accepted by the Employer/WAPDA through letter of acceptance dated 07.03.2019 addressed to the Lead Foreign Company at its office situated at House No.01, F-6/2 Hill Road, Islamabad (Pakistan). Pursuant to the aforesaid letter of acceptance, a formal agreement was executed between the employer/WAPDA and the JV. It is one of the claim of the petitioner for exemption from taxes that the contract document executed with the employer i.e. clause-14.1 clearly envisages that the contractual income of the contract of the contractor is not subject to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 and Sales Tax Act, 1990 on service.
3. The JV applied for registration with the Federal Board of Revenue and on 22.05.2019 accordingly the JV was registered having registration No. 5387927. In the said application for registration as well as the registration certificate, the address of the JV is provided as Moza Patti Banda Tehsil Pandyali, Mohmand District Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Mohmand. The JV had also applied for exemption from income tax through a proper application. The said exemption was refused by the Commissioner Income Tax on the ground that when the representative of the revenue department had visited the alleged office situated at Moza Patti Banda, it could not be verified as the JV was not physically present at the said address. The petitioner has also appended an agreement whereby certain properties were obtained on lease from locals which is situated in Mohmand Agency, the erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Area (“FATA”).
4. Appeal against the order of Income Tax Officer was dismissed by the Commissioner Inland Revenue vide order dated 7.5.2019.
5. The learned counsel representing the petitioner while referring the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Pakistan through Chairman FBR and others vs. Hazrat Hussain and others (2018 SCMR 939) has argued that there was complete immunity from payment of all taxes to all the persons who were resident of the erstwhile FATA and on promulgation of 25th amendment in the Constitution when normal taxation laws were extended to the erstwhile FATA, the income of all the persons including the companies who were residing in the erstwhile FATA were exempt from payment of income tax through SRO 1213(1)/2018 dated 5.10.2018, therefore, the impugned order whereby exemption was refused to the petitioner on its income albeit on the payment which the petitioner/JV would receive from WAPDA against the project’s income.
6. Against that, M/s Sanaullah DAG, Ghulam Shoaib Jally & Mukhtar Ahmad Maneri, Advocates have strongly stressed that the address given in the application for registration though relating to the project office when verified, there was no physical presence of the JV in the erstwhile FATA as the JV is operating from Islamabad and thus is not entitled to any exemption. The respondents in their arguments have also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Hasnain Cotex Limited vs. Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lahore (2017 PTD 1561).
7. Arguments heard and record perused.
8. The gamut of the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that since the JV being a person in terms of Section 80 Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (“Ordinance”) is physically located in the erstwhile FATA therefore, is entitled for exemption of the income tax. In order to appreciate the said arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner, we would like to refer to the brief history of the applicability of the Tax Laws to the erstwhile FATA.
BACKGROUND OF IMMUNITY FROM TAXES FOR THE INDIVIDUALS/PERSONS/COMPANIES ETC LOCATED IN THE ERSTWHILE FATA
9. Prior to the 25th amendment in the Constitution through Act No. XXXVII of 2018 dated 05.06.2018, there was a separate dispensation/mechanism for extension of laws to the erstwhile FATA. The relevant provision of the Constitution i.e. Article 247(3) for ease reference is reproduced as under:
“247 (3). No Act of [Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) shall apply to any Federally Administered Tribal Area or to any part thereof, unless the President so directs, and no Act of [Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament)] or a Provincial Assembly shall apply to a Provincially Administered Tribal Area, or to any part thereof, unless the Governor of the Province in which the Tribal Area is situate, with the approval of the President, so directs; and in giving such a direction with respect to any law, the President or, as the case may be, the Governor, may direct that the law shall, in its application to a Tribal Area, or to a specified part thereof, have effect subject to such exceptions and modifications as may be specified in the direction”.
10. There remained a judicial consensus that the Income Tax as well as Sales Tax Laws were never extended to the FATA, prior to the promulgation of 25th amendment thereby omitting Article 247 from the Constitution. However, there has been a long standing dispute between the Federal Board of Revenue (“FBR” and the trade community/business community of erstwhile tribal area regarding the imposition of income tax as well as sales tax on the import of raw material for the manufacturing units, which were located in the erstwhile FATA. This Court in its celebrated judgment authored by his Lordship Justice Yahya Afridi as he then was in the case of Messrs Taj Packages Company (Pvt) Ltd through Manager vs. The Government of Pakistan through Federal Secretary Finance and Revenue Division and 6 others (2016 PTD 203), has elaborately dealt with the issue of taxing the raw material/goods which were imported for the purpose of its consumption in the erstwhile FATA. The said judgment was also approved by the august Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Pakistan through Chairman, FBR and others vs. Hazrat Hussain (2018 SCMR 939), wherein it has been unequivocally held that the business concerns/manufacturing units located in the PATA are immune from the impost of both, the income tax as well as sales taxes; that similarly, the goods or machinery, which they are importing for their home consumption are equally immune from the impost of both taxes at the import stage, however, in order to ensure that the consumption of goods do not cross the limits of non-tariff area, the petitioners have to provide a security in form of post-dated cheques equal to the value of the imported goods.
11. The aforesaid immunity was available to the persons/corporate entities located within the erstwhile area of PATA as in view of the legal barrier of Article 247 of the Constitution; the provisions of the Ordinance were not extended to the erstwhile FATA.
12. Upon promulgation of the 25th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2018 on 24.5.2018, this legal barrier in form of Article 247 of the Constitution was erased and, thus, the provisions of the Ordinance became applicable to all the persons/corporate entities located within the territory of erstwhile FATA, as such, their income was subject to imposition of income tax under the Ordinance.
13. After 25th amendment in the Constitution, the trade community had raised voice for continuance of the said exemption from imposition of income tax and sales tax. The Federal Government through SRO 1212 (1)/2018 dated 5.10.2018 and SRO. 1213(1)/2018 dated 05.10.20218 had allowed the said exemption to the resident/ domicile of the erstwhile FATA/PATA.
14. The Ordinance provides both; the provisions of charging as well the mechanism for collection of tax whereas the word ‘income’ is defined in Section 2(29) of the Ordinance as:
“(29) “income” includes any amount chargeable to tax under this Ordinance, any amount subject to collection or deduction of tax under section 148, 150, 152(1), 153, 154, 156, 156A, 233, 233A, subsection (5) of Section 234 and any amount treated as income under any provision of this Ordinance and any loss of income.”
Chapter II of the Ordinance deals with the charging provisions whereas Part I of Chapter III explains taxable income, total income and heads of income. Chapter X of the Ordinance envisages for procedure of filing of return/assessments adjudication of claims as well as recovery of income tax dues. The mechanism for deduction and collection of advanced tax is provided in Part V of Chapter X of the Ordinance. The Division IV of the said chapter relates to grant of exemption from total income tax or issuance of lower rate certificate.
15. Section 53 of the Ordinance empowers the Federal Government not only to grant exemption to any person or class of persons from the payment of income tax but can also exempt/partially exempt any person from the application of the Ordinance. For convenience, Section 53 is reproduced as under:
“53. Exemptions and tax concessions in the Second Schedule.-(1) The income or classes income, or persons or classes of persons specified in the Second Schedule shall be-(a) exempt from tax under this Ordinance, subject to any conditions and to the extent specified therein; (b) subject to tax under this Ordinance at such rates, which are less than the rates specified in the First Schedule, as are specified therein; (c) allowed a reduction in tax liability under this Ordinance, subject to any conditions and to the extent specified therein; or (d) exempted from the operation of any provision of this Ordinance, subject to any condition and to the extent specified therein.”
16. Section 80 of the Ordinance, envisages that association of persons includes a firm, a Hindu undivided family, any artificial juridical person and anybody of persons formed under a foreign law but does not includes a company.
17 Section 92 of the Ordinance envisages for principal of taxation of association of persons which reads:
“An association of persons shall be liable to tax separately from the members of the association and [where the association of persons has paid tax the] amount received by a member of association in the capacity as member out of the income of the association shall be exempted from tax.”
18. Reverting back to the legal issue involved in the present case; as stated above, when on the promulgation of 25th amendment in the Constitution, the provisions of Ordinance became operative in the erstwhile FATA, the Federal Government pursuant to their commitment with the people/residents of erstwhile FATA/PATA issued SRO No. 887-1 of 2018 on 08.7.2018 thereby granting exemption to the individuals/corporate entities domiciled/resident of erstwhile FATA/PATA from the payment of income tax. Later the afore-said SRO was substituted by SRO No. 1213, which read as under:
Government of Pakistan
Revenue Division
Federal Board of Revenue.
Islamabad, the 5th October, 2018
NOTIFICATION
(Income Tax)
S.R.O. 1213(1)/2018.--WHEREAS prior to the Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act, 2018 (XXXVII of 2018), the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (XLIX of 2001) was not in force in the Tribal Areas as defined in Article 246 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, hereinafter called as the Constitution, and the levy of income tax was not attracted to the said Tribal Areas;
AND WHEREAS Article 247 of the Constitution stood omitted on commencement of the Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act, 2018) XXXVII of 2018) with effect from 31st day of May, 2018 and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) stood merged in the Provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan under paragraph (d) of Article 246 of the Constitution.
AND WHEREAS on commencement of the Constitution (twenty-fifth Amendment) Act, 2018 (XXXVII of 2018), the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (XLIX of 2001) is in force in the said Provinces including the erstwhile Tribal Areas forming part thereof;
AND WHEREAS a phased approach was needed for the full application of fiscal laws to the said erstwhile Tribal Areas, a decision was made to exempt all persons from levy of income tax which was not applicable to the said areas by virtue of said Article 247 and accordingly Notification No. S.R.O. 887(1)12018, dated the 23rd July, 2018, was issued by the Federal Government granting exemption from income tax as aforesaid;
AND WHEREAS concerns were raised by the trading community of the said erstwhile Tribal Areas to the effect that the aforesaid Notification did not restore the position as existed prior to the commencement of the Constitution (twenty-fifth Amendment) Act, 2018 (XXXVII of 2018);
NOW THEREFORE in order to address the concerns so raised and to restore the position in relation to levy of income tax to the said erstwhile Tribal Areas, and in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of section 53 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (XLIX of 2001), the Federal Government is pleased to direct that the following further amendments shall be made in the Second Schedule to the said Ordinance, namely:-
In the aforesaid Schedule--
(a) In Part--
(i) Clauses (144) and (145) shall be omitted; and
(ii) after clause (145), omitted as aforesaid, the following new clause shall be added, namely:-
“(146) Any income which was not chargeable to tax prior to the commencement of the Constitution twenty-fifth Amendment) Act, 2018 (XXXVII of 2018) of any individual domiciled or company and association of persons resident in the Tribal Areas forming part of the Provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan under paragraph (d) of Article 246 of the Constitution with effect from the 1st day of June, 2018 to the 30th day of June, 2023 (both days inclusive); and
(b) In Part IV,--
(i) clause (106) shall be omitted;
(ii) after clause (109), the following new clause shall be added, namely:-
“(110) The provisions of sections in Division III of Part V of Chapter X and Chapter XII of the Ordinance for deduction or collection of withholding tax which were not applicable prior to commencement of the Constitution (twenty-fifth Amendment) Act, 2018 (XXXVII of 2018) shall not apply to individual domiciled or company and association of person resident in the Tribal Areas forming part of the Provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan under paragraph (d) of Article 246 of the Constitution with effect from the day of June, 2018 to the 3dh day of June, 2023 (both days inclusive).
Sd/-
(Dr. Muhammad Iqbal)
Additional Secretary
19. Admittedly, the JV received the letter of acceptance for construction of Mohmand Dam on 07.03.2019 and then applied for registration with the Federal Board of Revenue on 22.05.2019 whereas the said SRO was issued/notified on 5th October, 2018. The perusal of the third recital as well as clause-146 of the said SRO would clearly suggest that any income of any individual domiciled or company and association of persons resident in the Tribal Areas which was not subject to the incidence of chargeability and income tax on the commencement of 25th Amendment in the Constitution through Act No. XXXVII dated 05.06.2018 would be enjoying the same immunity from the payment of income tax. The plain reading of this SRO would suggest that the said exemption was applicable to those individuals domiciled in erstwhile area, company and association of persons resident in the tribal area before the promulgation of 25th Amendment in the Constitution if were enjoying exemption from income tax, would be applicable to them. It is well settled that in a taxing statute one has to look at what is clearly said; there is no room for any intendment; there is no equity about a tax, nothing is to be read and nothing is to be implied.[1]
20. Similarly, it is settled by now that where a provision in a taxing statute can be reasonably interpreted in two ways, that interpretation which is favourable to the assessee has to be accepted.[2] Also if two views are possible, the one favour to the assessee has to be accepted.[3] However, the rules regarding exemption under taxing statute have to be established by the precedents and exemption under taxing statue must be strictly construed. Grants of tax exemptions are given a rigid interpretation against the assertions of the taxpayer and in favour of the taxing power. The basis for the rule is the same as that supporting a rule of strict construction of positive revenue laws that the burdens of taxation should be distributed equally and fairly among the members of society.[4]
The reason for requiring a strict construction of statutes in favour of the State where a person claims immunity from the common burden of taxation, has been stated by Mr. Justice Brewer, as appears from the quotation from his opinion in Stahl v. The Education Association of the Methodist Church (54 Kan. 542, 38 Pac. 796):
“All property receives protection from the state. Every man is secured in the enjoyments of his own, no matter to what use he devotes it. This security and protection carry with them the corresponding obligation to support. It is an obligation which rests equally upon all. It may require military service in time of war, or civil service in time of peace. It always requires pecuniary support. This is taxation. The obligation to pay taxes is co-extensive with the protection received An exemption from taxation is a release from this obligation. It is the receiving of protection without contributing to the support of the authority which protects. It is an exception to a rule, and is justified and upheld upon the theory of peculiar benefits received by the state from the property exempted Nevertheless, it is an exception; and they who claim under an exception must show themselves within its terms”.
21. Therefore, when an exempting provision is susceptible to two interpretations, the one going against the tax payer is preferred.[5]
22. Thus, keeping in view the law laid down, as stated above, that while interpreting a taxing statute must first be given their ordinary and natural meaning and in case of exemption, the person claiming exemption, it should establish that its case squarely falls under the provision of exemption. The history of extension of tax laws to the erstwhile FATA the immunity claimed by the residents of the area and the clear language of SRO 1213(1)/2018 dated 05.10.2018 would clearly suggest that the said exemption was/is applicable to those individuals/domiciled in erstwhile FATA, companies and associations of persons resident in the said area, their income prior to 25th amendment was immune from payment of income tax could only claim the said exemption and any company or individual not being the resident of erstwhile FATA who have subsequently established their office in FATA after 25th Amendment in the Constitution are not entitled to the exemption in terms of SRO 1213(1)/2018 dated 05.10.2018.
23. Even otherwise, in the present case, the reliance of the JV is in the first amendment to the JV agreement whereas Article-VI was amended by referring that the project will be managed through a Project Implementation Officer (PIO) situated at Mauza Patti Banda, Tehsil Pandyali Mohmand District, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Therefore, it is the claim of the JV that it has a registered office at erstwhile FATA, therefore, it being a person situated at/resident of erstwhile FATA is exempt from the payment of tax. However, not only the fact that the said JV has allegedly subsequently established the said place of business but the relevant officer of the respondent-department as evident from the impugned order when visited the said place, he could not find any place of business of the petitioner-JV; hence, this being purely a question of fact cannot be decided by this Court in its limited jurisdiction once it has been seriously disputed by the respondent-Revenue.[6]
24. Moving on further. The close perusal of Section 92 of the Ordinance of 2001 clearly suggest that income received by the members of the association of person constituted the income of the members of the JV and in order to avoid the said income being taxed twice, the association of person is required to pay the tax U/S 92 of the Ordinance of 2001. Thus, for all practical purposes it is the income of the partners of the JV which is subject to the incidence of taxation and both the members of JV are the resident of settled area as one has registered office at Lahore and the other is Foreign Company having office at Islamabad.
25. Moving on to the assertion of the learned counsel for the petitioner that since in the contract document, the employer has undertaken that the income of the contractor would not be subject to the incidence of taxation. There can be no two views that a tax is levied under the authority of Parliament/appropriate legislature and thus exemption can be granted by the appropriate legislature or the delegated authority under the legislation. WAPDA has no authority either to commit with the contractor or to allow the contractor to claim exemption from the statutory taxation. Similarly, ignorance of law is no excuse for a person that he would not be subject to the penal or taxing laws of the State.
26. In view of the above, we have reached at the inescapable conclusion that the petitioner has failed to make out a case for grant of exemption. Resultantly, we find no merit in this petition which is accordingly dismissed.
(Y.A.) Petition dismissed
[1]. Commissioner of Income Tax Khanpur vs. Upper Doab Sugar Mills (1978 All L-128). Pakistan Textile Mill Owners Association, Karachi and 02 others vs. Administrator of Karachi and 02 others (PLD 1963 SC 137).
Islamabad Electric Supply Company Limited vs. Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue Audit-II, LTU, Islamabad (2016 PTD 2685).
[2]. CIT vs. Naga Hills Tea Co. Ltd (AIR 1973 SC 2524).
[3]. Sun Export Corporation vs. Collector of Customs (1997) 6 SCC 564.
[4]. Sutherland on Statutory Construction (Third Edition Vol.3).
[5]. Collector of Custom FBR and another vs. Messrs Fitter Pakistan (Pvt) Ltd (2020 SCMR 1157).
Oxford University Press vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Companies Zone-I, Karachi and others (2019 SCMR 235).
Pakistan Machine Tool Factory (Pvt) Ltd, Karachi vs. Commissioner of Sales, Central, Zone-B, Karachi (2006 SCMR 1577).
Messrs Bisvil Spinners Ltd vs. Superintendent Central Excise and Land CustomsCircle Sheikhupura and another (PLD 1988 SC 370).
[6]. Messrs Arshad & Company vs. Capital Development Authority, Faisalabad through Chairman (2000 SCMR 1557).
Fida Hussain and another vs. Mst. Saiqa and others (2011 SCMR 1990).
PAKCOM Limited and others vs. Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 2011 SC 44).
