2023 MLD 739
Oral Sale---Proof ---Best witnesses---Held---Vendors, who by transferring their shares had already stood with the plaintiffs could ............
2023 MLD 654
Inheritance Mutation ---Suit for declaration with permanent injunction was filed by respondent being daughter of the deceased ("H") claiming that .............
2023 CLC 673
--Suit for declaration--Application for demarcation of ihata was not produced on record--Allotment of ihata--Mutation of ihata--
PLJ 2023 Lahore (Note) 52
Present: Shahid Bilal Hassan, J.
MUHAMMAD RAMZAN--Petitioner
versus
PROVINCE OF PUNJAB through DOR, Toba Tek Singh, etc.--Respondents
C.R. No. 3184 of 2011, decided on 27.1.2022.
Specific Relief Act, 1877 (I of 1877)--
----S. 42--Suit for declaration--Dismissed--Concurrent findings--Application for demarcation of ihata was not produced on record--Allotment of ihata--Mutation of ihata--Petitioner was failed to fulfilled conditions of allotment order--Challenge to--Oral assertion--Pivotal document for disposal of instant case was application allegedly moved by petitioner for demarcation of his portion of ihata, which has not been produced on record and petitioner even did not move any application seeking production of said application from concerned quarters--Oral assertion is not sufficient to prove stance of petitioner--There is nothing on record to prove that petitioner fulfilled conditions of allotment order as nothing as such has been brought on record--Concurrent findings on facts cannot be disturbed when same do not suffer from misreading and non-reading of evidence, howsoever erroneous in exercise of revisional--Petition dismissed. [Para 3] A, B & C
2017 SCMR 679, 2014 SCMR 1469 & 2014 SCMR 161 ref.
Malik Saleem Iqbal Awan, Advocate for Petitioner.
Mr. Tahrim Iqbal Butt, Assistant Advocate General Punjab.
Mian Tariq Hussain, Advocate for Respondent No. 5.
Respondent No. 4 ex-parte.
Date of hearing: 27.1.2022.
Order
C.M. No. 1-C of 2017
Through this application, the applicant seeks restoration of the captioned revision petition, dismissed for non-prosecution on 18.05.2017. Relying upon the contents of the application supported by an affidavit the same is allowed subject to all just and legal exceptions. Office is directed to fix the revision petition for today.
Main Petition
Tersely, the petitioner instituted a suit for declaration challenging the vires of Mutation No. 39 dated 28.02.1990 regarding allotment of disputed Ihata No. 21 measuring 10 marlas situated in Chak No. 668/9 GB, Tehsil Kamalia, District Toba Tek Singh. The suit was contested by the respondents while submitting written statement. Out of the divergent pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court framed issues and evidence of the parties was recorded. The learned trial Court vide impugned judgment and decree dated 22.02.2011 dismissed suit of the petitioner, who preferred an appeal but the same was also dismissed vide impugned judgment and decree dated 02.07.2011; hence, the instant revision petition.
2. Heard.
3. Considering the arguments and perusing the record, made available, as well as going through the impugned judgments and decrees, it is observed that the pivotal document for disposal of the instant case was application dated 17.08.1985 allegedly moved by the petitioner for demarcation of his portion of Ihata a, which has not been produced on record and the petitioner even did not move any application seeking production of the said application from the concerned quarters. In this view of the matter, mere oral assertion is not sufficient to prove the stance of the petitioner. Moreover, there is nothing on record to prove that the petitioner fulfilled the conditions of allotment order as nothing as such has been brought on record. In this view of the matter, the learned Courts below have rightly adjudicated upon the matter in hand by appreciating evidence in a minute manner and have reached to a just conclusion No illegality and irregularity is apparent on record warranting interference by this Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. As such concurrent findings on facts cannot be disturbed when the same do not suffer from misreading and non-reading of evidence, howsoever erroneous in exercise of revisional jurisdiction; reliance is placed on Muhammad Farid Khan v, Muhammad Ibrahim, etc. (2017 SCMR 679), Mst. Zaitoon Begum vs. Nazar Hussain and another (2014 SCMR 1469) and Cantonment Board through Executive Officer, Cantt. Board, Rawalpindi v. Ikhlaq Ahmed and others (2014 SCMR 161).
4. For the foregoing reasons and while placing reliance on the judgments supra the civil revision in hand being devoid of any force and substance stands dismissed.
(Y.A.) Petition dismissed
Execution of decree Limitation period , computing of - Limitation for filing of an execution petition is not provided in limitation law
PLD 2023 Lahore 157
--Disciplinary proceedings can be initiated can be against a civil servant within one year after his retirement in terms of Section 1(4) (iii) of the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006 (“the PEEDA Act”).
PLJ 2023 Lahore (Note) 51
[Multan Bench, Multan]
Present: Anwaar Hussain, J.
Dr. MUHAMMAD SAMAD KHAWAJA--Petitioner
versus
GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB through Chief Secretary etc.--Respondents
W.P. No. 3385 of 2021, heard on 2.12.2021.
Punjab Civil Servants Pension Rules, 1955--
----R. 1.8(a)(b)--Retirement from service--Issuance of show-cause notice after retirement--Initiating of recovery proceedings--Petitioner stood retied from service and he was issued impugned notice under Rules 1.8(a) of Rules after more than 2½ years of his retirement--Recovery proceedings against an employee shall not be initiated after one year of his retirement--This leaves no justification for respondents to issue impugned notice to petitioner after lapse of more than 2½ years--There was neither any room left for respondents to issue impugned notice nor there is anything, in rebuttal with respondent side to justify issuance thereof after one year of retirement of petitioner--Petition allowed.
[Para 7 & 8] A, B & D
PLJ 2021 SC 175 ref.
Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006—
----S. 1(4)(iii)--Disciplinary proceedings--Disciplinary proceedings can be initiated can be against a civil servant within one year after his retirement in terms of Section 1(4) (iii) of the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006 (“the PEEDA Act”). [Para 8] C
Mr. Zafar Mehboob Langrial, Advocate for Petitioner.
Mr. Muhammad Ayub Buzdar, Assistant Advocate General for Respondents.
Mr. Khurshid Iqbal, Chief Medical Technician Health, Muzaffargarh.
Date of hearing: 2.12.2021.
Judgment
Through this writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, the petitioner has challenged show-cause notice dated 02.07.2020 (“the impugned notice”) on the ground that it is illegal and unlawful as the same has been issued against the law inasmuch as the petitioner stood retired from Government service on 10.11.2017 and under Rule 1.8 of the Punjab Civil Services Pension Rules, 1955 (‘the Rules”), a show-cause notice cannot be issued to a Government servant after lapse of one year of his retirement.
2. Briefly stated facts of the case are that impugned notice was issued, inter alia, on the ground that the petitioner, while working as Medical Superintendent, DHQ, Hospital Muzaffargarh, applied for issuance of retirement Notification w.e.f. 10.11.2017, whereas on perusal of his file, it transpired that his date of birth written in his own handwriting in Punjab Public Service Commission Performa is 11.11.1957; on the other hand, according to his Secondary School Certificate, he was born on 11.11.1956; even though, the petitioner attained the age of superannuation, he continued to work and enjoy the powers of DDO from 10.11.2016 to 13.04.2017 and drew salaries for the said period on the basis of forged/bogus documents illegally and unlawfully.
3. Report and parawise comments were filed by the respondents wherein the contents of the impugned notice were reiterated.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner retired from service on 10.11.2017 but instead of releasing his pensionary benefits, Respondent No. 2 has issued impugned notice, which violates the mandate of Rule 1.8 of the Rules as a show-cause notice cannot be issued to a civil servant after lapse of one year of his retirement. Places reliance on Khalid Imran Khan Barki v. Government of Punjab and others (2021 PLC (CS) 426).
5. When confronted as to how proceedings initiated against a retired employee are sustainable after period of more than one year, no plausible explanation could be given by learned Law Officer.
6. Arguments heard. Record perused.
7. It is admitted position that the petitioner stood retied from service on 10.11.2017 and he was issued impugned notice under Rules 1.8(a) of the Rules on 02.07.2020, i.e., after more than 2½ years of his retirement. Rule 1.8 of the Rules reads as under:
“1.8 (a) Good conduct is an implied condition of every kind of pension. Government may withhold or withdraw a pension or any part of it if the pensioner be convicted of serious crime or be found to have been guilty of grave misconduct either during or after the completion of his service:
Provided that before any order to this effect is issued, the pension Sanctioning Authority shall give full opportunity to the pensioner to vindicate his position.
(b) Government reserves to themselves the right of recovery from the pension of Government pensioner on account of losses found in judicial or departmental proceedings to have been caused to Government by the negligence, or fraud of such Government pensioner during his service:
Provided that such departmental proceedings shall not be instituted after more than a year from the date of retirement of the Government pensioner.
Note-If the departmental proceedings are not completed within one year after retirement of the Government servant, he may be allowed to draw up to 80% or less of full pension so as to ensure that Government loss in full is recovered from the balance. In the case of judicial proceedings, judgment of the Court may be awaited. If the proceedings are delayed beyond one year after retirement, reduced pension may be allowed as in the case of pensioners facing departmental proceedings.
(c) In case the amount of pension granted to a Government servant be afterwards found to be in excess of that to which he is entitled under the rules, he shall be called upon to refund such excess.
(Emphasis supplied)
Bare perusal of above referred rule clearly indicates that it has been carved out in a mandatory manner that recovery proceedings against an employee shall not be initiated after one year of his retirement. This leaves no justification for the respondents to issue the impugned notice to the petitioner after lapse of more than 2½ years. Hence, reliance on Khalid Imran Khan Barki supra is well placed by learned counsel for the petitioner wherein this Court has held as under:
“14. In view of above referred mandatory provisions of law, there was no justification for the Respondents to issue the impugned show-cause notice after more than 4 years 9 months of retirement of Petitioner when he was no longer civil servant even as per Rule 1.8(b) of Pension Rules. Therefore, this Petition is allowed and the proceedings under Rule 1.8 of Pension rules through show-cause notice dated 22.09.2016 are set aside. No order as to costs.”
(Emphasis supplied)
I am further fortified by the dicta laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in Province of Punjab through Conservator of Forest, Faisalabad and others v. Javed Iqbal (PLJ 2021 SC 175) wherein Rule 1.8 (b) came under discussion and their lordships examined the reason for the limitation of one year envisaged under clause (b) of Rule 1.8 and held that the Government reserves the right of recovery from the pension of a Government pensioner on account of losses found in judicial or departmental proceedings to have been caused to Government by negligence or fraud of such Government servant during his service, but such right is not available to the Government for an indefinite period. Reference in Javed Iqbal supra has also been made to Notification No. SOR-I(S&GAD)4-38/97 dated 10.01.1998 wherein the Government itself has envisaged as under:
“... the Government reserves to itself the right to recover from the pension the amount of any pecuniary loss which it has suffered while the pensioner was in service. It is, however, to be noted that this power cannot be resorted to after afflux of one year from the date of retirement of the petitioner.”
8. Even otherwise, disciplinary proceedings can be initiated against a civil servant within one year after his retirement in terms of Section 1(4)(iii) of the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006 (“the PEEDA Act”). Similarly, if the proceedings are initiated under the PEEDA Act, the same are to be finalized within a period of two years as envisaged under Section 21 thereof. Hence, in any eventuality, a retired civil servant cannot be subjected to accountability for an indefinite period. In view of the above, there was neither any room left for the respondents to issue the impugned notice nor there is anything, in rebuttal with the respondent side to justify the issuance thereof after one year of retirement of the petitioner. Therefore, the impugned notice cannot sustain in the eye of law.
9. For that has been discussed above, this writ petition is allowed, the impugned notice as well as subsequent proceedings are set aside and the respondents are directed to release pensionary benefits to the petitioner in accordance with law.
(Y.A.) Petition allowed
O . XI , R. 21 --- Process of delivering interrogatories and requiring their answers -
2023 SCMR 636
Application of limitation to inheritance cases .
PLD 2022 Supreme Court 353
Evidential standards of proof applicable in civil cases
PLD 2022 SC 353
-Agreement to sell or any other agreement entered into between landlord and tenant after execution of a tenancy agreement in respect of premises shall not effect relationship of landlord and tenant unless tenancy is revoked through a written agreement.
PLJ 2023 Lahore (Note) 50
Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009 (VII of 2009)--
----Ss. 10 & 13--Ejectment petition--Allowed, Appeal--Dismissed--Rent agreement--Default in payment--Sale agreement--No revocation of tenancy--Challenge to--Merely on basis of agreement to sell, respondents cannot presume revocation of tenancy, when it is settled law that mere agreement to sell does not confer any title and only right available to parties is to file suit for specific performance--Respondent No. 1 was not in occupation of premises in pursuance to said agreement to sell but by virtue of rent deed. Respondent No. 1 or his legal heirs cannot take refuge behind agreement to sell and not only defaulted in payment of rent for last many years but also refuse to return premises denying relationship of landlord and tenant--Petitioner is still lawful owner of property but she is neither receiving any rent of said property nor its possession is being returned to her by tenant due to impugned judgment--Petition allowed. [Para 8, 9, 10 & 14] A, B, C, D & E
PLD 1986 Lahore 393, PLD 2016 Lahore 123, 2012 MLD 108,
2017 SCMR 330 and 2016 CLC 1832 ref.
Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009 (VII of 2009)--
----S. 10--Relationship of landlord and tenant--Agreement to sell or any other agreement entered into between landlord and tenant after execution of a tenancy agreement in respect of premises shall not effect relationship of landlord and tenant unless tenancy is revoked through a written agreement. [Para 9] B
M/s. Jawad Jamil and Moeen Ahmad Siddiqui, Advocates for Petitioner.
Mr. Riaz Hussain Chaudhry, Advocate for Respondents.
Date of hearing: 22.9.2021.
PLJ 2023 Lahore (Note) 50
Present: Abid Aziz Sheikh, J.
AQEELA ABID--Petitioner
versus
CH. BASHIR AHMAD, etc.--Respondents
W.P. No. 213378 of 2018, heard on 22.9.2021.
Judgment
This constitutional petition is directed against the judgment and decree dated 23.12.2017 passed by the learned Appellate Court.
2. Relevant facts are that Respondent No. 1 leased out property measuring 10-Marla 25-square feet bearing House No. 44, Ali Block, Ittefaq Town, Multan Road, Lahore (property) from the petitioner through rent deed dated 28.12.2002 against monthly rent of Rs. 7,000/-for period of 03 years. After expiry of aforesaid period, fresh lease agreement dated 09.11.2005 was executed for period of 02 years @ Rs. 9500/- per month and Respondent No. 1 also paid Rs. 20,000/-as security. On default in payment of rent, the petitioner filed first ejectment petition on 16.02.2008, however, due to some technical error in the pleadings, the said ejectment petition was withdrawn on 10.04.2010 and second ejectment petition was filed on 04.05.2010. However, the said ejectment petition was again withdrawn on 02.03.2011 on the plea that petitioner has entered into agreement to sell with one Mian Muhammad Mudassar and Mian Muhammad Abbas. Finally the third ejectment petition was filed on 02.04.2013 on the ground that petitioner has defaulted in payment of rent since 2012. The Respondent No. 1 filed leave to contest application in which he pleaded that as house in question has already been sold through agreement to sell dated 07.06.2011 to one Muhammad Abbas Bashir, therefore, the tenancy is revoked and Respondent No. 1 is no more the tenant of the petitioner. During pendency of the ejectment petition, the said Muhammad Abbas Bashir also filed application under Order I, Rule 10, C.P.C. to be impleaded as party in the ejectment petition, however, said application was dismissed vide order dated 28.05.2016. Finally the ejectment petition filed by the petitioner was allowed by the learned Rent Controller on 26.05.2017. However, in appeal through impugned order dated 23.12.2017, the ejectment petition filed by the petitioner was dismissed and the ejectment order passed by the learned Rent Controller was set aside. The petitioner being aggrieved has filed this constitutional petition.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that admittedly Respondent No. 1 is tenant of the petitioner and mere agreement to sell with one Muhammad Abbas Bashir does not change the status of the Respondent No. 1 as that of a tenant. He further submits that the possession of the house in question was always remained with the tenant in pursuance to tenancy agreement and was never handed over to Muhammad Abbas or any third party in pursuance to agreement to sell. Submits that Muhammad Abbas Bashir did not make full payment in terms of agreement to sell and even otherwise agreement to sell has no bearing on tenancy under Section 10 of the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009 (Act).
4. The learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand submits that the house in question was sold by the petitioner through agreement to sell dated 07.06.2011 to Muhammad Abbas Bashir who is son of deceased Respondent No. 1. Submits that the possession of house was also given to said Muhammad Abbas Bashir, therefore, Respondent No. 1 who has since been passed away, is no more the tenant of the petitioner since 07.06.2011. Learned counsel has placed reliance on Mian Umar Ikram-ul-Haque v. Dr. Shahida Hasnain and another (2016 SCMR 2186) to argue that Section 10 of the Act is not applicable in present matter.
5. Arguments heard. There is no dispute that petitioner is still the owner of the house in the question and the same was handed over to Respondent No. 1 as a tenant in pursuance to written lease agreements dated 28.12.2002 and 09.11.2005. Mere fact that the agreement to sell dated 07.06.2011 was executed between petitioner and one Muhammad Abbas Bashir will not change the status of the petitioner as of a tenant especially when till date neither any suit on the basis of said agreement to sell has been decreed nor property in question has been transferred in the name of Muhammad Abbas Bashir.
6. It is not the case of the Respondent No. 1 that after 07.06.2011, he took over the possession from Muhammad Abbas Bashir or started paying rent to said Muhammad Abbas Bashir rather he has only denied his status as of a tenant on the basis of agreement to sell between petitioner and Muhammad Abbas Bashir. It is also not disputed that application filed by Muhammad Abbas Bashir under Order I, Rule 10, C.P.C. to be impleaded as party in the ejectment petition was dismissed on 28.05.2016, which order being not further challenged has already attained finality.
7. No doubt after the death of Respondent No. 1, Muhammad Abbas Bashir was also impleaded as respondent being one of the legal heirs of Respondent No. 1. However, in these proceedings his status will be merely of legal heir of the tenant and not as occupant of the property on the basis of agreement to sell dated 07.06.2011, especially once his own application under Order I, Rule 10, C.P.C. was already dismissed on 28.05.2016 and said order has also attained finality.
8. Though the learned counsel for the respondents vehemently argued that in pursuance to agreement to sell dated 07.06.2011, possession of the house was also handed over to Muhammad Abbas Bashir. However, no such document is available on record between the petitioner and Respondent No. 1, whereby tenant was directed either to handover possession of the house to Muhammad Abbas Bashir or he was informed that from 07.06.2011 the tenancy is revoked. Even otherwise, merely on the basis of agreement to sell, the respondents/tenants cannot presume revocation of tenancy, when it is settled law that mere agreement to sell does not confer any title and the only right available to the parties is to file suit for specific performance. In this regard, reliance is placed on Islamabad Chamber of Commerce and Industries, Islamabad (PLD 1986 Lahore 393) and Mst. Gulshan v. Ameer Ali and others (PLD 1997 Karachi 292).
9. The next legal question require determination is that whether Section 10 of the Act is applicable in the present case. For convenience Section 10 of the Act is reproduced hereunder:
“10. Effect of other agreement.--An agreement to sell or any other agreement entered into between the landlord and the tenant, after the execution of a tenancy agreement, in respect of premises and for a matter other than a matter provided under the tenancy agreement, shall not affect the relationship of landlord and tenant unless the tenancy is revoked through a written agreement entered before the Rent Registrar in accordance with the provisions of Section 5.”
There is no doubt that under Section 10 of the Act, the agreement to sell or any other agreement entered into between the landlord and the tenant after the execution of a tenancy agreement in respect of the premises shall not effect the relationship of landlord and tenant unless the tenancy is revoked through a written agreement entered before the Rent Register in accordance with the provision of Section 5 of the Act. However, in order to apply Section 10 of the Act, the agreement to sell must be between landlord and tenant and as per law settled by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mian Umer Ikram-ul-Haq supra, if person is in occupation of the premises by virtue of agreement to sell and not because he was a tenant, this Section 10 of the Act will have no bearing on the matter.
10. In the present case indeed the agreement to sell dated 07.06.2011 is not between the landlord/petitioner and Respondent
No. 1/tenant. However, admittedly the Respondent No. 1 was not in occupation of the premises in pursuance to said agreement to sell but by virtue of rent deed dated 28.12.2002. In the application for leave to contest, it is neither the case of the Respondent No. 1 that possession was handed over to him by virtue of agreement to sell dated 07.06.2011, nor it was claimed by him that after agreement to sell, Muhammad Abbas Bashir handed over the possession to him as of a tenant or otherwise.
11. In application for leave to contest, the only claim of Respondent No. 1 is that as petitioner entered into agreement to sell with one Muhammad Abbas Bashir and handed over the possession to him in the said agreement, the tenancy has been revoked. I am afraid the above plea is misconceived. Once Respondent No. 1 entered into premises as a tenant of the petitioner, his status will remain as of a tenant unless the tenancy is revoked specifically between petitioner and the Respondent No. 1. The Respondent No. 1 cannot presume automatic revocation of tenancy just because petitioner entered into agreement to sell with one Muhammad Abbas Bashir.
12. Section 10 of the Act provides that the agreement to sell entered into between landlord and tenant after the execution of tenancy agreement shall not affect the relationship of landlord and tenant unless tenancy is revoked through a written agreement entered before the Rent Registrar in accordance with provision of Section 5 of the Act. No doubt in the present case, alleged agreement to sell dated 07.06.2011 is between petitioner and son of the Respondent No. 1 namely Muhammad Abbas. However, when it is settled law that agreement to sell does not confer any title, the tenancy will not revoke automatically unless in pursuance to said agreement to sell tenancy was specifically revoked.
13. Though agreement to sell does not confer any title, however if at all there was any claim available on the basis of agreement to sell dated 07.06.2011, it was to Muhammad Abbas Bashir. However admittedly not only his application to become party in the ejectment petition was dismissed on 28.05.2016, but till date neither his suit for specific performance has been decreed nor property has been transferred in his name through any registered document.
14. In nutshell the Respondent No. 1 or his legal heirs cannot take refuge behind agreement to sell dated 07.06.2011, (which has no nexus with the Respondent No. 1), and not only defaulted in payment of the rent for the last many years but also refuse to return the premises denying the relationship of landlord and tenant. This is a unique unfortunate situation where though petitioner is still lawful owner of the property but she is neither receiving any rent of said property nor its possession is being returned to her by tenant due to impugned judgment.
15. The case of Mian Umar Ikram-ul-Haq supra relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents actually supports the case of the petitioner. In the said case, it is held that when the party is in occupation of the premises by virtue of agreement to sell entered between the parties and not because he was a tenant then the case is not covered under Section 10 of the Act. However, in the present case, the Respondent No. 1 admittedly entered into premises on the basis of tenancy agreements dated 28.12.2002 and 09.11.2005 and not on the basis of agreement to sell dated 07.06.2011 between petitioner and Muhammad Abbas Bashir, hence his tenancy is not protected by terms of agreement to sell. In this regard reliance is also placed on Dr. Shahida Hasnain v. Mian Umar Ikram-ul-Haq and another (PLD 2016 Lahore 123), Haji Muhammad Saeed v. Additional District Judge (2012 MLD 108), Mst. Zarina Khan v. Mst. Farzana Shoaib (2017 SCMR 330) and Ayesha Moeen v. Appellate Rent Tribunal/Additional District Judge, Lahore and 4 others (2016 CLC 1832).
16. It is also relevant to note that if at all the learned Appellate Court reached to the conclusion that on the basis of agreement to sell dated 07.06.2011, the Respondent No. 1, is no more the tenant of the petitioner, the learned Court was required to grant leave to contest to the Respondent No. 1, instead of dismissing the ejectment petition.
17. In view of above discussion, this petition is allowed. Accordingly the impugned judgment passed by learned Appellate Court dated 23.12.2017 is set aside and the eviction order passed by the learned Special Judge Rent dated 26.05.2017 is restored.
(Y.A.) Petition allowed
Word “alteration” as “Variation; changing; making different--A change of a thing from one form or state to another; making a thing different from what it was without destroying its identity”-
PLJ 2023 SC 115
Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--
----Art. 185(2)(d)--Consolidated judgments--Modification in judgment--Judgment was partially upheld--Concurrent findings--Appellant was challenged part of judgment whereby his appeal was dismissed while he accepted order of modification which goes to his favour--Maintainability--Order of modification has been accepted by appellant as it goes in his favour and he has challenged part of judgment whereby his appeal was dismissed, he was not competent to file an appeal under Article 185(2)(d) of Constitution and he was required to file a petition for leave to appeal under Article 135(3) of Constitution--If a judgment is to change or alter or modify ruling of Court below, it would be said that judgment has varied ruling of lower Court--Where a judgment is partially upheld, and partially reversed, and only that part of judgment has been challenged which is partially maintained, then same cannot fall under ambit of variation, and would have to be considered as a judgment “upheld” to one extent, and a judgment “set aside” to rest of it--It is not a case for interference in concurrent findings of two fora below--There are concurrent findings of two fora below against petitioner on basis of admission in written statement as well as witness of petitioner--We have considered case where leave application should have been filed--Findings of fora below are correct and in accordance with law--Appeal dismissed.
[Pp. 117, 118, 119, 120] A, E, F, G, H & I
Ref. 2005 SCMR 1079, 1986 SCMR 121, 1989 SCMR 1434.
Words & Phrases--
----Variation--Black’s Law Dictionary has defined word “alteration” as “Variation; changing; making different--A change of a thing from one form or state to another; making a thing different from what it was without destroying its identity”--Term “variance” has been defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as “Pleadings”--A discrepancy or disagreement between two instruments or two allegations in same cause, which ought by law to be entirely consonant. [P. 118] B & C
Words & Phrases--
----Term “vary” has also been defined in Cambridge Dictionary as “If things of same type vary, they are different from each other, and if you vary them, you cause them to be different from each other”; and in Oxford Dictionary as “(of a group of similar things) to be different from each other in size, shape, etc”. [Pp. 118 & 119] D
Mr. M. Mehmood Sadiq, ASC for Appellant/Petitioner (in C.A. No. 8-Q of 2017).
Mir Talal Rind, ASC for Appellant/ Petitioner (in C.A. No. 11-Q of 2017 and C.P. No. 32-Q of 2017).
Mir Talal Rind, ASC for Respondent (in C.A. No. 8-Q of 2017).
Mr. M. Mehmood Sadiq, ASC for Respondents (in C.A. No. 11-Q of 2017 and C.P. No. 32-Q of 2017).
Date of hearing: 28.7.2022.
PLJ 2023 SC 115
[Appellate Jurisdiction]
Present: Yahya Afridi, Amin-ud-Din Khan and Jamal Khan Mandokhail, JJ.
ASADULLAH KHAN and another—Appellants/Petitioners
versus
MUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LTD. and another--Respondents
C.As. Nos. 8-Q and 11-Q & C.P. No. 32-Q of 2017,
decided on 28.7.2022.
(Against the judgment dated 29.12.2016 passed by the High
Court of Balochistan in R.F.A No. 155/2014 and Civil Revision
Petition No. 391 of 2014)
Judgment
Amin-ud-Din Khan, J.--Through this single judgment we intend to decide the instant appeal as well as connected Civil Appeal No. 11-Q of 2017 and CPLA No. 32-Q of 2017 as all the three matters have arisen out of the consolidated judgment of the learned Division Bench of the High Court of Balochistan Quetta dated 29.12.2016 whereby R.F.A. No. 155 of 2014 filed by the present appellant and Civil Revision No. 391 of 2014 filed by the MCB were dismissed.
2. The impugned judgment under challenge in R.F.A. No. 155 of 2014 was modified in a way that the amount of Rs. 14,45,369/-lying in the account of the appellant as was released in favour of the appellant vide order dated 8.9.2014 passed by the learned trial Court “the appellant is allowed to withdraw aforesaid amount with profit/interest from his account in accordance with law”.
3. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and minutely gone through the record. First we take the question of maintainability of the appeal as the same has been filed under Article 185(2)(d) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 when the instant appeal by the appellant is certainly against the dismissal of his RFA and the appellant supports the varied part of judgment, therefore, in our view the appeal under the above provision of the Constitution was not competent.
4. The learned High Court has modified the judgment as noted in Para 2 supra. The order of modification has been accepted by the appellant as it goes in his favour and he has challenged the part of the judgment whereby his appeal was dismissed, therefore, he was not competent to file an appeal under Article 185(2)(d) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 and he was required to file a petition for leave to appeal under Article 135(3) of the Constitution. In the given circumstances, it would be appropriate to delve upon the scope of Article 185(2)(d) of the Constitution. For ease of reference, the relevant portion of Article 185 of the Constitution, reads as follows:
“185. (1) Subject to this Article, the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine appeals from judgments, decrees, final orders or sentences of a High Court.
(2) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree, final order or sentence of a High Court--
(a) .....................................................
(b) .....................................................
(c) .....................................................
(d) if the amount or value of the subject-matter of the dispute in the Court of first instance was, and also in dispute in appeal is, not less than fifty thousand rupees or such other sum as may be specified in that behalf by Act of [Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament)] and the judgment, decree or final order appealed from has varied or set aside the judgment, decree or final order of the Court immediately below; or
(e) if the judgment, decree or final order involves directly or indirectly some claim or question respecting property of the like amount or value and the judgment, decree or final order appealed from has varied or set aside the judgment, decree or final order of the Court immediately below; or”
(emphasis supplied)
5. Anxious consideration has also been given to the Supreme Court Rules 1980, Orders XII and XIII pertaining to Civil Appeals and Petitions for Leave to Appeal in Civil Proceedings, respectively, but nothing could be found therein with regard to issue in hand except the Certificate from the AOR in Respect of Value of Property in Appeal Filed under Order XII, Rule 1(ii), at Serial No. 14 in the Sixth Schedule of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980, which reads as follows:
“CERTIFICATE FROM ADVOCATE-ON-RECORD IN RESPECT OF VALUE OF PROPERTY IN APPEALS FILED UNDER ORDER XII, RULE 1(ii) S.C.R
IN THE SUPREME COURT.
(Appellate Jurisdiction)
Civil Appeal No. _______ of _______19
A. P(B) ...................... Appellant
versus
C. D ........................ Respondent
CERTIFICATE
I, ____________________ AOR for the appellant in the above-cited appeal do hereby certify that the judgment/decree/final order involves directly/indirectly a claim/question respecting property of the value of not less than Rupees fifty thousand and that the judgment/decree/final order appealed from has varied/set aside, the judgment/decree/final order of the Court immediately below.
Dated this the ......... day of ......... 19 ......
AOR”
6. This Court further probed into the definition of “varied” as the term has been found in Article 185(2)(e) of the Constitution and the Certificate at Serial No. 14 noted supra. Black’s Law Dictionary has defined the word “alteration” as “Variation; changing; making different. A change of a thing from one form or state to another; making a thing different from what it was without destroying its identity.” The term “variance” has also been defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as “Pleadings”. A discrepancy or disagreement between two instruments or two allegations in the same cause, which ought by law to be entirely consonant. Thus, if the evidence adduced by the plaintiff does not agree with the allegations of his pleadings it is a variance. A disagreement between the allegations and proof in some matter which in point of law is essential to the charge or claim. A substantial departure in the evidence adduced from the issue as made by the pleadings.” The term “vary” has also been defined in the Cambridge Dictionary as “If things of the same type vary, they are different from each other, and if you vary them, you cause them to be different from each other”; and in the Oxford Dictionary as “(of a group of similar things) to be different from each other in size, shape, etc.”
7. The term “varied” as used in the present context seems also to present the same connotation as found in the lexical and legal dictionaries mentioned above; if a judgment is to change or alter or modify the ruling of the Court below, it would be said that the judgment has varied the ruling of the lower Court. However, where the same is set aside, or upheld, no modification takes place and the impugned ruling of the Court below is either accepted in toto or reversed absolutely. Where a judgment is partially upheld, and partially reversed, and only that part of the judgment has been challenged which is partially maintained, as in the instant case, then the same cannot fall under the ambit of variation, and would have to be considered as a judgment “upheld” to one extent, and a judgment “set aside” to the rest of it.
8. The instant case involves matter pertaining to property valued at more than Rs. 50,000/-in the trial Court, however, the High Court has “varied or set side the part of judgment, decree or final order of the Court immediately below”, as required under Article 185(2)(e) of the Constitution. The Appellant has only impugned that part of the judgment of the High Court which dismissed the claim of the Appellant in the RFA. Therefore, the present Civil Appeal under Article 185(2)(d) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 is not competent and the Appellant was required to file a Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal under Article 185(3) of the Constitution, in this eventuality. We have thoroughly examined the existing law on the subject but the answer is that it is a case of first impression. Though, previously when a decree or order was passed by the High Court and the party partially challenging a part of concurrent findings against them have filed Petition for Leave to Appeal, in the cases reported as “Muhammad Ismail and 5 others v. Bashir Ahmad and others” (2005 SCMR 1079), “Shakeel and another v. The Deputy Commissioner Sanghar and others” (1986 SCMR 121) and “The State Bank of Pakistan v. The Official Liquidator of National Commercial Bank Ltd.” (1989 SCMR 1434), thus, we are clear in our mind that in the instant case, the portion of the judgment of the High Court which varied the judgment of the lower Court was in favour of the Appellant and that portion was not challenged by the Appellant rather Appellant has challenged a portion of the judgment of the High Court as well as the two fora below whereby his claim was concurrently dismissed by all the two fora below, therefore, in our view, the appeal filed by the Appellant was not competent. He was required to file a Petition for Leave to Appeal.
9. We have considered the case of the Appellant on the touchstone of Article 185 (2)(d) and (e) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. No case has been made out even on merits. Therefore, no question of making out a case by the Appellant in the light of Clause (3) of Article 185 of the Constitution for grant of leave. Learned counsel for the appellant failed to make out a case for interference when there are concurrent findings of fact recorded by the two fora below against the appellant that he failed to prove the relevant documents to show that the amount claimed by the appellant to have been deposited in his account through the aforesaid deposit slips. When there are concurrent findings of fact of two fora below that the appellant has not proved through the documentary or oral evidence the case pleaded by him, therefore, it is not a case for interference in the concurrent findings of the two fora below.
10. Civil Appeal No. 11-Q of 2017 is barred by 64 days. The ground mentioned in C.M.A. No. 62-Q of 201.7 filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 for condonation of delay is that the application was filed for grant of certified copies on 2.1.2017 and the same were issued on 1.3.2017 whereas counsel for the appellant-Bank had gone for performance of Umrah from 15.3.201.7 to 13.4.2017 and the appellant was under the impression that the appeal period is 60 days. We are afraid that it is hardly a ground for condonation of delay. As the counsel has argued the case on merits that the modification has been challenged and argues that the plaintiff Asad Ullah Khan’s account was a current account, therefore, he is not entitled for profit and any interest on the amount decreed in his favour by the learned trial Court and confirmed by the appellate Court. We are of the view that impression of the appellant is misconceived. The learned High Court has not ordered for grant of any profit or interest rather the same has been allowed in accordance with law. Needless to observe that if on the current account no amount of interest or profit is admissible, the appellant is not obliged to pay the same.
11. Through CPLA No. 32-Q of 2017 order of dismissal of Civil Revision has been challenged by the defendant Bank. We have noticed that there are concurrent findings of two fora below against the petitioner on the basis of admission in the written statement as well as the witness of the petitioner-defendant Syed Zahid Hussain, Assistant Vice-President of the Bank, therefore, no case for grant of leave is made out. Consequently, Civil Appeal No. 8-Q of 2017 which was not competent and we have considered the case where leave application should have been filed. Findings of the fora below are correct and in
accordance with law, therefore, instant appeal stands dismissed. Civil Appeal No. 11-Q of 2017 being barred by time as well as on merits also stands dismissed and CPLA No. 32-Q of 2017 also stands dismissed as no case for grant of leave is made out.
(Y.A.) Appeal dismissed