‑𝑺𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒍‑‑‑𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕, 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒃𝒐𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒘‑‑‑𝑴𝒊𝒔𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒐𝒇 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆‑

 2001 𝑴 𝑳 𝑫 957

(𝒂) 𝑪𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒓𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒅𝒆 (𝑽 𝒐𝒇 1908)‑‑‑

‑‑‑‑𝑶. 𝑽𝑰, 𝑹.17‑‑‑𝑷𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔, 𝒂𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇‑‑‑𝑺𝒄𝒐𝒑𝒆‑‑‑𝑾𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒅𝒊𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒆, '𝒐𝒓 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒙𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒅𝒊𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒖𝒕𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒄𝒂𝒖𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏; 𝒔𝒖𝒄𝒉 𝒂𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆.

𝑴𝒔𝒕. 𝑮𝒉𝒖𝒍𝒂𝒎 𝑩𝒊𝒃𝒊 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒗. 𝑺𝒂𝒓𝒔𝒂 𝑲𝒉𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝑷𝑳𝑫 1985 𝑺𝑪 345 𝒓𝒆𝒇.

(𝒃) 𝑸𝒂𝒏𝒖𝒏‑𝒆‑𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒉𝒂𝒅𝒂𝒕 (10 𝒐𝒇 1984)‑‑‑

‑‑‑‑𝑨𝒓𝒕. 17‑‑‑𝑨𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒐𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕‑‑‑𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝑨𝒓𝒕.17 𝒐𝒇 𝑸𝒂𝒏𝒖𝒏‑𝒆-­𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒉𝒂𝒅𝒂𝒕, 1984‑‑‑𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚‑‑‑𝑾𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒐𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒆𝒙𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒍𝒐𝒏𝒈 𝒃𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒆𝒏𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒄𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝑸𝒂𝒏𝒖𝒏‑𝒆‑𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒉𝒂𝒅𝒂𝒕, 1984, 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝑨𝒓𝒕.17 𝒐𝒇 𝑸𝒂𝒏𝒖𝒏‑𝒆‑𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒉𝒂𝒅𝒂𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆.

(𝒄) 𝑸𝒂𝒏𝒖𝒏‑𝒆‑𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒉𝒂𝒅𝒂𝒕 (10 𝒐𝒇 1984)----

‑‑‑‑𝑨𝒓𝒕𝒔. 120 & 132‑‑‑𝑭𝒂𝒄𝒕, 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇‑‑‑𝑭𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒖𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒄𝒓𝒐𝒔𝒔‑𝒆𝒙𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕 𝒅𝒆𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒆𝒙𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏‑𝒊𝒏‑𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒆𝒇‑‑‑𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕‑‑‑𝑺𝒖𝒄𝒉 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒂 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕𝒆𝒅.

(𝒅) 𝑸𝒂𝒏𝒖𝒏‑𝒆‑𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒉𝒂𝒅𝒂𝒕 (10 𝒐𝒇 1984)‑‑‑

‑‑‑‑𝑨𝒓𝒕. 132‑‑‑𝑪𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒓𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒅𝒆 (𝑽 𝒐𝒇 1908), 𝑺.115 & 𝑶. 𝑽𝑰𝑰𝑰, 𝑹𝒓.3 & 5‑‑‑𝑹𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏‑‑𝑴𝒊𝒔𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒐𝒇 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆‑‑‑𝑬𝒙𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒑𝒖𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒅𝒐𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒆𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔, 𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒊𝒏 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒃𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝑻𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕‑‑‑𝑩𝒐𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒘 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒙𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒊𝒆𝒅‑‑‑𝑽𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒚‑‑‑𝑩𝒐𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒘 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒏 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒙𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒐𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒄𝒊𝒓𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒔.

(𝒆) 𝑾𝒆𝒔𝒕 𝑷𝒂𝒌𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏 𝑳𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑹𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒖𝒆 𝑨𝒄𝒕 (𝑿𝑽𝑰𝑰 𝒐𝒇 1967)‑‑‑

‑‑‑‑𝑺. 45‑‑‑𝑴𝒖𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏, 𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇‑‑‑𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒑𝒖𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒎𝒖𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒍𝒂𝒘𝒇𝒖𝒍𝒍𝒚 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚‑‑‑𝑷𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒖𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏‑‑‑𝑹𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒖𝒆 𝑶𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒆𝒓 𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒖𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒃𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒐𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚‑‑‑𝑽𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒚‑‑‑𝑹𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒖𝒆 𝑶𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒆𝒓 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒏𝒐 𝒍𝒂𝒘𝒇𝒖𝒍 𝒂𝒖𝒕𝒉𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒕𝒐 𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒍 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒖𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒏 𝒄𝒊𝒓𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒔.

(𝒇) 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒕 𝑨𝒄𝒕 (𝑰𝑿 𝒐𝒇 1872)‑‑‑

‑‑‑‑𝑺. 226‑‑‑𝑷𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚‑‑‑𝑳𝒂𝒘𝒇𝒖𝒍 𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚‑‑‑𝑷𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒑𝒂𝒍 𝒊𝒔 𝒃𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒍𝒂𝒘𝒇𝒖𝒍 𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚, 𝒔𝒐 𝒍𝒐𝒏𝒈 𝒂𝒔 𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒔𝒐 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒅.

𝑺𝒚𝒆𝒅 𝑯𝒖𝒎𝒂𝒚𝒖𝒏 𝒁𝒂𝒊𝒅𝒊 𝒂𝒏𝒅 4 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒗. 𝑴𝒔𝒕. 𝑯𝒖𝒔𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒏 𝑨𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒛𝒂 1999 𝑺𝑪𝑴𝑹 2718 𝒓𝒆𝒇.

(𝒈) 𝑺𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄 𝑹𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒇 𝑨𝒄𝒕 (𝑰 𝒐𝒇 1877)‑‑‑

‑‑‑‑𝑺. 12‑‑‑𝑺𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒍‑‑‑𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕, 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒃𝒐𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒘‑‑‑𝑴𝒊𝒔𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒐𝒇 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆‑‑‑𝑬𝒙𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒏𝒆𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒊𝒏 𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒊𝒏 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒃𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝑻𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕‑‑‑𝑩𝒐𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒘 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒙𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒂𝒔 𝒘𝒆𝒍𝒍 𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝑻𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑳𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓 𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒍𝒚‑‑‑𝑽𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒚‑‑‑𝑾𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒆𝒙𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇𝒔 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒏 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇𝒔 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒆‑‑‑𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒃𝒐𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒔𝒆𝒕 𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆.

𝑺𝒉. 𝑨𝒃𝒅𝒖𝒍 𝑨𝒛𝒊𝒛 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝑷𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔.

𝑨𝒓𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝑴𝒆𝒉𝒎𝒐𝒐𝒅 𝑪𝒉𝒂𝒖𝒅𝒉𝒓𝒚 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔.

𝑫𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈: 24𝒕𝒉 𝑵𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓, 2000.

 2001 𝑴 𝑳 𝑫 957
[𝑳𝒂𝒉𝒐𝒓𝒆]
𝑩𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝑴𝒂𝒖𝒍𝒗𝒊 𝑨𝒏𝒘𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒇 𝑯𝒂𝒒, 𝑱
𝑹𝑨𝑴𝒁𝑨𝑵 𝒂𝒏𝒅 2 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔‑‑‑‑𝑷𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔
𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒖𝒔
𝑳𝑨𝑹𝑨 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝑳𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒍 𝑯𝒆𝒊𝒓𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓‑‑‑‑𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔
𝑪𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍 𝑹𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑵𝒐. 153‑𝑫 𝒐𝒇 1988, 𝒉𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝒐𝒏 24𝒕𝒉 𝑵𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓, 2000.

𝑱𝑼𝑫𝑮𝑴𝑬𝑵𝑻

𝑶𝒏 23‑7‑1980 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒂 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒂𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔. 𝑰𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕 𝒊𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐. 1, 𝒂 𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒄𝒆𝒅 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒐𝒏, 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅 5765 𝒖𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒆𝒗𝒂𝒄𝒖𝒆𝒆 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅: 𝑯𝒆 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒈𝒐𝒕 𝒂𝒅𝒋𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒅 5557 𝒖𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒔. 𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒃𝒂𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 208 𝒖𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒔 𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝑵𝒐. 𝒍 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕/𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐. 2. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒖𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒔 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒕𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒕 𝑹𝒔.1,664 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒑𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐. 𝒍 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝑵𝒐.𝒍 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.2. 𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.1 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒊𝒏𝒕 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.2 𝒂𝒔 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒈𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒄𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒚𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒐𝒖𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒖𝒓𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒆𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕. 𝑯𝒂𝒗𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒖𝒔, 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒍 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒖𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒆𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐. 2 𝒆𝒙𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 1‑11‑1963 𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒂 𝒈𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒍 𝒑𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 ‑𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒂𝒗𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.2 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 6‑11‑1963. 𝑨𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒎𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈 64 𝑲𝒂𝒏𝒂𝒍𝒔, 5 𝑴𝒂𝒓𝒍𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕 108 𝒖𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒔 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒈𝒐𝒕 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒗𝒊𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝑳𝒂𝒎𝒃𝒂𝒚 𝑲𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒔𝒂 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.1 𝒈𝒐𝒕 𝑴𝒖𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑵𝒐.348 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏. 𝒇𝒂𝒗𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.2 𝒐𝒏 29‑1‑1964. 𝑺𝒊𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒍𝒚 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒎𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈 59 𝑲𝒂𝒏𝒍𝒂𝒔, 16 𝑴𝒂𝒓𝒍𝒂𝒔 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒈𝒐𝒕 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈 100 𝒖𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒔 𝒐𝒏 13‑2‑1964. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒕𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.2 𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒂𝒔 𝒈𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐. 𝒍 𝒘𝒉𝒐 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒂𝒗𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑴𝒖𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑵𝒐.212 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒈𝒐𝒕. 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 8‑3‑1964.. 𝑨𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒋𝒖𝒏𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.2 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒆𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒍 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒈𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒍 𝒑𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑹𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒖𝒆 𝑶𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒏 15‑4‑1964 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒈𝒐𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 15‑5‑1964. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒘𝒉𝒐 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒅𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒖𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏. 𝑨 𝑷𝒖𝒏𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒊𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐. 𝒍 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒉𝒆 𝒘𝒊𝒍𝒍 𝒈𝒆𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒖𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒇 𝒉𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒑𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒔𝒐𝒎𝒆 𝒎𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒎𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒚. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒂𝒍. 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒍𝒚, 𝑴𝒖𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑵𝒐.264 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅. 𝑰𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒂𝒌𝒆𝒏,𝒖𝒑 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑹𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒖𝒆 𝑶𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒏 1‑12‑1965 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒎𝒂𝒅𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒖𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 23‑12‑1965 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒑𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒂𝒏 𝒆𝒙𝒕𝒓𝒂 𝒂𝒎𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝑹𝒔.700 𝒕𝒐 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.1. 𝑯𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓, 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.1 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒆𝒘 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒖𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏. 𝑯𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑹𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒖𝒆 𝑶𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒏 18‑5‑1967. 𝑯𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒏 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑪𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒐𝒓 𝒐𝒏 5‑7-1968. 𝑾𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒔𝒆 𝒂𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒂 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒔𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒆𝒙𝒄𝒍𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒗𝒆 .𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒃𝒔𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒕𝒆 𝒐𝒘𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒂 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒖𝒂𝒍 𝒊𝒏𝒋𝒖𝒏𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒃𝒚 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔. 𝑰𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒍𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒂 𝒑𝒓𝒂𝒚𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒎𝒂𝒅𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒓𝒆 𝒎𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒆𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐. 𝒍 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒎 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒂 𝒅𝒊𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒐 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐. 𝒍 𝒕𝒐 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒔𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒎 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒊𝒎𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒎𝒂𝒅𝒆 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅.

2. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐. 𝒍 𝒘𝒉𝒐 𝒓𝒂𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒔𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒍 𝒐𝒃𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔. 𝑶𝒏 𝒎𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒔 𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒆𝒙𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒂𝒗𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐. 𝒍 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒖𝒓𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 208 𝒖𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒔. 𝑯𝒆 𝒅𝒊𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒙𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒍𝒚 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒎𝒑𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒊𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒗𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒅 𝒂𝒔 𝒊𝒕 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒖𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒔. 𝑯𝒆 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒖𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒂𝒗𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.2 𝒊𝒔 𝒃𝒐𝒈𝒖𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒗𝒊𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝑳𝒂𝒎𝒃𝒂𝒚. 𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑴𝒖𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑵𝒐.212 𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒊𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒈𝒐𝒕 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝒃𝒖𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚: 𝑯𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑹𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒖𝒆 𝑶𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒆𝒓 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝑴𝒖𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑵𝒐.264. 𝑭𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒔 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒇𝒓𝒂𝒎𝒆𝒅:‑--

(1) 𝑾𝒉𝒆𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒕? 𝑶𝑷𝑫

(2) 𝑾𝒉𝒆𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒕 𝒃𝒆𝒕𝒘𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒊𝒔 𝒗𝒐𝒊𝒅.?

(3) 𝑾𝒉𝒆𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒐 𝒋𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒓𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕? 𝑶𝑷𝑫.

(4) 𝑾𝒉𝒆𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒗𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒖𝒓𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒆𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕‑𝒇𝒆𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒋𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒔 𝒘𝒓𝒐𝒏𝒈? 𝑶𝑷𝑫.

(5) 𝑾𝒉𝒆𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒍𝒚 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒎𝒑𝒆𝒅, 𝒊𝒇 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒘𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒊𝒕𝒔 𝒆𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕? 𝑶𝑷𝑫.

(6) 𝑾𝒉𝒆𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐. 𝒍 𝒊𝒔 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒔𝒕𝒔? 𝑶𝑷𝑫.

(7) 𝑾𝒉𝒆𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒍𝒆 𝒊𝒔 𝒉𝒊𝒕. 𝒃𝒚 𝑴.𝑳.𝑹. 𝑵𝒐.64? 𝑶𝑷𝑫.

(

𝑾𝒉𝒆𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.2 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒐 𝒂𝒖𝒕𝒉𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒕𝒐 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒗𝒆𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒂𝒗𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇𝒔?

(9) 𝑾𝒉𝒆𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇𝒔 𝒐𝒃𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒘𝒂𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒔𝒂𝒍𝒆 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒔? 𝑶𝑷𝑫.

(10) 𝑹𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒇.

𝑬𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒅. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 17‑12‑1980. 𝑨 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒔𝒕 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒂 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑨𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒕 𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆 𝒐𝒏 27‑11‑1984. 𝑨 𝑪𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍 𝑹𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔, 𝒉𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓, 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒂𝒄𝒌 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒇𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒉 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒏 𝒉𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒂 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑨𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒕 𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆, 𝑲𝒂𝒔𝒖𝒓 𝒘𝒉𝒐 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒐𝒏 20‑1‑1988.

3. 𝑳𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒍 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒏 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒎𝒑𝒖𝒈𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒔𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆. 𝑳𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒍 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐. 1, 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒅, 𝒔𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒎𝒑𝒖𝒈𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒔.

4. 𝑰 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒈𝒐𝒏𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒑𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒔 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝑪𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍 𝑹𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏, 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒍 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒙𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒈𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒍 𝒑𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 (𝑬𝒙𝒉.𝑷.10) 𝒂𝒍𝒐𝒏𝒈𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒊𝒕𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐. 1. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕, 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 1‑11‑1963 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒗𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒐𝒏 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅 𝑬𝒙𝒉.𝑷.1. 𝑰𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.1 𝒂𝒄𝒌𝒏𝒐𝒘𝒍𝒆𝒅𝒈𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒆𝒊𝒑𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 208 𝒖𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒈𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝒊.𝒆. 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.2 𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒍 𝒈𝒆𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒖 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒖𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒆𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒉𝒆 𝒘𝒊𝒍𝒍 𝒉𝒊𝒎𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒇 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒇𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒂𝒗𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑹𝒂𝒎𝒛𝒂𝒏 𝒆𝒕𝒄., 𝒐𝒓 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝒘𝒊𝒍𝒍 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒇𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒂𝒗𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝑹𝒂𝒎𝒛𝒂𝒏 𝒆𝒕𝒄.

5. 𝑨𝒔 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 '𝒃𝒚 𝒎𝒆 𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒙𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒔𝒆 𝒅𝒐𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒊𝒆𝒅. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒍 𝒐𝒃𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒓𝒂𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝑰𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.2, 5 𝒂𝒏𝒅 7. 𝑨𝒍𝒍 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒔𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒔 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒂𝒗𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒔𝒕 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒐𝒃𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒊𝒕𝒔 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒔𝒆 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒊𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒍𝒚 𝒊𝒕 𝒖𝒑𝒉𝒆𝒍𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔.

6. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅𝒍𝒚 𝒆𝒙𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐. 𝒍 𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒂𝒗𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.2 𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒏 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅 𝒂𝒔 𝑬𝒙𝒉.𝑷.2. 𝑰𝒕 𝒅𝒐𝒆𝒔 𝒂𝒖𝒕𝒉𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.2 𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅.

7. 𝑰𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆 𝑵𝒐. 𝒍 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕. 𝑩𝒐𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒘 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒉𝒆𝒍𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒃𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒄 𝒅𝒐𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑬𝒙𝒉.𝑷.1 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒈𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒗𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒊𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐. 𝒍 𝒊𝒔 𝒃𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒕, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒏𝒍𝒚 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒊𝒓𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒔 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒂 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒕. 𝑰 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒃𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑨𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒕 𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆 𝒐𝒏 27‑9‑1987 𝒑𝒓𝒂𝒚𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒚 𝒃𝒆 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕 𝒔𝒐 𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒎 𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒔𝒌 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒇 𝒐𝒇 𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕. 𝑻𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑨𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒕 𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒆𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒐𝒏 20‑1‑1988 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒈𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒂 𝒅𝒆𝒍𝒂𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒔𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒍 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒎𝒂𝒌𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒃𝒆 𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒎𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒎𝒂𝒌𝒆 𝒐𝒖𝒕 𝒂 𝒏𝒆𝒘 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆. 𝑰 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑨𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒕 𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 20‑1‑1988 𝒊𝒔 𝒗𝒊𝒐𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒏 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝑴𝒔𝒕. 𝑮𝒉𝒖𝒍𝒂𝒎 𝑩𝒊𝒃𝒊 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒗. 𝑺𝒂𝒓𝒔𝒂 𝑲𝒉𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔 (𝑷𝑳𝑫 1985 𝑺𝒖𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 345). 𝑰 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆, 𝒆𝒙𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒏𝒍𝒚 𝒂𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒔𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒇 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒃𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒚 𝒐𝒏 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒊𝒕 𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒊𝒕 𝒘𝒊𝒍𝒍 𝒃𝒆 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒆 𝒐𝒓 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒙𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒐𝒓 𝒊𝒕 𝒘𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒖𝒕𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒄𝒂𝒖𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏. 𝑰, 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆, 𝒔𝒆𝒕 𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑨𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒕 𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒂𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕.

8. 𝑵𝒐𝒘 𝒅𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒊𝒕𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒊𝒔 𝒏𝒐 𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄 𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓 𝒘𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒏 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒏𝒐 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒆𝒙𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒆𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒆𝒙𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝑬𝑿𝒉.𝑷.1 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒆𝒙𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐. 𝒍 𝒐𝒓 𝒏𝒐𝒕. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒆𝒗𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒑𝒊𝒆𝒄𝒆𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒉𝒂𝒃 𝑫𝒊𝒏, 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒎𝒑 𝑽𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒐𝒓, 𝑵𝒂𝒋𝒎𝒖𝒍 𝑯𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒂𝒏, 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏‑𝒘𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒆𝒓, 𝑲𝒉𝒖𝒔𝒉𝒊 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅, 𝑴𝒂𝒓𝒈𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑲𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒖 𝑲𝒉𝒂𝒏, 𝑷.𝑾.5. 𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒎𝒑 𝑽𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒐𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏‑𝒘𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝑰 𝒘𝒊𝒍𝒍 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒎𝒖𝒄𝒉 𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒔𝒆 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒎𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒐𝒓 𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒍 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒔, 𝒐𝒏𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒍𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒎𝒑 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎 𝒐𝒇 𝑬𝒙𝒉𝒔.𝑷.1. 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑷.2 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒔𝒄𝒓𝒊𝒃𝒆𝒅 𝑬𝒙𝒉𝒔.𝑷.1. 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑷.2. 𝑰𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝑲𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒖 𝑲𝒉𝒂𝒏, 𝑫.𝑾.5 𝒂𝒍𝒕𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒆𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒂 𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒈𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝒑𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝑬𝒙𝒉.𝑷.2 𝒃𝒖𝒕 𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒂 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑬𝒙𝒉.𝑷.1.

9. 𝑲𝒉𝒖𝒔𝒉𝒊 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅, 𝑷.𝑾.3, 𝒉𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓, 𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒚 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒔 𝑳𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒂𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒉𝒆 𝒌𝒏𝒐𝒘𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒙𝒂𝒄𝒕 𝒘𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒔 𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒆𝒙𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒆𝒅 𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆:‑‑

𝑵𝒐𝒘 𝒃𝒐𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒘 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒐𝒃𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒊𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝑫𝒂𝒏𝒂 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒆𝒙𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑬𝑿𝒉.𝑷.1. 𝑻𝒐 𝒎𝒚 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒅, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕, 𝑬𝒙𝒉.𝑷.1 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒂 𝒅𝒐𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒍𝒂𝒘 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒅. 𝑵𝒆𝒆𝒅𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒐𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒆𝒙𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒍𝒐𝒏𝒈 𝒃𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒆𝒏𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒄𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑸𝒂𝒏𝒖𝒏‑𝒆‑𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒉𝒂𝒅𝒂𝒕 𝑶𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓, 1984 𝑨𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒍𝒆 17). 𝑻𝒉𝒖𝒔, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒘 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝒔𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒅𝒆 𝒂 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑻𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒇𝒆𝒓. 𝒐𝒇 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝑨𝒄𝒕, 1882 𝒊𝒔 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒄𝒆𝒅. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝒐𝒃𝒗𝒊𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒍𝒚 𝒊𝒔 𝒂 𝒗𝒊𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒓. 𝑰𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒖𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒎𝒆𝒂𝒏𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝑫𝒂𝒓𝒂 𝒈𝒐𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑬𝒙𝒉.𝑷.1 𝒘𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒏 𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒂𝒗𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝑵𝒐. 𝒍 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.2. 𝑾𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒊𝒎𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒂 𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒍𝒆 𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒑𝒖𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒓𝒐𝒔𝒔-𝒆𝒙𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒔 𝒅𝒆𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒉𝒊𝒎 𝒊𝒏 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒆𝒙𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏‑𝒊𝒏­-𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒆𝒇. 𝑻𝒉𝒖𝒔, 𝒊𝒕 𝒘𝒊𝒍𝒍 𝒃𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐. 𝒍 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔.

10. 𝑵𝒐𝒘 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒐 𝒓𝒆𝒃𝒖𝒕𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑫.𝑾.2 𝑼𝒎𝒂𝒓 𝑯𝒂𝒚𝒂𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.1 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆 𝒑𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝑬𝒙𝒉.𝑫.2. 𝑳𝒊𝒌𝒆 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒉𝒐 𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒂𝒊𝒏 𝒔𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒙𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒘𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒏 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒊𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒖𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒂 𝒘𝒐𝒓𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑬𝒙𝒉. 𝑷.1 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒆𝒙𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒉𝒊𝒔 .𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓. 𝑰𝒏 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒄𝒓𝒐𝒔𝒔‑𝒆𝒙𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔. 𝑯𝒆 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝑩𝒂𝒏𝒋𝒂𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒖𝒍𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒊𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒂 𝒈𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆. 𝑯𝒆 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒂𝒏𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒐 𝑪𝒉𝒖𝒏𝒊𝒂𝒏 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒆𝒙𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒆𝒅. 𝑰𝒏 𝒓𝒆𝒑𝒍𝒚 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒔 𝒂𝒔 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓:‑‑

𝑻𝒉𝒖𝒔, 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒊𝒔 𝒏𝒐 𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑬𝒙𝒉.𝑷𝑨 𝒆𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒐𝒓 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒘 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒊𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒖𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒊𝒏 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒙𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒏 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒆𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒏 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒙𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕.

11. 𝑻𝒐 𝒎𝒚 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒅 𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒕𝒐 .𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒎𝒖𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒘𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒃𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒏𝒐 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒆𝒗𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆. 𝑺𝒖𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒆 𝒊𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒔𝒐 𝒇𝒂𝒓 𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒔𝒕 𝒎𝒖𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒊.𝒆. 𝑴𝒖𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑵𝒐.212 𝒊𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅, 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅𝒍𝒚 𝒊𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒈𝒐𝒕 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒂𝒘𝒇𝒖𝒍𝒍𝒚 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐, 𝒍 𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒂𝒗𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔. 𝑰𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒊.𝒆. 𝒂 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏‑𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒓𝒆𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑷𝒂𝒕𝒘𝒂𝒓𝒊 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.2 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒆𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒍 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝑹𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒖𝒆 𝑶𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒆𝒓, 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆, 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒏𝒐 𝒍𝒂𝒘𝒇𝒖𝒍 𝒂𝒖𝒕𝒉𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒕𝒐 𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒍 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒖𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏. 𝑹𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒚 𝒃𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒅𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝑺𝒚𝒆𝒅 𝑯𝒖𝒎𝒂𝒚𝒖𝒏 𝒁𝒂𝒊𝒅𝒊 𝒂𝒏𝒅 4 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒗. 𝑴𝒔𝒕. 𝑯𝒖𝒔𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒏 𝑨𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒛𝒂 (1999 𝑺𝑪𝑴𝑹 2718). 𝑻𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒂 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒆𝒙𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝒃𝒖𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒑𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒅. 𝑻𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓 𝑳𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒑𝒔 𝒖𝒑𝒉𝒆𝒍𝒅 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑷𝒆𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒘𝒂𝒓 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒘 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒂 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒆 𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒐𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒊𝒔 𝒃𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒂𝒘𝒇𝒖𝒍 𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝒔𝒐 𝒍𝒐𝒏𝒈 𝒂𝒔 𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒔 𝒔𝒐 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒅.

12. 𝑻𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒊𝒔 𝒚𝒆𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆. 𝑰𝒏 𝒗𝒊𝒆𝒘 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒅, 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝒂𝒔 𝒘𝒆𝒍𝒍 𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒆𝒙𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐. 1. 𝑻𝒐 𝒎𝒚 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒅, 𝒊𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒅𝒐𝒖𝒃𝒕𝒇𝒖𝒍 𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒕 𝒂𝒍𝒍 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.2 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒐𝒌𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝒂𝒔 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒊𝒕, 𝒊𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒕, 𝒊𝒏 𝒗𝒊𝒆𝒘 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏. 202 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒕 𝑨𝒄𝒕, 1872.

13. 𝑨𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑬𝒙𝒉.𝑷.1 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒆𝒙𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐. 1, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒃𝒆𝒊𝒏𝒈, 𝒊𝒏 𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒏 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆, 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒆.

14. 𝑻𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝑪𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍 𝑹𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒍𝒚 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒅. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒃𝒐𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒘 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒔𝒆𝒕 𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒊𝒔 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒚 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒈𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒂 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒍 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 1‑11‑1963. 𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.1 𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒍 𝒆𝒙𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒍𝒆‑𝒅𝒆𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒂𝒗𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝑵𝒐.1 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒅𝒐 𝒔𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑬𝒙𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒍 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒊𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏 𝒐𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒅𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒏𝒆𝒆𝒅𝒇𝒖𝒍. 𝑵𝒐 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒄𝒐𝒔𝒕𝒔.

𝑸.𝑴.𝑯./𝑴.𝑨.𝑲./𝑹‑45/𝑳 𝑹𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒅.

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-𝑺𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒊𝒏𝒋𝒖𝒏𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏---𝑷𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇𝒔, 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒑𝒓𝒂𝒚𝒆𝒅 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒚 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒊𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒖𝒍𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒂𝒍 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 24 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒏𝒆𝒍𝒔 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒆𝒗𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒉 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒔, 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒊𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒔 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝑵𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒉-

 2016 𝒀 𝑳 𝑹 389

𝑺𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄 𝑹𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒇 𝑨𝒄𝒕 (𝑰 𝒐𝒇 1877)---

----𝑺𝒔. 42 & 54---𝑺𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒊𝒏𝒋𝒖𝒏𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏---𝑷𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇𝒔, 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒑𝒓𝒂𝒚𝒆𝒅 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒚 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒊𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒖𝒍𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒂𝒍 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 24 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒏𝒆𝒍𝒔 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒆𝒗𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒉 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒔, 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒊𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒔 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝑵𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒉---𝑺𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒍𝒚 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑻𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕---𝑽𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒚---𝑻𝒘𝒐 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒘 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒇𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒂𝒍 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒑𝒖𝒕𝒆---𝑫𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒔, 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓 𝒘𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒏 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔, 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒙𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 24 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒏𝒆𝒍𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇𝒔---𝑶𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒘𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓 𝒘𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒏 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕, 𝑻𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒚 𝒃𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒇𝒓𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔---𝑭𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑻𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒘𝒓𝒐𝒏𝒈---𝑻𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒅𝒊𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔, 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒐𝒏 𝒎𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒋𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒆𝒔---𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒃𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒘, 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒎𝒑𝒖𝒈𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒏 𝒆𝒂𝒄𝒉 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆---𝑹𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒊𝒎𝒑𝒖𝒈𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒔𝒆𝒕 𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆---𝑺𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇𝒔 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒙𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇𝒔 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒊𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒖𝒍𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒂𝒍 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒔 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 24 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒏𝒆𝒍𝒔.

𝑴𝒐𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑰𝒔𝒂 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝑷𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔.

𝑨𝒎𝒋𝒂𝒅 𝑯𝒖𝒔𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔.

𝑫𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈: 24𝒕𝒉 𝑨𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒍, 2015.

 2016 𝒀 𝑳 𝑹 389

[𝑮𝒊𝒍𝒈𝒊𝒕-𝑩𝒂𝒍𝒕𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏 𝑪𝒉𝒊𝒆𝒇 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕]

𝑩𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑨𝒍𝒂𝒎, 𝑱

𝑨𝑳𝑳 𝑹𝑬𝑺𝑰𝑫𝑬𝑵𝑻𝑺 𝑶𝑭 𝑽𝑰𝑳𝑳𝑨𝑮𝑬 𝑲𝑼𝑹𝑼, 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝑴𝒐𝒍𝒗𝒊 𝑴𝒐𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑯𝒖𝒔𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 2 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔---𝑷𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔

𝑽𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒖𝒔

𝑨𝑳𝑳 𝑹𝑬𝑺𝑰𝑫𝑬𝑵𝑻𝑺 𝑶𝑭 𝑽𝑰𝑳𝑳𝑨𝑮𝑬 𝑲𝑼𝑵𝑰𝑺/𝑯𝑨𝑹𝑰𝑲𝑶𝑵, 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝑴𝒐𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑩𝒂𝒒𝒊𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 4 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔---𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔

𝑪𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍 𝑹𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑵𝒐.12 𝒐𝒇 2011, 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 24𝒕𝒉 𝑨𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒍, 2015.

𝑶𝑹𝑫𝑬𝑹

𝑴𝑼𝑯𝑨𝑴𝑴𝑨𝑫 𝑨𝑳𝑨𝑴, 𝑱.---𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕/𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 07-12-2010, 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑨𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒕 𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆 𝑺𝒌𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒖, 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏. 𝑻𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒊𝒎𝒑𝒖𝒈𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓, 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒔𝒕 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔/𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇𝒔. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒔𝒕 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍, 𝑪.𝑭.𝑨. 𝑵𝒐.10/2004, 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑵𝒐.03/2005, 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒊𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕/ 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 10-07-2014 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑪𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍 𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆 𝑲𝒉𝒂𝒑𝒍𝒖/𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝑪.𝑺. 𝑵𝒐.27/2001, 𝑹𝒆𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑵𝒐.27/2014.

2. 𝑻𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕, 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔/ 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇𝒔 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒂𝒚𝒆𝒅 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒊𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒖𝒍𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒂𝒍 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 24 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒏𝒆𝒍𝒔 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝑵𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒉 𝑲𝒖𝒓𝒖. 𝑷𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔/ 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇𝒔 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒇𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒑𝒓𝒂𝒚𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔/ 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒊𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝑨𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒂𝒔, 𝒎𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈 599 𝒌𝒂𝒏𝒂𝒍𝒔, 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝑵𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒉 𝑲𝒖𝒓𝒖. 𝑺𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒍𝒚 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒊𝒏𝒋𝒖𝒏𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏. 𝑨𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒕𝒆 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆, 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒔𝒕 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒊𝒎𝒑𝒖𝒈𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓.

3. 𝑰 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒈𝒐𝒏𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒉𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒍 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒂𝒕 𝒍𝒆𝒏𝒈𝒕𝒉. 𝑶𝒃𝒗𝒊𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒍𝒚, 𝒂 𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒊𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒈𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒔 𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒐𝒅𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 115, 𝑪.𝑷.𝑪. 𝒆𝒙𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒅, 𝒋𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒚𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏. 𝑰, 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆, 𝒓𝒆𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒆 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 115, 𝑪.𝑷.𝑪. 𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒚 𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆:--

"115. 𝑹𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏. - [(1) 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒎𝒂𝒚 𝒄𝒂𝒍𝒍 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒔𝒖𝒄𝒉 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒏𝒐 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒕𝒐, 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒊𝒇 𝒔𝒖𝒄𝒉 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔 - -

(𝒂) 𝒕𝒐 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒆𝒙𝒆𝒓𝒄𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒂 𝒋𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒗𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒊𝒕 𝒃𝒚 𝒍𝒂𝒘, 𝒐𝒓

(𝒃) 𝒕𝒐 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒇𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒆𝒙𝒆𝒓𝒄𝒊𝒔𝒆 𝒂 𝒋𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒔𝒐 𝒗𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒅, 𝒐𝒓

(𝒄) 𝒕𝒐 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒙𝒆𝒓𝒄𝒊𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒊𝒕𝒔 𝒋𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒚 𝒐𝒓 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒊𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒖𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒚, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒎𝒂𝒚 𝒎𝒂𝒌𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒄𝒉 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒂𝒔 𝒊𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒏𝒌𝒔 𝒇𝒊𝒕].

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[(2) ………………………………….

(3) ………………………………….

(4) ………………………………….].

4. 𝑨 𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈, 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒑𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒇𝒖𝒍, 𝒂𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒊𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒘𝒐 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒘 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒇𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒂𝒍 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒑𝒖𝒕𝒆 𝒃𝒆𝒕𝒘𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔. 𝑭𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒖𝒔𝒂𝒍 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕, 𝒊𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔/ 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇𝒔 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒔𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉𝒕 𝒂 𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒚 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒊𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 24 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒏𝒆𝒍𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒇𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒘𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝑲𝒖𝒓𝒖 𝑵𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒉 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒏𝒆𝒍𝒔. 𝑭𝒐𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒚 𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆, 𝑰 𝒓𝒆𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒉𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕 𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓:--

𝑷𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔/𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇𝒔 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒈𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒏 𝒇𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒅𝒆𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 24 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒏𝒆𝒍𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒔𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕. 𝑾𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒏 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔/𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒊𝒔 𝒘𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒉 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒖𝒔𝒂𝒍. 𝑰𝒏 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.1 𝒂𝒏𝒅 2 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒘𝒊𝒔𝒆 𝒘𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒏 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕, 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒍𝒚 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒂 𝑵𝒐.1 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒙𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 24 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒏𝒆𝒍𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔/𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇𝒔. 𝑰𝒏 𝒎𝒚 𝒐𝒑𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒐𝒏, 𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆𝒔 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓 𝒘𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒏 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒚 𝒃𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒇𝒓𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔. 𝑰𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒅, 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒇𝒓𝒂𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆 𝑵𝒐.9 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔. 𝑴𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓, 𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒊𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔/𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇𝒔 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 24 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒏𝒆𝒍𝒔 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝑲𝒖𝒓𝒖 𝑵𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒉 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒚 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒊𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒖𝒍𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒂𝒍 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒏𝒆𝒍𝒔, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒚 𝒃𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔 𝒂 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒆𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕. 𝑰𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒅, 𝒏𝒆𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒏𝒐𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕 𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒔𝒕 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒕𝒐𝒐𝒌 𝒏𝒐𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒆.

5. 𝒀𝒆𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒊𝒎𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒊𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒂𝒌𝒆𝒏 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.9 𝒂𝒏𝒅 10 𝒋𝒐𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒍𝒚 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒈𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔:--

𝑰𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.9, 10. 𝑩𝒖𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒔𝒆 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒔 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒐𝒏 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇𝒔. 𝑷𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇𝒔 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒆 𝑬𝒙𝒉-𝑷/𝑫 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆 𝑵𝒐.10 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒔 𝒅𝒐𝒆𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒂𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝑨𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒂𝒔. 𝑯𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒎𝒚 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒔𝒆 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒔 𝒊𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒂𝒗𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇𝒔 𝒐𝒖𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕.

𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒈𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒏 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒕𝒘𝒐 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒂𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒃𝒖𝒕 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒌𝒏𝒐𝒘𝒏 𝒕𝒐 𝒉𝒊𝒎. 𝑺𝒐 𝒊𝒏 𝒗𝒊𝒆𝒘 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒗𝒆 𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒂𝒍 𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔/𝒐𝒑𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕, 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒚 𝒂𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒏𝒊𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒏𝒈. 𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔/𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅𝒍𝒚 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒅 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.9 𝒂𝒏𝒅 10, 𝒔𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒗𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒆𝒅 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚, 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒔𝒕 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒅𝒊𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒐 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒆𝒙𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕.

6. 𝑭𝒓𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒐𝒇 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.11 𝒕𝒐 14, 𝒂𝒔 𝑶𝑷𝑷, 𝒊𝒔 𝒂 𝒘𝒓𝒐𝒏𝒈 𝒑𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒇𝒓𝒂𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.5 𝒕𝒐 8 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒐𝒅𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.11 𝒕𝒐 14. 𝑰𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒊𝒎𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒏𝒐𝒕𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.5 𝒕𝒐 8 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒂𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒆 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.11 𝒂𝒏𝒅 14 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒏𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆. 𝑭𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒖𝒔𝒂𝒍 𝒐𝒇 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕/𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 10-07-2004 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕, 𝒊𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒄𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.5 𝒂𝒏𝒅 7 𝒐𝒏 𝒎𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒋𝒖𝒏𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒆𝒔. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒅𝒊𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒆 𝒈𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.5 𝒕𝒐 8. 𝑰 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒏𝒐𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒔𝒊𝒎𝒑𝒍𝒚 𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒔𝒐𝒎𝒆 𝒅𝒐𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔/𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.5 𝒕𝒐 8. 𝑰𝒏 𝒎𝒚 𝒐𝒑𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒐𝒏, 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒚 𝒃𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒅𝒆𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒍 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚, 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒆𝒗𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒚 𝒐𝒓 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒘𝒊𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒓𝒆𝒃𝒖𝒕𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝒐𝒇 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.5 𝒕𝒐 8. 𝑻𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒂𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒇𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒅 𝒏𝒆𝒈𝒍𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒓 𝒐𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.5 𝒕𝒐 8. 𝑭𝒐𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒚 𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆, 𝑰 𝒇𝒆𝒆𝒍 𝒊𝒕 𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒏𝒆𝒄𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒕𝒐 𝒓𝒆𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.5 𝒕𝒐 8, 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒈𝒐𝒆𝒔 𝒂𝒔 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓:--

𝑰𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.5, 6. 𝑶𝒏𝒖𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒔𝒆 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒔 𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒏 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒔. 𝑵𝒂𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒔𝒆 𝒕𝒘𝒐 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒔 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒐𝒏 𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕, 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆, 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒐𝒍𝒊𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒐 𝒐𝒏𝒆 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈. 𝑫𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒆 𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑰 𝒐𝒇 𝑬𝒙𝒉-𝑫/3 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑬𝒙𝒉-𝑫/8 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒓𝒅, 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒔𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑬𝒙𝒉-𝑷/𝑨, 𝑷/𝑩. 𝑯𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒎𝒚 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒔𝒆 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒔 𝒊𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒂𝒗𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒔.

𝑰𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆 𝑵𝒐.7. 𝑶𝒏𝒖𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒐𝒇 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆 𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒏 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒔. 𝑫𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓 𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒘𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒆𝒍𝒚 𝑨𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒂𝒔. 𝑰𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒐𝒇 𝑨𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒂𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒔𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒌𝒂𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅. 𝑯𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒎𝒚 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆 𝒊𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒂𝒗𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒔.

𝑰𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆 𝑵𝒐.8. 𝑩𝒖𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆 𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒏 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒔. 𝑫𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒐𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒂𝒔

𝑬𝒙𝒉-𝑫/3, 𝑫/8, 𝑫/4. 𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝑵𝒐.142 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒔𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝑾𝒂𝒛𝒊𝒓 𝑾𝒂𝒛𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝑴𝒊𝒔𝒄. 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆 𝑵𝒐.145. 𝑯𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒎𝒚 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆 𝒊𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒂𝒗𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒔.

7. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒔𝒕 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒎𝒑𝒖𝒈𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒏 𝒆𝒂𝒄𝒉 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆, 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒂𝒘 𝒈𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒔𝒕 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒏 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒏 𝒆𝒂𝒄𝒉 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒚 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒔𝒕 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕. 𝑺𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕/𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒔𝒕 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒘𝒓𝒐𝒏𝒈 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒐𝒏𝒍𝒚 𝒃𝒆𝒄𝒂𝒖𝒔𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒔𝒕 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒐𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒂𝒌𝒆 𝒖𝒑 𝒆𝒂𝒄𝒉 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒃𝒖𝒕 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒃𝒆𝒄𝒂𝒖𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒏𝒆𝒈𝒍𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒗𝒆 𝒑𝒐𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒇𝒍𝒐𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕/𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 10-07-2004 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕.

8. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒂𝒍 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒑𝒖𝒕𝒆 𝒃𝒆𝒕𝒘𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒊𝒔 𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒄𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒂 𝑵𝒐.3 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒂 𝑵𝒐.3 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒘𝒊𝒔𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒑𝒍𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒘𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒏 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕. 𝑰𝒏 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒂 𝑵𝒐.3 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕, 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔/ 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇𝒔 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒚 𝒂𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝑨𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒚 𝒆𝒙𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒏𝒆𝒍 𝑵𝒐.2. 𝑳𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒇𝒓𝒂𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.5 𝒕𝒐 8 𝒂𝒔 𝑶𝑷𝑫 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏. 𝑨𝒔 𝑰 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒂𝒍𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒚 𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒌𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝑰 𝒂𝒎 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒔𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒔𝒇𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.5 𝒕𝒐 8, 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒊𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒍𝒚, 𝑰 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒔𝒕 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐, 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆, 𝑰 𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏, 𝒓𝒂𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.5 𝒕𝒐 8, 𝒏𝒆𝒆𝒅𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒕𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒓 𝒂𝒅𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅, 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒔𝒕 𝒃𝒚 𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒖𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒖𝒎. 𝑷𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒎𝒂𝒚 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒂𝒄𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑪𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕, 𝒊𝒇 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔, 𝒇𝒆𝒍𝒕 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒔𝒇𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒖𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒖𝒎.

9. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒗𝒆 𝒑𝒐𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒖𝒕 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒔 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒇𝒍𝒐𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒊𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒖𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒂𝒔 𝒘𝒆𝒍𝒍 𝒂𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒔𝒕 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕, 𝒊𝒏𝒗𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕.

10. 𝑰𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒗𝒆 𝒄𝒊𝒓𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒔, 𝑰 𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒏 𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒎𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒔 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆. 𝑷𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕𝒆𝒅. 𝑰𝒎𝒑𝒖𝒈𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒔𝒕 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒔𝒆𝒕 𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆. 𝑺𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔/ 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇𝒔 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒙𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔/𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇𝒔 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒊𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒖𝒍𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒂𝒍 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒔 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 24 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒏𝒆𝒍𝒔 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝑲𝒖𝒓𝒖 𝑵𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒉 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒊𝒏𝒕/ 𝒅𝒆𝒑𝒖𝒕𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓 𝒐𝒘𝒏 𝒈𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒏𝒆𝒍𝒔. 𝑨𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒊𝒏𝒋𝒖𝒏𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔, 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒇𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒎𝒐𝒗𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒖𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒖𝒎 𝒂𝒇𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒉 𝒘𝒉𝒐 𝒔𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒅𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒑𝒖𝒕𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒘𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒐𝒇 𝑨𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒂𝒔 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒔 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔. 𝑷𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆𝒂𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓 𝒐𝒘𝒏 𝒄𝒐𝒔𝒕𝒔. 𝑭𝒊𝒍𝒆 𝒃𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅.

𝑯𝑩𝑻/91/𝑮𝑩 𝑷𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕𝒆𝒅.

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The ex-parte decree was passed without recording of any evidence, that rule of caution and propriety requires taking some proof from the plaintiffs for satisfying that the case set up by them was true.

 The bare reading of the mandatory provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 provides complete guidelines for the Courts and Process-Serving Agencies. It says that in all cases in which summons have been served under Rule 16 C.P.C. mentioned above, the Process Server shall require the signature of the person to whom the copy is so delivered or endorse on the original summons his report thereon. Rule 18 ibid further directs the manner of service in which the same is served, to mention the name and address of the person (if any) and identify the person served and witnesses of the delivery or tender of the summons. Similarly, rule 19 C.P.C. lays down the procedure for the Court that where a summon is returned under rule 17 aforesaid duly verified, the Serving Officer shall be examined on oath and may make such inquiry in the matter as it thinks fit and shall either declare that the summons is duly served or as it thinks fit and after his satisfaction to proceed further.

The Process Server was not summoned and examined on oath by the Court before initiating ex-parte proceedings to testify his report of service as provided under Order V Rule 19 CPC. Consensus of the courts are that for defending an exparte proceedings and decree the plaintif has to produce the process server to prove due service when the service was denied by the defendant.

The summon was neither witnessed by anybody from the locality nor any independent person was reported to be present at that time nor any affidavit was given in this regard. Endorsement on the back of summons does not indicate in such a method that the mode of service is effected in line with the above provision of law. There is no mention of identifying the person served as to who had identified the defendant ladies. It is also settled principle of law that where service of summons is denied and Process Server has nowhere stated in his report that copy of the summons is delivered to the defendant, the presumption would be that defendant is not properly served.

The ex-parte decree was passed without recording of any evidence, that rule of caution and propriety requires taking some proof from the plaintiffs for satisfying that the case set up by them was true. The learned trial Court adopted this process of passing the ex-parte decree without recording of evidence in the light of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 as evidenced from the order.

The Law Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1972) read with section 6 of the Oath Act, 1873, introduced the verification of pleadings on oath by adding the words “on oath or solemn affirmation” after the word verified in Rule 15(1) of Order VI, C.P.C. After such amendment, in presence of verified pleadings on oath, the Court has powers to proceed the case ex-parte against the defendant and pass a decree under Order IX, Rule 6(1), C.P.C. without calling for an affidavit or recording of ex-parte evidence.

The application for setting aside ex-parte decree was governed with Article 164 of the Limitation Act, 1908 which provides period of 30-days from the date of decree or where summon was not duly served when the applicant has knowledge of the decree. Residuary Article 181 of the Act ibid, provides period of three years when the right to apply accrues. The defendants/ predecessors of petitioners were not duly served and the plaintiffs/predecessors of the respondents failed to establish on record that suit was quite in the knowledge of the plaintiffs or they were duly served.

It is settled principle of law that principle of natural justice must be read in each and every Statute unless and until it is prohibited by the wording of the statute itself . The principle of “Audi alterm parterm” is also one of the basic principle of natural justice that nobody should be condemned unheard. Law favours adjudication of lis on merit and not on mere technicalities. No one should be knocked out merely on technicalities.

Civil Revision No.14 of 2016.
Mst. Zohran Bibi, etc. Versus. Ghulam Qadir, etc.

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-Suit for specific performance--Oral sale agreement--Multiple oral agreements--Non-mentioning of time, date and place--

 PLJ 2021 Lahore 851

Specific Relief Act, 1877 (I of 1877)--

----S. 12--Suit for specific performance--Oral sale agreement--Multiple oral agreements--Non-mentioning of time, date and place--Non-mentioning of names of witnesses in pleadings--Veracity of claim--Existence and validity of oral agreement--Burden of proof-- concurrent findings--Challenge to--Multiple oral arrangements between parties inter-se, without clearly stating time, date and place at which purported transactions including oral agreement to sell took place--Names of witnesses who were present at time of oral agreement are also not mentioned in pleading, which raises a serious doubt as to veracity of claim of petitioners to have entered into an oral agreement in respect of suit property, with regarding execution of said oral agreement--Relates to existence oral agreement and its validity and burden of proof too was on plaintiffs--Trial Court has, for cogent reasons and after proper appreciation of evidence on record, rightly decided same--Concurrent findings of facts cannot be upset by High Court in its revisional jurisdiction in a casual manner rather it has to be proved that same are perverse or arbitrary or same are based on misreading or non-reading of evidence which is not position in case in hand--Revision petition dismissed.            [Pp. 853 & 854] A, B & C

2010 SCMR 5 ref.

Ms. Naila Mushtaq Dhoon, Advocate for Petitioners.

Date of hearing: 3.6.2021.

 PLJ 2021 Lahore 851
Present: Anwaar Husssain, J.
KALSOOM AKHTAR, etc.--Petitioners
versus
Mst. PARVEEN AKHTAR, etc.--Respondents
C.R. No. 3239 of 2015, decided on 3.6.2021.

Order

Through instant civil revision, the present petitioners have assailed judgment and decree dated 22.11.2012 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Piplan, District Mianwali which was upheld through judgment and decree dated 11.05.2015 passed by the learned Addl. District Judge, Piplan, District Mianwali (Both the judgments and decrees are hereinafter referred as ‘Impugned Judgments’).

2. Brief facts of the case are that the present petitioners filed suit for specific performance on the basis of oral agreement pertaining to property measuring 6-Kanal 12-Marlas comprising Khata No. 42 situated in Chak No. 04/ML, Tehsil Piplan District Mianwali (hereinafter referred to as ‘the suit property. It is case of the petitioners that they are successor-in-interest of one Muhammad Aslam s/o Abdul Haq who died about 3½ years prior to the filing of civil suit and was owner of plots No. 29 and 30 measuring 7-Marlas each, which were allotted to said Muhammad Aslam (late) and his brother Muhammad Yousaf at chak No. 3/ML, Jinnah Abadi Scheme. Present Respondent No. 1 and her husband who is arrayed as Respondent No. 2, namely, Abdul Qadir (erroneously mentioned as father of Respondent No. 1 in the memo of parties annexed with the instant civil revision), entered into an oral arrangement with Muhammad Aslam (late) and the suit property was exchanged with plots No. 29 and 30. After evaluating the suit property for Rs. 90,000/-and plots No. 29 and 30 for Rs. 60,000/-, balance amount of Rs. 30,000/- was paid by late Muhammad Aslam to Respondent No. 1. On the basis of these oral arrangements, the petitioners are in possession of the suit property whereas plots No. 29 and 30 have been transferred by Respondent No. 1 in favour of respondents No. 3 and 4. Suit was contested, written statement was filed and out of the divergent pleadings, following eight issues were framed:

“ISSUES

1.       Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the decree for specific performance of the contract as prayed for? OPP

2.       Whether the Defendant No. 1 was competent to dispose off the land in question on the basis of oral agreement in the year 2003? OPP

3.       Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to get decree for specific performance of the contract on the basis of oral agreement? OPP

4.       Whether the present suit is time-barred? OPD

5.       Whether the present suit is not maintainable in its present form and is liable to be dismissed? OPD

6.       Whether the oral agreements are nullity in the eyes of law as well as against the fact and circumstances? OPD

7.       Whether the present suit is liable to be dismissed? OPD

8.       Relief.”

3. Parties adduced their evidence and the learned trial court dismissed the suit filed by the petitioners and the judgment of the learned trial court was upheld by the learned Additional District Judge, Piplan, District Mianwali.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the learned trial court as well as the learned appellate court below have erred in deciding the issues conjunctively and in this regard reliance has been placed on Asadullah Khan v. Abdul Karim (1997 CLC 1334). Further adds that the learned courts below have erred in holding that specific performance of an oral agreement cannot be granted. Places reliance on Qazi Muhammad Saqib Khan v. Ghulam Abbas and 2 others (2003 MLD 131).

5. Arguments heard. Record perused.

6. Perusal of the record indicates that it is not mere an oral agreement to sell on the basis of which the petitioners have filed suit for specific performance but reference has been made to multiple oral arrangements between the parties inter-se, without clearly stating the time, date and place at which purported transactions including oral agreement to sell took place. Moreover, the name of the witnesses who were present at the time of such oral agreement are also not mentioned in the pleading, which raises a serious doubt as to the veracity of claim of the petitioners to have entered into an oral agreement in respect of the suit property, with Respondent No. 1, regarding execution of said oral agreement. I am fortified by the judgments of the apex court reported as Nazir Ahmad & Another vs. Yousaf (PLD 2011 SC 161) and Muhammad Nawaz Through L.Rs vs. Haji Muhammad Baran Khan Through L.Rs and others (2013 SCMR 1300). The Honourable Supreme Court has authoritatively held that a suit for specific performance of oral agreement wherein beneficiary had neither mentioned the terms and conditions of the bargain nor disclosed the names of witnesses in whose presence the oral agreement to sell was arrived at cannot succeed.

7. Argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the issues framed in the suit filed by them have been decided conjunctively

which is in violation of applicable law is not well-founded and reliance placed on Asadullah Khan supra is misconceived as the facts in the said case are distinguished inasmuch as issues No. 1 to 3 decided conjunctively in the instant case, relates to the existence of oral agreement and its validity and burden of proof too was on plaintiffs. The learned trial court has, for cogent reasons and after proper appreciation of evidence on record, rightly decided the same. Similarly reliance placed on Qazi Muhammad Saqib Khan supra is also misplaced as it is clearly held in the said judgment of the Division Bench of this Court that if an oral agreement does not specify terms and conditions of the agreement, it is not valid in the eye of law, which precisely is the situation in the present case as no date, time and place of oral agreement to sell alongwith names of the witnesses present at the time of oral agreement to sell have been mentioned in the plaint of the present case.

8. Even otherwise, concurrent findings of facts cannot be upset by this Court in its revisional jurisdiction in a casual manner rather it has to be proved that the same are perverse or arbitrary or the same are based on misreading or non-reading of evidence which is not the position in the case in hand. In this regard, reference can safely be made to the case reported as Muhammad Idrees and others v. Muhammad Pervaiz and others (2010 SCMR 5).

9. In view of above, instant petition is dismissed in Iimine.

(Y.A.)  Petition dismissed

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