-Term “issue” in a civil case means------Regarding amendment of framed issues, Court possesses discretionary power--Pleadings of parties were in juxta-position--Suit for declaration-

 PLJ 2024 Lahore 253 (DB)

Present: Shahid Bilal Hassan and Masud Abid Naqvi, JJ.

ABDUL RAHMAN and others--Appellants

versus

MUHAMMAD FAROOQ and others--Respondents

R.F.A. No. 14953 of 2022, heard on 20.02.2024.

Specific Relief Act, 1877 (I of 1877)--

----S. 42--Civil Procedure Code, (V of 1908), O.XIV R.1, O.XX Rr. 1, 2 & 5, O.XX R.5--Pleadings of parties were in juxta-position--Non-framing of issues as per real controversy--Suit for declaration--Dismissed--Suit property was leased out--Default in payment of rent--Refusal to returned possession of suit property--Direction to--When pleadings of parties had been gone through and had been put in juxtaposition with issues framed it had been found that proper issues, keeping in view real controversy between parties had not been framed and only stereotype issues had been formulated--Issues were not according to pleadings of parties-- The issues framed by trial Court did not covered real controversy--Appeal allowed.                    [Pp. 257 & 260] A, G & H

PLD 2003 SC 184 and PLJ 2010 SC 530 ref.

Issue--

----Term “issue” in a civil case means a disputed question relating to rival contentions in a suit--For a correct and accurate decision in shortest possible time in a case, it is necessary to frame correct and accurate issues-- Issues mean a single material point of fact or law in litigation that is affirmed by one party and denied by other party to suit and that subject of final determination of proceedings.

                                                                                  [P. 257] B, C & D

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (V of 1908)--

----O.XIV Rr. 1 to 6, O.XV R. 1, O.XVIII R. 2, O.XX R. 5, O.XLI R. 31--Duty of Court--Framing of issues--It is duty of Court to frame issues from material propositions--To frame issues, Court is to find out questions of fact, questions of law and mixed questions of fact and law from pleading of parties and other materials, which are produced with pleading and parties are to produce their evidence to prove or disprove framed issues.   [P. 258] E

Discretionary power--

----Regarding amendment of framed issues, Court possesses discretionary power--Court can exercise this power when no injustice results from amendment of framed issue on that point, which is not present in pleading(s)--However, it cannot be exercised when it alters nature of suit, permits making of new case or alters stand of parties through rising of inconsistent pleas.                                                        [P. 259] F

Syed Muhammad Usman Tirmizi, Advocate for Appellants.

Mr. Asif Siddique Chaudhry, Advocate for Respondents.

Date of hearing: 20.02.2024.

Judgment

Shahid Bilal Hassan, J.--Succinctly, the appellants instituted a suit for declaration with subsequent relief along with recovery of mesne profit against the respondents with respect of the suit property measuring 178-Kanals 15-Marlas, situated at Mauza Maryuin Kalan, Tehsil and District Gujranwala, as per Record of Rights for the year 2014-15 contending therein that due to the permanent residence of the plaintiffs in District Lahore, they leased out the suit property to Defendant No. 13 who was son-in-law of their sister namely Zubaida Bibi, brother-in-law of plaintiff No. 1, but Defendant No. 13 always remained reluctant in payment of rent and most of the time he failed to pay the amount of Thaika” but the appellants tolerated this conduct of Defendant No. 13 due to the above said relationship. Ultimately on demand of plaintiffs, Defendant No. 13 refused to return the possession of suit property and this controversy led to registration of FIR No. 1/2016. Due to the above said litigation and the permanently living of appellants in Lahore, the appellants, on the offer of Defendant No. 1 became ready to enter into a fake and fictitious agreement with Defendant No. 1 who assured them that the said agreement would be merely to show the Defendant No. 13 and he being influential person would be in the better position than the appellants to litigate and deal with the Defendant No. 13 in the Courts and out of the Courts. Defendant No. 1 further persuaded the appellants that as soon as they would get the possession of suit property, they would settle all the matters with respect to their agreement and meanwhile preferred to write the agreement on the stamp paper valuing Rs. 100/-. Therefore, vide fictitious agreement dated 15.04.2016 with respect to suit property measuring 178-kanals 15-marlas in total consideration of Rs. 4 crores, 46-lacs, 87 thousand i.e. Rs. 2,000,000/- per acre on the stamp paper valuing Rs. 100/- penned down. At that time, it was also disclosed to the buyers that the appellants were in litigation with Zubaida Bibi with respect to her share in the suit property. The appellants claimed in the plaint that the price of land was much higher at that time but due to the dispute with Defendant No. 13, the appellants opted to show the low-price of their shares in the suit property. In the said agreement, fake payment of Rs. 2,500,000/- was also and to the extent of remaining payment, the target date was fixed as 15.01.2017. As a matter of fact, the payment was merely mentioned in the agreement to pressurize the Defendant No. 13 so that the possession of suit property could be restored to the appellants and it was orally settled down that the duration of agreement to sell and schedule for payment of consideration amount shall be settled down after taking the possession from Defendant No. 13. However, even after the attempt of sale agreement, Defendant No. 13 could not be refrained from his activities and continued to interfere into the suit property in one way or the other. Meanwhile, the appellants also moved an application for the correction of entries in “Khasra Girdawry” with respect to suit property and Defendant No. 13 also filed a suit for specific performance against the appellants and their sister. As a result of mutual settlement between the appellants and Defendant No. 1, the Defendant No. 1 pursued the suit for specific performance and appellants used to ask him about the status of their cases, the reply of the Defendant No. 1 always satisfied the appellants. However, on the demand of Appellants No. 1 and 2, ultimately in March, 2017, the Defendant No. 1 paid an amount of Rs. 1.8 million through cheque to the Appellants No. 1 and 2 and likewise in April, 2017, further consideration amount Rs. 1.3 million was paid, so in this way the outstanding amount towards the Defendant No. 1 remained Rs. 41,587,500/-. Ultimately, the Defendant No. 1 showed his failure to compel the Defendant No. 13 and also showed his inability to spend upon the litigation and also to further pay the remaining consideration amount, therefore, he suggested the appellants to enter into the fresh agreement with the Defendant No. 2 while reiterating his promise to pursue the above said litigation to get restored the possession and forthwith payment of remaining consideration amount. Like past, the appellants again trusted the words of Defendant No. 1 and on 06.11.2017, Appellants No. 1 & 2 entered into a new agreement with respect to the suit property with Defendant No. 2 in consideration of Rs. 44,687,500/-. Defendant No. 2 also caused to get mentioned the earnest amount as Rs. 17,500,0000-/ while explaining that it was necessary to intimidate the Defendant No. 13. In November 2017, further amount of Rs. 4,500,000/- in the shape of cheques was paid to the Appellants No. 1 & 2 with the commitment that all the litigations/cases would be concluded and the possession would also be restored to the appellants. Therefore, in this way, only the amount of Rs. 7.6 million was paid by the Defendants No. l & 2 to Appellants No. 1 & 2 and still huge amount was outstanding towards the Defendants No. 1 & 2. Meanwhile redemption amount of Rs. 425,000/- was also paid by the Defendants No. l & 2. In April 2018, Defendant No. 2 informed the Appellants No. 1 & 2 about the decision of their cases of ejectment and rent in their favour and assured them that soon they would be able to get the possession of suit property. As the Appellants No. 1 & 2 were weak persons, they opted to remain behind the scene to get the possession of the suit property. At that time there was great atmosphere of mutual trust between the parties to agreement after winning the litigation from the Defendant No. 13 and again appellants on the opinion of Defendant No. 2, signed the sale deed and also affixed their thumb impressions to further pressurize the Defendant No. 13. In April the amount of Rs. 2-million was paid to Defendant No. 2 and in this way, the amount of Rs. 346,500/ remained outstanding towards Defendant No. 2. After that, the Appellants No. l & 2 were informed by Defendants No. 1 & 2 that litigation before Anti-corruption has also been concluded in favour of Appellants No. 1 & 2 and as soon as they would get the possession of the suit property the remaining payment shall be made. Then appellants got the knowledge about the alienation of suit property in favour of Defendant No. 13, they forthwith contacted the Defendant No. 2 who became furious and thereafter Appellants No. 1 & 2 also came to know that in violation of impugned agreement, the suit property had been transferred in the name of Defendants No. 2 to 12 through misrepresentation and without knowledge and paying the remaining consideration amount. Since then, Appellants No. 1 & 2 have been asking for remaining consideration amount and for cancellation of impugned sale deed in favour of Defendants No. 2 to 12 along with mesne profits. They also alleged that due to the dishonesty on the part of Defendant No. 2, appellant No. 2 also passed away due to the cardiac arrest. Therefore, the appellants claimed Rs. 30,000,000/- too on account of general damages. The appellants also referred video recording as a proof of residual amount.

2. Written statement was submitted on behalf of Defendants No. 1 to 12 jointly. They raised certain preliminary and factual objections and termed the impugned transactions correct after fulfilling all the necessary ingredients of sale and ultimately prayed for dismissal of the suit.

3. The divergence in pleadings of the parties the learned trial Court framed following issues:-

1.       Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the decree for declaration along with permanent injunction as prayed for? OPP

2.       Whether plaintiffs have come to the Court with clean hands and they have locus standi to file the instant suit against the defendants? OPP

3.       Whether the suit of the plaintiff is false, frivolous and vexatious and the same is liable to be dismissed? OPD

4.       Relief.

Both the parties adduced their oral as well as documentary evidence. On conclusion of trial, the learned trial Court vide impugned judgment and decree dated 11.01.2022 dismissed suit of the appellants; hence, the instant appeal.

4. Heard.

5. In this case, when the pleadings of the parties have been gone through and have been put in juxtaposition with the issues framed it has been found that the proper issues, keeping in view the real controversy between the parties have not been framed and only stereotype issues have been formulated. In this regard, it is observed that the term “issue” in a civil case means a disputed question relating to rival contentions in a suit. It is the crucial point of disagreement, argument or decision. It is the point on which a case itself is decided in favour of one side or the other, by the Court. Framing of issues is probably the most important part of the trail of a civil suit. For a correct and accurate decision in the shortest possible time in a case, it is necessary to frame the correct and accurate issues. Inaccurate and incorrect issues may kill the valuable time of the Court. According to the dictionary meanings, “issue” means a point in question; an important subject of debate, disagreement, discussion, argument or litigation. Issues mean a single material point of fact or law in litigation that is affirmed by one party and denied by the other party to the suit and that subject of the final determination of the proceedings.

As per the Order XIV Rule 1(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, issues are of two kinds: (1) Issues of fact, (2) Issues of Law. Issues, however, may be mixed issues of fact and law. Rule 2(1) of Order XIV provides that where issues: both of law and fact arise in the same suit, notwithstanding that a case may be disposed of on a preliminary issue, the Court should pronounce judgment on all issues, but if the Court is of the opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on an issue of law only, it may try that issue first, if that issue relates to: The jurisdiction of the Court; or A bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in force. For that purpose, the Court may, if it thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the other issues until the issues of law have been decided. The main object of framing of issues is to ascertain the real dispute between the parties by narrowing down the area of conflict and determine where the parties differ. An obligation is cast on the Court to read the plaint and the written statement and then determine with the assistance of the learned counsel for the parties, material propositions of fact or of law on which the parties are at variance. The issue shall be formed on which the decision of the case shall depend. The object of an “issue” is to tie down the evidence and arguments and decision to a particular question so that there may be no doubt on what the dispute is. The judgment then proceeding issue-wise would be able to tell precisely how the dispute was decided.

It is duty of Court to frame issues from material propositions. To frame issues, Court is to find out questions of fact, questions of law and mixed questions of fact and law from pleading of parties and other materials, which are produced with pleading and parties are to produce their evidence to prove or disprove framed issues. Following are the relevant provisions in this regard:-

i.        Order XIV Rule 1 to 6 of CPC 1908

ii.       Order XVIII Rule 2 of CPC 1908

iii.      Order XX Rule 5 of CPC 1908

iv.      Order XLI Rule 31 of CPC 1908

v.       Order XV Rule 1 of CPC 1908

Matters to be considered before framing of issues are:-

i.        Reading of the plaint and written statement, the Court shall read the plaint and written statement before framing an issue to see what the parties allege in it.

ii.       Ascertainment whether allegations in Pleadings are admitted or denied, Order X Rule 1 permits the Court to examine the parties for the purpose of clarifying the pleadings, and the Court can record admissions and denials of parties in respect of an allegation of fact as are made in the plaint and written statement.

iii.      Admission by any Party. If any party admitted any fact or document, than no issues are to be framed with regard to those matters and the Court will pronounce judgment respecting matters which are admitted.

iv.      Examination of material proposition. The Court may ascertain, upon what material proposition of law or fact the parties are at variance.

v.       Examination of witnesses. The Court may examine the witnesses for purpose of framing of issues.

vi.      Consider the evidence. The Court may also in the framing of issues take into consideration the evidence led in the suit. Where a material point is not raised in the pleadings, comes to the notice of the Court during course of evidence the Court can frame an issue regarding it and try it.

vii.     Examination of any witnesses or documents under Order XIV Rule 4. Under this rule any person may be examined and any document summoned, for purposes of correctly framing issues by Court, not produced before the Court.

The Court may frame the issues from all or any of the following materials.

i.        Allegations made on oath. Issues can be framed on the allegations made on oath by the parties or by any persons present on their behalf or made by the pleader of such parties.

ii.       Allegations made in Pleadings. Issue can be framed on the basis of allegations made in the pleadings.

iii.      Allegations made in interrogatories. Where the plaint or written statement does not sufficiently explain the nature of the partys case, interrogatories may be administered to the party, and allegations made in answer to interrogatories, delivered in the suit, may be the basis of framing of issues.

iv.      Contents of documents. The Court may frame the issue on the contents of documents produced by either party.

v.       Oral examination of Parties. Issues can be framed on the oral examination of the parties.

vi.      Oral objection. Issues may be framed on the basis of oral objection.

Furthermore, at any time before passing of decree, Court can amend framed issues on those terms, which it thinks fit. However, such amendment of framed issues should be necessary for determination of matters in controversy between parties. Moreover, at any time before passing of decree, Court can strike out framed issues especially when it appears to Court that such issues have been wrongly framed or introduced. Regarding amendment of framed issues, Court possesses discretionary power. Court can exercise this power when no injustice results from amendment of framed issue on that point, which is not present in pleading(s). However, it cannot be exercised when it alters nature of suit, permits making of new case or alters stand of parties through rising of inconsistent pleas. Regarding amendment of framed issues, Court also has mandatory power. In fact, Court is bound to amend framed issues especially when such amendment is necessary for determination of matters in controversy, when framed issues of do not bring out point in controversy or when framed issues do not cover entire controversy. When the lower Court omitted to frame an issue before trying a matter in controversy, the appellate Court can frame the issue and refer it for trial to the lower Court. There is no need to remand the entire case. Then the lower Court should try such issues and return the evidence and its decision to the appellate Court.

6. However, in this case, the issues are not according to the pleadings of the parties. It seems that the learned trial Court was not acquainted with the real myth of framing of issues, because the parties have to lead evidence keeping in mind the burden of proof placed upon their shoulders while formulating issues. The issues framed by the learned trial Court do not cover the real controversy, meaning thereby the provisions of Order XIV, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 have been defiled. Evidence is led after framing of issues. The stage of framing of issues is very important in trial of civil suit because at that stage the real controversy between the parties is summarized in the shape of issues and narrowing down the area of conflict and determination where the parties differ and then parties are required to lead evidence on said issues. The importance of framing correct issues can be seen from the fact that parties are required to prove issues and not pleadings as provided by Order XVIII, Rule 2, CPC. The Court is bound to give decision on each issue framed as required by Order XX, Rule 5, CPC. Therefore, the Courts while framing issues should pay special attention to Order XIV of CPC and give in depth consideration to the pleadings etc. for the simple reason that if proper issues are not framed, then entire further process will be meaningless, which will be wastage of time, energy and would further delay the final decision of the suit. In the present case, as observed supra, the learned Trial Court did not ponder upon the pleadings of the parties while framing issues and could not sum up the real controversy into issues; thus, further proceedings are of no use. In this regard reliance is placed on Muhammad Yousaf and others v. Haji Murad Muhammad and others (PLD 2003 Supreme Court 184) wherein it has been held:

“The provisions as contained in Order XIV, Rule 5, C.P.C. were not kept in view and ignored completely by the learned trial Court while framing the issues as a result whereof controversy regarding removal of household articles could not be set as naught. There is no cavil to the proposition which was settled decades ago and still hold field “that where an issue, though in terms covering the main question in the cause, does not sufficiently direct the attention of the parties to the main questions of fact, necessary to be decided, and the parties may have been prevented from adducing evidence, or fresh issue may be directed to try the principal question of fact”. (Olagappa v. Arbuthnot (1875) 14 BLR 115-142, 14/268, 316. “The duty of raising issues rests under the Code of Civil Procedure on the Court and it would be unsafe to presume from the failure of the Court to raise the necessary issues an attention of the defendant to admit the fact, which the plaintiff was bound to prove.” (Ganou v. Shri Devsidhes War, 1902 AIR 26 Bom. 360-361).

Further reliance in this regard is placed on Mst. Rasheeda Bibi and others v. Mukhtar Ahmad and others (PLJ 2010 SC 530), wherein it has been held that:

“It is the duty of the Court to frame issues correctly primarily on pleadings of the parties, because the issues framed by the Court correctly reflect the controversies arising from the pleadings of the parties and the Court thus can render an effective judgment on the disputed facts and the party also know on what fact the evidence should be led.---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------, that framing of a particular issue was not pressed by party affected is no ground for condoning failure to frame necessary issue and the mandate of Order XIV, Rule 1, CPC reveals that it is incumbent upon the Court to frame issues in the light of the controversies raised in the pleadings and after examination of the parties, if necessary. Issues of law and facts are to be illustrated clearly, to enable the parties to understand the points at issue to support their respective claims by recording evidence on all material points. It is the settled principle of law that “action or inaction” on the part of the Court cannot prejudice a party to litigation and the failure of Courts below to determine material issue amounted to exercise of jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity.

7. For the foregoing reasons, without touching the merits of the case, may it prejudice case of either of the side, the impugned judgment and decree dated 11.01.2022 handed down by the learned trial Court is set aside by allowing the appeal in hand and case is remanded to the learned trial Court with a direction to re-frame issues, keeping in view the above said observations by considering the pleadings of parties, record evidence and decide the case afresh on merits in accordance with law within a period of six months from the date of receipt of copy of this judgment. The adversaries are directed to appear before the learned trial Court on 07.03.2024.

(Y.A.)  Appeal allowed

ڈگریدار ۔۔۔ decree کسی دیگر شخص کو ٹرانسفر بھی کر سکتا ہے ۔۔ ایسا موصول کنندہ transfree خود اجراء دائر کر سکتا ہے ۔۔ یا دوران اجراء پارٹی بن سکتا ہے ۔۔

 Order 21۔ rule 16
P L D 1963 Dacca 197
Before Hasan, J
RAJA KUMAR SIL‑--Appellant
versus
ABUL HASNAT CHOUDHURY AND ANOTHER
Respondents
Second Miscellaneous Appeal decided on 27th February 1962.
Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXI, r. 16‑Applica tion‑Transfer of interest in decree must be in writing or by operation of law.
Jugulkishore v. Messrs Raw Cotton Co. A I R 1955 S C 576 and Bon Behary Roy v. Dhirendra Nath 3 D L R 285 ref.
Abu Bakkar for Appellant.
Nasiruddin Chowdhury for Respondent No. 1.

JUDGMENT
One Pramada Bala Kar instituted Money Suit No. 17 of 1954? against the appellant (judgment‑debtor). Thereafter she sold the tenanted lands along with the arrears of rent and other lands to one Hriday Ranjan Kar on 1st November 1954, vide Exh. A(1) for a valuable consideration. In this document a statement was made along with the statement as to conveyance of arrears of rent that Money Suit No. 17 of 1954, was pending against the tenants in which the purchaser would be in a position to join the seller as a co‑plaintiff or as a plaintiff on substitution and that the purchaser may also execute the decree if the purchaser did not have him added as a co‑plaintiff or substituted in place of the plaintiff (the vendor). The decree in the Money Suit No. 17 of 1954, was passed on 30th March 1955, which was not put into execution either by Pramada Bala Kar or her vendee Hriday Ranjan Kar. Hriday Ranjan Kar sold his right, title and interest on 22nd February 1956, (Exh. A) acquired by him by virtue of Exh. A(1) to Abul Hasnat Choudhury and another, the respondents in this appeal, who, in their turn, put the decree passed in the Money Suit No. 17 of 1954, into execution on which Money Execution No. 16 of 1958, was started. In view of the provision of Order XXI, rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure notices were served both on the decree holder as well as on the judgment‑debtor and the execution at the instance of the present purchasers from Hriday Ranjan Kar was opposed on the ground, that neither Hriday Ranjan nor the present persons alleged to have purchased from Hriday Ranjan were the transferees within the meaning of Order XXI, rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure which runs as follows:
"Where a decree or, if a decree has been passed jointly in favour of two or more persons, the interest of any decree holder in the decree is transferred by assignment in writing or by operation of law, the transferee may apply for execution of the decree to the Court which passed it; and the decree may be executed in the same manner and subject to the same conditions as if the application were made by such decree holder."
On the aforesaid provision of the law the two Courts below have taken two different views. The trial Court relying on the case of Mathurapur Zemindary Co. Ltd. v. bhasaram Mandal and athers (28 C W N 626), held that there was no transfer by Pramada Bala Kar the decree‑holder either to Hriday Ranjan or to the purchasers from Hriday Ranjan as contemplated by rule 16 of Order XXI which requires that the assignment must be in writing or by operation of law and as when the kabala was executed by Pramada Bala Kar on 1st of November 1954, there was no decree in existence inasmuch as the decree was passed on the 30th March 1955, while on the other hand the lower Appellate Court held that there was an assignment of the decree by Pramada Bala Kar in favour of Hriday Ranjan Kar. In the present appeal the soundness of the view taken by the lower Appellate Court has been questioned.
2. It is the cardinal principle of law that literary and dictionary meaning to be given to the provisions of the Statutes without violation. A mere reading of rule 16 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure goes to show that an assignment of a decree which can be put into execution by the transferee must be in writing or by operation of law. On this, attempts have been made in some High Courts to give relief in certain cases when it is possible. Hence there is divergence of opinions in different High Courts of India and elsewhere.
3. In the case of Jugalkishore Saraf v. Messrs Raw Cotton Co. Ltd. (A I R 1955 S C 676), S. R. Das, J., observed as follows: --‑
"Suffice it to say that there is no warrant for confining transfers by operation of law to transfers by operation of statutory laws. When a Hindu or a Muhammadan dies intestate and his heirs succeed to his estate there is a transfer not by any statute but by the operation of their respective personal law. In order to constitute a transfer of property by operation of law, all that is necessary is that there must be a passing of one person's rights in property to another person by the force of some law, statutory or otherwise.
Reference has already been made to the case of Purmanandas Jivandas v. Yallabdas Walliji, were, by applying the equitable principle Sargent, C. J.; upheld the appellant's right to maintain the application for execution. In the beginning the learned Chief Justice ounded his decision on the ground that the appellant had become the transferee of the decree by operation of law'. This view appears to me to be logical, for it was by the operation of the equitable principle that the right, title and interest of the transferor in the after‑acquired decree became the property of the appellant. In other words it was equity which operated on the decree as soon as it was passed and passed the interest of the decree‑holder to the appellant.
It is difficult to appreciate the implication of the first proposi tion. When on a true construction of the deed it actually operates to transfer a decree then in existence, no equitable principle need be invoked, for in that case the transfer is by the deed itself and as such is by an assignment in writing. It is only when the deed does not effectively transfer the decree because, for instance, the decree is not then in existence; but constitutes only an agreement to transfer the decree after it is passed that the invocation of the equitable principles becomes ' necessary and it is in those circumstances that equity fastens and operates upon the decree when it is passed and effects a transfer of it."
Bhagwati, J., observed as follows:‑
"A judgment‑debt or decree is not an actionable claim for no action is necessary to realise it. It has already been the subject of an action and is secured by the decree. A decree to be passed in future also does not come as such within the definition of an actionable claim and an assignment or transfer thereof need not be effected in the manner prescribed by section 130, Transfer of Property Act . . . . . .
The assignment in writing of the decree to be passed would thus result in a contract to assign which would become a complete equitable assignment on the decree being passed and would fulfil the requirements of Order XXI, rule 16 in so far as the assignment or the transfer of the decree would in that event be effectuated by an assignment in writing which became a complete equitable assignment of the decree when passed. There is nothing in the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code or any other law which prevents the operation of this equitable principle and in working out the rights and liabilities of the transferee of a decree on the one hand and the decree‑holder and the judgment‑debtor on the other, there is no warrant for reading the words `where a decree . . . . . . is transferred by assignment in writing in the strict and narrow sense in which they have been read by the High Court of Madras . . . . .There could be no objection to decide questions involving investigation of complicated facts or difficult questions of law in execution proceedings, as section 47, Civil P. C., authorises the Court executing the decree to decide all questions arising therein and relating to execution of the decree and sub section (2) further authorises the executing Court to treat a proceeding under the section as a suit thus obviating the necessity of filing a separate suit for the determination of the same."
4. In the aforesaid case there was a contract to convey a decree that was to be obtained which was later on obtained and the persons in whose favour the contract was made applied for execution of the decree which was allowed.
5. In the present case before me from the recital in Exh. A (1) it appears that Pramada Bala Kar conveyed her right, title and interest in respect of all the arrears of rent for which the Money Suit No. 17 of 1954, was pending against the judgment debtor.
It was further stipulated that the purchaser Hriday Ranjan would be in a position to join the suit as a co‑plaintiff or be substituted in place of the plaintiff. If none was done, he would be in a position to put the decree when it is obtained into execution. So from this recital it appears to me that all right, title and interest that Pramada Bala Kar had in the arrears of rent was conveyed to the purchaser Hriday Ranjan, thereby also all her right in the decree to be obtained by Hriday Ranjan was transferred. In other words there was not a contract between Pramada Bala Kar and Hriday Ranjan for transfer of a future decree but in fact decree was the conveyed. After the decree was passed on 30‑3‑55, Hriday Ranjan cold to the present respondents his absolute right in the decree and other properties vide Exh. A on the 27th February 1956. In this document the decree has been specifically mentioned. 6. The learned Advocate for the appellant has relied on the case of Bon Behary Roy v. Dhirendra Nath Roy ((1951) 3 D L R 285), in support of his contention that unless an assignment be in writing or by operation of law, provision of rule 16 of Order XXI has no application. I have gone through the decision. It is a decision by a Division Bench of this Court. It does not appear from the judgment that this point was directly involved in that case and it does not further appear that any reasons were assigned for, coming to such a decision. Furthermore, in the facts and circumstances stated above there was in fact sale of the decree in writing in the present case. Hence the said decision has no bearing on the case before me. In my opinion, the application for execution at the instance of the present purchasers from Hriday Ranjan is maintainable and is not hit by Order XXI rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The appeal is accordingly dismissed without any order as to costs.
Leave under clause 15 of the Letters Patent is granted.
S. B./A. H.
Appeal dismissed.

When question of inheritance is involved limitation does not run--Every Muslim in the sub-continent is presumed to belong to Sunni sect, unless ‘good evidence’ to the..........

Limitation--
When question of inheritance is involved limitation does not run--Moreover, when foundational transaction is based on fraud and mala fide, subsequent superstructure built thereon cannot be allowed to stand and ultimately collapses.

2024 CLC 895

Every Muslim in the sub-continent is presumed to belong to Sunni sect, unless ‘good evidence’ to the contrary is produced by the party contesting the same. The judicial determination of whether the said presumption of faith of a party, positively stands rebutted, would be adjudged by the Court on the principle of preponderance of evidence produced by the parties. No strict criteria can be set to determine the faith of a person and therefore to pass any finding thereon, the Courts are to consider the surrounding circumstances i.e. way of life, parental faith and faith of other close relatives.

There is no principle of universal application to determine the faith of a person except direct disclosure by words from the mouth of deceased, circumstantial evidence of the conduct of deceased and opinion of witnesses.

PLJ 2024 Lahore 160

Present: Shahid Bilal Hassan, J.

Mst. NAWAB BIBI (deceased) through L.Rs.--Petitioners

versus

HAKIM ALI and others--Respondents

C.R. No. 2312 of 2014, heard on 4.10.2023.

Specific Relief Act, 1877 (I of 1877)--

----S. 42--Inheritance--Sole legal heir--Determination of faith--Hearsay evidence--Pedigree table--Concurrent findings--Suit for declaration--Entitlement for 1/2 share--Deprivation from lawful right--Challenge to--There is no principle of universal application to determine faith of a person except direct disclosure by words from mouth of deceased, circumstantial evidence of conduct of deceased and opinion of witnesses--When predecessor in interest of present petitioners had failed to prove that Shera was professing Shia faith during his life time, ultimate result would be that he was Sunni by faith and same had rightly been determined and declared as such by Courts below--Predecessor of petitioners in connected revision petition knowingly and deliberately did not disclose name of daughter of deceased Shera only to deprive her from her lawful right--Courts below have rightly adjudged that Mst. Nawab Bibi being daughter and legal heir of Shera was entitled to inherit 1/2 of disputed property, owned by Shera--The findings recorded on this score being based on proper appreciation of evidence were upheld and maintained--Courts below had committed no illegality, irregularity and wrong exercise of jurisdiction--Revision petition dismissed.          [Pp.162 & 163] A, B, C, D & F

PLJ 2023 SC 8, 2014 SCMR 1469, 2014 SCMR 161, 2017 SCMR 679, PLD 2022 SC 13 and PLD 2022 SC 21 ref.

Limitation--

----When question of inheritance is involved limitation does not run--Moreover, when foundational transaction is based on fraud and mala fide, subsequent superstructure built thereon cannot be allowed to stand and ultimately collapses.                                                                                         [P. 163] E

Mr. Ijaz Hussain, Advocate for Petitioners.

Syed Kaleem Ahmad Khurshid and Sultan Mehmood, Advocates for Respondents No. 4 to 9.

Respondents No. 1 to 3 Ex parte on 3.10.2016.

Date of hearing: 4.10.2023.

Judgment

This single judgment shall decide the captioned revision petition and connected C.R.No. 1992 of 2014, as both are outcome of one and the same impugned judgments and decrees.

2. Purportedly, Mst. Nawab Bibi was the sole legal heir of her father namely Shera son of Allah Din and being his sole legal heir, she was entitled to inheritance of legacy of the said Shera but the predecessors in interest of the Respondents Namely Fazal Din, Elahi Bukhsh, Allah Dad, Roshan and Jhanda got incorporated a false, bogus and fraudulent Mutation No. 80/437 of inheritance of deceased Shera by showing therein that deceased Shera had one brother and one daughter but both had died prior to death of Shera and in the absence of other legal heirs, above said Fazal Din, etc. were entitled to inherit the property of deceased Shera; therefore, the above said inheritance mutation was sanctioned by the revenue officer on 03.12.1955. In 1993, the predecessor in interest of the petitioner(s) namely Mst. Nawab Bibi daughter of Shera came to know about the alleged fraudulent, forged and frivolous mutation of inheritance ibid and instituted suit for declaration by challenging the validity of the same. The Defendants Namely Azmat Bibi, Hakim Ali, Rajoo Bibi, Bashir Ahmad, Nazir Ahmad, Ghafoor and Manzoor submitted their conceding written statements, whereas the Defendants No. 5 to 9 and Defendants No. 3-A to 3-C contested the suit. The divergence in pleadings of the contesting parties was summed up into issues by the learned trial Court. Evidence of the parties in pro and contra was recorded. On conclusion of trial, the learned trial Court dismissed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 21.11.2000. An appeal was preferred by the aggrieved party, which was allowed on 14.06.2001 and case was remanded to the learned trial Court for decision afresh. After remand, the learned trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 19.01.2002 decreed the suit in favour of Mst. Nawab Bibi. Bashir Ahmad, etc. being aggrieved preferred an appeal which was dismissed on 06.01.2003. Revision petition was filed, which was allowed vide order dated 12.03.2012 and the case was remanded to the learned trial Court for decision afresh. The learned trial Court framed additional Issue 1-A (Whether the deceased father of deceased plaintiff was Shia by faith? OPP). After this, evidence of the parties was recorded on additional issue. The learned trial Court vide impugned judgment and decree dated 21.02.2013 decreed the suit of the petitioner(s)/plaintiff(s) to the extent of 1/2 share as inheritance from the legacy of the deceased Shera. The petitioner(s)/plaintiff(s) being aggrieved preferred an appeal but the same was dismissed vide impugned judgment and decree dated 02.05.2014; hence, the instant revision petition by Mst. Nawab Bibi through her legal heirs with the prayer that she is entitled to inherit half property of deceased Shera as sharer and half as return, whereas the petitioners in connected C.R.No. 1992 of 2014 have prayed for setting aside the impugned judgments and decree and dismissal of the suit of Mst. Nawab Bibi.

3. Heard.

4. Every Muslim in the sub-continent is presumed to belong to Sunni sect, unless ‘good evidence’ to the contrary is produced by the party contesting the same. The judicial determination of whether the said presumption of faith of a party, positively stands rebutted, would be adjudged by the Court on the principle of preponderance of evidence produced by the parties. No strict criteria can be set to determine the faith of a person and therefore to pass any finding thereon, the Courts are to consider the surrounding circumstances i.e. way of life, parental faith and faith of other close relatives. Reliance in this regard is placed on Mst. Chanani Begum (Deceased) through LRs. v. Mst. Qamar Sultan (2020 SCMR 254) and Abdul Rehman and others v. Mst. Allah Wasai and others (2022 SCMR 399). Further reliance in this regard can also be placed on judgment reported as Ghulam Shabbir and others v. Mst. Bakhat Khatoon and others (2009 SCMR 644). A detailed analysis in this regard, by referring the least precedents rendered by the Privy Council and Courts, has been made by this Court in judgment reported as Tahira Bibi v. Muhammad Khan, etc. (PLJ 2019 Lahore 829), which does not need to re-discussed here again as the crux of the observation is that there is no principle of universal application to determine the faith of a person except direct disclosure by words from the mouth of deceased, circumstantial evidence of the conduct of deceased and opinion of witnesses.

In the present case, the Issue No. 1-A is pivotal which was framed with regards to faith of the deceased Shera. The deposition of P.W.1 is hearsay as he, during cross examination, deposed that daughter of Shera told him that Shera was Shia by faith, so his evidence has rightly been discarded. P.W.2 namely Haji Ejaz deposed that he did not know Shera and never saw him, so his evidence has also no value in the eye of law. Evidence of P.W.3 is not worthy of credence because admittedly Shera died in 1949 and at that time age of this P.W. has rightly been counted as seven(7) years because he mentioned his age as 71 years at time of recording his evidence. Moreover, his deposition is beyond the pleadings when he deposed that Shera died in the year 1956, whereas the same has been pleaded as 1949. P.W.4 deposed that he did not know Shera. It means that the depositions of all the P.Ws. is based on hearsay and is not based on personal knowledge; therefore, the same is rightly been discarded and disbelieved. When the predecessor in interest of the present petitioners namely Mst. Nawab Bibi has failed to prove that Shera was professing Shia faith during his life time, the ultimate result would be that he was Sunni by faith and the same has rightly been determined and declared as such by the learned Courts below while passing the impugned judgments and decrees.

5. So far as the claim of the petitioners in connected revision petition is concerned, it is observed that pedigree table prepared by the revenue authority during mutation proceedings, on the information provided by the predecessor in interest of the petitioners, in connected revision petition, which divulges that Shera had a daughter but she was shown to be dead and her name was not disclosed. Meaning thereby the predecessor of the petitioners in connected revision petition knowingly and deliberately did not disclose name of Mst. Nawab Bibi, daughter of the deceased Shera only to deprive her from her lawful right. Therefore, in presence of admission of D.W.1 that Shera was original owner of the disputed property and Mst. Nawab Bibi was the only daughter and legal heir of the said Shera, the learned Courts below have rightly adjudged that Mst. Nawab Bibi being daughter and legal heir of Shera is entitled to inherit 1/2 of the disputed property, owned by Shera. The findings recorded on this score being based on proper appreciation of evidence are upheld and maintained.

6. Question of limitation has also rightly been adjudicated upon by the learned Courts below because fraud vitiates the most solemn transaction and in such like position, when question of inheritance is involved the limitation does not run. Moreover, when the foundational transaction is based on fraud and mala fide, the subsequent superstructure built thereon cannot be allowed to stand and ultimately collapses. Furthermore, the concurrent/coexisting possession of the deceased petitioner Mst. Nawab Bibi and after her demise, that of the present petitioners, her successors, would be considered.

7. Pursuant to the above, it is held that the learned Courts below have committed no illegality, irregularity and wrong exercise of jurisdiction, rather after evaluating evidence on record have reached to a just conclusion that the petitioners/defendants have miserably failed to prove their case through trustworthy and reliable evidence. The impugned judgments and decrees do not suffer from any infirmity rather law on the subject has rightly been construed and appreciated. As such, the concurrent findings on record cannot be disturbed in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Reliance is placed on judgments reported as Mst. Zaitoon Begum v. Nazar Hussain and another (2014 SCMR 1469), Cantonment Board through Executive Officer, Cantt. Board Rawalpindi v. Ikhlaq Ahmed and others (2014 SCMR 161), Muhammad Farid Khan v. Muhammad Ibrahim, etc. (2017 SCMR 679), Muhammad Sarwar and others v. Hashmal Khan and others (PLD 2022 Supreme Court 13) and Mst. Zarsheda v. Nobat Khan (PLD 2022 Supreme Court 21) wherein it has been held that:

‘There is a difference between the misreading, non-reading and misappreciation of the evidence therefore, the scope of the appellate and revisional jurisdiction must not be confused and care must be taken for interference in revisional jurisdiction only in the cases in which the order passed or a judgment rendered by a subordinate Court is found perverse or suffering from a jurisdictional error or the defect of misreading or non-reading of evidence and the conclusion drawn is contrary to law. This Court in the case of Sultan Muhammad and another v. Muhammad Qasim and others (2010 SCMR 1630) held that the concurrent findings of three Courts below on a question of fact, if not based on misreading or non-reading of evidence and not suffering from any illegality or material irregularity effecting the merits of the case are not open to question at the revisional stage.’

Further in judgment reported as Salamat Ali and others v. Muhammad Din and others (PLJ 2023 SC 8), it has invariably been held that:

‘Needless to mention that a revisional Court cannot upset a finding of fact of the Court(s) below unless that finding is the result of misreading, non-reading, or perverse or absurd appraisal of some material evidence. The revisional Court cannot substitute the finding of the Court(s) below with its own merely for the reason that it finds its own finding more plausible than that of the Court(s) below.’

8. For the foregoing reasons, the revision petition in hand and connected C.R. No. 1992 of 2014 come to naught and the same stand dismissed. No order as to the costs.

 (Y.A.) Revision petition dismissed

وکیل کا اختیار

*AUTHORITY OF COUNSEL*_

_ایک وکیل کو خصوصی طور پر یہ اختیار حاصل ہوتا ہے کہ وہ اپنے سائل کے لئے جو بہتر سمجھے کرے۔_
_*(1990 ALD 623 – 1989 CLC 1316)*_
_وکیل کی طرف سے انجام دیئے گئے افعال سائل پر قابل پابندی ہوتے ہیں جب تک اسکے اختیار پر پابندی نہ لگادی گئی ہو۔_
_*(1990 CLC 1473 – AIR 1975 Sc 2202)*_
_فریقین اپنے وکلاء کی طرف سے نیک نیتی پر کئے گئے کاموں کے پابند ہیں جو انہوں نے اپنے دائرہ اختیار میں رہ کر سر انجام دیئے ہوں۔_
_*(AIR 1929 PC 33)*_
_ایک وکیل اپنا اختیار دوسرے وکیل کو منتقل کر سکتا ہے۔_
_*(1984 CLC 2154 – AIR 1932 Lah 373)*_
_*(AIR 1922 Cal 515)*_
_عام قسم کے فرائض مثلاً درخواست یا دعویٰ وغیرہ دائر کرنا وکلاء کے کلرکوں کو بھی تفویض کئے جا سکتے ہیں۔_
_*(AIR 1941 Pesh 1 – AIR 1939 Rag 1)*_
_البتہ کلرک اپنے وکیل کی طرف سے مقدمہ کی پیروی کرنے کا مجاز نہیں۔_
_*(1984 CLC 3332 – AIR 1928 Lah 841)*_
_وکیل دعویٰ بھی واپس لینے کا مجاز ہے بشرطیکہ معاہدے میں اس کے برعکس کوئی شرط شامل نہ ہو۔_
_*(PLD 1993 Lah 76)*_
_وکیل کو مصالحت کرنے یا تنازعہ کو حل کرنے کا بھی اختیار حاصل ہے۔_
_*(1992 SCMR 876 – PLD 1992 Lah 432)*_
_وکیل ان معاملوں میں مصالحت نہیں کر سکتا جو دعویٰ سے متعلقہ نہ ہو۔_
_*(1992 SCMR 876)*_
_وکیل حقائق کے کسی معاملے کے بارے میں اقبالی بیان دے سکتا ہے۔_
_*(1989 MLD 141)*_
_وکیل کی طرف سے اقبالی بیان اسکے سائل پر قابل پابندی جب تک کہ حقائق کا غلط ادراک نہ کیا گیا ہو۔_
_*(1992 SCMR 876 – PLD 1965 SC 106)*_
_وکیل کا اقبالی بیان سائل پر اس وقت قابل پابندی نہ ہوگا جب وہ ہدایات کی خلاف ورزی کرتے ہوئے دیا گیا ہو۔_
_*(1992 SCMR 876 – 1984 CLC 1771)*_
_قانون کے سوال پر غلط اقبالی بیان سائل پر قابل پابندی نہیں ہوگا۔_
_*(1991 MLD 1030 1291 – PLD 1975 Lah 311)*_
_وکیل دعویٰ میں مصالحت کرنے کا مجاز نہیں ہوگا جب تک اسے اس سے متعلق واضح ہدایات نہ دی گئی ہوں۔_
_*(PLD 1979 AJK 23 - AIR 1941 Sindh 28 861)*_
_البتہ ایک با اختیار وکیل دعویٰ میں مصالحت کرنے کا مجاز ہے۔_
_*(1971 SCMR 634 – PLD 1978 Lah 829)*_
_وکالت نامہ کی تعبیر سختی سے کی جانی چاہئے۔_
_*(1991 CLC N67 – 1991 CLC N124)*_
_وکیل یہ اختیار بھی رکھتا ہے کہ وہ سائل کی طرف سے عرضی دعویٰ یا جواب دعویٰ پر دستخط کرے۔_
_*(PLD 1980 Kar 477)*_
_عدالت کو اس امر کا اختیار حاصل ہے کہ وہ کسی فریق کی گلو خلاصی وکیل کی طرف سے دیئے گئے اقبالی بیان سے کرادے۔_
_*(1993 SCMR 657 – PLD 1979 SC AJK 47)*_
_وکیل کی طرف سے بحث کے دوران اظہار رائے اس کے سائل پر قابل پابندی نہیں ہے۔_
_*(ILR 18 Mad 73)*_
_کسی وکیل کی طرف سے ایک قانونی نکتہ پر دی گئی رائے جو اس نے پہلے دعویٰ میں دی ہو دوسرے مقدمہ میں اس پر قابل پابندی نہیں ہوگی۔_
_*(PLD 1980 SC 22 – PLD 1976 Sc 202)*_
_وکیل کی ابتدائی ذمہ داری یہ ہے کہ وہ مقدمہ کی پیروی مناسب طور پر کرے اور عدالت کی امداد اس طرح سے کرے کہ اسے انصاف کی بناء پر قانون کے مطابق فیصلہ کرنے میں مدد ملے۔_
_*(PLD 1997 Kar 204)

Suit for declaration and injunction --- Rejecting of plaint --- Limitation --- Fresh plaint , filing of --- Principle --- Plaint filed by respondent / plaintiff was rejected by Trial . Court but Lower Appellate Court set aside the order of Trial Court ---

 PLD 2024 Sindh 121
ALI MARDAN SHAH and 3 others versus V MUSHTAQUE through L.Rs. and others.
R. A. No. 165 of 2010

Suit for declaration and injunction --- Rejecting of plaint --- Limitation --- Fresh plaint , filing of --- Principle --- Plaint filed by respondent / plaintiff was rejected by Trial . Court but Lower Appellate Court set aside the order of Trial Court --- Validity --- Mere rejection does not preclude presentation of fresh plaint , provided the underlying defect remains uncured or is incapable of being cured --- Rejection on account of limitation and/or res judicata is prima facie incurable defect , which precludes de novo agitation if the infirmity subsisted --- Order passed by Lower Appellate Court addressed glaring defects in plaintiff's case in a perfunctory manner and then proceeded to allow appeal in absence of defects having been justifiably disapplied , cured or distinguished - Law required Court to first determine whether proceedings filed there before were within time and Courts were mandated to conduct such exercise regardless of whether or not any objection had been taken in such regard --- Proceedings barred by even a day could be dismissed --- Once time began to run , it would run continuously and bar of limitation created vested rights in favour of other party --- Matter barred by time had to be dismissed without touching upon merits and once limitation had lapsed , door of adjudication was closed irrespective of pleas of hardship , injustice or ignorance --- Provisions of O. VII , R 13 , C.P.C. did not merit relief in presence of bar of limitation --- Lower Appellate Court disregarded underlying facts and overriding interpretation of law , while rendering order in question and had exercised jurisdiction with manifest irregularity --- High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction set aside order passed by Lower Appellate Court and restored that of Trial Court --- Revision was allowed , in circumstances .


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