Case Law : CPC (V of 1908), 0. XXXVII, R. 3 Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.

 Suit No.477 of 1985 and Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 4995 of 1986, decided on 27/10/1987.

(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance (XIX of 1979)‑‑

‑‑‑5. 2‑‑Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), 0. XXXVII, R. 3 Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S. 5‑‑Recovery of bank loan‑‑Application for leave to defend suit‑‑Application for condonation of delay filed after application for leave to defend suit‑‑Effect‑‑Application for condonation of delay filed under S.5, Limitation Act, held, could not be rejected only because same was filed after the application for leave to defend suit, more so, where same had been filed before decision of application for leave to defend suit.

(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance (XIX of 1979)‑‑

‑‑‑S. 2‑‑Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), 0. V, Rr. 15, 17 & 20‑‑Sind Chief Court Rules (O.S.) Rr. 8 & 141‑‑Service of summons on defendant‑‑Procedure stated.

(c) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance (XIX of 1979)‑‑

‑‑‑S. 2‑‑Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), 0. V, Rr. 15, 17 & 20‑‑Sind Chief Court Rules (O.S.), R. 8‑‑Service by summons and service by publication‑‑Comparison of‑‑Service by publication, held, was on same footing as service by summons or by registered post.

Messrs Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. v. Messrs Tahir Traders and 8 others P L D 1986 Kar. 369 and Middle East Ltd. v. Messrs Zubna Ltd. and 3 others P L D 1987 Kar. 206 ref.

(d) Interpretation of statute‑‑

‑‑‑Rules‑‑Conflict in provisions of Ordinance and Rules‑‑Rules being subordinate legislation, whenever there is a conflict between the provisions of Rules and the Ordinance, Rules would have to give way to the provisions of Ordinance.

(e) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance (XIX of 1979)‑‑

‑‑‑5. 7‑‑Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), 0. XXXVII, R. 3‑‑Sind Chief Court Rules (O.S), R.8‑‑Suit for recovery of bank loan‑ Service‑‑Procedure to be followed‑‑In cases for recovery of bank loans procedure for service of defendant as provided under OAXXVII of Civil Procedure Code, has to be followed‑‑Such provisions being of penal nature prohibit defendant from appearing or defending suit unless he had moved application for leave to defend suit within ten days from date of service of summons‑‑Such penal provisions have to be strictly construed and period of limitation could not be computed unless summons were served in Form 4 alongwith a copy of plaint‑ Service of summons in suits under Ordinance XIX of 1979, in spite of provisions of R.8 of Sind Chief Court Rules could not be considered good service unless same was effected in accordance with procedure laid down under O.XXXVII, CPC. [pp. 298, 299] E & H

(f) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance (XIX of 1979)‑‑

‑‑‑5. 2‑‑Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), 0. V, R.17‑‑Service by publication when considered to be good service‑‑Where procedure under O.V, R. 17, CPC had been followed with regard to service of summons, then service by publication, held, could be considered as a good service because in that case defendant would be deemed to have notice of suit and copy of plaint alongwith summons in Form 4 would be deemed to have been served upon him.

(g) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance (XIX of 1979)‑‑

‑‑‑5. 7‑‑Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), 0. XXXVII, R. 3‑‑Recovery of bank loan‑‑Procedure to be followed‑‑Purpose and scope of provisions of O.XXXVII, Civil Procedure Code‑‑Procedure provided under provisions of O.XXXVII, Civil Procedure Code being considered to be for expeditious disposal, held, was specifically provided in Ordinance XIX of 1979 to be follower‑‑Provision of O.XXXVII, C.P.C. has limited scope and only few kinds of suits could be instituted thereunder‑‑Scope of 0. XXXVII, Civil Procedure Code, has, however, been enlarged under Ordinance XIX of 1979, as under S.7 thereof, all suits before Special Court including suits based on mortgage or statement of accounts are to be tried under summary procedure provided for, under such order.

(h) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance (XIX of 1979)‑‑

‑‑‑S. 2‑‑Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), 0. XXXVII R. 3 Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.5‑‑Recovery of Bank loan‑‑Application for leave to defend suit‑‑Period of limitation, computation of‑‑Period of limitation of ten days, held, would not start running before the date when defendant had filed application under 0. XXXVII, R. 3, CPC where summons with Form 4 alongwith a copy of plaint were not served upon him‑‑In such case there would be no necessity to file application under S.5, Limitation Act, for condonation of delay alongwith application for leave to defend suit.

Inamul Haq for Plaintiff. Z.U. Ahmed for Defendant.

The Constitution, which is characterized as a living and organic thing, is not to be interpreted narrowly or restrictively, and a pedantic interpretive approach is to be avoided۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔

In Sindh Revenue Board through Chairman, Government of Sindh and another v. The Civil Aviation Authority of Pakistan through Airport Manager (2017 SCMR 1344), the august Supreme Court of Pakistan while deliberating over the imposition of sales tax by the Province discussed legislative domain of the Federation and the Provinces and concluded that the pith and substance of a subject should be looked at. The Court held that: 

37. The Constitution, which is characterized as a living and organic thing, is not to be interpreted narrowly or restrictively, and a pedantic interpretive approach is to be avoided. Whilst the provincial legislatures are independent, they must operate within the sphere allotted to them and within their prescribed limit. Neither the Federation nor the provinces should invade upon the rights of the other nor encroach on the other’s legislative domain. The pith and substance of the legislated subject is to be examined to determine in whose legislative sphere a particular subject comes under. And above all a reasonable interpretation which does not produce impracticable results should be adopted. (Emphasis added)

 Part of Judgment 

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT AT LAHORE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT 

Writ Petition
1024369.9518-09

2020 LHC 2274

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Case Law : CPC Ss. 13, 44-A, 151 & O.XI,

 (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----Ss. 13, 44-A, 151 & O.XI, R.2---Law Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1972), S.3---Intra court appeal---Foreign judgment---Execution---Interrogatories---Scope---Application filed by defendant under O.XI, R.2, C.P.C. read with S.151, C.P.C. for administering interrogatories on plaintiff for examination and reply thereof was dismissed by Single Judge of High Court---Validity---Matters already decided and adjudicated by foreign courts were conclusive, definitive and irrefutable in nature and could not be re-opened except as provided under the exceptions of S.13 C.P.C.---Interrogatories were meant to ascertain facts which were not so disclosed in plaint---Scrutiny of facts was out of the ambit of S.13 C.P.C., therefore, such interrogatories had no role in a suit filed on the basis of foreign judgment and decree under S.13, C.P.C.---Defendant had chosen to continue with its case only on the basis of foreign judgment and decided to forego its claim on original cause of action, then defendant was not to lead any evidence in the matter, as according to defendant foreign judgment was conclusive in its own nature---Only case remained was adjudication of it with respect to six exceptions available to defendant under S.13, C.P.C.---No evidence was available and consequently question of any interrogatories did not arise as facts were not to be ascertained anymore and the only legal issues (on the basis of six exceptions) were to be decided and no interrogatories could be administered on plaintiff---Division Bench of High Court declined to interfere in order passed by Single Judge of High Court---Intra Court Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

Muhammad Ilyas Hussain v. Cantonment Board, Rawalpindi PLD 1976 SC 785; Muhammad Khan v. Ghulam Abbas 2002 MLD 1372 and Abdul Ghani v. Saley Muhammad PLD 1960 Kar. 594 ref.

(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----Ss. 13 & 44-A---Foreign judgment---Execution, refusal of---Principle---Provisions of S.44-A, C.P.C. and S.13, CPC are not independent of each other and are in fact interlinked and dependent in as much as even a final judgment of a foreign court, after its approval from appellate court (of a country with whom there is an international treaty) cannot be executed directly without recourse to the provisions of exceptions as contained in S.13, CPC---Court in Pakistan can refuse execution of such final judgments of foreign courts, if they fall under any of the exceptions contained in S.13, CPC---No foreign judgment or decree can be executed on the basis of provisions of S.44-A, CPC independently, without recourse to and satisfaction of the provisions of S.13, CPC.

Akhtar Ali Mahmood for Appellant.

Hamza I, Ali for Respondent.

Date of hearing: 8th Octobe, 2013.

P L D 2014 Sindh 209

Before Aqeel Ahmad Abbasi and Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar, JJ

Syed JAFFER ABBAS---Appellant

Versus

HABIB BANK LIMITED---Respondent

JUDGMENT

MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, J.---Instant High Court Appeal arises out of an order dated 13-12-2011 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Suit No.908 of 2003 whereby the application filed by the appellant under Order XI Rule 2 read with section 151, C.P.C., for administering the interrogatories on the plaintiff for examination and reply thereof was dismissed. By consent of both the learned counsel for the parties, instant appeal is being disposed of at Katcha Peshi stage.

2.Succinctly, the facts relevant for the disposal of the instant Appeal are that the respondent had filed a suit bearing No.908 of 2003 against the appellant for recovery of certain amount on the basis of a foreign judgment under section 13 of CPC. Summons were issued, and accordingly the appellant had filed its written statement on or about 22-1-2004. According to the appellant when the matter was set for directions on 12-2-2004 before the Additional Registrar (OS), the appellant had filed an application bearing C.M.A. No.1433 of 2004 under Order XI, Rule 2, C.P.C. for administering the interrogatories on the respondents, which was dismissed by the Additional Registrar (OS) vide order dated 13-5-2004. Being aggrieved by such order of dismissal passed by the Additional Registrar an Appeal bearing C.M.A. No.3569 of 2004 was preferred, whereas the respondent also preferred an appeal against the said order bearing C.M.A. No.3568 of 2004. Both these appeals were put up before this Court, and vide order dated 10-10-2005 the said appeal of the appellant was allowed and C.M.A. bearing No.1433 of 2004 under Order XI, Rule 2, C.P.C. was listed for hearing before a learned Single Judge of this Court, which has now been dismissed by the impugned order dated 13-12-2011.

3.It is the case of the appellant that in terms of Order XI, Rule 2, C.P.C. read with Rule 186 of the Sindh Chief Court Rules (OS) a vested right is embodied therein for the appellant to obtain directions of this Court to deliver interrogatories on the respondent for admissions or evidence of material facts, which are to be adduced at the trial by the respondent and to assist this Court in a fair disposal of the proceedings at or before the trial. While arguing the appeal learned counsel for the appellant submitted that administering the interrogatories is a vested right of the appellant and in terms of Rule 186 of SCCR the Additional Registrar (OS) was bound to refer them to the respondent for appropriate answers. He referred to "Words and Phrases" Volume 22 "Intent-Inter Vivos Trust" for definition and further explanation of the word 'interrogatories'. He further contended that instead of examining the interrogatories on merits, the learned Single Judge has dismissed the application and as such the impugned order cannot be sustained. It has been further argued that in fact the suit filed by the respondent is an ordinary suit under section 9, CPC for recovery of certain amount of money, and is not a suit under section 13, CPC as according to the learned counsel, the respondent in the plaint had set up its case not only on the basis of the foreign judgment but also on the initial cause of action, which continues on the basis of the foreign judgment. His further contention was, that in fact the plaintiff was praying for a money decree and hence this could only be treated as an ordinary suit and, therefore, the procedure as well as the provisions under the SCCR (OS) and CPC respectively, are to be followed and applied in so far as the case of the appellant is concerned. He submitted that the interrogatories filed through the application under Order XI, Rule 2, C.P.C. were not for the evidence and merely questions required to be answered by the respondents as the appellant at the moment cannot go to the foreign country from where the judgment being relied upon has been obtained by the respondent and further the appellant also does not know as to what material was placed before the foreign court. Lastly, he submitted that his interrogatories should have been examined on merits and if the Court comes to the conclusion that they are not correct or relevant, the same could have been refused on its own merits.

4.Conversely, Mr. Hamza I. Ali, learned counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that he has also filed cross objections against the impugned order under Order XLI, Rule 22 read with section 151, CPC, as according to him, the learned Single Judge had although dismissed the application, but while doing so, the learned Single Judge in paragraph 9 of the impugned order, had erred while observing that "the present proceedings are in the nature of a civil suit in every sense of the word", as such, the aforementioned conclusion is contradictory and inconsistent with his observations in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the impugned order. He submitted that, although, while filing the suit the respondent had based its case primarily on the foreign judgment, but an alternate prayer was also made, which has been mistakenly referred to as an alternate cause of action by the learned Single Judge, which in fact was not the case of the respondent. He submitted that he is ready to drop all his prayers made in the plaint, except that of section 13, CPC, as his case is exclusively based on the foreign judgment which has been passed in favour of the respondent and is covered under section 13, CPC. He argued that it is his right to drop one or any of the reliefs so claimed, and for this he can also file an application under Order VI, Rule 17, C.P.C. for amendment of the plaint as according to him it is to be seen that what can substantially be done, rather to follow the procedure which is not the master but is subservient. He contended that the appellant has no reason or right to object to such withdrawal of claim/prayer and he has already done so substantially, through the cross-objections filed in the instant appeal. In support of his contention regarding pressing and or dropping the alternate prayers at this stage of the case as well as through oral motion, he relied upon the case of Mohd. Ilyas Hussain v. Cantonment Board, Rawalpindi reported in PLD 1976 SC 785 and case of Muhammad Khan v. Ghulam Abbas reported in 2002 MLD 1372. In so far as the contents of the interrogatories are concerned, the learned counsel contented that they are totally uncalled for in the instant matter, as the purpose of interrogatories is primarily to seek admissions on facts, whereas the present suit filed by the respondent is based on a foreign judgment, which is presumed to be conclusive in terms of section 13, CPC and therefore, no interrogatories could be administered on the respondent. He submitted that interrogatories are only relevant if the respondent had filed its suit on the original cause of action and not on the basis of a foreign judgment. He finally submitted that there is no place at all for interrogatories in the instant proceedings. He relied upon the case of Abdul Ghani v. Saley Muhammad reported in PLD 1960 Karachi 594. He further submitted that the respondent is not seeking any execution under section 13, CPC but only the fruits of a foreign judgment/decree under it, through proper filing of the suit. He further contended that the appellant has every right to contest the suit, in terms of the six exceptions provided under section 13, CPC itself, but cannot ask for ascertaining any facts through interrogatories as all the facts are conclusive in nature in so far as foreign judgment/decree is concerned.

5.While exercising right of rebuttal, Mr. Akhter Ali Mahmud, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted, that it is not the case of dropping one prayer and pressing the other, rather it is the case of praying for a decree of certain sum of money through an ordinary suit under the civil jurisdiction of this Court. The respondent's prayer is for adjudication of claim by the civil Court in respect of a claim of recovery of money and not of execution of a foreign decree. The suit has to be adjudicated, before any execution could be sought. It was further contented that if the appeal is not allowed and the interrogatories are not allowed to be administered, it would amount to execution of the judgment simplicitor. It was lastly contended that section 13, CPC does not cater to the instant situation, and is only in respect of conclusiveness of a foreign judgment and perhaps there is no concept of institution of a suit under section 13, CPC, and if there is any, then it has to be adjudicated upon like an ordinary civil suit.

6.We have heard both the learned counsel, perused the record and have also gone through the case-law relied upon by them. Both, the appellant as well as respondent felt aggrieved by the impugned order which has been assailed through instant appeal by the appellant whereas, the respondent (the plaintiff in the suit) has also filed cross-objections in terms of Order XLI, Rule 22 read with section 151, C.P.C. On perusal of the cross-objections, it appears that now the controversy which is to be resolved in the instant case is to determine, as to whether the appellant can administer interrogatories in a suit exclusively based on a foreign judgment filed under section 13, CPC by the respondent. The findings of the learned single judge in the impugned order were based on the terms, when the case of the respondent was, firstly on the basis of a foreign judgment, and in addition to the alternate claim as noted and reproduced in para-6 of the impugned order whereas, now through the cross-objections as well as the arguments of the learned counsel for the respondent, it appears that the controversy in the suit is now only on the basis of the foreign judgment/decree passed in favour of the respondent and nothing else. The proposition as formulated above is the only question which needs adjudication in this appeal. Since controversy involves section 13, CPC, accordingly the same is reproduced hereunder:--

13. "When foreign judgment not conclusive:--A foreign judgment shall be conclusive as to any matter thereby directly adjudicated upon between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim litigating under the same title except:--

(a)where it has not been pronounced by a Court of competent jurisdiction;

(b)Where it has not been given on the merits of the case;

(c)Where it appears on face of the proceedings to be founded on an incorrect view of International Law or a refusal to recognize the law of [Pakistan] in cases in which such law is applicable;

(d)where the proceedings in which the judgment was obtained are opposed to natural justice;

(e)where it has been obtained by fraud;

(f)Where it sustains a claim founded on a breach of any law in force in [Pakistan]".

7.It is pertinent to note that the learned Single Judge while dismissing the application of the appellant was pleased to observe, that the question required to be answered through interrogatories relates to the evidence to be led by the respondent. Such observation was perhaps made for the reason that at the relevant time the respondent, according to its pleadings, had chosen to set up its case in respect of the original cause of action also. For this reason, the learned Single Judge was further pleased to observe that, if at all, the respondent chooses to lead the evidence in respect of the original cause of action, then of course, the appellant will be entitled to cross-examine the respondent's witness and to examine and challenge any documents that are reproduced and thereafter, such question as contained in the interrogatories can be put to such witnesses. The learned Single Judge on the basis of the alternate cause of action had also observed that in fact the suit is an ordinary suit in every sense of the word and, therefore, evidence was required to be led by the respondent in the suit.

8.In view of the cross objections and the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent in this regard, it appears that the respondent has abandoned its case on the original cause of action, thus the question of leading any evidence by the respondent in the matter is no more alive. The question now therefore arise, that as to whether in a suit exclusively and entirely based on a foreign judgment/decree, can there be any interrogatories which can be administrated on the party which has filed a suit in terms of section 13, CPC. The provision of section 13, CPC as reproduced above clearly shows that foreign judgment is conclusive as to any matter thereby directly adjudicated upon between the same parties or between the parties under whom they or any of them claim litigating under the same title, except where it has not been pronounced by a Court of competent jurisdiction, or where it has not been given on the merits of the case; or where it appears on the face of the proceedings to be based on incorrect view of International Law or a refusal to recognize the law of Pakistan in cases where such law is applicable or where the proceedings in which the judgment was obtained are opposed to natural justice; or where it has been obtained by fraud; and where it sustains a claim founded on a breach of any law in force in Pakistan. We have also noticed that in addition to section 13, CPC, there is another provision i.e. section 44-A of CPC, which we consider to be of relevance as it relates to execution of decree passed by Courts in the United Kingdom and other reciprocating territory. The provisions of section 44-A, CPC are also reproduced for ease of reference:--

44-A. "Execution of decrees passed by Courts in the United Kingdom and other reciprocating territory.---(1) Where a certified copy of a decree of any of the superior Courts of the United Kingdom or any reciprocating territory has been filed in a District Court, the decree may be executed in Pakistan as if it had been passed by the District Court.

(2)Together with the certified copy of the decree shall be filed a certificate from such superior Court stating the extent, if any, to which the decree has been satisfied or adjusted and such certificate shall, for the purpose of proceedings under this section, be conclusive proof of the extent of such satisfaction or adjustment.

(3)The provisions of section 47 shall as from the filing of the certified copy of the decree apply to the proceedings of a District Court shall refuse execution of any such decree, if it is shown to the satisfaction of the Court that the decree falls within any of the exceptions specified in clauses (a) to (f) of Section 13.

From the perusal of subsection (3) of section 44-A, it is reflected that even when a foreign decree is being executed in terms of the procedure provided in CPC, the Court which is the executing the decree, can refuse the execution of the same if it has been shown to the satisfaction of the executing court, that such decree falls within any of the exceptions specified in Clauses (a) to (f) of section 13, CPC.

9.Therefore, in view of the explicit provisions of section 13, CPC, this Court cannot sit in appeal against the findings and conclusions drawn on the facts of a foreign court or to adjudicate as to whether such findings are supported by any evidence or not. Matters already decided and adjudicated by the foreign Courts are conclusive, definitive and irrefutable in nature and cannot be Re-opened, except as provided under the exceptions of section 13, CPC. Insofar as interrogatories are concerned, they are meant to ascertain the facts which are not so disclosed in the plaint, and since, scrutiny of facts is out of the ambit of section 13 ibid, therefore, such interrogatories have no role in a suit filed on the basis of a foreign judgment and decree under section 13, CPC. This could be discerned from the bare reading of the relevant provisions of Civil Procedure Code that certain sanctity has been attached to a foreign judgment, and if the same is not allowed, then perhaps such provision will become redundant and redundancy cannot be attributed to any provision of a statute. It is also a settled legal position, that interrogatories are not allowed to be put up to witnesses, but only to a party to a suit, as one cannot administer interrogatories to ascertain the evidence by which the opposing party would prove its case. One cannot be allowed to ask questions that exclusively relate to evidence of the opposing party, the reason being that it would enable an unscrupulous party to even tamper with the opponent's witnesses and to manufacture evidence in contradiction, so as to defeat justice. Since the facts are conclusive in cases like the one in hand, no further interrogation can be made in so far as facts are concerned. However, the appellant is at liberty to challenge such judgment on the basis of exceptions as provided for in section 13, CPC itself. We are of the candid view that the Court in a Suit under section 13, CPC, has the right to examine as to whether such judgment is passed on merits or not. Whereas for a judgment being enforceable under law, it must be a judgment on merits and for being a judgment on merits it ought to have been based on evidence and the material produced by the parties. In other words, if no evidence or material is adduced by the plaintiff (respondent) while obtaining a judgment and decree from a foreign Court, and if the judgment is by way of penalty against the defendant (appellant) it will not be conclusive, as for being conclusive, it must be based on evidence. It seems that in the instant case the appellant wants to have answers to its interrogatories, even before any further proceedings are initiated in the suit, even before framing of issues, as it is perhaps being anticipated that since the conclusiveness of the foreign judgment is not open to any investigation in so far as the facts and its conclusiveness is concerned, as such it is very likely to be decreed against it. This perhaps is not the proper appreciation of law and procedure insofar as suits under section 13, CPC are concerned. The presumption as to its being conclusive is dependent on a number of factors; in fact six very important exceptions have already been incorporated under section 13, CPC itself. A foreign judgment would only be conclusive, once it is demonstrated that the procedure followed by the foreign court was the one warranted by law and not otherwise and was based on the principles of natural justice. Even a judgment, which has been passed without due heed to any judicial process, i.e. the court rendering such judgment, has not observed the minimum requirement of natural justice; was not composed of impartial persons; has not acted in a fair and lucid manner; was bigoted and was not in good faith; no reasonable notice or opportunity was allowed to the aggrieved party, will not be a judgment which could be called as conclusive or binding within the contemplation of section 13, C.P.C.

10.We have also seen the controversy in hand from another angle. A foreign judgment, even in terms of section 44-A, CPC, (wherein direct execution can be filed on the basis of such foreign judgment), is not conclusive, and is subject to satisfaction of exceptions as contained in section 13, CPC by virtue of sub section (3) of section 44-A, CPC. This means that the provisions of section 44-A and section 13 are not independent of each other and are in fact interlinked and dependent in as much as even a final judgment of a foreign court, after its approval from the appellate Court (of a country with whom there is an international treaty) cannot be executed directly without recourse to the provisions of exception as contained in section 13, CPC and the Courts in Pakistan can even refuse the execution of such final judgments of the foreign Courts, if they fall under any of the exceptions as contained in section 13, CPC This understandably means that no foreign judgment or decree could be executed on the basis of the provisions of section 44-A, CPC independently, without recourse to and satisfaction of the provisions of section 13, CPC.

11. In our humble view, the appellant can raise all sorts of objections and can also ask the Court to frame issues, and may also rely on documentary and or any other evidence as is relatable to the six exceptions under section 13, in negating the conclusiveness of the foreign judgment, if so required and specially when the respondent is not pressing its claim on the basis of original cause of action and only relies upon the foreign judgment. Once the respondent has chosen to continue with its case only on the basis of the foreign judgment, and decides to forego its claim on the original cause of action, then the respondent will, obviously not lead any evidence in the matter, as according to the respondent's case, the foreign judgment is conclusive in its own nature, and the only case remains, is to the adjudication of it with respect to the six exceptions available to the appellant under section 13, CPC. In that case, there will be no evidence and consequently the question of any interrogatories does not arise, as facts are not to be ascertained anymore and only the legal issues (on the basis of six exceptions) are to be decided. Therefore we are of the view in that case; no interrogatories could be administered on the respondent.

12.In view of hereinabove, we do not find any merits in the instant High Court Appeal, which is hereby dismissed along with listed application(s), however, with no order as to cost. The cross objections filed by the respondent are allowed to the extent that the suit will proceed only on the basis of foreign judgment, and the Respondent may file an application under Order VI, Rule 17, C.P.C., for amendment of the plaint for such purposes before the learned Single Judge.

MH/J-25/KIntra-Court Appeal dismissed.

There is no cavil with the proposition that relief of specific performance is discretionary in nature and despite proof of an agreement to sell, exercise of discretion can be withheld if the Court considers that grant of such relief would be unfair or inequitable

So far as the case in hand is concerned, it is directly and squarely hit by illustration I of Section 22. In this regard, I am also fortified by the law laid down in “Sheikh Akhtar Aziz Versus Mst. Shabnam Begum and others” (2019 SCMR 524) wherein it has been held as under:- “

Finally, there is no cavil with the proposition that relief of specific performance is discretionary in nature and despite proof of an agreement to sell, exercise of discretion can be withheld if the Court considers that grant of such relief would be unfair or inequitable.” 

Part Of Judgment 

IN THE ISLAMABAD HIGH COURT, ISLAMABAD. 
Bakht Baidar VS Ghulam Nabi
Civil Revision-42-2017 | -
Honourable Mr. Justice Ghulam Azam Qambrani

Case Law : Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C

 JUDGMENT

ABDUL RASOOL MEMON, J.---The applicant through this revision petition has assailed the order dated 01.11.2012 passed by the learned III-Additional District Judge, Karachi West in Civil Appeal No.07/2012, whereby he dismissed the appeal upholding the order dated 23.01.2012 passed by the learned III-Senior Civil Judge Karachi West in Suit No. NIL of 2012 titled M. Asim Arman v. Collectorate of Customs and others holding the suit not maintainable and did not entertain the same as per law.

2. Briefly, the facts giving rise to this revision petition are that the applicant filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction against the respondents with assertions that he imported a data processing equipment namely "mini migra line extender 37 DV" vide IGM No.D-2134 dated 29.02.2004, Index No.1, vide LC No.2362-03 dated 22.12.2003 issued from Faisal Bank Limited but on post release security respondent declaring it as cable line extending equipment classified under PCT 8543.8900 demanded 5% custom duty, 15% sales tax total amounting to Rs.19,33,223/- including Income Tax which he clarified that the equipment in question was not liable to payment of such taxes but respondents were bent upon to recover the same and ultimately in the month of November 2011 they issued a letter dated 15.11.2011 along with copy of order dated 22.5.2004 directing him to make payment of demanded tax duties and issued Warrant of Attachment dated 23.12.2011 for recovery of sum of Rs.19,33,223/- on account of the custom duty, sales tax and income tax thereafter, the applicant brought the instant suit for grant of following prayers:-

(i) To declare that the warrant of attachment dated 23.12.2011 sent by the Defendants is void, ab initio and without lawful authority and against the provision of S.R.O. 45 Schedule VI of Customs Act, 1990 as equipment classified under heading 8534.0000 in the category of "special classification provisions" attracting 0% Customs duty.

(ii) To declare that the warrant of attachment dated 23.12.2011 sent by the Defendants against the plaintiff is barred by time as notice for such recovery was mandatory to be served within a period of three years.

(iii) To restrain the above said Defendants, their men, associates, legal heirs, representatives, attorneys, nominees, successors- in-interest, assignees, any other person or persons working under them and acting on their behalf not to dispossess the plaintiff or not to issue/execute any warrant/proceedings against the plaintiff.

(iv) Cost of the suit.

3. Learned trial court before admission held the suit as not maintainable being barred under section 217 of Customs Act, 1969 which is special law having preference over the general law and an adequate remedy in shape of appeal under section 193 of the Customs Act was available to applicant. Appeal No.07/2012 filed against said order also met the same fate.

4. Arguments heard and record perused.

5. Learned counsel for the applicant contended that applicant has challenged the orders of the Custom Authorities based on mala fides as special plea has been taken that the judgment was signed by said authorities on 22.5.2004 for a case instituted on 25.6.2004 shown to be heard on 16.7.2004 and finally decided on 16.7.2004, copied on 23.11.2004 declaring the equipment in question classified under heading 8543.8900 liable for payment of custom duty and sales tax contrary to law and that under section 32(2) of the Customs Act a show cause notice was required to be served upon the applicant wherein a period of three years for recovery of alleged duties is required but he served with time barred notice, as such the suit filed by applicant is competent and has erroneously been rejected. In support of his contention he placed reliance on the cases reported as 1999 MLD 1728, PLD 1997 Karachi 541, 2004 PTD 1189, 1992 SCMR 1898, 2002 MLD 130, 1990 CLC 511, 2007 PTD 127 and 2011 SCMR 1279.

6. Learned counsel for respondents in rebuttal has argued that the present suit was not maintainable on account of bar contained in Section 217(2) of the Customs Act. She further contended that the Customs Act is a complete Code, as plaint was rightly rejected by the learned III-Senior Civil Judge Karachi West and said may be termed as an order passed under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. which itself is a decree. She has further submitted that Show cause notice issued on 25.6.2014 in terms of Section 32(3) of the Customs Act, 1969 and Section 36(2) of Sales Tax Act, 1990 read with Section 148 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 to Applicant for recovery of short levied customs duty/taxes was well within the limitation framed under Section 32(5) of the Customs Act, 1969 therefore the order of the authority concerned is in accordance with law and cannot be questioned in Civil Court. She has placed reliance on the cases of (1) Muhammad Idris v. The Collector of Customs, Karachi and another (PLD 1971 Karachi 911) and (2) Moon Corporation v. Central Board of Revenue (2004 PTD 2615).

7. The object of Customs Act, 1969 is complete Code in respect of Levy and collection of Customs duties and other allied matter. The rights of the parties are fully protected by the law in letter and spirit, reliance is placed on the case of Muhammad Idris (supra). Section 193 of the Customs Act provides that any person feels aggrieved by the decision or order passed under Sections 33, 79, 80 and 179 of the Act, 1969 can prefer an appeal to the Collector within thirty days from date of communication to him of such decision or order, it also contained provision of condonaton of delay in filing of appeal after prescribed period of limitation. Where the law provides a remedy of appeal or revision to any Tribunal fully competent to give relief, any indulgence to the contrary by the High Court, is bound to produce a sense of distrust in statutory Tribunals. Reliance is placed on case of Shahid Agency v. The Collector of Customs reported in 1989 CLC 1938.

8. It is the case of the applicant that the notice was issued to him after lapse of seven years for recovery of tax and finally on 23.12.2011 warrant of attachment was issued against him. In the case reported as Moon Corporation v. Central Board of Revenue reported as 2004 PTD 2615 relied upon by the counsel for the respondents, it is held as under:--

"In any event, even if the order suffers from any illegalities the petitioners could always seek appellate and revision remedies in the hierarchy in the Tribunal established under the Customs Act. We are, therefore, not inclined to interfere with the impugned order and dismiss the petition in limine. The observations made above, however, are only tentative and will not prejudice the petitioner in case he chooses to approach any appropriate forum for redress. The petitioner will also be free to approach the concerned authorities and seek extension of time for compliance of the impugned order, if he so desires."

9. The ratio of the above cited case is that when an action or order passed by Customs suffers from any illegality, an aggrieved party can seek remedy from the hierarchy provided under the Customs Act.

10. The case laws relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant have no relevance with the facts and circumstances of this case on the contrary ratio of all the aforesaid referred judgments is that the assumption of jurisdiction adjudicates the dispute relating to customs duties would come within the domain of highest hierarchy/tribunal established in the said Act for adjudication of the controversies in respect of the levies of taxes. Apart from above, in the aforesaid case law it has been held that there was bar contained under section 217 of Customs Act in respect of suits filed by the importers and same were held incompetent.

11. In view of above circumstances, the order of the learned III-Senior Civil Judge Karachi West is in accordance with law and that order could be termed as an order passed under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. as incompetent suit should be buried before its inception. Moreover, the order under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. is itself a decree within the meaning of Section 2 of the CPC, as such no formal decree was required to have been prepared by the trial court and the said order itself was appealable, therefore, the findings of the appellant Court in respect of non-availability of the decree are contrary to law. However, in respect of the bar of jurisdiction, the concurrent findings of the two Courts below do not require any interference and no illegality or irregularity has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the applicant. The discretion/ jurisdiction exercised by both the Courts are in accordance with law without any material illegality or irregularity, therefore, the very revision application is incompetent which stands dismissed accordingly.

SL/M-53/SindhPetition dismissed.

2016 P T D 163

[Sindh High Court]

Before Abdul Rasool Memon, J

MUHAMMAD ASIM ARMAN

Versus

COLLECTORATE OF CUSTOMS (PREVENTIVE) and 3 others

R.A. No.197 of 2012, decided on 07/05/2015.

(a) Customs Act (IV of 1969)---

----Ss.193 & 217---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.2 & O. VII, R.11---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss.42 & 52---Suit for declaration and permanent injunction---Maintainability---Protection of action taken under Customs Act, 1969---Suit barred under Customs Act, 1969---Order passed under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C.---Nature and effect---Remedy available under special law---Scope---Concurrent findings---Rules for interference---Plaintiff filed suit for declaration and permanent injunction challenging validity of demand letter under which tax duties were imposed by defendants on equipment imported by plaintiff and warrant of attachment issued for non-payment of said duties---Contention raised by plaintiff was that the equipment imported by him was not subject to payment of any tax duties and that show-cause notice issued to plaintiff was time barred in terms of S. 32(2) of Customs Act, 1969---Defendant took plea that show cause notice was within time as provided under S. 32(5) of Customs Act, 1969---Trial Court dismissed the suit being barred under S. 217 of Customs Act, 1969 and due to availability of adequate remedy of appeal under S. 193 of the Act---Appellate court upheld judgment and decree of Trial Court---Validity---Customs Act, 1969 was complete Code in respect of levy and collection of customs duties and other allied matter and rights of parties were fully protected by said law---When an action or order passed by Customs suffered from illegalities, aggrieved party could always seek remedy in hierarchy provided under the said Act---Assumption of jurisdiction to adjudicate dispute relating to customs' duties would come within domain of highest hierarchy or Tribunal established under Customs Act, 1969---Under S. 217 of Customs Act, 1969 provided bar in respect of suits filed by importers and the same were incompetent---Section 193 of Customs Act, 1969 provided that any person who felt aggrieved by decision or order passed under Ss. 33, 79, 80 & 179 of the Act could prefer appeal to Collector within thirty days from date of communication of order, and it also contained provision as to condonation of delay in filing of appeal after prescribed period of limitation---Order passed by Trial Court was in accordance with law and the same could be termed as an order passed under O. VII, R. 11, CPC---Order passed under O. VII, R. 11, CPC was itself a decree within meaning of S. 2, CPC and the same was appealable without any formal decree prepared by Trial Court---Findings of appellate court in respect of non-availability of decree were contrary to law---Where law had provided a remedy of appeal or revision to any Tribunal fully competent to give relief, any indulgence to contrary by High Court, was bound to produce sense of distrust in statutory Tribunals---Concurrent findings of courts below did not require any interference---No illegality or irregularity could be pointed out in finding of court below---Revision petition was dismissed in circumstance.

(b) Customs Act (IV of 1969)---

----Preamble---Object of Customs Act, 1969 is complete Code in respect of levy and collection of customs duties and other allied matters and rights of parties are fully protected by said law.

(c) Customs Act (IV of 1969)---

----Ss. 33, 32, 79, 80, 179, 193 & 217----Section 193 of Customs Act, 1969 provides that any person who feels aggrieved by decision or order passed under Ss. 33, 79, 80 & 179 of the Act can prefer appeal to Collector within thirty days from date of communication of order, and it also contains provision of condonation of delay in filing of appeal after prescribed period of limitation.

(d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----

----O. VII, R. 11, & S.2----Rejection of plaint---"Decree"---Scope---Order of court to the effect that suit was incompetent could be termed as an order passed under O. VII, R. 11, CPC, as such suit should have been buried before its inception---Order passed under O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C. was itself a "decree" within meaning of S. 2, CPC the same was appealable without any formal decree prepared by Trial Court---Finding of appellate court in respect of non-availability of decree were contrary to law.

(e) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----

----S. 115---Revision---Maintainability---Remedy available under special law---Scope---Where law provides a remedy of appeal or revision to any Tribunal fully competent to give relief, any indulgence to the contrary by High Court, is bound to produce sense of distrust in statutory Tribunals.

1999 MLD 1728; PLD 1997 Kar. 541; 2004 PTD 1189; 1992 SCMR 1898; 2002 MLD 130; 1990 CLC 511; 2007 PTD 127; 2011 SCMR 1279; Muhammad Idris v. The Collector of Customs, Karachi and another PLD 1971 Kar. 911; Moon Corporation v. Central Board of Revenue 2004 PTD 2615 and Shahid Agency v. The Collector of Customs 1989 CLC 1938 rel.

Syed Jehangeer Akhtar for Applicant.

Dikhurram Shaheen for Respondents.

Date of hearing: 12th March, 2015.

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