Though section 10 of the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009 is only applicable where agreement to sell is between landlord and tenant,............

 Though section 10 of the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009 is only applicable where agreement to sell is between landlord and tenant, however, where tenant is in possession of the premises not in pursuant to any agreement to sell but through tenancy agreement, then his status shall remain as of a tenant for the purpose of ejectment petition.

Misc. Writ 213378/18
Aqeela Abid Vs Ch Bashir Ahmad etc
Mr. Justice Abid Aziz Sheikh
22-09-2021
2021 LHC 4888












‑𝑺.118‑‑‑𝑬𝒙𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒄𝒐‑𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒓 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒋𝒐𝒊𝒏𝒕 𝑲𝒉𝒂𝒕𝒂‑‑‑‑𝑶𝒏𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒋𝒐𝒊𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒘𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒊𝒇 𝒘𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝒊𝒏 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒄𝒊𝒓𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒔, 𝒘𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒂𝒅𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒚 𝒂𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒋𝒐𝒊𝒏𝒕 𝒄𝒐‑𝒐𝒘𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒚‑

 2002 𝒀 𝑳 𝑹 2603

𝑻𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒇𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝑨𝒄𝒕 (𝑰𝑽 𝒐𝒇 1882)‑‑‑
‑‑‑‑𝑺.118‑‑‑𝑬𝒙𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒄𝒐‑𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒓 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒋𝒐𝒊𝒏𝒕 𝑲𝒉𝒂𝒕𝒂‑‑‑𝑪𝒐‑𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒓 𝒊𝒏 𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒂 𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒋𝒐𝒊𝒏𝒕 𝑲𝒉𝒂𝒕𝒂 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒇𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒅𝒋𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒄𝒐‑𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒊𝒏 𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒄𝒐‑𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒓'𝒔 𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒔 𝒘𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒍𝒚 𝒔𝒂𝒇𝒆𝒈𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒚 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒈𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒂 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒃𝒚 𝒈𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒎 𝒂 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒘𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒃𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒄𝒐‑𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒅𝒋𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏‑‑‑𝑶𝒏𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒋𝒐𝒊𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒘𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒊𝒇 𝒘𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝒊𝒏 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒄𝒊𝒓𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒔, 𝒘𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒂𝒅𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒚 𝒂𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒋𝒐𝒊𝒏𝒕 𝒄𝒐‑𝒐𝒘𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒚‑‑­𝑺𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒘𝒉𝒐𝒎 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒆𝒙𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒄𝒐‑𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒑 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒐 𝒔𝒉𝒐𝒆𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒄𝒐‑𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒉𝒐 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒆𝒙𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒅 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒘𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒃𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆 𝒂 𝒄𝒐‑𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒓 𝒊𝒏 𝒋𝒐𝒊𝒏𝒕 𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒐‑𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒉𝒐 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒆𝒙𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒅 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒉𝒊𝒎.
𝑭𝒆𝒓𝒐𝒛 𝒗. 𝑺𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝑷𝑳𝑫 1985 𝑺𝑪 254 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑺𝒊𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒒𝒖𝒆 𝒗. 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑨𝒌𝒓𝒂𝒎 2000 𝑺𝑪𝑴𝑹 533 𝒓𝒆𝒇.
𝑹𝒂𝒏𝒂 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑨𝒇𝒛𝒂𝒍 𝑲𝒉𝒂𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝑷𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔.
𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒇 𝑪𝒉𝒂𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.2.
𝑵𝒆𝒎𝒐 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑹𝒆𝒎𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔.
𝑫𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈: 4𝒕𝒉 𝑨𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒍, 2002.

 2002 𝒀 𝑳 𝑹 2603
[𝑳𝒂𝒉𝒐𝒓𝒆]
𝑩𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝑺𝒚𝒆𝒅 𝒁𝒂𝒉𝒊𝒅 𝑯𝒖𝒔𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒏, 𝑱
𝑨𝑩𝑫𝑼𝑳 𝑯𝑨𝑴𝑰𝑫 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓‑‑‑𝑷𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔
𝑽𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒖𝒔
𝑨𝑩𝑫𝑼𝑹 𝑹𝑨𝑯𝑰𝑴 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔‑‑‑𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔
𝑪𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍 𝑹𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑵𝒐.1056/𝑫 𝒐𝒇 1991, 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 4𝒕𝒉 𝑨𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒍, 2002.


𝑱𝑼𝑫𝑮𝑴𝑬𝑵𝑻

𝑻𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒊𝒔 𝒂 𝒄𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍 𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑨𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒕 𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆, 𝑮𝒖𝒋𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒘𝒂𝒍𝒂 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 9‑5‑1991 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒃𝒚 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝑮𝒉𝒖𝒍𝒂𝒎 𝑯𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒓/𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.2, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 5‑5‑1990 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒔𝒆𝒕 𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒖𝒍𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒊𝒏 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒂𝒍 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔.
𝑨𝒃𝒅𝒖𝒍 𝑹𝒂𝒉𝒊𝒎, 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐. 1 𝒘𝒉𝒐 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒄𝒐‑𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒓 𝒊𝒏 𝑲𝒉𝒂𝒕𝒂 𝒂𝒍𝒐𝒏𝒈𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒄𝒐‑𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒆𝒙𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒅 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒎𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈 2 𝑲𝒂𝒏𝒂𝒍𝒔 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝑯𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒓/𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.2 𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒊𝒏 𝒊𝒏 𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒖 𝒐𝒇 4 𝑲𝒂𝒏𝒂𝒍𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒉𝒊𝒎, 𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆 𝒆𝒙𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒆𝒅 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 18‑2‑1981. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒊𝒏 𝒃𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉𝒕 𝒂 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒋𝒐𝒊𝒏𝒕 𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒆 𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝑨𝒃𝒅𝒖𝒍 𝑹𝒂𝒉𝒊𝒎/𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.1 𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒂𝒗𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝑯𝒂𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒓/𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.2. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒅. 𝑰𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕. 𝑩𝒐𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒂𝒅𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒆𝒅 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒔𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒔. 𝑨𝒃𝒅𝒖𝒍 𝑹𝒂𝒖𝒇 𝑷.𝑾. 1 𝒐𝒏𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇 𝒉𝒊𝒎𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒇 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒔 𝒂 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒔 𝑯𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒓/𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕/𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔‑𝒃𝒐𝒙. 𝑺𝒐𝒎𝒆 𝒅𝒐𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒃𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉𝒕 𝒐𝒏 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅. 𝑶𝒏 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒐𝒏 𝑰𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆 𝑵𝒐.7 𝒖𝒑 𝒉𝒆𝒍𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒙𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆 𝒃𝒖𝒕 𝒐𝒃𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒆𝒙𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒎𝒂𝒅𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒂 𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄 𝒏𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓. 𝑰𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒐𝒃𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒆𝒅 "𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐. 2 𝒉𝒂𝒔, 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒉𝒐𝒆𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.1 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆 𝒂 𝒄𝒐‑𝒐𝒘𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒋𝒐𝒊𝒏𝒕 𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒊𝒏 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.1". 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒍𝒚 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒅 𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 5‑5‑1990. 𝑶𝒏 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑨𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒕 𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆, 𝒉𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓, 𝒐𝒏 𝒂 𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒚 𝒅𝒊𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒈𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒆𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒔𝒆𝒕 𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒔𝒐𝒎𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐‑𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒂 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒑𝒓𝒆‑𝒆𝒎𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒒𝒖𝒂 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒔𝒂𝒍𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒇𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒔𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒇. 𝑪𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒏𝒈𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 9‑5‑1991, 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑨𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒕 𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆, 𝒊𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒍 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆‑𝒆𝒎𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒒𝒖𝒂 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒎. 𝑰𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒇𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒗𝒊𝒆𝒘 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒋𝒐𝒊𝒏 𝑲𝒉𝒂𝒕𝒂, 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.2 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒐𝒏𝒍𝒚 𝒕𝒂𝒌𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.1. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒍 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.2 𝒔𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒃𝒖𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒂 𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒐 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒑𝒖𝒕𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒍 𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒋𝒐𝒊𝒏𝒕 𝑲𝒉𝒂𝒕𝒂 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐‑𝒐𝒘𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔.
2. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒋𝒐𝒊𝒏𝒕 𝑲𝒉𝒂𝒕𝒂, 𝒐𝒖𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 2 𝑲𝒂𝒏𝒂𝒍𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒆𝒙𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐. 1 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.2 𝒊𝒔 𝒔𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒐𝒏, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒊𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒔𝒖𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒐𝒓 𝒏𝒐𝒏‑𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆. 𝑰𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒖𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆 𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒏 𝒊𝒏 𝑭𝒆𝒓𝒐𝒛 𝒗. 𝑺𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔 (𝑷𝑳𝑫 1985 𝑺𝑪 254) 𝒘𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒈𝒆𝒕 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅. 𝑰𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒉𝒆𝒍𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒂 𝒄𝒐­-𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒓 𝒊𝒏 𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒂 𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒄𝒂𝒏 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒇𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒅𝒋𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒄𝒐‑𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒊𝒏 𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒄𝒐-­𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒓𝒔' 𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒔 𝒘𝒊𝒍𝒍 𝒃𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒍𝒚 𝒔𝒂𝒇𝒆𝒈𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒚 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒈𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒂 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒃𝒚 𝒈𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒎 𝒂 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒑𝒖𝒕𝒆 𝒘𝒊𝒍𝒍 𝒃𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐‑𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒔 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒅𝒋𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏. 𝑰𝒏 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑺𝒊𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒒𝒖𝒆 𝒗. 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑨𝒌𝒓𝒂𝒎 (2000 𝑺𝑪𝑴𝑹 533) 𝒊𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒐𝒃𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 "𝒐𝒏𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒋𝒐𝒊𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒘𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒊𝒇, 𝒅𝒆𝒂𝒍𝒔 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒄𝒊𝒓𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒘𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒂𝒅𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒚 𝒂𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒋𝒐𝒊𝒏𝒕 𝒄𝒐‑𝒐𝒘𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒚". 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒃𝒔𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒕𝒆𝒍𝒚 𝒋𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒎𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒆𝒙𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆 𝒃𝒖𝒕 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒄𝒐‑𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒓𝒔. 𝑯𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒐𝒃𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.2 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒎𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒚 𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒉𝒐𝒆𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐. 1 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒃𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆 𝒂 𝒄𝒐­-𝒐𝒘𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒋𝒐𝒊𝒏𝒕 𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒊𝒏, 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐. 1. 𝑻𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒃𝒔𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒕𝒆𝒍𝒚 𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒂𝒄𝒉 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒂𝒘 𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒏 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒐𝒓 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕, 𝒉𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓, 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒚𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒑𝒍𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒔 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒂 𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔/𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇𝒔 𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒊𝒏 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆‑𝒆𝒎𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒑𝒍𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒍𝒚 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒅. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒖𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒔𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆 𝑵𝒐.7 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒂𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒅.
3. 𝑻𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒍𝒚 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕𝒆𝒅. 𝑵𝒐 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒄𝒐𝒔𝒕𝒔.
𝑯.𝑩.𝑻./𝑨‑318/𝑳 𝑹𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕𝒆𝒅.

‑‑𝑺𝒔. 17 & 24‑‑‑𝑬𝒗𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒕‑‑‑𝑫𝒆𝒏𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒑 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒓𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒕‑‑‑𝑬𝒗𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒍𝒂𝒅𝒚 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒈𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒉𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒍𝒐𝒐𝒌𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒂𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒔 𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒑𝒂𝒍, 𝒘𝒉𝒐 𝒂𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒑𝒖𝒓𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒍𝒂𝒅𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒚𝒆𝒍𝒍, 𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒕 𝒐𝒖𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒃𝒓𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓‑‑

2002 𝑪 𝑳 𝑪 78
(𝒂) 𝑪𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒐𝒏𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝑹𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑨𝒄𝒕 (𝑿𝑰 𝒐𝒇 1963)‑‑‑
‑‑‑‑𝑺𝒔. 17 & 24‑‑‑𝑬𝒗𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒕‑‑‑𝑫𝒆𝒏𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒑 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒓𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒕‑‑‑𝑬𝒗𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒍𝒂𝒅𝒚 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒈𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒉𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒍𝒐𝒐𝒌𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒂𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒔 𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒑𝒂𝒍, 𝒘𝒉𝒐 𝒂𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒑𝒖𝒓𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒍𝒂𝒅𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒚𝒆𝒍𝒍, 𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒕 𝒐𝒖𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒃𝒓𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓‑‑𝑹𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒓 𝑨𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒔 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒍𝒂𝒅𝒚, 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒔 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒔 𝒔𝒖𝒃‑𝒍𝒆𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒆‑‑‑𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒃𝒆𝒕𝒘𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔, 𝑪𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕'𝒔 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒔 𝒆𝒙𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒅𝒖𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒂𝒘‑‑‑𝑽𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒚‑‑‑𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒍𝒂𝒘, 𝒂𝒔 𝒔𝒖𝒄𝒉 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝑪𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒘𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒘𝒂𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒍𝒂𝒅𝒚 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒂𝒔 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝑺.17 𝒐𝒇 𝑪𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒐𝒏𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝑹𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑨𝒄𝒕, 1963‑‑‑𝑹𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒓 𝒃𝒆𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒂 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒊𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒋𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒏𝒐 𝒋𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒐 𝒅𝒆𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆, 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒍𝒂𝒅𝒚 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒍 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒑𝒂𝒍 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕‑‑‑𝑺𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒑𝒂𝒍 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒍 𝒂𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒍𝒂𝒅𝒚 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝑶.𝑿𝑽𝑰𝑰, 𝑹.3, 𝑪.𝑷.𝑪., 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒇𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍‑‑𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒂𝒍 𝒐𝒇 𝒔𝒖𝒄𝒉 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒇𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒂 𝒕𝒂𝒌𝒆𝒏 𝒃𝒚 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒑𝒂𝒍 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒘𝒏𝒆𝒓/𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒓𝒅‑‑‑𝑭𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝑹𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒔𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒅, 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒃𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒏 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅‑‑‑𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒊𝒏 𝒄𝒊𝒓𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒔.
𝑹𝒆𝒉𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒖𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒉 𝒗. 𝑵𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒓 𝑲𝒉𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 7 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔 1991 𝑴𝑳𝑫 1011 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑴𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒌 𝑨𝒃𝒅𝒖𝒍 𝑸𝒂𝒚𝒚𝒖𝒎 𝒗. 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑯𝒖𝒔𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒏 1990 𝑺𝑪𝑴𝑹 1716 𝒓𝒆𝒇.
(𝒃) 𝑸𝒂𝒏𝒖𝒏‑𝒆‑𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒉𝒂𝒅𝒂𝒕 (10 𝒐𝒇 1984)‑‑‑
‑‑‑‑𝑨𝒓𝒕. 163‑‑‑𝑺𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒐𝒂𝒕𝒉‑‑‑𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒄𝒂𝒏 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒅𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒏 𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒐𝒂𝒕𝒉, 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒐𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆‑‑‑𝑰𝒏 𝒂𝒃𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒔𝒖𝒄𝒉 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕, 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒄𝒆 𝒂𝒏 𝒖𝒏𝒘𝒊𝒍𝒍𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒏 𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒐𝒂𝒕𝒉.
𝑼𝒎𝒂𝒓 𝑭𝒂𝒓𝒐𝒐𝒒 𝑲𝒉𝒂𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕.
𝑨𝒉𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝑷𝒊𝒓𝒛𝒂𝒅𝒂 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔.
𝑫𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈: 4𝒕𝒉 𝑶𝒄𝒕𝒐𝒃𝒆𝒓, 2000.


2002 𝑪 𝑳 𝑪 78
[𝑲𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒊]
𝑩𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒃𝒃𝒊𝒓 𝑨𝒉𝒎𝒆𝒅, 𝑱
𝑴𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒓𝒔 𝑺𝑯𝑬𝑹𝑨𝑵𝑰 𝑩𝑹𝑶𝑻𝑯𝑬𝑹𝑺‑‑‑𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕
𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒖𝒔
𝑴𝒔𝒕. 𝑺𝑨𝑹𝑾𝑨𝑻 𝑨𝑲𝑯𝑻𝑨𝑹 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓‑‑‑𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔
𝑭𝒊𝒓𝒔𝒕 𝑹𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝑵𝒐.630 𝒐𝒇 2000, 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒅‑ 𝒐𝒏 4𝒕𝒉 𝑶𝒄𝒕𝒐𝒃𝒆𝒓, 2000.


𝑶𝑹𝑫𝑬𝑹

𝑴𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒓𝒔 𝑺𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒊 𝑩𝒓𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒊𝒕𝒔 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒏𝒆𝒓, 𝑾𝒂𝒒𝒂𝒓 𝑺𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒊 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 24 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑪𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒐𝒏𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑹𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑨𝒄𝒕, 1963 (𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑨𝒄𝒕), 𝒂𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓, 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 10‑4‑2000 𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑨𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝑹𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑪𝒍𝒊𝒇𝒕𝒐𝒏 𝑪𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒐𝒏𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕, 𝑲𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒊 𝒊𝒏 𝑹.𝑪. 𝑵𝒐.74 𝒐𝒇 1990 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.1 𝒂𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.2 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕, 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒃𝒚 𝑨𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝑹𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏, 𝒊𝒏 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑵𝒐. 𝑰𝑰‑𝑪, 12𝒕𝒉 𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒎𝒆𝒓𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑺𝒕𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒕, 𝑷𝒉𝒂𝒔𝒆‑𝑰𝑰 𝑬𝒙𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏, 𝑫𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝑯𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒈. 𝑨𝒖𝒕𝒉𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒚, 𝑲𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒊.
𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒃𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒇 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝑴𝒓𝒔. 𝑺𝒂𝒓𝒘𝒂𝒕 𝑨𝒌𝒉𝒕𝒂𝒓 (𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐. 1) 𝒊𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒘𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒍𝒂𝒅𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑷𝒍𝒐𝒕 𝑵𝒐, 11‑𝑪, 12𝒕𝒉 𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒎𝒆𝒓𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑺𝒕𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒕, 𝑷𝒉𝒂𝒔𝒆 11 𝑬𝒙𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒔𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏 𝒔𝒉𝒐𝒑𝒔/𝒈𝒐𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒏𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝑷𝒂𝒌𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏 𝑫𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝑶𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝑯𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑨𝒖𝒕𝒉𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒚, 𝑲𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒊 (𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒊𝒕?𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒔), 𝒔𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕.𝑵𝒐.2 𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝑹𝒔.2,000 𝒑𝒆𝒓 𝒎𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒉 𝒆𝒙𝒄𝒍𝒖𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒆𝒍𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒊𝒕𝒚, 𝒈𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒘𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒖𝒎𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒈𝒆𝒔, 𝒑𝒂𝒚𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒂𝒅𝒗𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒔𝒕 𝒘𝒆𝒆𝒌 𝒐𝒇 𝒆𝒂𝒄𝒉 𝒎𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒉, 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒚 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕, 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 27‑2‑1984 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒐𝒅 𝒐𝒇 11 𝒎𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒉𝒔. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.2 𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒔, 𝒂𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒙𝒑𝒊𝒓𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕. 𝑯𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒂𝒖𝒍𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒑𝒂𝒚𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒘.𝒆.𝒇. 𝑱𝒖𝒍𝒚 𝒕𝒐 𝑺𝒆𝒑𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓, 1987. 𝑬𝒗𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑹𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑪𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝑵𝒐.68 𝒐𝒇 1987 𝒃𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑨𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝑹𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔, 𝑪𝒍𝒊𝒇𝒕𝒐𝒏 𝑪𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒐𝒏𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕, 𝑲𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒊. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒕𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒆𝒕𝒘𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒓𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒚 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒆𝒙𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 30‑8‑1987 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒆𝒏𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒅 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝑹𝒔.3,000 𝒑𝒆𝒓 𝒎𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒉 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒇𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.1 𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒍 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒔𝒖𝒃‑𝒍𝒆𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒔 𝒐𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒄𝒊𝒓𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒔. 𝑰𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒍𝒂𝒅𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓 1988, 𝒔𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒇𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝑳𝒂𝒉𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒋𝒐𝒊𝒏 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒉𝒖𝒔𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒖𝒑𝒕𝒐 14‑9‑1990. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.2 𝒑𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝑹𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑪𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒐𝒓 𝒖𝒑𝒕𝒐 𝑴𝒂𝒚, 1990, 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒂𝒖𝒍𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒑𝒂𝒚𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒘.𝒆.𝒇. 1‑6‑1990. 𝑶𝒏 𝒓𝒆𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒏 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝑳𝒂𝒉𝒐𝒓𝒆, 𝒔𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒍𝒐𝒏𝒈𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒃𝒓𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓, 𝒉𝒖𝒔𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒂 𝒇𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒅, 𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒔 𝒃𝒖𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒇𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒐𝒄𝒄𝒖𝒑𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒓𝒅 𝒄𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒌𝒏𝒐𝒘 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.2 𝒊𝒏 𝒖𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒗𝒊𝒐𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒕 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒘𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒓𝒅 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒔𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 17 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑨𝒄𝒕, 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒈𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒂𝒖𝒍𝒕 𝒂𝒔 𝒘𝒆𝒍𝒍 𝒂𝒔 𝒔𝒖𝒃‑𝒍𝒆𝒕𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒕 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒏 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕.
𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.2 𝒊𝒏 𝒔𝒑𝒊𝒕𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒊𝒄𝒆 𝒇𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒔𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒄 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒘𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒏 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕, 𝑴𝒓𝒔. 𝑺𝒂𝒓𝒘𝒂𝒕 𝑨𝒌𝒉𝒕𝒂𝒓 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒘𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒔 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒐𝒏 𝒖𝒑𝒕𝒐 14‑7‑1984, 𝒘𝒉𝒐 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒍 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒐𝒏𝒆 𝑴𝒓𝒔. 𝑸𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒓 𝑱𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒍 𝑲𝒉𝒂𝒏 𝒃𝒚 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕, 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 14‑7‑1984 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝑹𝒔.1,25,000 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒆𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒖𝒍𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏, 𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒗𝒂𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒄𝒆𝒇𝒖𝒍 𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒑𝒖𝒓𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒍𝒐𝒏𝒈𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒑𝒂𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒕. 𝑶𝒏 1‑10‑1986. 𝑴𝒓𝒔. 𝑸𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒓 𝑱𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒍 𝒆𝒙𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒚 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒂𝒗𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝑵𝒊𝒔𝒂𝒓 𝑨𝒉𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝑺𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒊, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒚𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒓 𝒃𝒓𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕, 𝒍𝒆𝒕𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒐𝒖𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒓𝒆 𝒈𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒅 𝒇𝒍𝒐𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒐 𝒉𝒊𝒎 𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝑹𝒔.1,700 𝒑𝒆𝒓 𝒎𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒉 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝑹𝒔.20,000 𝒂𝒔 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒅𝒆𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒊𝒕. 𝑰𝒏 𝒑𝒖𝒓𝒔𝒖𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒚 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕, 𝑵𝒊𝒔𝒂𝒓 𝑨𝒉𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝑺𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒊 𝒄𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒐𝒄𝒄𝒖𝒑𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒓𝒆 𝒇𝒍𝒐𝒐𝒓 𝒂𝒔 𝒂 𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒖𝒓𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒓 𝑸𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒓 𝑱𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒍 𝒘.𝒆.𝒇. 1‑10‑1987 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝑺𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒊 𝑩𝒓𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒐𝒏𝒈𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒃𝒓𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝑾𝒂𝒒𝒂𝒓 𝑨𝒉𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝑺𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒊 (𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕). 𝑰𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒇𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝑵𝒊𝒔𝒂𝒓 𝑨𝒉𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝑺𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒊 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝑪𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍 𝑺𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝑵𝒐. 1663 𝒐𝒇 1987 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝑽𝒕𝒉 𝑪𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍 𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆, 𝑲𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒊 𝑺𝒐𝒖𝒕𝒉 𝒂𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕 𝑸𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒓 𝑱𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑴𝒓𝒔. 𝑺𝒂𝒓𝒘𝒂𝒕 𝑨𝒌𝒉𝒕𝒂𝒓. 𝑴𝒓𝒔. 𝑸𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒓 𝑱𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒍 𝒊𝒔 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒍𝒚 𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒕𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝑼.𝑺.𝑨., 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝑸𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒓 𝑱𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒍, 𝒊𝒔 𝒍𝒐𝒐𝒌𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒂𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒚. 𝑴𝒓𝒔. 𝑺𝒂𝒓𝒘𝒂𝒕 𝑨𝒌𝒉𝒕𝒂𝒓 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒐 𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒄𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒇𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒚 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒆 𝑺𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒁𝒂𝒎𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝑲𝒉𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒔 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒋𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒖𝒏𝒂𝒖𝒕𝒉𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒅 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒕𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒃𝒚 𝒉𝒊𝒎 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕. 𝑯𝒆 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒍𝒍 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒎𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒂𝒍𝒍 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒕𝒘𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝑴𝒓𝒔. 𝑺𝒂𝒓𝒘𝒂𝒕 𝑨𝒌𝒉𝒕𝒂𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑺𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒁𝒂𝒎𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝑲𝒉𝒂𝒏 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒗𝒆.
𝑨𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒇𝒓𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒑 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒓𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒃𝒆𝒕𝒘𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑹𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒃𝒚 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓, 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 5‑11‑1991, 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝑭𝒊𝒓𝒔𝒕 𝑹𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝑵𝒐.709 𝒐𝒇 1991. 𝑩𝒚 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓, 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 17‑8‑1998, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒇 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒇𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓:‑‑
"𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒊𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑹𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒓, 𝑪𝒍𝒊𝒇𝒕𝒐𝒏 𝑪𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒐𝒏𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕, 𝒘𝒉𝒐 𝒊𝒔 𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒃𝒚 𝒅𝒊𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒇𝒓𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒂 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒙𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒓 𝒏𝒐𝒏‑𝒆𝒙𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒑 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒓𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒃𝒆𝒕𝒘𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔. 𝑩𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 𝒅𝒆𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏, 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆 .𝒇𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒘𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒃𝒆 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒂𝒌𝒆𝒏 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑹𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒓, 𝒊𝒇 𝒂𝒏𝒚. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑹𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒓 𝒊𝒔 𝒇𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒅𝒊𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒍𝒚 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒊𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒐𝒏 𝒅𝒆𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒑 𝒃𝒆𝒕𝒘𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒏 𝒂 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒐𝒅 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒘𝒐 𝒎𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒉𝒔 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒆𝒊𝒑𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓."
𝑨𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒅𝒂𝒗𝒊𝒕‑𝒊𝒏‑𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝑨𝒌𝒉𝒕𝒂𝒓 𝑨𝒍𝒊 𝑲𝒉𝒂𝒏, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒉𝒖𝒔𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒓𝒅 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒏𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒔 𝒅𝒐𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔, 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒔, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒅𝒂𝒗𝒊𝒕‑𝒊𝒏‑𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒏𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒔 𝒅𝒐𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔, 𝒃𝒐𝒕𝒉 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒓𝒐𝒔𝒔‑𝒆𝒙𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑹𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒓 𝒇𝒓𝒂𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒊𝒏𝒈, 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒔:‑‑
"(1) 𝑾𝒉𝒆𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒑 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒓𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒃𝒆𝒕𝒘𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒐𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.2?
(2) 𝑾𝒉𝒆𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.1 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒕?
(3) 𝑾𝒉𝒆𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐. 2 𝒊𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒕𝒆𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.1?
(4) 𝑾𝒉𝒆𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.2 𝒊𝒔 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒑𝒂𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕?
(5) 𝑾𝒉𝒆𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.2 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒍𝒇𝒖𝒍 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒂𝒖𝒍𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒑𝒂𝒚𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕?
(6) 𝑾𝒉𝒆𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒇 𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒆𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏?
(7) 𝑾𝒉𝒆𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝑴𝒓𝒔. 𝑸𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒓 𝑱𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒍 𝒆𝒙𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒂 𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒚 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕, 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 1‑10‑1988 𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒂𝒗𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝑵𝒊𝒔𝒂𝒓 𝑨𝒉𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝑺𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒊, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒚𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒓 𝒃𝒓𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝑽𝒊𝒒𝒂𝒓 𝑨𝒉𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝑺𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒊, 𝒍𝒆𝒕𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒐𝒖𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒓𝒆 𝒈𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒅 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏?
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𝑾𝒉𝒆𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒏 15‑9‑1987, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝑵𝒊𝒔𝒂𝒓 𝑨𝒉𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝑺𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒊 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝑪𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝑵𝒐. 1663 𝒐𝒇 1987 :𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝑽𝒕𝒉 𝑪𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍 𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆, 𝑲𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒊, 𝑺𝒐𝒖𝒕𝒉 𝒂𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒑𝒖𝒓𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒓 𝑴𝒓𝒔. 𝑸𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒓 𝑱𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.1 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.2 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒊𝒏𝒋𝒖𝒏𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏?
(9) 𝑾𝒉𝒆𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.1 𝒊𝒏 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒏𝒊𝒗𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒆𝒂𝒄𝒉 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝑹𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑪𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝑵𝒐.68 𝒐𝒇 1987 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑪𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝑵𝒐. 1585 𝒐𝒇 1987 𝒊𝒏 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒐 𝒇𝒓𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒂𝒘𝒇𝒖𝒍 𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.2 𝒊𝒏 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏?
(10) 𝑾𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒔𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒃𝒆?"
𝑨𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒆𝒗𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒄𝒆𝒅 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑹𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.1 𝒊𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒓𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.2 𝒊𝒔 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒔𝒖𝒃‑𝒍𝒆𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒆. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒔 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕, 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒖𝒍𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒍𝒚, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒅‑ 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒎𝒑𝒖𝒈𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓. 𝑯𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍.
𝑰 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒉𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝑴𝒓. 𝑼𝒎𝒂𝒓 𝑭𝒂𝒓𝒐𝒐𝒒 𝑲𝒉𝒂𝒏, 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒍 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑴𝒓. 𝑨𝒉𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝑷𝒊𝒓𝒛𝒂𝒅𝒂, 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒍 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔.
𝑴𝒓. 𝑼𝒎𝒂𝒓 𝑭𝒂𝒓𝒐𝒐𝒒 𝑲𝒉𝒂𝒏 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒗𝒆𝒉𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒍𝒚 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑹𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒓 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.1 𝒂𝒔 𝒐𝒘𝒏𝒆𝒓/𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒓𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.2 𝒂𝒔 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒕. 𝑯𝒆 𝒇𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒖𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕, 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 28-9-1989 𝒊𝒏 𝑺𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝑵𝒐. 1663 𝒐𝒇 1987, 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝑵𝒊𝒔𝒂𝒓 𝑨𝒉𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝑺𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒎 𝒂𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.1 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑸𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒓 𝑱𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒍, 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝑸𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒓 𝑱𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒍 𝒘𝒂𝒔? 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒆𝒙𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒅𝒖𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒂𝒘.
𝑰𝒏 𝒎𝒚 𝒗𝒊𝒆𝒘, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒔 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒂𝒘, 𝒂𝒔 𝒔𝒖𝒄𝒉, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒗𝒆 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒍 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏, 𝒂𝒔 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 17 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑨𝒄𝒕.
𝑴𝒓. 𝑼𝒎𝒂𝒓 𝑭𝒂𝒓𝒐𝒐𝒒 𝑲𝒉𝒂𝒏 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒗𝒆𝒉𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒍𝒚 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.1 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒔𝒂𝒍𝒆 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝑸𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒓 𝑱𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒍 𝒐𝒏 14-7-1984 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒆𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒖𝒍𝒍 𝒂𝒎𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝑹𝒔.1,25,000 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝑬𝒙𝒉.0/1 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕'𝒔 𝒃𝒓𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒕. 𝑯𝒆 𝒇𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑹𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒓 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒏 𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒐𝒂𝒕𝒉 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒔, 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒚 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒆𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒍𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝑸𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒓 𝑱𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒍. 𝑯𝒆 𝒇𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒆 𝒐𝒏 𝑬𝑿𝒉.𝑨/1𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑹𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒓 𝒊𝒏 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒂𝒕 𝒂 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒊𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.1 𝒊𝒏 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒆𝒊𝒑𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒎𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕.
𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔' 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒍 𝒎𝒆𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒃𝒚 𝒎𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒖𝒔𝒂𝒍 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒂𝒌𝒆 𝒐𝒂𝒕𝒉 𝒐𝒏 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇'𝒔 𝒅𝒆𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒐 𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒍𝒖𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒏 𝒎𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒕. 𝑰𝒏 𝒔𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔, 𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝑹𝒆𝒉𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒖𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒉 𝒗. 𝑵𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒓 𝑲𝒉𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 7 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔 1991 𝑴𝑳𝑫 1011.
𝑰𝒏 𝒎𝒚 𝒗𝒊𝒆𝒘, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒄𝒂𝒏 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒅𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒏 𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒐𝒂𝒕𝒉 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒐𝒕𝒉 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆. 𝑰𝒏 𝒂𝒃𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒏 𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒐𝒂𝒕𝒉, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒄𝒆 𝒂𝒏 𝒖𝒏𝒘𝒊𝒍𝒍𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒐𝒂𝒕𝒉, 𝒂𝒔 𝒔𝒖𝒄𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒂 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒐 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒄𝒆.
𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒍𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑹𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒔𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒅𝒆𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒍 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝒕𝒐 𝑸𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒓 𝑱𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒍, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒓 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒍𝒊𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒋𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏. 𝑰𝒏 𝒎𝒚 𝒗𝒊𝒆𝒘, 𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒆𝒅 𝒔𝒂𝒍𝒆 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒆𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓, 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 22-12-1998 𝒐𝒇 𝑰𝑰𝑰𝒓𝒅 𝑺𝒆𝒏𝒊𝒐𝒓 𝑪𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍 𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆, 𝑲𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒊, 𝑺𝒐𝒖𝒕𝒉, 𝒊𝒏 𝑺𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝑵𝒐.1384 𝒐𝒇 1991, 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝑸𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒓 𝑱𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒍 𝑲𝒉𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑴𝒓𝒔. 𝑺𝒂𝒓𝒘𝒂𝒕 𝑨𝒌𝒉𝒕𝒂𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑫.𝑯.𝑨. 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒕, 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝑶𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 17, 𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆 3, 𝑪.𝑷.𝑪., 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒆 𝒂𝒈𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒂 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒖𝒎 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒊𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒋𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏. 𝑵𝒐 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅, 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒔 𝒎𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔' 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒍. 𝑻𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒍 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕. 𝑻𝒉𝒖𝒔, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒂 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝑴𝒓𝒔. 𝑸𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒓 𝑱𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒍 𝑲𝒉𝒂𝒏 𝒊𝒔 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒍𝒂𝒅𝒚 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒐𝒘𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒃𝒚 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒔𝒂𝒍𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒓𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕, 𝑵𝒊𝒔𝒂𝒓 𝑨𝒉𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝑺𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒊 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒂𝒗𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑹𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒓 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒍𝒖𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑴𝒓𝒔. 𝑺𝒂𝒓𝒘𝒂𝒕 𝑨𝒌𝒉𝒕𝒂𝒓 𝒊𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒓𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑮𝒖𝒍 𝒁𝒂𝒎𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝑲𝒉𝒂𝒏 𝒊𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒂 𝒔𝒖𝒃-𝒍𝒆𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒆.
𝑰𝒏 𝒎𝒚 𝒗𝒊𝒆𝒘, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑹𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒓 𝒊𝒔 𝒔𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒅 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒃𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒃𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉𝒕 𝒐𝒏 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅, 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒖𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒍𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒔:--
(1) 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝑺𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝑵𝒐. 1585 𝒐𝒇 1987 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝑿𝑰𝑰𝑰𝒕𝒉 𝑪𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍 𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆, 𝑲𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒊 𝑺𝒐𝒖𝒕𝒉 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐. 2 𝒂𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.1 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒊𝒏𝒋𝒖𝒏𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 (𝑨𝒏𝒏𝒆𝒙𝒖𝒓𝒆 "𝑨/4").
(2) 𝑻𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒚 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕, 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 27-2-1984 𝒂𝒏𝒅 30-8-1987 𝒃𝒆𝒕𝒘𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.1 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.2.
(3) 𝑹𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑪𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝑵𝒐.68 𝒐𝒇 1987 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.1 𝒂𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐. 2(𝒄).
(4) 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒂 𝒕𝒂𝒌𝒆𝒏 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝑺𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝑵𝒐. 1665 𝒐𝒇 1987 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒚 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒊𝒏 1983 𝒃𝒚 𝑸𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒓 𝑱𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒍 𝒎𝒖𝒄𝒉 𝒃𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒔𝒂𝒍𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒇𝒂𝒗𝒐𝒖𝒓, 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔, 𝒂 𝒅𝒊𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒂 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕, 𝒕𝒂𝒌𝒆𝒏 𝑴𝒓𝒔. 𝑸𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒓 𝑱𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒍 𝑲𝒉𝒂𝒏 𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒃𝒓𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝑵𝒊𝒔𝒂𝒓 𝑨𝒉𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝑺𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒊 𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒏 1-10-1986. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕'𝒔 𝒃𝒓𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒃𝒚 𝑴𝒓𝒔. 𝑸𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒓 𝑱𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒍 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓 1983 𝒎𝒖𝒄𝒉 𝒃𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒔𝒂𝒍𝒆 𝒊𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆.
𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒍 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒔𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒎𝒑𝒖𝒈𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒎𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒑 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒓𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒃𝒆𝒕𝒘𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒉𝒊𝒎𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒇 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒂 𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒓𝒅 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝒗𝒊𝒆. 𝑸𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒓 𝑱𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒍, 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆, 𝒐𝒏𝒖𝒔 𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒇𝒕𝒔 𝒐𝒏 𝒉𝒊𝒎 𝒕𝒐 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒉𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒓𝒅 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒘𝒉𝒐 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒓𝒅. 𝑸𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒓 𝑱𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒍 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔-𝒃𝒐𝒙 𝒕𝒐 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒆 𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒇 𝒂𝒔 𝒐𝒘𝒏𝒆𝒓/𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒓𝒅. 𝑯𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒕 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 22-12-1998. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒇𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒈𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒃𝒖𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒏, 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒆 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.1 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒕 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒍𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝑸𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒓 𝑱𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒃𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝑨𝒃𝒅𝒖𝒍 𝑸𝒂𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝑪𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒅𝒉𝒓𝒚 (𝒂𝒔 𝒉𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒏 𝒘𝒂𝒔) 𝒊𝒏 𝑴𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒌 𝑨𝒃𝒅𝒖𝒍 𝑸𝒂𝒚𝒚𝒖𝒎 𝒗. 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑯𝒖𝒔𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒏 1990 𝑺𝑪𝑴𝑹 1716 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒘𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒔:
'𝑻𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒐𝒏𝒖𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒖𝒆𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒇𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒄𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍 𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒊.𝒆. 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒑 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒓𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.1 𝒔𝒂𝒚𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒉𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒏𝒆 𝑲𝒂𝒃𝒖𝒍 𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝑭𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒉 𝑲𝒉𝒂𝒏, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒏𝒖𝒔, 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆, 𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒉𝒊𝒎 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒊𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒉𝒊𝒎 𝒕𝒐 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝑲𝒂𝒃𝒖𝒍 𝑲𝒉𝒂𝒏 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒓𝒅. 𝑵𝒆𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝑲𝒂𝒃𝒖𝒍 𝑲𝒉𝒂𝒏 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔‑𝒃𝒐𝒙, 𝒂𝒍𝒕𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒉𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒅𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔, 𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒑 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒂𝒌𝒆𝒏 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒆 𝑲𝒂𝒃𝒖𝒍 𝑲𝒉𝒂𝒏; 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.1 𝒅𝒊𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒉𝒊𝒎𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒇 𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒎 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒍𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒚, 𝒃𝒖𝒕 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒊𝒕 𝒃𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒂 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒓𝒅 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒐𝒏, 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆, 𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓'𝒔 𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒕 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒍𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒐𝒏."
𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒂 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝑸𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒓 𝑱𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒍 𝒊𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒘𝒏𝒆𝒓/𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒓𝒅, 𝒘𝒉𝒐 𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒃𝒓𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒊𝒔𝒉𝒆𝒅, 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒓𝒚, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒂𝒍 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒇𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒂𝒌𝒆𝒏 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕.
𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒖𝒑𝒔𝒉𝒐𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒗𝒆 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒐 𝒎𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒊𝒔 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒍𝒊𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒆 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒍𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏.
𝑻𝒉𝒆𝒔𝒆 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒔𝒉𝒐𝒓𝒕 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒏𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 4‑10‑2000.
𝑺.𝑨.𝑲./𝑺‑148/𝑲 ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????? 𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅.


Inheritance---Limitation---Scope---Property claimed on basis of inheritance---Acquiescence of claimant heir--

P L D 2014 Supreme Court 167 

Inheritance---Limitation---Scope---Property claimed on basis of inheritance---Acquiescence of claimant heir---Effect---Law of limitation was not to be ignored entirely or brushed aside whenever property was claimed on the basis of inheritance---Conduct of claimant-heir might become relevant and material when the bar of time limitation was pleaded by the defendant-heir---Defendant-heir might show that claimant-heir by his/her acts, overt or implicit, demonstrated acquiescence in the defendant's title to the suit property thereby allowing him to deal with it was exclusive owner, for instance by regularly and openly disposing of parts of the property or developing it at his own expense over a period of time within the knowledge of the claimed-heir---When in such circumstances the defendant-heir transferred suit property for valuable consideration, the transferee was entitled to believe that defendant-heir had a valid title to transfer.

----Inheritance---Limitation---Scope---Property claimed on basis of inheritance---Acquiescence of claimant-heir---Effect---Waiver of inheritance right in property---Scope---Plaintiff-heir filed suit in the year 1991 assailing registered sale deed dated 8-6-1916 and sale mutation dated 23-12-1917---Plaintiff had also challenged inheritance and gift mutations dated 5-12-1930, 1-9-1949 and 11-11-1959 respectively along with further mutations attested from time to time up to the year 1987---Plaintiff-heir was more than 80 years old at the time of filing the suit in the year 1991, and according to evidence she was 6/7 years old, when entire suit property was inherited by her as a limited owner---Plaintiff-heir married in the year 1930 and as a result had to give up her property in favour of her step-sister, and since then plaintiff remained out of possession of suit property---Plaintiff-heir was aware as to how property was handled thereafter and of her rights therein---Plaintiff-heir was well aware of the transfer of suit property made by her step-sister and the subsequent gift transfer, but never questioned the sale deed of the year 1916 till filing of suit in the year, 1991---Suit property was further sold and re-sold, constructed and re-constructed upon, but the plaintiff took no action to annul or prevent the transfers of suit property---When plaintiff filed suit in the year 1991, there were as many as 251 transferees of suit property-Conduct of plaintiff clearly demonstrated acquiescence in all the impugned transfers of property which amounted to waiver of her right---Transferees of suit property, on account of plaintiff-heir's in action, led to believe that defendant-heir-transferor had a valid title in the suit property.
P L D 2014 Supreme Court 167










چینی کی قیمتوں کے بارے سپریم کورٹ آف پاکستان کا فیصلہ

PLD 2021 SC 806

Constitutional Courts of the country have a duty to resolve legal disputes coming before them in accordance with the Constitution and the law. In the discharge of their duties and functions, the Courts do not supervise pricing nor monitor profit and loss dealings by or between the stakeholders. In our view, the High Court has in the present case entered the uncertain territory of monitoring commercial and policy terms regulating the supply of an edible commodity in the market. This endeavour is far removed from its jurisdiction vested by Article 199 of the Constitution and is likely to involve technical details that are outside the realm of judicial adjudication. The common questions of law and jurisdiction raised in the petitions pending before the High Court are already noted for its determination in Writ Petition No.3834 of 2020. Notices under Order XXVII-A CPC have also been issued to the Law Officers of the Federation and the Province. The respondent private parties who are present before us are also ready to proceed with their cases. We consider that judicial consideration by the High Court ought to be devoted to resolving the legal dispute between the parties rather than the pricing mechanism regulating commercial and policy matters. Accordingly, the learned High Court shall make a serious effort to decide the legal issues arising for determination in this matter within a fortnight from the date of receipt of this order. If either party prolongs the proceedings on account of adjournments or otherwise they shall be subject to penalization, inter alia, by modification of the terms of the interim relief ordered below.

In any event it is settled position of law that in Suit before the Court of plenary jurisdiction subject to provisions of Sections 16 to 20 of Code of Civil Procedure 1908, t

 In any event it is settled position of law that in Suit before the Court of plenary jurisdiction subject to provisions of Sections 16 to 20 of Code of Civil Procedure 1908, the territory of place of residence of the defendant is to be followed. Therefore, it is held that if a hardship or inconvenience is to be compared or evaluated between husband and a wife the precedence is to be given to the hardship and inconvenience of a wife being a female. Since on merits as well as in the facts and circumstances the prayer for transfer of proceeding from one district to another has a substance and the instant case satisfies the tests of law the conversion of one proceeding into another shall not be problematic. As the technical rules unless insurmountable should yield to interest of substantial justice.

Therefore, contrasting the legal effect of the principle of conversion; the precedence of wife for determining a convenient forum; and the principle of hardship, this Court converts the instant Transfer Application from Section 25-A of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 into an Application under section 24 of CPC wherein this Court has ample power on its own motion or on an Application of any of the parties to transfer any Suit to any Court subordinate to it.

Transfer Application No.35804 of 2021
Mst. Saira Arif. Vs. Amir Ali.








سپریم کورٹ نے نسلہ ٹاور نظر ثانی درخواستیں مسترد کرتے ہوئے نسلہ ٹاور گرانے کا فیصلہ برقرار رکھا ہے، حکام سے عملدرآمد رپورٹ طلب کرتے ہوئے کمشنر کراچی کو ایک ماہ میں نسلہ ٹاور خالی کرانے کا حکم دیدیا۔

 چیف جسٹس نے ریمارکس دیئے کہ اگر میرا گھر غیر قانونی ہے تو وہ بھی گرا دیں۔ دوران سماعت فاضل وکیل منیر اے ملک نے کہا کہ وزیراعلی سندھ نے ایک زمانے میں یہ زمین دی۔

جسٹس اعجاز الاحسن نے ریمارکس دیتے ہوئے کہا کہ یہ مغلوں کا زمانہ تو نہیں وزیر اعلیٰ کچھ بھی کرے۔سپریم کورٹ کراچی رجسٹری میں چیف جسٹس آف پاکستان جسٹس گلزار احمد کی سربراہی پر مشتمل تین رکنی بینچ کے روبرو نسلہ ٹاور نظر ثانی کیس کی سماعت ہوئی۔
چیف جسٹس نے استفسار کیا کمشنر صاحب نسلہ ٹاور سے متعلق کیا پیش رفت ہیں ساری تفصیل بتائیں نسلہ ٹاور سے متعلق ٹرائینگل کیوں نہیں گرایا۔ چیف جسٹس نے حکم دیا جائیں، دیکھیں اور فوری رپورٹ دیں۔
الا ٹیز کے وکیل منیر اے ملک نے موقف دیا سندھی مسلم سوسائٹی میں کوئی بھی پلاٹ لیز نہیں۔ مسئلہ صرف ٹرائینگل کا ہے۔ عدالت اس ٹرائینگل کو گرا دے تو کوئی اعتراض نہیں۔ عدالت سندھی مسلم سوسائٹی کو بھی طلب کرے۔ جسٹس اعجاز الاحسن نے ریمارکس دیئے آپ صرف اپنے پلاٹ کی بات کریں۔ آپ اپنا ٹائٹل ظاہر کریں، اپنے کیس کی بات کریں۔
مسئلہ یہ ہے کہ آپ کے پاس جو زمین ہے وہ آپ کی نہیں بنتی۔ 780 سے ایک ہزار اسی اسکوائر یارڈ کیسے ہوگیا صرف اس کا جواب دیں۔ منیر اے ملک نے موقف دیا کہ عدالت کمشنر مقرر کر دیں اور معائنہ کروا لیں۔ بیرسٹر عابد زبیری نے کہا شاہراہ فیصل کو اسی کی دہائی میں چھوٹا کیا گیا۔
چیف جسٹس نے ریمارکس میں کہا کہ شاہراہ فیصل کبھی چھوٹی نہیں کی گئی۔ منیر اے ملک نے کہا کہ میرا ٹائٹل سندھ مسلم سوسائٹی ہے آپ سندھی مسلم سوسائٹی سے پوچھ لیں۔ جسٹس اعجاز الاحسن نے ریمارکس دیئے جو شخص خود ٹائٹل کا مجاز نہیں آپ کو کیسے مجاز کر سکتا ہے۔ سندھی مسلم سوسائٹی خود لیز کی مجاز نہیں تو آپ کو کیسے کر سکتا ہے۔
منیر اے ملک نے دلائل میں کہا کہ نسلہ ٹاور کی طرح بے شمار عمارتیں کھڑی ہیں۔ جس طرح نسلہ ٹاور کی تعمیر ہوئی ویسے ہی بے شمار عمارتیں بنائی گئیں۔ گلاس ٹاور کی طرح ہمیں بھی ریلیف دیا جائے۔ جسٹس اعجاز الاحسن نے ریمارکس دیئے کیا یہ ممکن ہے 780 اسکوائر یارڈ سے اضافی کو گرا دیا جائے۔ منیر اے ملک نے موقف دیا کہ یہ تو ماہر ہی بتا پائے گا۔
جسٹس اعجاز الاحسن نے ریمارکس دیئے آپ تو نسلہ ٹاور کے مالک کو پکڑیں۔ بیرسٹر عابد زبیری نے دلائل میں کہا کہ گھر سے بے گھر ہوجانا بڑا مشکل ہوتا ہے۔ چیف جسٹس نے ریمارکس دیئے کراچی میں تو ساری چیزیں بکتی ہیں۔ اپروو پلان ہو یا لیز، سب بکتا ہے۔ جسٹس اعجاز الاحسن نے منیر اے ملک سے مکالمہ میں کہا کہ آپ کے دلائل سے مطمئن نہیں۔
چیف جسٹس نے ریمارکس دیتے ہوئے کہا کہ آپ نقشہ دیکھیں، سروس روڈ نسلہ ٹاور میں شامل ہے۔ ہم نے یہ سب علاقے دیکھے ہیں، آپ نے بھی ساری زندگی یہیں گزاری۔ جسٹس اعجاز الاحسن نے ریمارکس دیئے اصل کیس یہ ہے کہ آپ کے پاس 340 اسکوائر یارڈ کی لیز نہیں۔ چیف جسٹس نے ریمارکس دیتے ہوئے کہا کہ سروس لین تو وہاں سے بالکل غائب کردی گئی۔
منیر اے ملک نے کہا کہ عدالت نے پورے نسلہ ٹاور کو گرانے کا حکم دیا۔ چیف جسٹس نے ریمارکس دیئے اگر آپ جزوی قبضے والی جگہ گرا سکتے ہیں تو گرا دیں۔ منیر اے ملک نے عدالت سے مکالمہ میں کہا کہ یہی کریں گے تو پورا کراچی گرانا پڑے گا۔
چیف جسٹس نے ریمارکس دیئے تو آپ کو کیا تکلیف ہے پھر؟ منیر اے ملک ایڈووکیٹ نے کہا کہ میرا اور آپ کا گھر بھی اسی شہر میں ہے۔ چیف جسٹس نے ریمارکس دیئے ایسا ہے تو میرا گھر جب دل چاہیں گرا دیں۔ اگر میرا گھر غیر قانونی سمجھتے ہیں تو وہ بھی گرا دیں۔
Affectees of Nalahs:
.............
There is a big issue for the Government of Sindh so also the Government of Pakistan to rehabilitate the affectees of the Gujjar Nalah, Orangi Nalah and Mehmoodabad Nalah, in that, the Government of Sindh says that it has no funds altogether to provide for the rehabilitation of the affectees. The statement of the Advocate General Sindh on its face appears to be not reasonable rather such a statement ought not to have been made by the Advocate General Sindh before this Court rather the Sindh Government ought to have stated that as it had stated before this Court which is reflected in the previous orders of this Court, it will do everything to provide for the rehabilitation of the affectees of the above Nalahs. Funding for such rehabilitation is the responsibility of the Government of Sindh itself, in that, as a Government, it has to provide funding from its available resources and the Sindh Government cannot be obliviated of its responsibility. We, therefore, direct the Chief Minister, Government of Sindh to ensure that the affectees of the above Nalahs are rehabilitated by providing them all sorts of amenities, which are required in the present day living. The Chief Minister, Government of Sindh shall ensure that funding is arranged for this purpose and the affectees of the above Nalahs are rehabilitated in all manners preferably within a period of one year. An initial report under the hands of the Chief Minister, Government of Sindh shall be submitted before this Court within a period of two weeks from today.

CONST. PETTITION NO.9 OF 2010



























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