--S. 12--Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 185(3)--Filing of suit by performa respondent after transfer of suit plot--

 PLJ 2022 SC 233

Specific Relief Act, 1877 (I of 1877)--

----S. 12--Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 185(3)--Suit for specific performance--Concurrent findings--Agreement to sale--Non-proving of sale consideration by performance respondent--Subsequent purchaser--Filing of suit by performa respondent after transfer of suit plot--Time-barred--No cause of action--No locus standi--Challenge to--Judge without application of his judicial and independent mind dismissed both appeals in a cursory manner, specially appeal of Respondent No. 1 as payment of sale consideration was not proved by proforma respondent in accordance with Law and despite this important fact burdened Respondent No. 1 to pay back double amount of sale consideration to porforma respondent--When suit is dismissed in toto, penalty of double payment also get buried with suit--Such findings of High Court, visibly against proforma respondent, have not been challenged by him which means that same have attained finality between parties--He bitterly failed to prove proper execution of agreement and payment of sale consideration and this very fact has also been admitted by him in his cross­ examination--Trial Court and Appellate was absolutely wrong in their perception by holding that agreement of sale and payment of sale consideration has been proved by proforma respondent--Suit plot was lawfully transferred in name of Respondent No. 2 and same was accordingly incorporated in his name in record of Respondent No. 3--Present petitioner, falling in steps of proforma respondent, cannot question allotment or its sale to Respondent No. 2 and she, as such, has no cause of action and locus standi in this regard--Petition was dismissed. [Pp. 235 & 236] A, B, C & D

Mr. Zaheer Bashir Ansari, ASC for Petitioner.

N.R. for Respondents.

Date of hearing: 21.2.2022.


 PLJ 2022 SC 233
[Appellate Jurisdiction]
Present: Sardar Tariq MasoodMazhar Alam Khan Miankhel and Qazi Muhammad Amin Ahmed, JJ.
MAH JABEEN ASHFAQ--Petitioner
versus
NOOR MAHI and others--Respondents
C.P. No. 3367 of 2018, decided on 21.2.2022.
(Against the order dated 23.05.2018 passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in C.R. No. 401/ 16)


Judgment

Mazhar Alam Khan Miankhel, J.--The petitioner, being Plaintiff No. 1A in the main suit, through instant petition under article 185(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 has questioned the impugned order dated 23rd April, 2018 of the learned Judge-in-Chambers of the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad whereby the civil revision, filed by the petitioner and Respondent No. 4 ('Proforma Respondent'), was dismissed by upholding the concurrent findings of dismissal of their suit for specific performance.

2. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and have gone through the available record.

The record of the case would reveal that initially the proforma respondent filed a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell dated 19th June, 1997 and subsequently, the present petitioner was also impleaded as Plaintiff No. 1A being an alleged purchaser of the suit plot from proforma respondent. The claim of the proforma respondent was categorically denied by Respondent No. 1 being the allottee of the suit plot by Respondent No. 3. The Respondent No. 1 further alleged that he had sold away the plot in favour of Respondent No. 2 (Abdul Ghaffar Khan). The said transfer was accordingly incorporated in the name of Respondent No. 2 in the record of Respondent No. 3. It is not out of place to mention here that the suit of the proforma respondent was filed after the transfer of the suit plot in the name of Respondent No. 2. After recording pro and contra evidence, the suit of the plaintiff was dismissed by the trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 24.11.2010 by holding that the agreement of sale by Respondent No. 1 with the plaintiff/proforma respondent was proved and established on the record and the payment of sale consideration by proforma respondent to Respondent No. 1 was also proved, so, burdened the Respondent No. 1 to pay the double amount of sale consideration to proforma respondent for the reason that the suit plot was sold to Respondent No. 2, prior to the institution of suit. Both the plaintiffs (petitioner and the proforma respondent) and Respondent No. 1 filed two separate appeals. The plaintiffs were aggrieved from dismissal of their suit despite the fact that agreement of sale and payment of sale consideration was held to be proved whereas the Respondent No. 1 was aggrieved of fixation of amount of Rs. 1,000,000/- (the double amount of actual sale consideration allegedly received by Respondent No. 1).

Description: A3. The perusal of the judgment and decree dated 11.6.2016 of the Appellate Court would reflect that the learned Judge without application of his judicial and independent mind dismissed both the appeals in a cursory manner, specially the appeal of Respondent No. 1 as the payment of sale consideration was not proved by proforma respondent in accordance with the Law and despite this important fact burdened the Respondent No. 1 to pay back the double amount of the sale consideration to porforma respondent.

4. Both the plaintiffs filed civil revision before the Islamabad High Court by questioning the dismissal of their suit for specific performance whereas the Respondent No. 1 did not question the findings of the Appellate Court though the same were against the facts and the record of the case. Perusal of the impugned judgment would reflect that the learned Judge-in-Chambers of the High Court has fully scanned the entire material and the evidence on the record in presence of both the plaintiffs (plaintiff lA and proforma respondent) and has very rightly observed and held that the proforma respondent has failed to prove the execution of sale agreement with Respondent No. 1 and has also failed to prove the payment of sale consideration to Respondent No. 1 and the suit of proforma respondent was also held to be hopelessly time barred. The learned Judge has dismissed the suit for specific performance in toto. When the suit is held to fail for want of proof and also being barred by time then burdening the Respondent No. 1 with payment, double the sale consideration actually paid, stands automatically set aside. Though such observations and findings are missing specifically in the judgment impugned herein but it is manifest that when the suit is dismissed in toto, the penalty of double payment also get buried with the suit. Such findings of the High Court, visibly against the proforma respondent, have not been challenged by him which means that the same have attained finality between the parties. So, the proforma respondent, after the findings of the High Court, cannot claim the payment of double sale consideration from Respondent No. 1. If already received, he is bound to repay the same to Respondent No. 1. We, in the peculiar circumstances of the case can clarify the judgment impugned before us just to do complete justice between the parties within the contemplation of Article 187 of the Constitution.

Description: DDescription: CDescription: B5. The status, as apparent from the record, of the present petitioner is the subsequent purchaser of the suit plot from proforma respondent and the success of the petitioner is dependent on the success of proforma respondent. Evidence on the record, led by the proforma respondent, reflects that he bitterly failed to prove the proper execution of the agreement and payment of sale consideration and this very fact has also been admitted by him in his cross­ examination. The trial Court and the Appellate was absolutely wrong in their perception by holding that the agreement of sale and payment of sale consideration has been proved by the proforma respondent. Besides the above, the proforma respondent filed his suit on 1st September, 2006 against an alleged sale agreement dated 19.6.1997, after more than nine years which was hopelessly barred by time and he failed to give any plausible reason for this delay in filing his suit. The Courts below, the trial Court and the Appellate Court failed to give any finding on Issue No. 5 regarding limitation and dealt with this issue in a cursory manner. The record further reflects that the suit plot was lawfully transferred in the name of Respondent No. 2 and the same was accordingly incorporated in his name in the record of Respondent No. 3. The present petitioner, falling in the steps of proforma respondent, cannot question the allotment or its sale to Respondent No. 2 and she, as such, has no cause of action and locus standi in this


regard. Hence, this petition being meritless is dismissed as such and leave refused.

(Y.A.)  Petition dismissed

-In a suit for possession under S.9 of Specific Relief Act, 1877, the plaintiff has to establish at trial: firstly, that he was in possession of specific immovable property; secondly, that he was dispossessed by the defendant; thirdly, that he was dispossessed without his consent and not in accordance with law; and fourthly, that such dispossession took place within a period of six months prior to the institution of the suit.

 2022 Y L R 76
[Lahore (Multan Bench)]
MOHAMMAD HANIF and 4 others
Versus
ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, VEHARI and 2 others

(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---
----O. VI, R. 17---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S. 9---Pleadings, amendment of---Respondents' suit for possession was decreed by Trial Court---First Information Report was also launched by respondent regarding illegal dispossession---Petitioners filed revision petition---Respondent filed application for amendment of the plaint during the pendency of civil revision which was allowed by revisional Court---Revision petition was dismissed---Validity---None of the marginal witnesses of the alleged agreements to sell entered appearance in the witness box which was basic requirement of Art. 79 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984---As per Jamabandi, suit property was owned by Government of the Punjab and the revenue record depicted that the petitioners, and not the respondents, were recorded as illegal occupants thereof---No other revenue document was there to suggest that respondent ever remained in possession---Respondent took stance in the application that while institution the suit, he appended jamabandi regarding suit property in a specific khasra---Said assertion was not established through any document---Respondent had instituted suit regarding property falling in another khasra and categorically deposed the same while being cross-examined, he could not summarily be allowed to amend the plaint to incorporate a different description of suit property i.e., one falling in specific khasra---Courts below had given weightage to FIR lodged by the respondent ignoring altogether other documentary evidence including the criminal proceedings initiated by the respondent against the petitioners---Except the said FIR, nothing had been brought on record by the respondent in support of his stance regarding his possession or dispossession by the petitioner---Plaintiff/respondent had to stand on his own legs to prove his case---Revisional court had erred in allowing the amendment of the plaint followed by the amendment in the decree, particularly when the respondent had failed to establish basic ingredients of S.9 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877---High Court allowed the Constitutional petition and directed the office to transmit the copy of the present judgment to the relevant authorities for safeguarding the interest of the Government qua the suit property.
(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---
---O. VI, R. 17---Pleadings, amended of---Legislature had empowered the court to allow the amendment of pleadings at any stage of the proceedings, but such discretion was not unfettered/unrestricted as it was imperative that the amendment of the pleadings might be allowed in just manner/terms---Amendment might not be allowed when it was likely to change the nature of the suit /cause of action---Amendment was also not permissible where, on account of omission to raise a plea in the pleadings, a valid right was accrued to the opposite party.
(c) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--
----S.9---Suit for possession---Essentials---In a suit for possession under S.9 of Specific Relief Act, 1877, the plaintiff has to establish at trial: firstly, that he was in possession of specific immovable property; secondly, that he was dispossessed by the defendant; thirdly, that he was dispossessed without his consent and not in accordance with law; and fourthly, that such dispossession took place within a period of six months prior to the institution of the suit.

عدالت پرچہ ڈگری تیار کرنے کی پابند ھے اور پرچہ ڈگری تیار کرنے کی کوئی معیاد نہ ھے

 2022 MLD 1203

Court has to draw up a decree sheet and no limitation has been provided for drawing up such a decree sheet. It is a settled proposition of law that no person shall suffer for the act or omission or neglect of the court, or its officials, and the act of court shall not prejudice anyone.
It is not a part of the duty of a litigant to remind the court or its office about its obligation to draw up a decree after the judgment is announced in any suit. No one can deny that it was the duty of the Court to prepare and complete the decree sheet in line with its judgment. If it fails to perform its duty, was it fair to punish a party for default of the Court.
This Court while dealing with a similar type of situation declared that the court needed to draw up a decree sheet and the omission or neglect on the part of the court in the performance of its statutory duties cannot be taken as a ground for penalizing the party.
Furthermore, no time limit having been provided under Order XX Rule 7 of the CPC for preparation or signing of a decree after the pronouncement of a judgment, as it prescribes duty that the formal decree made out in a case should bear the date of judgment. However, the preparation of a decree is a ministerial act, the date of the signing of the decree remains uncertain. The august Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that limitation under Article 156 for filing an appeal runs from the signing of the decree and period elapsing between announcing of judgment and signing of decree to be accommodated.
Mere technicalities cannot defeat the rights of any person, although certain technicalities of law, where right is vested in the opposite party by efflux of time or where public policy demands so, may become relevant, however, the same cannot be given any preference by defeating the ends of justice, depriving a party of substantive rights, which accrued to it under the law and principle of justice.

-Ss. 39, 42 & 54--Exchange of Property--Dismissal of suit for declaration cancellation of mutation entries and permanent injunction-

 PLJ 2022 Quetta 7

Specific Relief Act, 1877 (I of 1877)--

----Ss. 39, 42 & 54--Exchange of Property--Dismissal of suit for declaration cancellation of mutation entries and permanent injunction-Acceptance of appeal--Non-production of oral or documentary evidence regarding fraudulently mutation entries--Silence of agreement regarding description of property and mutation numbers--No cause of action--Challenge to--Nothing specifically was brought on record through any oral or documentary evidence to suggest that mutation entries in question have fraudulently been carried out by petitioners in their favour--Witnesses have not mentioned a single word with regard to fraudulent transfer of disputed property--Agreement is silent with regard to description of property, its mutation numbers etc, thus does not disclose any cause of action in favour of plaintiffs--Defendants produced as many as ten (10) witnesses and also recorded statement of their attorney and all of them deposed possession of cultivation of defendants--Defendant Nos. 3 to 6 remained alive for more than twenty (20) years after transfer of property in question in revenue record, but they kept silent, even plaintiffs and Defendant Nos. 3 to 6 also kept mum since long
time--Respondent have Failed to prove their case through confidence inspiring evidence, main issue No. 3 has been resolved against plaintiffs they have failed to prove issue--It is now well settled principle of law that lacunas of defendants cannot be extended in favour of plaintiffs--Revision petition allowed.

                                                       [Pp. 10, 12 & 15] A, B, C, D, E & F

2013 SCMR 299 ref.

Mr. Shams-ud-Din Achakzai, Advocate for Petitioners.

Mr. Masoom Khan Kakar, Advocate for Respondents.

Mr. Saifullah Sanjarani, Assistant A.G. for State.

Date of hearing: 6.10.2020.


 PLJ 2022 Quetta 7
Present: Abdullah Baloch, J.
ABDUL GHAFFAR and others--Petitioners
versus
SHINKO and others--Respondents
C.R. No. 46 of 2012, decided on 23.10.2020.


Judgment

This petition is directed against the judgment & decree dated 18th February 2012 (hereinafter referred as “the impugned judgment & decree”) passed by learned District Judge, Zhob (hereinafter referred as “the appellate Court”) whereby the appeal filed by the respondents was allowed and the suit of plaintiffs was decreed against the petitioners and the judgment & decree dated 25th November 2011 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Zhob (hereinafter referred as “the trial Court”) was set aside.

2. Brief facts of the case are that the respondents/plaintiffs filed a suit Declaration, Cancellation of Mutation Entries and Permanent injunction against the petitioners/defendants in the trial Court with the averments that they were owner of land bearing Khata No. 172, Kathooni No. 192/193, Khasra No. 41-42 total 83 rod and 20 pole at Meena Bazar was exchanged with the father of defendant” Nos. 3 to 6 and possession was given to them. In exchange of that they got possession of a piece of land bearing Khata No. 165, Kathooni No. 185 Khasra No. 4 rod 428 and 18 pole from the father of Defendant Nos. 3 to 6 and the said piece of land was registered in the name of father of Defendant Nos. 3 to 6, but defendant/Petitioner Nos. 1 & 2 with collaboration of revenue staff fraudulently transferred the land in question in their name through fake sale deed and documents.

3. The suit was contested by the petitioners/defendants by means of filing written statements. After framing issues and recording evidence pro & contra, the learned trial Court dismissed the suit filed by the respondents/plaintiffs vide judgment & decree dated 25th November 2011.

4. Being aggrieved, the respondents/appellants assailed the judgment & decree of the learned trial Court before the learned appellate Court and the appeal of the respondents/appellants was accepted and the suit was decreed in their favour, vide impugned judgment & decree as mentioned hereinabove in Para No. 1. Whereafter the instant Civil Revision Petition has been filed.

5. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record, which reveals that the plaintiffs elucidated that they have exchanged a piece of land having Khata No. 172, Kathooni No. 192/193, Khasra No. 41-42 total 83 rod and 20 pole at Meena Bazar with the father of Defendant Nos. 3 to 6 and given possession of the same to them. In exchange of that they got the possession of a piece of land bearing Khata No. 165, Kathooni No. 185 Khasra No. 4 rod 428 and 18 pole from the father of Defendant Nos. 3 to 6, but the by petitioners/Defendant Nos. I & 2 with collaboration of revenue staff fraudulently transferred the land in question in their name through fake sale deed and documents.

6. On the other hand, the petitioners/Defendant Nos. 1 & 2 vehemently denied the claim of the plaintiffs/respondents, while Defendant Nos. 3 to 6 conceded the claim of the plaintiffs. Out of the pleadings, the learned trial Court framed the following issues:

“1.      Whether no cause of action accrued to plaintiffs’ side to file’ instant suit against the defendants?

2.       Whether the suit is not maintainable by virtue of less Court fee, jurisdiction and time limitations, as mentioned in legal Objections 1, 2, 3 of written statement of the Defendant's No. 1 to 2?

3.       Whether Defendants’ No. 1 to 2 illegally and fraudulently through misrepresentation mutated property in dispute?

4.       Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for relief claimed?

5.       Relief?”

7. The entire case of the parties revolved around the Issue No. 3 that “Whether Defendants No. 1 to 2 illegally and fraudulently through misrepresentation mutated property in dispute?” in support of their claim the plaintiffs/Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 produced as many eleven (11) PWs and also the attorney of the plaintiffs recorded his statement. The reprisal of entire evidence reflects that nothing specifically was brought on record through any oral or documentary evidence to suggest that the mutation entries in question have fraudulently been carried out by the defendants/petitioners in their favour in this regard PW-1 Musa Kalim, PW-2 Mulla Iran, PW-Shakar Din who have brought on record an unregistered stamp paper as Ex.P/3-A, which suggests that their parents 35 years ago sell and exchanged the property in question, but however, it is pertinent to mention here that this agreement was carried out on 25th August 2006 by the plaintiffs and Defendant Nos. 3 to 6, even these witnesses have not mentioned a single word with regard to fraudulent transfer of the disputed property, while PW-4 Ayaz Khan is also one of the signatory of Ex.P/3-A and he has also did not depose a single word with regard to fraudulent transfer and mutation. Likewise, PW-5 Saeedullah, PW-6 Haji Sharaf Khan, PW-7 Juma Khan, PW-8 Abdullah Shah, PW-9 Muhammad Ismail and PW-11 Dost Muhammad, Record Keeper, Tehsil office Zhob he has produced Fard-e-Haqqiyat as Ex. P/11-A, which was correct according to their record during cross examination in reply of Question No. 2 he stated that:

Description: ADescription: B"یہ درست ہے کہ EXP/11-A پر ظاہر شاہ کے نام پر کٹ کے نشان ہے ملاحضہ کیا گیا ظاہر شاہ کے نام پر بال پن سے کٹ کے نشان پایا گیا۔"

In reply of Question No. 3 he deposed that:

"یہ درست ہے کہ EXP/11-D کھاتہ کھتونی نمبر اور تاریخ درج نہ ہے۔

And specifically In reply of Question No. 4 he replied that:

"یہ درست ہے کہ درخواست  EXP/11-D میں خرید و فروخت کا ذکر بھی نہ ہے۔

In reply of Question No. 5 he answered that:

"یہ درست ہے کہ جس اراضی کو ہم کسی دوسرے شخص کے نام انتقال کرانا مقصود ہو تو اسکے لئے تصدیق و شناخت کنندہ کا ہونا یعنی اسکا دستخط ضروری ہے۔

In reply of Question No. 6 he stated that:

"یہ درست ہے کہ EXP/11-A میں تصدیق کنندہ میں ملک فتح محمد ولد بلو کے دستخط ہے۔

In reply of Question No. 7 he replied that:

"یہ درست ہے کہ EXP/11-A کے مطابق انتقال 1990 میں ہو چکا ہے۔

In reply of Question No. 10 he deposed that:

"یہ درست ہے کہ EXP/11-A کے مطابق چھ حصہ داران میں سے ہر حصہ دار کے حصہ میں تقریباً ساڑھے بیس ایکڑ زمین آتی ہے۔

In reply of Question No. 11 he stated:

"یہ درست ہے کہ پیش کردہ دستاویزات بالکل اصل ہے۔

In reply of Question No. 12 he answered that:

"یہ درست ہے کہ کوئی جعلی کاروائی دستاویزات میں نہ ہوئی ہے۔

On 10th September 2011 once again the PW-11 was called for cross examination of respondents/Defendant Nos. 3 to 6, wherein in reply of Question No. 1 he stated that:

"یہ درست ہے کہ EXP/11-A انتقال پر ظاہر شاہ کا دستخط ہے لیکن وہ قلم سے کاٹا گیا ہے۔ اور ساتھ ہی اکبر علی کادستخط ہے۔

In reply of Question No. 2 he replied that:

"مجھے علم نہ ہے کہ اکبر علی پڑھا لکھا نہ تھا اور دستخط نہ کر سکتا تھا اور انگھوٹا لگاتاتھا۔

8. The attorney of plaintiffs Shinko son of Majeed, while recording his statement, stated that their elders have exchanged the land bearing Khasra Nos. 41-42 30-35 years ago with one Akbar Ali the predecessor of Defendant Nos. 3 to 6, while he asked the sons of Akbar Ali in the year 2006 to get effect proper transfer of land in question, however, in the year 2007 they came to know that land in question had fraudulently been transferred in the name of Defendant No. 1 in the year 1990, he also deposed that with regard to exchange of land in question, the plaintiffs along with Defendant Nos. 3 to 6 carried out an agreement in the year 2006 and both the parties admitted the fact that their elders have exchanged the land 30 to 35 years before. In reply of questions he stated that:

ہمارے وہ زمین انتقال والی ہے اور اُس وقت بھی میرے والد کے نام پر ہے۔

میرا والد تقریباً 13، 14 سال پہلے فوت ہوئے ہے۔

یہ درست ہے کہ فتح محمد ولد بلو ہمارے کلی کا ملک ہے۔

یہ درست ہے کہ ملک کو گاوں میں فوتگی وغیرہ یا دیگر کی واقع کا علم ہوتا ہے۔

یہ درست ہے کہ ہمارے علاقے میں تقریباً 50 سال پہلے بندوبست  ہو چکا ہے۔

ہم نے آپنی زمین ابھی تک اکبر علی والوں کے نام پر منتقل نہ کرائی ہے۔ از خود کہا کہ زمین دی ہے لیکن رواج اور اعتبار ایک دوسرے پر ہیں اس وجہ سے منتقل نہ کیا گیا۔

اکبر علی اور میرا والد زمین کے تبادلہ کے بعد اندزاً 20 سال تک زندہ رہیں۔

یہ درست ہے کہ ان 20 سالوں کے دوران میرے اور اکبر علی کے والد کے درمیان کوئی تحریر نہ ہوا از خود کہا کہ ہمارے رواج اعتماد کے وجہ سے نہ کیا۔

یہ درست ہے کہ اکبر علی کے چار بیٹوں کو میں نے بطور گواہ پیش نہ کیا ہے از خود کہا کہ ظاہر شاہ بطور مدعا علیہم شامل ہے۔ یہ غلط ہےکہ ظاہر شاہ اور میں نے مل کر جھوٹا دعویٰ تیار کیا ہے۔

Description: C9. The perusal of entire oral and documentary evidence including the agreement dated 25th August 2006 Ex. P/3-A does not disclose any fraudulent transfer of the property in question by the defendants/petitioners, even if all the agreement dated 25th August 2006 Ex. P/3-A taken into consideration that the elders of the respondents have exchanged the property in question, the agreement is silent with regard to description of the property, its mutation numbers etc, thus does not disclose any cause of action in favour of plaintiffs.

Description: D10. It is pertinent to mention here that the burden of proof of Issue No. 3 was on the shoulders of plaintiffs, which they failed to discharge, however, in rebuttal the defendants also produced as many as ten (10) witnesses and also recorded the statement of their attorney and all of them deposed the possession of cultivation of defendants and mainly one official witness i.e. DW-9 Dost Muhammad, Record Keeper Tehsil Zhob, who produced Intheqal No. 235, Khata Kathooni No. 45/48 and 161/180 as Ex. D/9-A in reply of Question No. 1 he stated that:

یہ درست ہے کہ پیش کردہ انتقال 05/01/2005  کو درج ہوا ہے۔

In reply of Question No. 2 he deposed that:

یہ درست ہے ریکارڈ کے مطابق اکبر علی ولد عطا محمد کا جائیداد ظاہر شاہ، عبد اللہ شاہ، متین شاہ، فواد شاہ کے نام منتقل ہوا ہے جو کہ پسران اکبر علی ہے۔

In reply of Question No. 3 he replied that:

یہ درست ہے کہ کھاتہ کھتونی نمبر 165/185 اکبر علی مذکورہ سے ظاہر شاہ کے نام پر تحریر ہو چکا ہے لیکن بعد میں قلم سے کاٹا گیا ہے۔

11. It is worthwhile to mention here that no question was put to the DWs with regard to fraudulent transfer of the property in question. On the other hand, the respondents/Defendant Nos. 3 to 6 did not produce any witness except the statement of respondent/ Defendant No. 3 Zahir Shah, who deposed that his father has exchanged the property in question bearing Khasra No. 41-42 with the father of Shinko 30-35 years ago and given the possession of exchanged properties to each other, while property in question was fraudulently transferred in the name of plaintiffs in the year 1990. In reply of questions he stated that:

یہ درست ہے کہ نصر اللہ نے میرے اور میرے بھائی کے خلاف قاضی کے عدالت میں ایک دعویٰ دائر کیا تھا۔

یہ درست ہے کہ وہ دعویٰ خسرہ نمبر 41-42 کے اراضیات میں سے تھا از خود کہا کہ ان خسرہ جات میں کئی حصہ دار ہیں۔

یہ درست ہے کہ وہ دعویٰ 09/03/2009 میں ڈگری ہوا تھا۔

یہ درست ہے کہ میں نے اُس ڈگری کے خلاف مجلس شوریٰ میں اپیل کی تھی جو خارج ہوئی اور اب میرے اپیل ہائیکورٹ میں پینڈنگ ہے۔

میں نے داد گل کے کوئٹہ میں فوت ہونے کی بابت کوئی فوتگی سرٹیفکیٹ عدالت میں پیش نہ کیا ہے۔

میرے نام پر کوئی بندوبست شدہ اراضی نہ ہے۔ البتہ میرے والد کے نام پر بندوبستی اراضی ہے۔

یہ درست ہے کہ بندوبست 1968-69 میں ہوا تھا۔

جب ہمارے والدین نے اراضی کا تبادلہ کیا تھا تو اُسوقت بندوبست ہو چکا تھا۔

میرے والدین نے تحصلیدار کو تبادلہ کے حوالے سے زمین ناموں پر ٹرانسفر کرنے کے بابت تحصلیدار کو درخواست نہ دیا تھا۔

میرے والد 1997 میں فوت ہوا۔

یہ درست ہے کہ 1990، 1997 تک میرے والد نے اراضی کے ٹرانسفر ہونے کے حوالے سے کوئی شکایتی درخواست تحصیل وغیرہ میں نہ دیا تھا۔ از خود کہا کہ علم ہی نہیں تھا۔ البتہ شنکو اس وقت بھی زمین کاشت کر رہا تھا۔

یہ غلط ہے کہ فتح محمد ولد بلو ہمارے علاقے کا ملک تھا۔ از خود کہا کہ ہم کلی ابراہیم زئی والوں کا ملک ہاشم ہے۔

یہ درست ہے کہ ملک فتح نے اس اراضی کے انتقال کے تصدیق تحصیل میں کی تھی از خود کہا کہ غلط طور پر کی تھی۔

یہ درست ہے کہ میں نے کوئی گواہ پیش نہ کیا ہے کہ متدعویہ اراضی میرا والد کاشت کرتا تھا از خود کہا کہ میں خود گواہ ہوں کہ ہم اپنے والد کے ساتھ بچپن میں کاشت میں مدد کرتے تھے۔

یہ درست ہے کہ میں نے اپنے والد کا فوتگی سرٹیفکیٹ عدالت پیش نہ کی ہے۔

میں نے تحصیل میں والد کے فوتگی کے بعد جائیداد اپنے نام ٹرانسفر کرنے کے بابت کوئی درخواست نہ دیا تھا۔

12. It is important to mention here that the said witness in cross examination in reply of a question stated that they have carried out an agreement with the plaintiffs in the year 2006, but he has failed to mention a single word in his examination in chief with regard to carrying out any agreement pertaining to the disputed land. He also deposed incorrect that no property of his father has been transferred in his name, while DW-9 Dost Muhammad, Record Keeper of Tehsil Zhob produced Intheqal No. 235 of Khasra No. 41-42 in reply of Question No. 1 stated that:

یہ درست ہے کہ پیش کردہ انتقال 05/01/2005 کو درج ہوا ہے۔

In reply of Question No. 2 he deposed that:

یہ درست ہے ریکارڈ کے مطابق اکبر علی ولد عطا محمد کا جائیداد ظاہر شاہ، عبداللہ شاہ، متین شاہ، فواد شاہ کے نام منتقل ہوا ہے جو کہ پسران اکبر علی ہے۔

13. From the entire reappraisal of evidence produced by the parties, it appears that an attempt made by the plaintiffs and Defendant Nos. 3 to 6 by garb of simple agreement dated 25th August 2006 to usurp the property in dispute, which was not claimed by their elders in their life time as both the predecessors of the plaintiffs and Defendant Nos. 3 to 6 remained alive for more than twenty (20) years after the transfer of property in question in revenue record, but they kept silent, even the plaintiffs and Defendant Nos. 3 to 6 also kept mum since long time. Reliance in this regard is placed in the case of “Muhammad Rustam and others vs. Mst. Makhan Jan and others” 2013 SCMR 299, wherein it was held by the Hon’ble apex Court that:

Description: E“3. Having heard petitioners’ learned counsel at some length, we find that admittedly the impugned mutation of inheritance bearing No. 571 dated 9-7-1927 was never challenged by Mst. Karam Jan; that she remained alive till 1975 and no reason whatsoever is reflected either in the plaint or in the evidence led to indicate as to why she did not challenge the said mutation. It has never been the case of the petitioners that either they or their predecessor-in-interest were unaware of the said mutation. In the afore-referred circumstances, the judgment of the learned High Court is unexceptionable. So far as the precedent case-law to which reference has been made by petitioners’ learned counsel is concerned, the same is distinguishable as in none of the judgments the question of locus standi was a moot point. In Abdul Haq v. Mst. Surraya Begum (2002 SCMR 1330), this Court inter alia was seized of a similar issue and while dismissing the petition, it observed as follows:

             “11. Atta Muhammad was deprived of right to inherit the property as a consequence of mutation in dispute but he did not challenge the same during his life time. The petitioners claimed the property through Atta Muhammad as his heirs who fried the suit as late in 1979 about nine years after the sanction of mutation which had already been given effect to in the record of rights. The petitioners, therefore, had no locus standi to challenge the mutation independently, for Atta Muhammad through whom they claimed inheritance himself had not challenged the same during his lifetime.”

Description: F14. Thus, plaintiffs/respondent have failed to prove their case through confidence inspiring evidence, however, main Issue No. 3 has been resolved against the plaintiffs they have failed to prove the issue. It is now well settled principle of law that the lacunas of defendants cannot be extended in favour of plaintiffs.


For the reasons discussed hereinabove, the petition is accepted the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned appellate Court dated 18th February 2012 is hereby set aside and the judgment & decree dated 25 November 2011 passed by the learned trial Court is hereby maintained.

Parties are directed to bear their own cost.

(Y.A.)  Petition accepted

-Proof---"Reasonable" and "natural gift"---- Principles for ascertaining when the right to sue accrues to a donor or owner of property, to seek a declaration of his ownership right over the property stated.

 2022 S C M R 1009

Gift---
----Proof---"Reasonable" and "natural gift"---In the present case the gift transaction recorded in the impugned gift mutation appeared to be reasonable and natural in the facts and circumstances of the case; where a father (donor), whose son had contracted a second marriage, transferred some of his property to his first daughter-in-law (donee), who also happened to be his niece, and to his granddaughters (donees) to ensure their financial security, out of his love and affection for them---Impugned gift mutation was held to be valid---Appeal was partially allowed.

Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882)---
----S. 54---Agreement to sell and sale mutation---Genuineness and validity---Purported vendee was unable to prove the essential ingredients of the sale transaction and the due sanction of the sale mutation that recorded it---Record showed that there were inconsistencies and clear contradictions in the testimony of the purported vendee's two witnesses on material particulars of the sale transaction and of the sale mutation recording the same in the revenue record---No independent witnesses, in particular, the patwari who entered, and the revenue officer who sanctioned the sale mutation were examined in evidence---In fact, no cogent, reliable evidence was produced by the purported vendee to prove payment of the sale-consideration, the most essential ingredient of a valid sale, to the purported vendor---High Court had rightly found the alleged sale and sale mutation as invalid---

Limitation Act (IX of 1908)---
----First Sched. Art. 120---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S. 42---Right to sue--- Limitation period, commencement of--- Principles for ascertaining when the right to sue accrues to a donor or owner of property, to seek a declaration of his ownership right over the property stated.
Article 120 of First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908 ('the Limitation Act') clearly declares that for computing the limitation, the period of six years would commence from the date of accrual of right to sue, but it does not state when such right accrues. To ascertain, when does the right to sue accrue to a donor, to seek a declaration of his ownership right over the property shown to have been gifted and of his such right not to be affected by the gift mutation, section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 ('the Specific Relief Act") has to be considered.
Joint reading of Article 120 of First Schedule to the Limitation Act and section 42 of the Specific Relief Act shows that right to sue accrues to a person against the other for declaration of his right, as to any property, when the latter denies or is interested to deny his such right. It thus postulates two actions that cause the accrual of right to sue, to an aggrieved person: (i) actual denial of his right or (ii) apprehended or threatened denial of his right.
An important question to consider next was as to what "actions" can be termed as an "actual denial of right", and what a mere "apprehended or threatened denial of right", in the context of adverse entries recorded in the revenue record. It is important to note that a person may ignore an "apprehended or threatened denial" of his right taking it not too serious to dispel that by seeking a declaration of his right through instituting a suit, and may exercise his option to institute the suit, when he feels it necessary to do so, to protect his right. For this reason, every "apprehended or threatened denial" of right gives a fresh cause of action and right to sue to the person aggrieved of such apprehension or threat. However, this option to delay the filing of the suit is not available to him in case of "actual denial" of his right; where if he does not challenge the action ofactual denial of his right, despite having knowledge thereof, by seeking declaration of his right within the limitation period provided in the Limitation Act, then his right to do so becomes barred by law of limitation.
Admittedly, entries in the revenue record do not create or extinguish proprietary rights. Such an entry may at most be termed as a mere "apprehended or threatened denial" of right, and not an "actual denial" of right. Accordingly, every new adverse entry in the revenue record relating to proprietary rights of a person in possession (actual or constructive) of the land regarding which the wrong entry is made, gives to such person, a fresh cause of action to institute the suit for declaration.
The situation is, however, different in a case where the beneficiary of an entry in the revenue record also takes over the possession of the land on the basis of sale or gift transaction, as the case may be, recorded in that entry. His action of taking over possession of the land in pursuance of the purported sale or gift is certainly an "actual denial" of the proprietary rights of the purported seller or donor. Therefore, in such a case, if the purported seller or donor does not challenge that action of "actual denial" of his right, within the prescribed limitation period, despite having knowledge thereof, then his right to do so becomes barred by law of limitation.
Limitation Act (IX of 1908)---
----Ss. 2(, 9 & 18---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VI, R. 4---Fraud---Right to sue---Limitation period, commencement of---Principles relating to commencement of limitation period where a person(or his legal heir)claim to be deprived of the knowledge of his right to sue based on the fraud of the other party stated.
Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1908 ('the Limitation Act") postpones the commencement of the limitation period in cases where a person is by means of fraud kept from the knowledge of his right to institute a suit. In such circumstances, the period of limitation commences from the date when the fraud first became known to the "person injuriously affected". Such injuriously affected person can, therefore, institute a suit within the limitation period specified for such suit in the First Schedule ("Schedule") to the Limitation Act, but computing it from the date when he first had knowledge of the fraud, whereby he was kept from knowledge of his right to institute the suit. Thus, section 18 of Limitation Act is an umbrella provision that makes the limitation period mentioned in the Articles of the Schedule, begin to run from the time different from that specified therein.
The "fraud" stated in section 18 of the Limitation Act must not be confused with the fraud that constitutes cause of action, and creates a right to institute the suit for the relief prayed therein. The "fraud" envisaged in section 18 only relates to concealing, not creating, the right to sue, and thus affects only the limitation period, and has nothing to do with the cause of action and the relief prayed.
When despite obtaining knowledge of such fraud and his right to sue, as mentioned in section 18, the injuriously affected person does not institute the suit within the prescribed limitation period, no fresh period of limitation can be available to his legal heir(s) or any other person who derives his right to sue from or through him (the injuriously affected person); for once the limitation period begins to run, it does not stop as per section 9 of the Limitation Act.
Further, the definition of the term "plaintiff", as given in section 2(
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of the Limitation Act also has the effect of barring the fresh start of the limitation period for the legal heir(s) or any other person, who derives his right to sue from or through such injuriously affected person, as it provides that "plaintiff" includes any person from or through whom a plaintiff derives his right to sue.
Therefore, it is the date of knowledge of the "person injuriously affected" of the fraud mentioned in section 18, and of his right to sue that is relevant for computing the limitation period, not of his legal heir(s), unless he asserts and prove that his predecessor (the person injuriously affected) never came to know of the fraud, whereby his right to institute the suit was concealed, in his lifetime; in the latter eventuality, it is, of course, the knowledge of the present plaintiff (his successor) that would be the starting point for the limitation to run.
A plaintiff who wants to avail the benefit of section 18 of the Limitation Act must assert the commission of such fraud by the defendant, in the plaint, and should also give the particulars thereof, and the date of knowledge, as required under Rule 4 of Order VI of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and then prove the same through positive evidence.

Limitation Act (IX of 1908)---
----S. 18 & First Sched., Art. 120---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S. 42---Gift mutation---Suit for declaration challenging a gift mutation on grounds of fraud---Limitation period, commencement of---Scope---Date of knowledge of donor and not of his legal heir as the starting point for computing period of limitation---In the present case, bar of limitation applied to the challenge made by the respondent to the gift mutation of 1977 after a period of 32 years---Respondent was claiming his right over the suit property based on his inheritance from the estate of his father, and challenged the gift mutation, essentially on the ground that the same was the result of fraud, and asserted that he gained knowledge thereof some days before the institution of the suit---However, neither in the plaint nor in the evidence, did the respondent assert that his father, the purported donor, who remained alive for about 23 years after sanction of the gift mutation, was not aware of the gift mutation and thus could not challenge the same during his lifetime---Such omission on the part of the respondent, was crucial and in fact, defeated the very legal basis upon which he could have saved his claim from the bar of limitation---In the present case, the "person injuriously affected" by the alleged fraud (if it were committed) in getting the gift mutation sanctioned was the respondent's father(the purported donor)---Respondent derived his right to institute the suit to challenge the gift mutation from his father, being his legal heir, therefore, it was the date of the knowledge of his father, not of the respondent that was the starting point for computing the limitation period of six years provided in Article 120 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908 - the residuary Article applicable to suits instituted, under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act 1877 for declaration of any right as to any property---Furthermore the respondent (plaintiff) did not assert in the plaint that the appellants (defendants), by means of fraud, kept, his father (the person injuriously affected) from the knowledge of his right to institute the suit to challenge the gift mutation, during his life, nor did he give the particulars thereof---Respondent (plaintiff) did not assert any such fraud of the appellants even against himself, and give any date of his attaining knowledge of such fraud and his right to institute the suit---Therefore, the benefit of section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1908 for computing the limitation period for instituting the suit to challenge the gift mutation could not be extended to the respondent (plaintiff)---Appeal was partially allowed.
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