--Respondent-plaintiff filed suit for declaration and injunction in which he claimed to be owner in possession of suit land on the basis of an agreement to sell--

 2022 C L C 563

(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---
----O.VII, R.1---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Arts. 117 & 120---Pleadings---Proof---Onus to prove---Plaintiff, in order to succeed, has to stand on his own legs---Imperative for plaintiff to prove his case independently and without merely getting any support or flaws/lapses, if any, of his adversary.
(b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)---
----S.3 Arts.113 & 120---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 42 & 54---Limitation, determination of---Jurisdiction of Court---Respondent-plaintiff filed suit for declaration and injunction in which he claimed to be owner in possession of suit land on the basis of an agreement to sell---Suit filed by respondent-plaintiff was dismissed by Trial Court but Lower Appellate Court decreed the same in his favour---Validity---Lower Appellate Court failed to consider that on the basis of some agreement, suit for declaration was not maintainable---To seek decree for its specific performance, period of only three years per Art.113 of Limitation Act, 1908, was available to institute the suit---Agreement in question was settled on 22-3-1995 and suit for specific performance on its strength could be filed till 21-3-1998, whereas while stretching it to accord decree for declaration Court was bound to satisfy that suit per Art. 120 of Limitation Act, 1908, was instituted within six years--- Suit was filed on 22-04-2002 after more than seven years and Lower Appellate Court did not attend such aspect--- As per mandate of S. 3 of Limitation Act, 1908, Lower Appellate Court was under obligation to scrutinize the plaint, application and appeal on the point of limitation regardless of the fact that the point of limitation was agitated by either party or not--- High Court set aside judgment and decree passed by Lower Appellate Court and restored that of Trial Court---Second appeal was allowed, in circumstances.

--Interim relief ---Scope---Petitioner filed constitutional petition challenging the action of the respondents in taking over the land situated at old Walton Airport (Lahore) owned by Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) in an illegal manner--

 2022 CLC 532

Art.199---Constitutional petition---Judicial restraint---Policy decision by Government---Interim relief ---Scope---Petitioner filed constitutional petition challenging the action of the respondents in taking over the land situated at old Walton Airport (Lahore) owned by Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) in an illegal manner---Validity---In the absence of any glaring illegality or violation of fundamental rights, it was imperative that the Courts should exercise judicial restraint from passing any adverse order, which could potentially hinder or nullify any government initiative to encourage and promote the investment process because judicial restraint encouraged the judges to exercise their powers with restraint and wisdom and limit the exercise of their own powers while intervening in the matters relating to policy of the government having financial perspective and outcome and exercise---High Court observed that without there being any obvious illegality and deviation from law, any interference by the Court within the purview of Art.199 of the Constitution would badly hamper the initiatives to enhance business activities and would put the whole scheme of actions for promotion of business and trade for the public, a fundamental right provided under Art.18 of the Constitution, to a standstill---Under Art.199 of the Constitution, High Court was though competent to exercise power of judicial review to examine administrative actions from the touchstone of violation of law and breach of Constitution yet the power of judicial review was regulated by the principles of Judicial Restraint---Interim relief , in writ petition, could only be granted as per mandate of Art.199(4) of the Constitution where it was clearly stated that under writ jurisdiction, before making an interim order, the Court had to look into the public interest which should not be harmed/hampered in any manner, therefore, keeping in view the fact that the petitioner had failed to make out a prima facie case in his favour and balance of convenience was not tilted in favour for grant of interim relief ---Application for grant of interim relief was dismissed, in circumstances

S.12(2)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.10 A---Decree on basis of compromise---Application of petitioner for setting aside decree on basis of fraud was dismissed by appellate/decreeing Court without framing issues/recording evidence-

 2022 CLC 404

S.12(2)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.10 A---Decree on basis of compromise---Application of petitioner for setting aside decree on basis of fraud was dismissed by appellate/decreeing Court without framing issues/recording evidence---Power of attorney on behalf of petitioner/applicant was available on record---Petitioner's contention that he never appointed the attorney as counsel nor any power of attorney was executed in his favour; that alleged power of attorney did not reflect any sign/stamp; and that petitioner/applicant was not given opportunity of hearing---Validity---Application under S.12(2) of Civil Procedure Code needed framing of issues and recording of evidence---Application elaborated that counsel who agreed to appoint referee for obtaining his decision regarding dispute pending before Court and consequential decree on basis of the same decision of referee was without their consent---Statement of such counsel was without any lawful authority---For determination of such fraud/misrepresentation framing of issue and recording of evidence were essential/obligatory for providing opportunity to the parties to prove the factual dispute---Revision petition was accepted and case was remanded for re-adjudication after framing issues and recording evidence.
Art.10 A---Right of hearing of a party to lis was one of the fundamental principles of jurisprudence which is guaranteed by Art.10 A of the Constitution in its assurance of a "fair trial and due process" to a litigant

--𝑮𝒊𝒇𝒕---𝑮𝒊𝒇𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚---𝑺𝒄𝒐𝒑𝒆---𝑷𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇𝒔 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝒊𝒏 𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒆 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝒂𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒂𝒕𝒉 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒑𝒂𝒍 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒚 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒆𝒂𝒕𝒉 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒑𝒂𝒍--

 đ‘ˇđ‘łđ‘Ť 2016 𝑳𝒂𝒉𝒐𝒓𝒆 287

𝑰𝒔𝒍𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒄 𝒍𝒂𝒘---
----𝑮𝒊𝒇𝒕---𝑮𝒊𝒇𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚---𝑺𝒄𝒐𝒑𝒆---𝑷𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇𝒔 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝒊𝒏 𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒆 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝒂𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒂𝒕𝒉 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒑𝒂𝒍 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒚 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒆𝒂𝒕𝒉 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒑𝒂𝒍---𝑺𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇𝒔 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑻𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒃𝒖𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒖𝒕 𝒃𝒐𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝑻𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕---𝑽𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒚---𝑮𝒊𝒇𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒂 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒃𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒘𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒏𝒍𝒚---𝑾𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒑𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒊𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒅𝒐𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝒅𝒖𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒍𝒐𝒗𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏---𝑨𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒏𝒐 𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒏 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒘𝒏 𝒃𝒆𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒇---𝑨𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒖𝒔𝒆 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒑𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒏𝒍𝒚 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒇𝒆𝒓 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒑𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕 𝒅𝒆𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒓 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕 𝒎𝒖𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒑𝒂𝒍 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕---𝑷𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒑𝒂𝒍, 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆, 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝒃𝒖𝒕 𝒉𝒆 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕 𝒅𝒆𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒂𝒗𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒃𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒑𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚---𝑻𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒇𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝒊𝒏 𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒂𝒗𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕 𝒐𝒏 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒘𝒏 𝒃𝒆𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒇 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒂𝒘---𝑵𝒐 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕 𝒅𝒆𝒆𝒅 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒆 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒑𝒂𝒍---𝑨𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒈𝒆𝒕 𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒑𝒂𝒍 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒇𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒂𝒗𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒘𝒏 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓---𝑵𝒐 𝒔𝒖𝒄𝒉 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒈𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒇𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒂𝒗𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒏𝒆𝒂𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆---𝑮𝒊𝒇𝒕 𝒅𝒆𝒆𝒅 𝒆𝒙𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒖𝒍𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒚𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒂𝒘---𝑰𝒏𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒓𝒚 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒊𝒏𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒓𝒚 𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒖𝒕𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒆𝒂𝒕𝒉 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒑𝒂𝒍---𝑭𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑻𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒆𝒂𝒕𝒉 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒑𝒂𝒍 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒉𝒆𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒗𝒆---𝑺𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒍𝒚 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑻𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒔𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒚𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒂𝒘---𝑰𝒎𝒑𝒖𝒈𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒔 𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒔𝒆𝒕 𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒐𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝑻𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒅---𝑺𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒖𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇𝒔 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒄𝒐𝒔𝒕𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒕 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒄𝒐𝒔𝒕𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒕---𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒔 𝒘𝒆𝒍𝒍 𝒂𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒄𝒊𝒓𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒔.
𝑴𝒂𝒉𝒐𝒎𝒎𝒆𝒅𝒂𝒏 𝑳𝒂𝒘 𝒃𝒚 𝑫.𝑭. 𝑴𝒖𝒍𝒍𝒂, 𝒑𝒑. 138 𝒂𝒏𝒅 149; 𝑨𝒎𝒏𝒂 𝑹𝒂𝒏𝒊 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒗. 𝑨𝒔𝒉𝒇𝒂𝒒 𝑨𝒉𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔 2008 𝑺𝑪𝑴𝑹 805; 𝑯𝒂𝒋𝒊 𝑭𝒂𝒒𝒊𝒓 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒗. 𝑷𝒊𝒓 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 1997 𝑺𝑪𝑴𝑹 1811; 𝑴𝒔𝒕. 𝑺𝒉𝒖𝒎𝒂𝒍 𝑩𝒆𝒈𝒖𝒎 𝒗. 𝑴𝒔𝒕. 𝑮𝒖𝒍𝒛𝒂𝒓 𝑩𝒆𝒈𝒖𝒎 𝒂𝒏𝒅 3 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔 1994 𝑺𝑪𝑴𝑹 818 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑭𝒊𝒅𝒂 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝒗. 𝑷𝒊𝒓 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑲𝒉𝒂𝒏 (𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒅) 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝑳𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒍 𝑯𝒆𝒊𝒓𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝑷𝑳𝑫 1985 𝑺𝑪 341 𝒓𝒆𝒍.
𝑴𝒊𝒂𝒏 𝑯𝒂𝒎𝒆𝒆𝒅-𝒖𝒅-𝑫𝒊𝒏 𝑲𝒂𝒔𝒖𝒓𝒊 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕.
𝑨𝒛𝒉𝒂𝒓 𝑴𝒂𝒒𝒃𝒐𝒐𝒍 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒉 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔.
𝑫𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈: 25𝒕𝒉 𝒂𝒏𝒅 29𝒕𝒉 𝑨𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒍, 2014.

 đ‘ˇđ‘łđ‘Ť 2016 𝑳𝒂𝒉𝒐𝒓𝒆 287
𝑩𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝑨𝒎𝒊𝒏-𝒖𝒅-𝑫𝒊𝒏 𝑲𝒉𝒂𝒏, 𝑱
𝑴𝒔𝒕. 𝑩𝑼𝑫𝑯𝑨𝑰 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝑳𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒍 𝑯𝒆𝒊𝒓𝒔---𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕
𝑽𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒖𝒔
𝑮𝑯𝑼𝑳𝑨𝑴 𝑴𝑼𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑭𝑨 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔---𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔
𝑹.𝑺.𝑨. 𝑵𝒐.54 𝒐𝒇 1997, 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 29𝒕𝒉 𝑨𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒍, 2014.


𝑱𝑼𝑫𝑮𝑴𝑬𝑵𝑻
𝑨𝑴𝑰𝑵-𝑼𝑫-𝑫𝑰𝑵 𝑲𝑯𝑨𝑵, 𝑱. 𝑻𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒍𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒅𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒗𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑹.𝑺.𝑨.𝑵𝒐.54 𝒐𝒇 1997 𝒂𝒔 𝒘𝒆𝒍𝒍 𝒂𝒔 𝑪𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍 𝑹𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑵𝒐.1712 𝒐𝒇 1997, 𝒂𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒎𝒐𝒏 𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒂𝒘 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒊𝒏𝒗𝒐𝒍𝒗𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒃𝒐𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒔.
2. 𝑻𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒖𝒍𝒂𝒓 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍, 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕-𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 21.06.1997 𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑨𝒅𝒅𝒍: 𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒕 𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆, 𝑶𝒌𝒂𝒓𝒂, 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔-𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕𝒆𝒅, 𝒃𝒚 𝒘𝒂𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉, 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 29.01.1995 𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑪𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍 𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆 1𝒔𝒕 𝑪𝒍𝒂𝒔𝒔, 𝑶𝒌𝒂𝒓𝒂 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕-𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒔𝒆𝒕 𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆.
3. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒔 𝒂𝒔 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒔-𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇𝒔 𝑴𝒔𝒕. 𝑩𝒖𝒅𝒉𝒂𝒊, 𝑴𝒔𝒕. 𝑴𝒂𝒓𝒚𝒊𝒎 𝒅𝒂𝒖𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝑪𝒉𝒂𝒘𝒂 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑹𝒂𝒎𝒛𝒂𝒏 𝒔/𝒐 𝑪𝒉𝒂𝒌𝒂𝒓 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒂 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒏 21.06.1976 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒚 𝒃𝒆𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒍 𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝑪𝒉𝒐𝒈𝒉𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒂 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒅, 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇 𝑵𝒐.1 𝒃𝒆𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒔𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒔 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒍𝒆𝒅 1/2 𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆, 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇 𝑵𝒐.2 1/6 𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒃𝒆𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒖𝒊𝒏𝒆 𝒔𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇 𝑵𝒐.3 𝒊𝒔 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 1/27 𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆. 𝑻𝒉𝒆𝒚 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒅 𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕 𝒅𝒆𝒆𝒅 𝑵𝒐.3438 𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 04.12.1975 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒎𝒖𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑵𝒐.54, 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 19.12.1975 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒃𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕 𝒅𝒆𝒆𝒅. 𝑰𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒖𝒍𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒇𝒓𝒂𝒖𝒅, 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒖𝒆 𝒊𝒏𝒇𝒍𝒖𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒏𝒖𝒍𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒚𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒂𝒘. 𝑻𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒖𝒔 𝑪𝒉𝒐𝒈𝒉𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒂 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒃𝒓𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇 𝑵𝒐.1 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒖𝒊𝒏𝒆 𝒃𝒓𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇 𝑵𝒐.2. 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑹𝒂𝒎𝒛𝒂𝒏 𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝑪𝒉𝒂𝒌𝒂𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒈𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝑪𝒉𝒂𝒌𝒂𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑪𝒉𝒂𝒘𝒂 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝑵𝒂𝒘𝒂𝒃, 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇𝒔 𝒊𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.1 𝑮𝒉𝒖𝒍𝒂𝒎 𝑴𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒇𝒂 𝒊𝒔 𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.2 𝑾𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒚𝒂𝒎, 𝒘𝒉𝒐 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒂 𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒖𝒑𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒅. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒖𝒏𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒅, 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒏𝒐 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒉𝒊𝒎. 𝑯𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒐𝒍𝒅 𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒂𝒔 𝒘𝒆𝒍𝒍 𝒂𝒔 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒄𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒏𝒊𝒄 𝒑𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒕, 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆, 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒖𝒆 𝒊𝒏𝒇𝒍𝒖𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.1 𝒂𝒏𝒅 2. 𝑰𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒅𝒖𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒖𝒆 𝒊𝒏𝒇𝒍𝒖𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒂 𝒑𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒈𝒐𝒕 𝒆𝒙𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒂𝒗𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.1 𝒐𝒏 02.10.1973 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝒃𝒖𝒕 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒉𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒍𝒚 𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒔𝒂𝒍𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.1 𝒂𝒔 𝑨𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝒕𝒐 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒘𝒏 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒊.𝒆. 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.2 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕 𝒅𝒆𝒆𝒅-𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 04.12.1975 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒎𝒖𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑵𝒐.54 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒃𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒔𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 19.12.1975. 𝑭𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒉𝒐𝒈𝒉𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒂 𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒘𝒂𝒚 𝒐𝒏 25.11.1975 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒂𝒕𝒉 𝒐𝒇 𝑷𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒑𝒂𝒍 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑨𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒇𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒊𝒇𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝑷𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒑𝒂𝒍 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑨𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝑷𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒑𝒂𝒍, 𝒕𝒐 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒘𝒏 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓.
4. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒘𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒏 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒅. 𝑳𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒇𝒓𝒂𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒊𝒏𝒗𝒊𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆. 𝑩𝒐𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒂𝒅𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒓𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒔 𝒘𝒆𝒍𝒍 𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒐𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒔𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓 𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔. 𝑨𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍, 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 29.01.1995 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕. 𝑨𝒏 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔-𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒔𝒕 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕, 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅. 𝑯𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆, 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒖𝒍𝒂𝒓 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍.
5. 𝑻𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍 𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏, 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓-𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝑴𝒔𝒕. 𝑩𝒖𝒅𝒉𝒂𝒊 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 21.06.1997 𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑨𝒅𝒅𝒍: 𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒕 𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆, 𝑶𝒌𝒂𝒓𝒂, 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔-𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇𝒔 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕𝒆𝒅, 𝒃𝒚 𝒘𝒂𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉, 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 29.01.1995 𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑪𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍 𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆 1𝒔𝒕 𝑪𝒍𝒂𝒔𝒔, 𝑶𝒌𝒂𝒓𝒂 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒊𝒏𝒋𝒖𝒏𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔-𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇𝒔, 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒔𝒆𝒕 𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆.
6. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒔 𝒂𝒔 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍 𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒖𝒕𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓, 𝑶𝒌𝒂𝒓𝒂 𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒏 03.08.1987 𝒖𝒑𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒏𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒓𝒚 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒆𝒂𝒕𝒉 𝒐𝒇 𝑪𝒉𝒐𝒈𝒉𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒂 𝒂𝒔 25.11.1975, 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝑮𝒉𝒖𝒍𝒂𝒎 𝑴𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒇𝒂 𝒆𝒕𝒄 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 05.09.1987. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒅. 𝑳𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒇𝒓𝒂𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒊𝒏𝒗𝒊𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆. 𝑩𝒐𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒂𝒅𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒓𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒔 𝒘𝒆𝒍𝒍 𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒐𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆. 𝑽𝒊𝒅𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 29.01.1995 𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅. 𝑨𝒏 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒔𝒕 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕, 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 21.06.1997 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒔𝒆𝒕 𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔-𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇𝒔 𝑮𝒉𝒖𝒍𝒂𝒎 𝑴𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒇𝒂 𝒆𝒕𝒄 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒅. 𝑯𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍 𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏.
7. 𝑳𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒍 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒂𝒔 𝒘𝒆𝒍𝒍 𝒂𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏-𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒂𝒓𝒈𝒖𝒆𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒆𝒙𝒉𝒂𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆, 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒃𝒚 𝒆𝒂𝒄𝒉 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒑𝒐𝒊𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕 𝒂𝒔 𝒘𝒆𝒍𝒍 𝒂𝒔 𝒍𝒂𝒘 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒏𝒐𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕, 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒍𝒂𝒘 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆; 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒔𝒕 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒎𝒆𝒆𝒕 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒘𝒓𝒐𝒏𝒈𝒍𝒚 𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒆, 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆, 𝒑𝒓𝒂𝒚𝒔 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒔𝒕 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕. 𝑰𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒇𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒓𝒈𝒖𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒈𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇-𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓 1976 𝒃𝒖𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒐 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒏𝒈𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅 𝒐𝒇 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒖𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒂𝒕𝒉 𝒐𝒇 𝑪𝒉𝒐𝒈𝒉𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒂 𝒐𝒏 05.09.1987, 𝒂𝒔 𝒔𝒖𝒄𝒉, 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒍𝒚 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒘𝒓𝒐𝒏𝒈𝒍𝒚 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍.
8. 𝑶𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒅, 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒍 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒔𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒔𝒕 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕; 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒃𝒔𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒕𝒆𝒍𝒚 𝒏𝒐 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒔𝒕 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕, 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆, 𝒑𝒓𝒂𝒚𝒔 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒂𝒍 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒔 𝒘𝒆𝒍𝒍 𝒂𝒔 𝒄𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍 𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏.
9. 𝑰 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒉𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒍 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒂𝒕 𝒇𝒖𝒍𝒍 𝒍𝒆𝒏𝒈𝒕𝒉 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒈𝒐𝒏𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒗𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒖𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅 𝒂𝒔 𝒘𝒆𝒍𝒍 𝒂𝒔 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒐𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒘 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒍 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔.
10. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒔 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒊𝒔 𝒂 𝒑𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 2-10-1973, 𝒄𝒐𝒑𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒔 𝑬𝒙.𝑷-1. 𝑶𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒃𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒑𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝑮𝒉𝒖𝒍𝒂𝒎 𝑴𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒇𝒂, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒐𝒘𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝑪𝒉𝒐𝒈𝒉𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒂, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒖𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒂𝒗𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕 𝒅𝒆𝒆𝒅 𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 04.12.1975 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒃𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒑𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚.
11. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒃𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒄 𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒍𝒊𝒔 𝒊𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒂 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒏 𝒘𝒉𝒐𝒔𝒆 𝒇𝒂𝒗𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒊𝒔 𝒂 𝒑𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒊𝒔 𝒑𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒐 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒚, 𝒄𝒂𝒏 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒇𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕 𝒐𝒏 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒘𝒏 𝒃𝒆𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒇 𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒄𝒂𝒏 𝒃𝒆 𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒋𝒖𝒔𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒎 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒊𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒑𝒂𝒍 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒇𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒅𝒆 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒑𝒂𝒍 𝒉𝒊𝒎𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒇 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒔𝒆 𝒑𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒄𝒂𝒏 𝒃𝒆 𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒐 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒕𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅 𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒔 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒂 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒏 𝒘𝒉𝒐𝒔𝒆 𝒇𝒂𝒗𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒊𝒔 𝒂 𝒑𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒇𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒔𝒂𝒍𝒆 𝒐𝒓 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕 𝒄𝒂𝒏 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒇𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒂𝒗𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒏𝒆𝒂𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄 𝒐𝒓 𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒑𝒂𝒍. 𝑻𝒉𝒆𝒔𝒆 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒍 𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔, 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆, 𝑰 𝒘𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒍𝒊𝒌𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒅𝒊𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒖𝒑𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒔𝒆 𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒔𝒕.
12. 𝑻𝒐 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝒎𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒍𝒚 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒏 𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒑𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒊𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍, 𝒊𝒔 𝒅𝒖𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒍𝒐𝒗𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒐𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒆. 𝑭𝒐𝒓 𝒅𝒊𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒖𝒑𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒏𝒆𝒄𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒆𝒗𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝑴𝒐𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒆𝒅𝒂𝒏 𝑳𝒂𝒘 𝒃𝒚 𝑫.𝑭. 𝑴𝒖𝒍𝒍𝒂 𝒊.𝒆. 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.138 𝒂𝒏𝒅 149 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒏𝒆𝒄𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒒𝒖𝒐𝒕𝒆𝒅, 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒂𝒔 𝒇𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒔:
"138. 𝑯𝒊𝒃𝒂 𝒐𝒓 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕: 𝑨 𝒉𝒊𝒃𝒂 𝒐𝒓 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕 𝒊𝒔 "𝒂 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒇𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒚, 𝒎𝒂𝒅𝒆 𝒊𝒎𝒎𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒍𝒚, 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒆𝒙𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆," 𝒃𝒚 𝒐𝒏𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒏𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓, 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒐𝒓 𝒐𝒏 𝒃𝒆𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒇 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒓.
"𝑯𝒊𝒃𝒂" 𝒎𝒆𝒂𝒏𝒔 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒇𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝒊𝒏 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒃𝒚 𝒐𝒏𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒏𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒕 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒊𝒔 𝒂 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒇𝒖𝒍𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒐 𝒎𝒂𝒌𝒆 𝒂 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕 𝒗𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒅."
149. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝑻𝒉𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒂𝒍𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒂 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕: 𝑰𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒗𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒂 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒔𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒃𝒆 (1) 𝒂 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒐𝒏𝒐𝒓, (2) 𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕, 𝒆𝒙𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝒐𝒓 𝒊𝒎𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒅, 𝒃𝒚 𝒐𝒓 𝒐𝒏 𝒃𝒆𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒇 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒆, 𝒂𝒏𝒅 (3) 𝒅𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒐𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒆 𝒂𝒔 𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 150. 𝑰𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒔𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒕𝒆."
𝑰𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒄𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒂 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒄𝒂𝒏 𝒃𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒘𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒏𝒍𝒚. 𝑻𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝒊𝒏 𝒘𝒉𝒐𝒔𝒆 𝒇𝒂𝒗𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒈𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒍 𝒑𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒏 𝒃𝒆 𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒊𝒇 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒎𝒂𝒅𝒆 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒘𝒏𝒆𝒓, 𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝒄𝒂𝒏 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒇𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕, 𝒂𝒔 𝒊𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒑𝒓𝒆-𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒂 𝒗𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒅 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕, 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕 𝒃𝒆 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒐𝒏𝒐𝒓. 𝑰𝒏 𝒎𝒚 𝒗𝒊𝒆𝒘, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝒊𝒏 𝒘𝒉𝒐𝒔𝒆 𝒇𝒂𝒗𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒊𝒔 𝒂 𝒑𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒇𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒐 𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒏 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒘𝒏 𝒃𝒆𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒇. 𝑻𝒉𝒆𝒔𝒆 𝒑𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒄𝒂𝒏 𝒐𝒏𝒍𝒚 𝒃𝒆 𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒑𝒂𝒍 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒐𝒏𝒍𝒚 𝒊𝒏 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒐 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒕𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒇𝒆𝒓 𝒊𝒏 𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒑𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕 𝒅𝒆𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒓 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕 𝒎𝒖𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒄𝒂𝒏 𝒃𝒆 𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒊.𝒆. 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝒐𝒏 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒘𝒏 𝒃𝒆𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒇. 𝑭𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒐𝒓𝒆, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒏𝒍𝒚 𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒊𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑷𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒑𝒂𝒍 𝒊𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕:
𝒅𝒐𝒆𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒔𝒉𝒐𝒘 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒑𝒂𝒍 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒅. 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒑𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒋𝒖𝒔𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒈𝒆𝒕𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈, 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕 𝒅𝒆𝒆𝒅 𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒖𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕 𝒅𝒆𝒆𝒅 𝒔𝒉𝒐𝒘𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝒐𝒏 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒘𝒏 𝒃𝒆𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒇 𝒊𝒔 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒂𝒗𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒊𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒂𝒘 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒏𝒐 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕 𝒅𝒆𝒆𝒅 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒓 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒆 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒐𝒘𝒏𝒆𝒓, 𝒊.𝒆. 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒑𝒂𝒍. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒏𝒐𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒔𝒖𝒑𝒓𝒂 𝒕𝒂𝒌𝒆𝒏 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕 𝒅𝒆𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒔 𝑬𝒙.𝑷.2. 𝒅𝒐𝒆𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒔𝒉𝒐𝒘 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒈𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒇𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒂𝒗𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒏𝒆𝒂𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒏𝒕. 𝑰𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒗𝒊𝒆𝒘 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒓, 𝒈𝒊𝒇𝒕 𝒅𝒆𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒔 𝒏𝒖𝒍𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒚𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒂𝒘 𝒐𝒏 𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒍 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒔.
13. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅 𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝒄𝒂𝒏 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒇𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒑𝒂𝒍 𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒂𝒗𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒘𝒏 𝒏𝒆𝒂𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒑𝒂𝒍. 𝑰𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆, 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅𝒍𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒂𝒗𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒏𝒕/𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚. 𝑰𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒖𝒑𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒏𝒕/𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝒕𝒐 𝒈𝒆𝒕 𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒑𝒂𝒍 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒇𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒑𝒂𝒍'𝒔 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒂𝒗𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒘𝒏 𝒏𝒆𝒂𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒊.𝒆. 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚. 𝑵𝒐 𝒔𝒖𝒄𝒉 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒓 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒊𝒔 𝒏𝒐 𝒔𝒖𝒄𝒉 𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒎𝒑𝒖𝒈𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒅𝒐𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕, 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆, 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒇𝒆𝒓 𝒊𝒔 𝒏𝒖𝒍𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒚𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒂𝒘. 𝑰𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒙𝒕, 𝑰 𝒂𝒎 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒎 𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒏 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒖𝒈𝒖𝒔𝒕 𝑺𝒖𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝑷𝒂𝒌𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒔 "2008 𝑺𝑪𝑴𝑹 805 (𝑨𝒎𝒏𝒂 𝑹𝒂𝒏𝒊 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒗. 𝑨𝒔𝒉𝒇𝒂𝒒 𝑨𝒉𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔), 1997 𝑺𝑪𝑴𝑹 1811 (𝑯𝒂𝒋𝒊 𝑭𝒂𝒒𝒊𝒓 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒗. 𝑷𝒊𝒓 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓), 1994 𝑺𝑪𝑴𝑹 818 (𝑴𝒔𝒕. 𝑺𝒉𝒖𝒎𝒂𝒍 𝑩𝒆𝒈𝒖𝒎 𝒗. 𝑴𝒔𝒕. 𝑮𝒖𝒍𝒛𝒂𝒓 𝑩𝒆𝒈𝒖𝒎 𝒂𝒏𝒅 3 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔) 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑷𝑳𝑫 1985 𝑺𝒖𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 341 (𝑭𝒊𝒅𝒂 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝒗. 𝑷𝒊𝒓 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑲𝒉𝒂𝒏 (𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒅) 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉-𝑳𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒍 𝑯𝒆𝒊𝒓𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔)".
14. 𝑺𝒐 𝒇𝒂𝒓 𝒂𝒔 𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒆𝒂𝒕𝒉 𝒐𝒇 𝑪𝒉𝒐𝒈𝒉𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒂 𝒊𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅, 𝒅𝒆𝒂𝒕𝒉 𝒄𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝑪𝒉𝒐𝒈𝒉𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒂 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒔 𝑬𝒙.𝑷-6, 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒔𝒉𝒐𝒘𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 25.11.1975 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒂 𝒕𝒉𝒐𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒊𝒏𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒓𝒚 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒖𝒕𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓, 𝑶𝒌𝒂𝒓𝒂. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒑𝒐𝒊𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒉𝒆𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒗𝒆. 𝑨𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅𝒍𝒚, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒚 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒅𝒆𝒂𝒕𝒉 𝒐𝒇 𝑪𝒉𝒐𝒈𝒉𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒂 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒔 25.11.1975 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒈𝒐𝒕 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 24.12.1975 𝒃𝒚 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑨𝒌𝒓𝒂𝒎, 𝑪𝒉𝒐𝒘𝒌𝒊𝒅𝒂𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒗𝒊𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒚 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒈𝒐𝒕 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 26.01.1984 𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒆𝒂𝒕𝒉 𝒐𝒏 13.12.1975, 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒂𝒔 𝑬𝒙.𝑷-1, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒄𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍 𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏. 𝑰𝒕 𝒔𝒉𝒐𝒘𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒉𝒆𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒊𝒏𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒓𝒚 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒊𝒏𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒓𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒖𝒕𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓, 𝑶𝒌𝒂𝒓𝒂 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓, 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒊𝒎𝒑𝒖𝒈𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒄𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍 𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏. 𝑰 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒏𝒐𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒏𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒓𝒚 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒄𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒍𝒚 𝒔𝒉𝒐𝒘 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒍𝒚 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒔𝒕 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒗𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒂𝒗𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒔𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒂𝒘.
15. 𝑰𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒘𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒗𝒆, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒔 𝒘𝒆𝒍𝒍 𝒂𝒔 𝒄𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍 𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒔 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 21.06.1997 𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑨𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒕 𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆, 𝑶𝒌𝒂𝒓𝒂 𝒊𝒎𝒑𝒖𝒈𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒔 𝒘𝒆𝒍𝒍 𝒂𝒔 𝒄𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍 𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒔𝒆𝒕 𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒖𝒍𝒕 𝒘𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒃𝒆, 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕-𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇 𝑴𝒔𝒕. 𝑩𝒖𝒅𝒉𝒂𝒊 𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒍 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒄𝒐𝒔𝒕𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒕, 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒊𝒏𝒋𝒖𝒏𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝑮𝒉𝒖𝒍𝒂𝒎 𝑴𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒇𝒂 𝒆𝒕𝒄. 𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒍 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒄𝒐𝒔𝒕𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒕.
𝒁𝑪/𝑩-21/𝑳 𝑶𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒍𝒚.

---𝑶. 𝑿𝑿𝑿𝑽𝑰𝑰, 𝑹𝒓.1 & 2---𝑵𝒆𝒈𝒐𝒕𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝑰𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝑨𝒄𝒕 (𝑿𝑿𝑽𝑰 𝒐𝒇 1881), 𝑺. 118---𝑹𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒚---𝑵𝒆𝒈𝒐𝒕𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 (𝑪𝒉𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆)--

 2018 𝑪 𝑳 𝑫 104

𝑪𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒓𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒅𝒆 (𝑽 𝒐𝒇 1908)---
----𝑶. 𝑿𝑿𝑿𝑽𝑰𝑰, 𝑹𝒓.1 & 2---𝑵𝒆𝒈𝒐𝒕𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝑰𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝑨𝒄𝒕 (𝑿𝑿𝑽𝑰 𝒐𝒇 1881), 𝑺. 118---𝑹𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒚---𝑵𝒆𝒈𝒐𝒕𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 (𝑪𝒉𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆)---𝑷𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒖𝒎𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏---𝑷𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒃𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒉𝒐𝒏𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝑩𝒂𝒏𝒌 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑻𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒂𝒗𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇---𝑷𝒍𝒆𝒂 𝒓𝒂𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒔 𝒂 𝒈𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒆---𝑽𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒚---𝑫𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒔 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒘𝒏 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒅𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒄𝒓𝒐𝒔𝒔-𝒆𝒙𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆 𝒃𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒔𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒆𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒊𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒆---𝑫𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒖𝒕 𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒊𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒆---𝑫𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒈𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒏 𝒃𝒚 𝒉𝒊𝒎 𝒂𝒍𝒕𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒂𝒔 𝒈𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒃𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒌---𝑷𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒐𝒖𝒔 𝒃𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒕𝒘𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅---𝑬𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒏𝒆𝒈𝒐𝒕𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏---𝑨𝒍𝒕𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒖𝒎𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝑺. 118, 𝑵𝒆𝒈𝒐𝒕𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝑰𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝑨𝒄𝒕, 1881, 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒃𝒖𝒕𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒚𝒆𝒕 𝒊𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒃𝒖𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒄𝒐𝒈𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆---𝑵𝒐 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒑𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒚 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒇𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝑻𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒃𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒕 𝒍𝒂𝒘𝒇𝒖𝒍 𝒂𝒖𝒕𝒉𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒐𝒓 𝒃𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒐𝒖𝒔 𝒆𝒙𝒆𝒓𝒄𝒊𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒋𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏---𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒃𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒘 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒃𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒂𝒗𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒐𝒏 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅---𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒄𝒊𝒓𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒔.
𝑴𝒔𝒕. 𝑻𝒂𝒋 𝑩𝒊𝒃𝒊 𝒗. 𝑺𝒚𝒆𝒅 𝑨𝒉𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒉 1989 𝑺𝑪𝑴𝑹 1001 𝒓𝒆𝒇.
𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑨𝒛𝒊𝒛𝒖𝒓 𝑹𝒆𝒉𝒎𝒂𝒏 𝒗. 𝑳𝒊𝒂𝒒𝒂𝒕 𝑨𝒍𝒊 2007 𝑪𝑳𝑫 1605 𝒓𝒆𝒍.
𝑻𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒒 𝒁𝒖𝒍𝒇𝒒𝒂𝒓 𝑨𝒉𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝑪𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒅𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕.
𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒌𝒆𝒆𝒍 𝑱𝒂𝒗𝒆𝒅 𝑪𝒉. 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕.
𝑫𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈: 30𝒕𝒉 𝑴𝒂𝒓𝒄𝒉, 2017.

 2018 𝑪 𝑳 𝑫 104
[𝑳𝒂𝒉𝒐𝒓𝒆 (𝑴𝒖𝒍𝒕𝒂𝒏 𝑩𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒉)]
𝑩𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒉𝒊𝒅 𝑲𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒎 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑴𝒖𝒛𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍 𝑨𝒌𝒉𝒕𝒂𝒓 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒓, 𝑱𝑱
𝑴𝑼𝑯𝑨𝑴𝑴𝑨𝑫 𝑵𝑨𝑾𝑨𝒁---𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕
𝑽𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒖𝒔
𝑸𝑨𝒁𝑰 𝑴𝑼𝑯𝑴𝑴𝑨𝑫 𝑹𝑨𝑺𝑯𝑰𝑫---𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕
𝑹.𝑭.𝑨. 𝑵𝒐. 428 𝒐𝒇 2014, 𝒉𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝒐𝒏 30𝒕𝒉 𝑴𝒂𝒓𝒄𝒉, 2017.


𝑱𝑼𝑫𝑮𝑴𝑬𝑵𝑻

𝑴𝑼𝒁𝑨𝑴𝑰𝑳 𝑨𝑲𝑯𝑻𝑨𝑹 𝑺𝑯𝑨𝑩𝑰𝑹, 𝑱.---𝑻𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒊𝒔 𝒅𝒊𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 04.09.2014 𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑨𝒅𝒅𝒍. 𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒕 𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆, 𝑴𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒔𝒊, 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝑹𝒔.25,50,000/- 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕.
2. 𝑩𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒇 𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒂 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝑹𝒔.25,50,000/- 𝒂𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒃𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆 𝒃𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑵𝒐. 32187815 𝒅𝒓𝒂𝒘𝒏 𝒐𝒏 𝑴𝒖𝒔𝒍𝒊𝒎 𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒎𝒆𝒓𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑩𝒂𝒏𝒌 𝑳𝒊𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒆𝒅, 𝑴𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒔𝒊 𝑩𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒉. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒎 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇/𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒉𝒆 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒅𝒆𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒃𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒑𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒔 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝑸𝒂𝒛𝒊 𝑻𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒔. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒅𝒆𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒕𝒆 𝒔𝒐𝒎𝒆 𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒃𝒐𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒐𝒖𝒔 𝒃𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒂𝒎𝒐𝒏𝒈𝒔𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒎𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒗𝒆𝒔 𝒃𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒉 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒕. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒆𝒙𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒏𝒆𝒆𝒅 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝑹𝒔.3 𝑴𝒊𝒍𝒍𝒊𝒐𝒏. 𝑶𝒏 03.07.2009, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒅𝒗𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒎𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝑹𝒔.25,50,000/- 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒓𝒆𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒅 𝒂 𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒂𝒗𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆 𝒐𝒏 02.12.2009, 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒉𝒐𝒏𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑩𝒂𝒏𝒌 𝒅𝒖𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒖𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒇𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒔. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒈𝒐𝒕 𝒂 𝒄𝒓𝒊𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝑭𝑰𝑹 𝑵𝒐.368/2010, 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒐𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 489-𝑭, 𝑷.𝑷.𝑪 𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒕 𝑷.𝑺. 𝑪𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝑴𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒔𝒊 𝒂𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆-𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒂𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕. 𝑰𝒏 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒆, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅, 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 26.02.2011 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒇𝒖𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒐𝒇 𝒔𝒖𝒓𝒆𝒕𝒚 𝒃𝒐𝒏𝒅. 𝑻𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒏 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒆𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒎𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒉𝒆 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒃𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒌 𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒔 𝒈𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒏𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒃𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒇𝒓𝒂𝒖𝒅𝒖𝒍𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒍𝒚 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒖𝒑 𝒐𝒏𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒂𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕. 𝑨𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒐𝒇 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 04.09.2014 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑨𝒅𝒅𝒍. 𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒕 𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆, 𝑴𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒔𝒊. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒃𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕.
3. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒍 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒓𝒈𝒖𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒅 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒎𝒆𝒎𝒐 𝒔𝒍𝒊𝒑 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒃𝒆𝒔𝒕 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒉𝒆𝒍𝒅. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒐 𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒎𝒆𝒎𝒐. 𝒔𝒍𝒊𝒑 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒐𝒏 10.10.2011, 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒔𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒆 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒏 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒔𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 11.10.2012 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒅 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒐𝒖𝒔 𝒆𝒙𝒆𝒓𝒄𝒊𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒋𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏.
4. 𝑻𝒉𝒆𝒔𝒆 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒓𝒂𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒅𝒖𝒍𝒚 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑨𝒅𝒅𝒍. 𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒕 𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 11.10.2012, 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒅 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒐 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒅 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒆𝒗𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒊𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒘:-
"𝑹𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅 𝒈𝒐𝒆𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒔𝒉𝒐𝒘 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇 𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒓 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒆𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒃𝒚 𝒎𝒚 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒓 𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 10.10.2011 𝒘𝒉𝒐 𝒐𝒃𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒊𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒏𝒆𝒄𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇 𝒕𝒐 𝒈𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒏𝒐𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑺𝑯𝑶 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 76(𝒂) 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑨𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒍𝒆 77 𝒐𝒇 𝑸𝒂𝒏𝒖𝒏-𝒆-𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒉𝒂𝒅𝒂𝒕. 𝑷𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒄𝒓𝒊𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒔𝒖𝒎𝒎𝒐𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑨𝒌𝒉𝒕𝒂𝒓 𝑫𝒐𝒈𝒂𝒓/𝑺𝑯𝑶 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆. 𝑹𝒆𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒆𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑨𝒌𝒉𝒕𝒂𝒓 𝑫𝒐𝒈𝒂𝒓 𝑺𝑰/𝑺𝑯𝑶 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒊𝒆𝒅. 𝑪𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒑𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒄𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒔𝒉𝒐𝒘 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑨𝒌𝒉𝒕𝒂𝒓 𝑫𝒐𝒈𝒂𝒓 𝑰𝒏𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒐𝒓 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒊𝒆𝒅. 𝑴𝒚 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒓 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒐𝒃𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒐𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒆 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆/𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆. 𝑺𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒅𝒐𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒂𝒗𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑺𝑯𝑶 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑨𝒌𝒉𝒕𝒂𝒓 𝑫𝒐𝒈𝒂𝒓 𝒕𝒐 𝒘𝒉𝒐𝒎 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒔𝒆 𝒅𝒐𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒊𝒆𝒅. 𝑰𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒊𝒓𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒔, 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇 𝒊𝒔 𝒍𝒆𝒇𝒕 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒏𝒐 𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒃𝒖𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒐𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒆 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏. 𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒆 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒍𝒂𝒘."
5. 𝑭𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒊𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒄𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 10.10.2011 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒃𝒚 𝒐𝒃𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒔𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒔𝒕 𝒈𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒏𝒐𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑺𝑯𝑶 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝑨𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒍𝒆𝒔 76(𝒂) 𝒂𝒏𝒅 77 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑸𝒂𝒏𝒖𝒏-𝒆-𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒉𝒂𝒅𝒂𝒕 𝑶𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓, 1984. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 10.10.2011 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒚 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒊𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒓𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝑨𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒍𝒆 77. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒆𝒗𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝑨𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒍𝒆𝒔 76 𝒂𝒏𝒅 77 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑸𝒂𝒏𝒖𝒏-𝒆-𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒉𝒂𝒅𝒂𝒕 𝑶𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓, 1984 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒘:
"76. 𝑪𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒐 𝒅𝒐𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒎𝒂𝒚 𝒃𝒆 𝒈𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒏. 𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒚 𝒃𝒆 𝒈𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒙𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆, 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒓 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒂 𝒅𝒐𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒔:
(𝒂) 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒊𝒔 𝒔𝒉𝒐𝒘𝒏 𝒐𝒓 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒓 𝒑𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕 𝒘𝒉𝒐𝒎 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒐𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒔𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒅, 𝒐𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒖𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒄𝒉 𝒐𝒇, 𝒐𝒓 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝒕𝒐, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕; 𝒐𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒚 𝒃𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒆 𝒊𝒕; 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒏 𝒂𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒏𝒐𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒆 𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝑨𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒍𝒆 77, 𝒔𝒖𝒄𝒉 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝒅𝒐𝒆𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒆 𝒊𝒕.
(𝒃) ----------
(𝒄) 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒅𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒚𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒓 𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒕, 𝒐𝒓 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝒐𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒏𝒐𝒕, 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒘𝒏 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒂𝒖𝒍𝒕 𝒐𝒓 𝒏𝒆𝒈𝒍𝒆𝒄𝒕, 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒆 𝒊𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒆.
(𝒅) ----------
(𝒆) ----------
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𝑰𝒏 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒔 (𝒂), (𝒄), (𝒅) 𝒂𝒏𝒅 (𝒆), 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒐𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒃𝒍𝒆.
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77. 𝑹𝒖𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒏𝒐𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒆. 𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒐𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒊𝒏 𝑨𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒍𝒆 76, 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒂𝒑𝒉 (𝒂), 𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒍 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒆 𝒈𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒏 𝒖𝒏𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒐 𝒈𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒄𝒉 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒍𝒚 𝒈𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒏 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝒊𝒏 𝒘𝒉𝒐𝒔𝒆 𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒓 𝒑𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒐𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒊𝒔, 𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒐 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒅𝒗𝒐𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒄𝒉 𝒏𝒐𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒆 𝒊𝒕 𝒂𝒔 𝒊𝒔 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒄𝒓𝒊𝒃𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒍𝒂𝒘; 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒊𝒇 𝒏𝒐 𝒏𝒐𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒆 𝒊𝒔 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒄𝒓𝒊𝒃𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒍𝒂𝒘, 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒏 𝒔𝒖𝒄𝒉 𝒏𝒐𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒆 𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒊𝒓𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆:
𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒔𝒖𝒄𝒉 𝒏𝒐𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒆 𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒍 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒐 𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒔, 𝒐𝒓 𝒊𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒏𝒌𝒔 𝒇𝒊𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒔𝒆 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒊𝒕:
(1) ----------
(2) ----------
(3) ----------
(4) ----------
(5) ----------
(6) 𝑾𝒉𝒆𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒏 𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒐𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒖𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒄𝒉 𝒐𝒇, 𝒐𝒓 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝒕𝒐, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕."
(𝒆𝒎𝒑𝒉𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒔 𝒔𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒅)
6. 𝑭𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒖𝒔𝒂𝒍 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆-𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝑨𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝒊𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒃𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒙𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆, 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒓 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒂 𝒅𝒐𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒎𝒂𝒚 𝒃𝒆 𝒈𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒏, 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒂, 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒏 𝒊𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒖𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒄𝒉 𝒐𝒇 𝒐𝒓 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒐𝒓 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒐𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒅𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒚𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒓 𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒕 𝒐𝒓 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒏 𝒂 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝒔𝒆𝒆𝒌𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒐 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒄𝒉 𝒅𝒐𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒘𝒏 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒂𝒖𝒍𝒕 𝒐𝒓 𝒏𝒆𝒈𝒍𝒆𝒄𝒕, 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒆 𝒊𝒕.
7. 𝑾𝒉𝒆𝒏 𝒊𝒏 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕, 𝒊𝒕 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒑𝒊𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑺𝑯𝑶 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒅𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒉𝒆 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒄𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆 𝒂𝒍𝒐𝒏𝒈 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒓𝒆𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕/𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒆𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆, 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒊𝒏 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆. 𝑻𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒔𝒖𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒆 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒐𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒂𝒗𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒅𝒖𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒄𝒊𝒓𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒚𝒐𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕. 𝑩𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒊𝒓𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒔 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒄𝒓𝒊𝒃𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒖𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒊𝒎𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒕𝒐 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒅𝒐𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒓𝒈𝒆𝒅, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒘𝒆𝒍𝒍 𝒊𝒏 𝒊𝒕𝒔 𝒋𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔. 𝑰𝒏 𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒐𝒑𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒅 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒔𝒖𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒍𝒚 𝒆𝒙𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒋𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒆𝒅, 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒃𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒆𝒙𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒓𝒂𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒍 𝒋𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒔𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒍𝒂𝒘 𝒉𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆𝒅. 𝑩𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒔, 𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒋𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒊𝒔 𝒆𝒙𝒆𝒓𝒄𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒆 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒖𝒏𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝒂 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒄𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒋𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒆 𝒊𝒔 𝒎𝒂𝒅𝒆 𝒐𝒖𝒕. 𝑹𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒚 𝒃𝒆 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒄𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝑴𝒔𝒕. 𝑻𝒂𝒋 𝑩𝒊𝒃𝒊 𝒗. 𝑺𝒚𝒆𝒅 𝑨𝒉𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒉 (1989 𝑺𝑪𝑴 𝑹 1001), 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒊𝒏 𝒊𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒉𝒆𝒍𝒅 𝒂𝒔 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓:
"𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒈𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒏, 𝒂𝒏 𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒊𝒔𝒉𝒆𝒅 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒑𝒍𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒂𝒘 𝒘𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒃𝒆 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅, 𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒆𝒍𝒚, 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒖𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒈𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒔 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒐𝒓 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒎𝒂𝒅𝒆 𝒐𝒖𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒊𝒔 𝒂 𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒍𝒚 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒊𝒔 𝒕𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒎𝒖𝒄𝒉 𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒕𝒔 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏. 𝑰𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒉𝒆𝒍𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒍𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒑𝒐𝒊𝒏𝒕 𝒔𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒆 𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍, 𝒆𝒙𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒂 𝒄𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒄𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒋𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒆. 𝑾𝒆 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒔𝒇𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒍𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 𝒔𝒖𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒈𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒊𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒏 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒕𝒐 𝒖𝒑𝒔𝒆𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒔𝒐 𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒆𝒙𝒄𝒍𝒖𝒅𝒆 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒆𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒖𝒑𝒐𝒏 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑻𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕."
(𝒆𝒎𝒑𝒉𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒔 𝒔𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒅)
8. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒍 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒖𝒕𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆, 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒊𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒃𝒆𝒔𝒕 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒇𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒃𝒆𝒔𝒕 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆, 𝒂𝒅𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒖𝒎𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒅𝒓𝒂𝒘𝒏 𝒂𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕/𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝑨𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒍𝒆 129, 𝒊𝒍𝒍𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 (𝒆) 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑸𝒂𝒏𝒖𝒏-𝒆-𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒉𝒂𝒅𝒂𝒕 𝑶𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓, 1984 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒍𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅. 𝑻𝒐 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒐𝒍𝒗𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒈𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒅 𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒚 𝒃𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒅𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝑨𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒍𝒆 75 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑸𝒂𝒏𝒖𝒏-𝒆-𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒉𝒂𝒅𝒂𝒕 𝑶𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓, 1984, 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒔 𝒂𝒔 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓:
"75. 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒐𝒇 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒐𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒃𝒚 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆. 𝑫𝒐𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒎𝒖𝒔𝒕 𝒃𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒆𝒙𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒔 𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒅."
𝑻𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝑨𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒍𝒆 75 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒅𝒐𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒎𝒖𝒔𝒕 𝒃𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆, 𝒊𝒕 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒔 𝒆𝒙𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒔 𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝑨𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒍𝒆 76 𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒓𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝑨𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒍𝒆 77 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑸𝒂𝒏𝒖𝒏-𝒆-𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒉𝒂𝒅𝒂𝒕 𝑶𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓, 1984. 𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒏 𝒆𝒙𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒐 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒐𝒇 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒐𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒊.𝒆. 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒃𝒆𝒔𝒕 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒂𝒗𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆. 𝑩𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒔 𝑨𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒍𝒆 76 𝒊𝒔 𝒂 𝑷𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒑𝒍𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒂𝒘 𝒐𝒇 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑨𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒍𝒆 129, 𝒊𝒍𝒍𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 (𝒆) 𝒎𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒚 𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒂 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒖𝒎𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏, 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒏 𝒊𝒏 𝑨𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒍𝒆 76 𝒘𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒂𝒊𝒍 𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒃𝒆𝒔𝒕 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒄𝒓𝒊𝒃𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆-𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒍𝒍𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏.
9. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒏𝒆𝒙𝒕 𝒐𝒃𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒓𝒂𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒘𝒓𝒐𝒏𝒈 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕 𝒏𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒔 3380-4 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕 𝒏𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓 𝒊𝒔 3480-4. 𝑻𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒃𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒎𝒂𝒅𝒆 𝒐𝒖𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅 𝒂𝒔 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒖𝒔𝒂𝒍 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒘𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒏 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒊𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒔𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒉𝒆 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒉𝒆 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒃𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒌 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒔 𝒈𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒆. 𝑯𝒆 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆 𝒅𝒊𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒐 𝒉𝒊𝒎 𝒐𝒓 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒔𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒉𝒊𝒎, 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒎 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒃𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒌 𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒇𝒓𝒂𝒖𝒅𝒖𝒍𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒍𝒚 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕, 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆, 𝒃𝒚 𝒎𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒚 𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒘𝒓𝒐𝒏𝒈 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐. 𝒊.𝒆., 3380-4 𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒂𝒅 𝒐𝒇 3480-4 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕, 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒏𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒘𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒏 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕, 𝒘𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒇𝒊𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕.
10. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇/𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒆𝒅 𝒑𝒉𝒐𝒕𝒐𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕 𝒄𝒐𝒑𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒊𝒔 𝒆𝒙𝒉𝒊𝒃𝒊𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒔 𝑬𝒙𝒉.𝑷-1 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒎𝒆𝒎𝒐 𝒔𝒍𝒊𝒑 𝒂𝒔 𝑬𝒙𝒉.𝑷-2. 𝑩𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒂𝒔 𝑷𝑾-1 𝒊𝒏 𝒔𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒎 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑰𝒒𝒃𝒂𝒍 𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝑷𝒆𝒆𝒓 𝑩𝒂𝒌𝒉𝒔𝒉 (𝑷𝑾-2) 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒁𝒖𝒍𝒇𝒊𝒒𝒂𝒓 𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝑯𝒂𝒋𝒊 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝒀𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒂𝒇 (𝑷𝑾-3) 𝒃𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒘𝒉𝒐𝒎 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒎𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒑𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕, 𝒘𝒉𝒐 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆. 𝑩𝒐𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒔𝒆 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒔 𝒔𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒎 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒃𝒚 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒕𝒂𝒌𝒆𝒏 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒄𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆. 𝑻𝒉𝒆𝒚 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒄𝒓𝒐𝒔𝒔-𝒆𝒙𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒃𝒖𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒚 𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒐𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒆𝒙𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏-𝒊𝒏-𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒆𝒇. 𝑰𝒓𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝑨𝒉𝒎𝒂𝒅, 𝑴𝒂𝒏𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒓, 𝑴𝑪𝑩 𝑩𝒂𝒏𝒌 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒔 𝑷𝑾-4 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒈𝒐𝒕 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆 𝑬𝒙𝒉.-𝑷1 𝒅𝒓𝒂𝒘𝒏 𝒐𝒏 𝑨/𝒄 𝑵𝒐. 3480-4, 𝒃𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒆𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕, 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝑸𝒂𝒛𝒊 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑹𝒂𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒅, 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒊𝒕𝒔 𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒉𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒉𝒐𝒏𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒆𝒄𝒂𝒖𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒖𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒃𝒂𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆. 𝑯𝒆 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒐𝒓𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆 𝒆𝒙𝒉𝒊𝒃𝒊𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒔 𝑬𝒙𝒉.𝑷-1 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒎𝒆𝒎𝒐 𝒐𝒇 𝒔𝒍𝒊𝒑 𝒂𝒔 𝑬𝒙𝒉.𝑷-2 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒆𝒎𝒐 𝒐𝒇 𝒔𝒍𝒊𝒑 𝒃𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒔𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒆𝒔 𝒂𝒔 𝑬𝒙𝒉.𝑷2/1. 𝑯𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒄𝒓𝒐𝒔𝒔-𝒆𝒙𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒖𝒕 𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆.
11. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒔 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒘𝒏 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝒂𝒔 𝑫𝑾-1. 𝑰𝒏 𝒄𝒓𝒐𝒔𝒔-𝒆𝒙𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒉𝒆 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆 𝒃𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒔𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒆𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒊𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒆. 𝑯𝒆 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒊𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒆. 𝑯𝒆 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒈𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒏 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒍𝒕𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒂𝒔 𝒈𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒃𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒌. 𝑷𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒐𝒖𝒔 𝒃𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒕𝒘𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅. 𝑬𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒏𝒆𝒈𝒐𝒕𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏. 𝑨𝒍𝒕𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒖𝒎𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 118 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑵𝒆𝒈𝒐𝒕𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝑰𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝑨𝒄𝒕, 1881 𝒊𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒃𝒖𝒕𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆, 𝒊𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒃𝒖𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒄𝒐𝒈𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒇𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒔𝒖𝒄𝒉 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒐𝒏𝒍𝒚 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒃𝒖𝒕 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒔 𝒂𝒔 𝑷𝑾-2 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑷𝑾-3 𝒊𝒏 𝒘𝒉𝒐𝒔𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒚𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒎𝒂𝒅𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕. 𝑭𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒐𝒓𝒆, 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒔𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑩𝒂𝒏𝒌 𝑴𝒂𝒏𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒓 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅. 𝑻𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒇. 𝑹𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒚 𝒃𝒆 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒄𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑨𝒛𝒊𝒛𝒖𝒓 𝑹𝒆𝒉𝒎𝒂𝒏 𝒗. 𝑳𝒊𝒂𝒒𝒂𝒕 𝑨𝒍𝒊 (2007 𝑪𝑳𝑫 1605) 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒊𝒏 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑺𝒖𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒉𝒆𝒍𝒅 𝒂𝒔 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓:
"𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒙𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒓𝒚 𝒏𝒐𝒕𝒆 𝒐𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒆𝒊𝒑𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒘𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒏 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒃𝒖𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒓𝒐𝒔𝒔-𝒆𝒙𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐 𝒏𝒐𝒕𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒆𝒊𝒑𝒕 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒆𝒙𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒉𝒊𝒎 𝒂𝒔 𝒂 𝒈𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒃𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕. 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒐 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 118 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑨𝒄𝒕, 𝒖𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒍 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒊𝒔 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒅, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒖𝒎𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒍 𝒃𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒅𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒏𝒆𝒈𝒐𝒕𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒎𝒂𝒅𝒆 𝒐𝒓 𝒅𝒓𝒂𝒘𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒊𝒔𝒉 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒈𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒓𝒚 𝒏𝒐𝒕𝒆 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒆𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒃𝒚 𝒉𝒊𝒎."
12. 𝑵𝒐 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒑𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒚 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒅 𝒐𝒖𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒃𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒘 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒃𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒕 𝒍𝒂𝒘𝒇𝒖𝒍 𝒂𝒖𝒕𝒉𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒐𝒓 𝒃𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒐𝒖𝒔 𝒆𝒙𝒆𝒓𝒄𝒊𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒋𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒃𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒘 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒃𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒂𝒗𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅, 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒖𝒍𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒍𝒚, 𝒘𝒆 𝒖𝒑𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒆. 𝑻𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒃𝒆𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒎𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝒊𝒔 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅.
𝑴𝑯/𝑴-133/𝑳 𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅.

-Suit for declaration and injunction---Oral Gift ---Proof---Suit was filed by respondent/ plaintiff assailed mutation of Gift made in favour of petitioners/ defendants on the plea of fraud--

 2022 CLC 433

Ss.2 & 54---Punjab Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967), S.42---Punjab Land Revenue Rules, 1968, R.34---Suit for declaration and injunction---Oral Gift ---Proof---Suit was filed by respondent/ plaintiff assailed mutation of Gift made in favour of petitioners/ defendants on the plea of fraud---Trial Court dismissed the suit filed but Lower Appellate Court decreed the same against petitioners/ defendants---Validity---Roznamcha Waqiati was the first document wherein fact of acquiring any right and ownership in immovable property through any mode, including of Gift , was ought to be recorded as per statutory command of S.42 of Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967 and R.34 of Punjab Land Revenue Rules, 1968---If any person had acquired ownership through Gift in land of an estate, then that person was required to prove that his / her claim was duly brought before Patwari to be recorded in Roznamcha for subsequent entry of mutation and sanctioning thereof and then its ultimate incorporation in Periodical Records of such estate, failure would jeopardize his/ her claim and would make it non est---Petitioners/ defendants did not plead with particulars relating to performance of Gift in their written statement which was sine qua non and silence of record about performance of three essential ingredients of Gift besides omission of its date, time and place, had made the transaction non est---Missing of all such essential ingredients from written statement along with date, time and place of performance was enough to annul transaction/ mutation---No party to lis could be allowed to lead evidence beyond pleadings nor could it be read in evidence---No such evidence was produced by petitioners/ defendants to prove that essential ingredients for a valid Gift were performed/ fulfilled---High Court declined to interfere in judgment and decree passed by Lower Appellate Court as neither any illegality nor irregularity was committed even findings were also not perverse and were recorded in conformity with law as well as evidence available on record
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